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‘The Global Encyclopaedia of Informality represents the beginning of a new era in 
informality studies. With its wealth of information, diversity, scope, theoretical 
innovation and artistic skill, this collection touches on all the aspects of social and 
cultural complexity that need to be integrated into policy thinking.’
Predrag Cvetičanin, Centre for Empirical Cultural 
Studies of South-East Europe, Belgrade, Serbia
‘This is a monumental achievement – an indispensable reference for anyone in the 
social sciences interested in informality.’
Martin Holbraad, Professor of Social Anthropology, UCL, and 
editor-in-chief of Social Analysis 
‘This impressive work helps us understand our complex times by showing how 
power develops through informal practices, mobilizing emotional, cognitive 
and relational mechanisms in strategies of survival, but also of camouflage and 
governance.’
Donatella della Porta, Director of Centre of Social Movements Studies, 
Scuola normale superiore, Firenze, Italy
‘An impressive, informative, and intriguing collection. With evident passion and 
patience, the team of 250 researchers insightfully portrays the multiplicity of 
informal and often invisible expressions of human interdependence.’
Subi Rangan, Professor of Strategy and Management, 
INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France
‘This compendium of terms used in different cultures to express aspects of infor-
mal economy provides a unique supplement to studies of a major (yet understated 
by academic economics) social issue. It will be of key significance for in-depth 
teaching of sociology, economics and history.’
Teodor Shanin, OBE Professor and President of the 
Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences
‘Modern states have sought to curb, control and subdue informality. The entries 
in the Global Encyclopaedia demonstrate the endurance of informality over 
such efforts. More recently, the rise and political success of anti-establishment 
movements in so many parts of the world is a wide-ranging challenge and de-
legitimisation of national and transnational formal institutions of governance. 
Understanding the perceived shortcomings of formal institutions and the appeal 
of anti-establishment movements must at least in part be informed by a study of 
informality and its networks. This Encyclopaedia is essential reading if we wish to 
understand and engage with these challenges of our age.’ 
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This book invites you on a voyage of discovery, to explore society’s open 
secrets, to comprehend unwritten rules and to uncover informal prac-
tices. Broadly defined as ‘ways of getting things done’, these informal yet 
powerful practices tend to escape articulation in official discourse. We 
have identified unique research into such practices across area and across 
discipline, which charts the grey zones and blurred boundaries, and dis-
tinguished types of ambivalence and contexts of complexity. Our Global 
Informality Project database is searchable by region, keyword or type of 
practice. Do explore what works and how, where and why!
The informal practices revealed in this book include emotion- 
driven exchanges (from gifts or favours to tribute for services), values- 
based practices of solidarity and belonging enacting multiple identities, 
interest- driven know- how (from informal welfare to informal employ-
ment and entrepreneurship, often not seen or appreciated as expertise), 
and power- driven forms of co- optation and control. The paradox  – or 
not  – of the invisibility of these informal practices is their ubiquity. 
Expertly practised by insiders but often hidden from outsiders, informal 
practices are, as this book shows, deeply rooted all over the world.
Fostering informal ties with ‘godfathers’ in Montenegro, ‘dear 
brothers’ in Finland and ‘little cousins’ in Switzerland – known locally 
as kumstvo, Hyvä veli, and Vetterliwirtschaft – as well as Klungel (soli-
darity) in Cologne, Germany, compadrazgo (reciprocity) in Chile, or 
blat (networks of favours) in Russia, can make a world of difference to 
your well- being. Yet just like family relations, social ties not only enable 
but also limit individual decisions, behaviour and rights, as is revealed 
in the entries on janteloven (aversion to individuality) in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, or krugovaia poruka (joint responsibility) in 
Russia and Europe.
The Global Informality Project (GIP) assembles pioneering research 
into the grey areas of informality, known yet unarticulated, enabling yet 
constraining, moral to ‘us’ yet immoral to ‘them’, divisive and hard to 


























discourse, these practices are deeply woven into the fabric of society and 
are as pervasive as the usage of the terms, or language games, associated 
with them: pulling strings in the UK, red envelopes in China, pot du vin 
in France, l’argent du carburant paid to customs officials in sub- Saharan 
Africa, coffee money (duit kopi) paid to traffic policemen in Malaysia, and 
many others (Blundo, Olivier de Sardan, 2007: 132). While they may be 
taken for granted and familiar, such practices can also be uncomfortable 
to discuss and difficult to study.
Entries from all five continents presented in these volumes are sam-
ples of the truly global and ever- growing collection online (www.infor-
mality.com). Practices are captured in the language of participants, local 
jargons that we interpret as ‘language games’, shared, understood and 
played, to follow Ludwig Wittgenstein’s take on practices. Based on ver-
nacular knowledge and assembled locally, our global collection of case 
studies allows us to view practices in a comparative context, without 
diminishing their diversity.
A unique feature of this book is that it includes material that previ-
ously has not been seen together. Each entry in this collection, describing 
the nitty- gritty of getting things done in a specific context, is fascinat-
ing in its own right. However, when these practices are clustered into a 
wider ‘family’ and looked at as constellations, new patterns of regular-
ity emerge. Such patterns, shared by some entries but lacking in others, 
tie entries together in a way that is best grasped by the notion of ‘family 
likeness’ or ‘family resemblance’ originally enunciated by Wittgenstein 
(1969: 75, 118). Hereby we discover a complicated network of simi-
larities and rela tionships, overlapping and criss- crossing (Wittgenstein 
1969: 75, 118, sections 66– 7). In such conceptualisation of family resem-
blance, its ambivalent nature – being similar and yet different, whereby 
similarities ‘crop up and disappear’ – is central (Wittgenstein 1953). Our 
dataset of practices, in all its richness and complexity, enables us to iden-
tify such ‘differing similarities’ in the four modes of human interaction – 
re- distribution, solidarity, market and domination – and to establish pat-
terns of ambivalence in the workings of doublethink, double standards, 
double deed and double incentives.
This encyclopaedia is a path- breaking collection of informal prac-
tices that reveals a number of discoveries:
• The bottom- up comparative analysis of practices from all over the 
world questions common assumptions on informality and reframes 


















• The book highlights the role of ambivalence and complexity in 
the workings of human societies. Neither hidden nor fully artic-
ulated, neither particular nor universal, the patterns of ambiva-
lence – substantive, normative, functional or motivational – prove 
essential for our understanding of fringes, grey zones and blurred 
boundaries, which are themselves central for the world to go 
round.
• It opens up new policy dimensions regarding such issues as corrup-
tion, social capital, trust, risk, mobility and migration, consump-
tion, shortages, barter, survival strategies, resistance capacity, 
alternative currencies, informal economies, remittance economies, 
labour markets, entrepreneurship and democracy.
• It illustrates the potential of ‘network expertise’, that is, cross- 
disciplinary and cross- area inquiry enabled by the network of 
researchers. Where the disciplinary methods tend to focus select-
ively on political, economic, or social aspects, the ‘networked’ 
perspective provides insights into the complexity of the forces 
at play.
• Although informal patterns, identified in these volumes, do not 
admit to quantitative analysis as readily as other phenomena, they 
have potential to become an explanatory tool for understanding 
social and cultural complexity and a basis for crowdsourcing in fur-
ther data collection.
Pavel Filonov’s Formula of Spring (on the cover) is an inspiration for 
these volumes. It tackles the paradox of the abstract and the  natural, it 
formularises what is impossible to formalise, and it visualises the invisible, 
hidden or taken- for- granted. Filonov’s personal story points to the import-
ance of formal constraints for generating unintended consequence: his 
‘anatomic’ artistic style was driven by his repeated failure to pass anatomy 
at art school and his unique, after years of study, knowledge of the subject. 
Filonov’s canvas is the best proxy to the social and cultural  complexity we 
aim to capture.
What is achieved in these volumes has been possible thanks to a 
remarkable collaboration of scholars across disciplines and area studies: 
sociologists, anthropologists, economists, historians and political scien-
tists. Without their combined scholarly commitment, the ambition to 
portray at least a fragment of the world’s social and cultural complexity 
would never have materialised. The majority of entries are based on orig-
inal ethnographic research and materials collected through fieldwork 















journalism and media research through computer- aided technologies 
and human- assisted analysis. Collectively, it has taken the authors of 
these volumes more than a thousand years of research to build up this 
‘informal view of the world’, itself only a beginning to our understanding 
of the ambivalent patterns of social and cultural complexity, and only a 
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How to use this book
The collection is organised in two volumes, four parts and eight chapters. 
You can start reading this book anywhere, but we suggest starting from 
the end – the glossary – where you will find brief descriptions of the prac-
tices included in the volumes in alphabetical order. 
The table of contents guides you through over 200 authored entries 
from 5 continents and 66 countries and indicates the way in which they 
are clustered together. If you recognise the name of the practice or are 
interested in a particular country, you can go straight to the relevant 
entry and follow the cross- references from there.
Outsiders rarely know or recognise a local practice by its  colloquial 
name. To overcome this problem, we have clustered practices by ‘family 
resemblance’, supplied illustrations where possible, and briefly explained 
practices in the glossary. To ensure the flow of argument from one entry to 
another in each cluster, we have placed similar entries next to each other 
so that they feed into each other, add specific detail, but also develop the 
general themes of ambivalence and complexity. We  intentionally have 
not organised material by historical periods, geographical locations or 
analytical concepts, in order to follow the ‘practical sense’ of informality 
in clustering the entries (Bourdieu 1980/ 1990). Where possible, entries 
flow in the bottom- up logic in the chapters, thereby tracing the blurred 
boundaries and grey zones:
• from more socially acceptable practices to more questionable;
• from practices driven by survival to practices driven by 
self- expression;
• from daily or regular to once- in- a- lifetime needs and the needs of 
others (brokerage);
• from more visible practices to less visible (or deliberately made vis-
ible or invisible);
• from more traditional/ universal to more modern/ temporal prac-













xvHow To uSE THiS Book
xv
Finally, each cluster of entries is introduced and concluded by a piece with 
comparative or conceptual entries, indicated as ‘general’. For example, 
Chapter 6 on gaming the system benefits from an introduction to the strat-
egies of camouflage (by Philip Hanson); general entries identifying pat-
terns common for the cluster such as cash- in- hand (by Colin Williams), 
brokerage (by David Jancsics), window dressing (by David Leung), and 
pyramid schemes (by Leonie Schiffauer); as well as a conclusion with meth-
odological implications for the study of part- time crime and ‘camouflaged’ 
activities (by Gerald Mars). The authors of conceptual or reflective pieces 
offer possible perspectives, thematic links and further research questions 
in order to help the reader with the uneasy tasks of comparing the incom-
parable and theorising the practice. Such entries themselves constitute a 
‘network expertise’ – a coordinated conceptual framework – aimed at tack-
ling complexity through mastering paradoxes; articulating the unspoken 
and visualising the invisible; finding patterns in the amorphous and for-
malising the informal; finding similarities in differences and differences in 
similarities; comparing the incomparable and doing the undoable.
Please note, we do not claim the absolute ubiquity of practices in 
respective societies. Following Olivier de Sardan’s take on culture, we 
understand social and cultural complexity as ‘a set of practices and rep-
resentations that investigation has shown to be shared to a significant 
degree by a given group (or sub- group), in given fields and in given con-
texts’ (Olivier de Sardan 2015: 84).
Individual entries in this Encyclopaedia present empirical material 
that:
• makes the ‘informal order’ more visible through ethnography and 
examples;
• refers to the key themes of ambivalence and complexity explored 
in the volume;
• weaves into a critical discussion of concepts devised for tackling 
such practices (such as clan, patronage, nepotism, informal net-
works or informal institutions);
• illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of discipline- based analysis;
• points to existing research and new research questions;
• suggests cross- references to parallel practices in other parts of 
the world.
Bibliography for How to use this book
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Introduction: the informal view of the 
world – key challenges and main  





Informality, to paraphrase Friedrich Nietzsche, is a term that has history 
rather than a definition. Given the cross- discipline and cross- area nature 
of the Global Informality Project, it would probably be difficult to agree 
on a definition of informality acceptable to all. Therefore, we use the 
word as an umbrella term for a variety of social and cultural phenomena 
that are too complex to be grasped in a single definition. In broad terms, 
we refer to the world’s open secrets, unwritten rules and hidden practices 
assembled in this project as ‘ways of getting things done’. Informal prac-
tices may escape articulation in official discourse, but they capture the 
‘know- how’ of what works in their vernacular representations.
Intuitively, there are several connotations of informality. It can 
mean relationships that are not formalised or that take place outside for-
mal contexts; it can mean relaxed or casual manners in the absence of 
protocol; it can also stand for natural, or local, ways of getting things done 
that precede formalisation or resist articulation in dominant discourses. 
In the academic literature, ‘informality’ can be associated with pre- mod-
ern societies or local knowledge, but most commonly the term is used 
to describe practices that emerge unofficially (such as favelas, slums and 
other unplanned settlements) or underground, constitute grey areas and 
form a variety of shadow, second or covert economies. Pioneered by Keith 
Hart (1973), the typology of informal activities in Africa has reframed 
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in his introduction to Part III, a 1972 International Labour Organisation 
report opened half a century of debates on the informal sector and set a 
number of tendencies in motion. Conceptualisation of self- and multiple- 
employment and casual labour in the so- called Third World cities opened 
up ‘informality’ for measurement and aid, and so ‘informal economy stud-
ies’ were born. Studies of the informal sector in the ‘Third World’ have 
created interest in the informal sector in ‘First World’ countries such as 
Britain: cheats at work, dock pilferage, fiddling and other forms of part- 
time crime and occupational deviance (Mars 1974, 1982; Ditton 1977). 
The concept of the informal sector has also been explored in the context of 
the ‘Second World’: second economy in Soviet Georgia (Mars and Altman 
1983), varying degrees of legality of ‘coloured markets’ in the Soviet 
Union (Katsenelinboigen 1977), the ‘informal sector’ in Eastern Europe 
(Sampson 1985). These and many more were included in an impressive 
bibliography on the ‘second economy’ of the USSR and Eastern Europe 
(Grossman 1985/ 1992). Since then, the view of the informal sector in 
developing countries has evolved. On the basis of recent evidence – eco-
nomic, sociological and anthropological – from Latin American countries, 
one can see it as an unregulated micro- entrepreneurial sector and not as a 
disadvantaged residual of the formal sector (Maloney 2004).
In the 1990s, the informal economy became a theme of transition 
and reform of transitioning societies. Subversive but also supportive 
roles of informal practices in post- communist transformations are well 
documented. Informality became associated with practices that not only 
coexist but also penetrate, divert and exploit formal institutions, concep-
tualised as types of interaction between formal and informal institutions 
in economics (Greif 1994; Ensminger 1997; Williamson 2000; Teubner 
2001; Nee 2003; Roland 2004; Aligicia 2006; Boettke et al. 2008; Easterly 
2008; North 2008; Nye 2008; Pejovich 2008; Williamson 2009; Tabellini 
2010) and political science (Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004).
More recently, the claim of the unregulated nature of the infor-
mal sector has been contested by scholars of urban informality (Roy and 
AlSayyad 2004; Roy 2009, 2011). They emphasise the complexity of the 
formal/ informal interaction, the role of the state in creating constraints 
that shape informal activities, and the grey zones associated with prop-
erty formalisation, gender and the connivance of states in reproducing 
informality (Varley 2007, 2010). The notion of ‘grey zones’ becomes 
increasingly influential within post- colonial and post- socialist stud-
ies, and is associated with in- betweenness, liminality, marginality and 
ambiguity (Thomassen 2014, 2015; Knudsen and Frederiksen 2015). 






















Palestinian refugee camps and urban surroundings, Lorenzo Navone 
and Federico Rahola point to the emergence of the continuum, whereby 
camps and cities overlap with one another: ‘while the camps are incor-
porated into irregular urban growth, the cities are affected by the infor-
mality of the camps’ (see mukhayyam, 5.7 Volume 2). Given the scale, 
visibility and materiality of urban informality, the field of urban devel-
opment and planning is, perhaps, in the lead as regards ideas for policy 
(Dupont et al. 2017; Sigha and Amoros forthcoming).
In sociological literature, informality is conceptualised as the oppos-
ite of formality, following Erving Goffman’s conception of ‘role distance’ 
and frontstage/ backstage dichotomy. In the frontstage, actors ought to 
perform according to their scripts; in the backstage, they can relax and 
use backstage language. Barbara Misztal distinguishes formal modes of 
interaction from the informal as ideal types depicted in Table 0.1, whereas 
a particular balance between formality and informality is contextual and 
defined by the three styles (realms) of social interaction: civility (encoun-
ters), sociability (exchange) and intimacy (pure relationship) (2000: 71).
Historians are likely to view informality as preceding formality, 
whereby the processes of modernisation are associated with formalisation 
and order, and with the development of formal institutions. Social and pol-
itical theorists consider formal institutions as bodies determining the life 
of modern societies (Coleman 1988) and colonising the everyday worlds 
(life- worlds) of individuals (Habermas 1981 cited in Thompson 1983).
In their 2012 volume, Thomas Christiansen and Christine Neuhold 
have assembled a global collection of work on informal governance, 
understood in the vein of Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky’s con-
ception of informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwrit-
ten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside officially 
sanctioned channels’ (2004: 727). They note that various authors attach 
the adjective ‘informal’ to politics, arrangements, networks, institu-
tions, organisations, norms, rules, activity or influence. Christiansen 
and Neuhold identify at least three separate usages of informality by the 
Table 0.1 Ideal types of (in)formality and their associations
Informality Formality
Face- to- face, intimate relationship
Personal modes of social control
Reliant on tacit knowledge
Private
Communal
Impersonal, transparent and explicit
Social distance and structures of power
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contributors (Christiansen and Neuhold 2012). First, the designation 
of the framework within which decisions are taken as being informal 
(institutions, organisations, networks); second, the identification of the 
process or procedure through which policies are made as being informal 
(politics, arrangements, activity); and, third, the classification of the out-
come of any such process as being informal (rules, norms, influence). 
The organisation of this global collection is by world region. In fact, most 
empirical research into informality is area- specific and reproduces the 
existing geographical divides: volumes on Central and Eastern Europe 
or Russia (Gold et al. 2002; Morris and Polese 2013); comparative stud-
ies of informal economies and social capital (Pichler and Wallace 2007); 
low/ high trust societies (Fukuyama 1995) and low/ high context cultures 
(Gudykunst 1983).
This book follows a different logic. Rather than reaffirming area- 
studies divisions, we shift focus to local practices from all over the globe 
and bring them together. Finding similarities in differences and dif-
ferences in similarities challenges our assumptions of the centrality of 
formal institutions for shaping informal practices and highlights the 
embeddedness of informal practices in grey zones and blurred bound-
aries, associated with a universally human capacity for doublethink, 
double standard, double deed and double incentive. The focus on under-
standing social and cultural complexity, rather than downplaying it for 
the purposes of comparison, brings many reductionist assumptions on 
informality into question: its residual status vis- à- vis formality and legal 
norms, its association with periphery rather than centre, underdevel-
opment, poverty and inequality. As many entries in this encyclopaedia 
emphasise, informality is central to local culture and community life in 
the form of giving and sharing, which is not necessarily related to poverty 
and inequality. The Italian practice caffè sospeso eliminates the identity of 
the donor of a free cup, left for a local recipient, thus creating a long reci-
procity cycle, whereby coffee falls down ‘from the clouds’, not from the 
donor’s hands (see caffè sospeso, 5.11 Volume 2).
One might strive to arrive at an orderly view of informality. But 
informality is disorderly in nature, and its practical role in resolving 
tensions between authorised and unauthorised, regulated and unregu-
lated activities suggests multiple hypotheses to test. To collect data and 
to understand evidence, one has to embrace the idea of complexity. 
Consider, for example, the principle of equal representation of Tanzania’s 
120 ethnicities in the context of rotating government appointments  – 
where the legal norm does not allow for a practical solution, informal 























Formal constraints limit but also enable informal ways of cir-
cumventing them. For example, an economy of shortage generated an 
economy of favours, whereby blat represented an indispensable set of 
practices that enabled the Soviet system to function, made it tolerable, 
yet also subverted it. Blat was intrinsically ambivalent: it both served the 
regime and the people, while simultaneously undermining the regime 
and corrupting the people. According to this ambivalent logic, formal 
constraints are crucial for the workings of informality. But the reverse 
is also true. The formal order is enacted and exercised on the basis of 
meta- rules of applying formal rules, the non- codified ‘know- how’ of how 
to follow, implement, enforce or bend a rule. Thus, formal institutions 
would not work without informal relationships supporting them and 
making things happen by the book or by the declared principles. This is 
not to say that formality is a myth, or the biggest case of camouflage, but 
to suggest that formality can only be enacted in practice in conjunction 
with informality, both played as appropriate in a given context, seeming 
opposite but interconnected and interdependent. Like yin and yang in the 
natural world, the ways of getting things done in practice are shaped by 
both formal and informal constraints. Informality is central for maintain-
ing order. Jan Kubik and Scott Radnitz in their conceptual entries point 
out that informality is not only a ‘weapon of the weak’ but is also central 
to the workings of political and economic systems by creating incentives 
to conform and comply with the existing rules (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Informal ties are precious and conducive to both fluidity and resistance. 
Formalising everything is a mistaken antidote. In other words, formality 
does not always play the hand of those it is meant to defend or represent, 
whereas informality is not always subversive. One can thus think of blat 
as a factor of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also as a factor of sup-
porting the Soviet experiment that would not have lasted so long with-
out the back- up of blat and tolkachi. Our purpose here is to question the 
relevance of this dichotomy, and of our assumptions, on both formality 
and informality, from the bottom- up perspective. So we will present our 
dataset and let the reader conclude on the role and place of informality 
in contemporary societies.
Finding patterns in the amorphous
Creating a catalogue of informal practices around the globe raised the 
question of how to organise this fascinating material. In the preface to 
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This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laugh-
ter that shattered, as I  read the passage, [which] quotes a ‘cer-
tain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it is written that ‘animals 
are divided into:  (a)  belonging to the Emperor, (b)  embalmed, 
(c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, 
(h)  included in the present classification, (i)  frenzied, (j)  innu-
merable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera, 
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way 
off ‘look like flies’.
Organising material turned out to be no laughing matter in this pro-
ject. Assembled on the basis of an open- call, bottom- up approach, the 
dataset of entries was originally planned to be organised alphabetically. 
But once a critical mass of entries had arrived, it became possible to clus-
ter them and identify some underlying patterns. Some clusters emerged 
from similarities – a lot can be learnt from the comparative analysis of 
similar practices that have different names in different cultures, such as 
blat, guanxi, jeitinho, sociolismo, compadrazgo, pituto, štela, vrzki and 
vruzki standing for exchanges of favours in Chapter 1, or a variety of 
terms for facilitating gifts or payments in Chapter 2. This material may 
come across as repetitive, but the repetition is essential to preserve the 
encyclopaedic style, whereas each entry is independent from another.
What does the repetition reveal and conceal? It highlights simi-
larities and points out common patterns of human interaction, regard-
less of geographical or historical specifics. In an open call, authors 
were invited to suggest references to analogous practices elsewhere, 
and editors were keen to introduce cross- references where possible. 
Highlighting similarities, however, may also serve as faux amis in 
analysis, especially where the cross-cultural expertise required for 
highlighting differences is missing. The comparative assessment of dif-
ferences implies fluency in multiple contexts and a certain degree of 
marginality to relate to the compared cases without bias. It may be that 
similar exchanges of favours operate differently in different contexts: 
some practices seem to be grounded more in sociability and openness 
in the use of personal contacts, others in belonging to a closed net-
work, brokerage or instrumental exchange. Thus, similar entries might 
be found in the cluster of economies of favours, but also in the cluster 
of practices of solidarity or gaming the system (Chapters 1, 3 and 6).
Some patterns seem more universal than others, say, strategies 
of survival related to basic needs such as dwelling or welfare (Chapter 















practices seem more associated with particular historical periods or spe-
cific contexts (Chapters 4, 7 and 8).
As editors, we have clustered practices by asking ‘What is this prac-
tice a case of?’ and run student workshops to determine the order of 
entries within each cluster. This way of ordering, and re- ordering every 
time a new entry arrived, has taken time. There are remarkable differ-
ences within the clusters, but clustering similar cases from different 
contexts has allowed us to capture the blurring of boundaries between 
sociability and instrumentality, inclusion and exclusion, us and them, 
dependence and autonomy, cultural customs and market rationality, 
materiality and immateriality, private and public.
The main achievement of this project – apart from its unique con-
stellation of ethnographies of informal ways of getting things done – is to 
highlight the centrality of ambivalence for understanding social and cul-
tural complexity and for the future policy agenda. We did not specifically 
ask researchers to reflect on the ambivalence of informal practices and 
yet, almost without exception, they pointed out its importance.
Handling the ambivalence of informality
Why is it so difficult to work with informality? Informal practices are not 
only omnipresent and amorphous. They are often invisible, resist articu-
lation and measurement, and hide behind paradoxes, unwritten rules 
and open secrets. They are context- bound and complex, but the greatest 
challenge for researchers is their ambivalence. Like a quantum particle, 
we find them in two modalities at once: informal practices are one thing 
for participants and another for observers. For example, patron– client 
relations can be seen as a means of levelling the playing field and giving 
an underdog a chance (see kula, 7.2 Volume 2). On the other hand, the 
same practices can be easily bound up with chains of illicit exchanges 
for votes and other resources (see raccomandazione, 6.15 Volume 2). 
The moral complexities surrounding connections and recommendations 
in Italy embrace the reliance on family, friendship, solidarity and reci-
procity. At the same time they are denounced as illegality, associated with 
slyness, and slighted as a poor man’s making do (l’arte dell’arrangiarsi).
Informality is grounded in the human ability to justify subvert-
ing constraints. Such subversion, however, may also support those 
constraints, just as an exception supports the rule. Multiple survival 
strategies in Chapter 5 indicate that informal practices providing access 
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they enable individuals to game the system but also allow the system 
to exploit individuals. The system justifies certain practices by legalis-
ing them. For example, the Russian state has formalised the principle 
of joint accountability (see krugovaia poruka, 3.10 in this volume) for 
governing remote communities, collecting taxes and army conscrip-
tion. In the UK, practices of ‘old corruption’ were parasitical but entirely 
legal (see 7.3 Volume 2). ‘Old corruption’ entailed the appointment of 
an aristocrat, his relative or a political ally to an official position with 
an income manifestly in excess of what a non- aristocratic holder of the 
position would earn. Such legalised privileges reproduce certain pat-
terns of inclusion and exclusion in societies, seen as legal but not neces-
sarily legitimate. The impossibility of clear categorisation results in a 
fluid navigation of double standards, whereby people seamlessly allow 
themselves what they deny to others.
In its sociological sense, ambivalence, as defined by Robert Merton, 
refers to incompatible normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour. The incompatibility derives from a certain status and the 
constraints that social structures generate for the holder of that status 
(Merton 1976: 6– 7). Merton’s analysis of sociological ambivalence stems 
from Pitirim Sorokin’s statement that actual social relations are predom-
inantly of one type or another, rather than comprising pure types, and 
he points out that ‘it is precisely the matter of not confining our attention 
to the dominant attributes of a role or social relation that directs us to 
the function and structure of sociological ambivalence’ (Merton 1976: 
16). It differs from the psychological term Ambivalenz, coined by Swiss 
psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler and defined as ‘the co- existence in one person 
of contradictory emotions or attitudes (such as love and hate) towards a 
person or thing’ in the Oxford English Dictionary (see Ambivalenz 1911 
online).
The core type of sociological ambivalence puts contradictory 
demands upon the occupants of a status in a particular social relationship. 
Since these norms cannot be simultaneously expressed in behaviour, they 
come to be expressed in an oscillation of behaviours: ‘of detachment and 
compassion, of discipline and permissiveness, of personal and impersonal 
treatment’ (Merton 1976: 8). Merton provides examples of professions, 
such as doctors, managers and academics, characterised by the oscillat-
ing occurrence of compassion, permissiveness and preferential treatment 
on the one hand, and of detachment, discipline and impersonal treat-
ment on the other. Merton’s principles of ambivalence, operationalised 
as clashing attitudes or oscillating behaviours, are in my view essential to 





















In the context of modernity, ambivalence is associated with fragmen-
tation and failure of manageability. Zygmunt Bauman defines ambivalence 
as the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one cat-
egory and views it as a language- specific disorder. The main symptom of 
disorder is the acute discomfort we feel when we are unable to read the situ-
ation properly and to choose between alternative actions (Bauman 1990, 
1991: 1, 12). Bauman lists ambivalence among ‘the tropes of the “other” 
of order: ambiguity, uncertainty, unpredictability, illogicality, irrationality, 
ambivalence, brought about by modernity with its desire to organise and to 
design’ (1990, 1991: 7). It is a social counterpart of emotional ambivalence 
in psychology (love– hate) or materials with ambivalent qualities in physics 
(semiconductors). In other words, it is a situation of coexisting thesis and 
antithesis, without certainty of their synthesis, yet without uncertainty as 
to what coexisting categories, attitudes and beliefs are.
Informal practices collected here represent both fluidity and resist-
ance. If defined by what it is not, informality is opposed to the rigidity 
of formal constraints and to the possibility of instantaneous top- down 
change. Such ambivalence is essential for the workings of informal prac-
tices and is enacted in doublethink (sociability vs instrumentality), dou-
ble standards (us vs them), double deed (supportive vs subversive), and 
double purpose (publicly declared vs self- serving). The ambivalence is 
best understood through the paradoxes it produces, and illustrated by 
such examples as the role of hackers in advancing cyber- security, or the 
contribution of non- conformity to innovation.
Types of ambivalence and the structure of the book
The collection of entries is organised in two volumes, four parts and eight 
chapters.
Part I explores the substantive ambivalence and interplay between 
sociable and instrumental in relationships – the ‘instrumentality of soci-
ability’ and the ‘sociability of instrumentality’. The relationships tend to 
be seen as social (or based on sociability) by participants but as instru-
mental (or based on interest) by observers. The substantive ambivalence 
of informal exchanges – where one cannot agree or disagree with either 
participants or observers – means that a single categorisation of the way 
in which gifts, favours, transfers and transactions are given, taken or 
exchanged is impossible. The difficulties of categorisation or tensions of 
substantive ambivalence are discussed in more detail in the preface to 
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predominantly sociable and predominantly instrumental exchanges: nei-
ther gift nor commodity; neither gift nor payment. One can observe from 
the case studies in Chapters 1 and 2 that some relationships are more 
sociable than others (and the entries have been organised in order of 
decreasing sociability), while others are more instrumental than others 
(so the entries are organised in order of increasing instrumentality). For 
example, social networks are used to obtain something that one is enti-
tled to, but with greater ease and in less time than would be the case 
without them and in a spirit of friendship (see compadrazgo, 1.4 in this 
volume), whereas the custom of informal payments in Nigeria seems to 
be a euphemism for a bribe or a levy (see dash, 2.21 in this volume).
Part II explores practices linked to identity, belonging and solidarity. 
The double standards grounded in the fundamental divide into ‘us’ and 
‘them’, or normative ambivalence, account for divisive identities and the 
associated performance of inclusion and exclusion. Focus on normative 
ambivalence enables us to reveal the open secrets of identities, moulded 
by lineage, community or consumption (whether religion, music or art) as 
well as to explain multiple identities emerging in complex societies with 
their constellations of coexisting rural, urban, local and global mindsets. 
The entries in this part are organised according to strength of obligation 
within social circles, termed the ‘lock- in effect’: from the traditional grip 



























































reciprocity and voluntary belonging; from traditional values to forms of 
self- expression; from norms generating conformity (Chapter 3) to those 
that generate non- conformity and protest (Chapter 4). As presented on 
Figure 0.2, on the left there are strong institutions of the customary law 
in the Caucasus (see adat, 3.1 in this volume) and godparents in the 
Balkans (see kumstvo, 3.6 in this volume). These practices are the most 
venerated and significant for sustaining conformity and informal order 
in societies. Just like blood relatives, kumovi are supposed to help each 
other and in most cases they do so in spite of formal roles, just as adat 
may come in direct contradiction with the law. The norms of conformity 
are equally powerful in Scandinavia: one should never try to be better or 
different, or consider oneself more valuable than others (see janteloven, 
3.11 in this volume). These norms are embodied in informal practices 
that confer negative attitudes towards individuality, self- expression and 
measures of success. In contrast, practices of non- conformity, associated 
with subcultural languages (see mat 4.5, padonki 4.6 and verlan 4.7 in 
this volume) or cross- cultural forms of rebellion (see graffiti, 4.9 in this 
volume), are aimed at the power of mass media, authorities and political 
regimes (as in the cases of self- production practices of Roentgenizdat and 
samizdat in the Soviet Union, see 4.3 and 4.4 in this volume).
The entries in Part III illustrate the functional ambivalence of infor-
mality – supportive of participants yet viewed as subversive by observers; 
SOLIDARITY
THE LOCK-IN EFFECT 
OF SOCIAL TIES





























































































Figure 0.3 Functional ambivalence.
subversive of formal constraints (such as geographical borders, short-
ages, all kinds of regulations) yet also supportive of them; bending the 
rules yet also complying with and reinforcing them (see Figure 0.3). The 
gleaning practices (known as pabirčenje in Serbia, see 5.9, Volume 2) 
enable the community to benefit from the crops remaining in the fields 
(need but also greed) and build the landowner’s reputation for generos-
ity, while at the same time sustaining and supporting a clientelist network 
that could potentially serve to support his political ambitions. By allow-
ing the poor to glean on his field in the short run, the landowner prevents 
potential social unrest and acquires stable political support among the 
local population in the long run, thus ultimately reinforcing the hierarchy 
and inequality. The blurred boundary between need and greed is the key 
theme and an underlying principle by which the material is organised in 
Part III: from practices fuelled by the need for access to bare necessities in 
the beginning of Chapter 5 to those driven by greed, ambition and passion 
to challenge the constraints by the end of Chapter 6. For example, UK reg-
ulations regarding expenses incurred by Members of Parliament (MPs) 
exempt second-home sales from capital-gains tax and create an incentive 
for gaming the system. An MP can choose which home is registered as 
his or her official ‘second home’ with the apparent aim of maximising 
financial gain. A number of MPs were alleged to have made substantial 













excluding any profit from capital- gains tax (see flipping, 6.35 Volume 2). 
Other key themes in Part III include the role of the state, the enabling 
power of constraints, and the sources of effectiveness of informal systems 
emerging in response to an over- controlling centre.
Motivational ambivalence is a central theme in Part IV: whatever 
the declared motivation in a legal case or anti- corruption campaign, 
some hidden interests may also be served in the process. In most cases, it 
is impossible to establish with certainty whether the public motive takes 
precedence over the private, or the private over the public. Similar to 
the order of entries in the other parts – from more social to more instru-
mental in redistribution, from more binding forms of solidarity to non-
conformist practices, from more of a need to more of a greed in market 
behaviour – the entries in Part IV are arranged according to the incen-
tives used for domination: from ‘more of a carrot’ to ‘more of a stick’ 
(see Figure 0.4). ‘Carrots’ (albeit with strings attached) are aimed at 
co-opting various groups into compliance by satisfying their needs what-
ever they might be: from a financial loan to a certain degree of impunity. 
Thus in India, beside the profits involved in adopting a political career 
path and the impunity that such careers grant, there is also a particular 
aura of prestige and status that goes hand in hand with political public 
positions in South Asia (see Mafia Raj, 7.11 Volume 2). ‘Sticks’ illustrate 
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Table 0.2 Types of ambivalence and their implications for social and cultural complexity
Types of ambivalence 
of informal practices
Modus operandi Implications for analysing 
complexity
The continuum that proved use-






relationship vs use of 
relationship
Multiple categorisation
Impossibility of ‘either- or’ 
oppositions
From sociability to instrumen-








What we allow ourselves vs 
what we accept from another




Us and them are context-bound









Supportive vs subversive in 














declared vs hidden agendas in 
co- optation and control
The public/ private borderline is 
porous and contextual
Motive is camouflaged as its 
opposite
Co- optation and control are 
co- dependent
From co- optation by carrots to 
control by sticks
From material to non- material












selectively as ammunition (telefonnoe pravo in courts, kompromat in the 
media, psikhushka for the opposition), or by using informal leverage in 
formal contexts and resorting to the instruments of informal power.
The ambivalence of informal practices, multiple moralities, incon-
sistent legitimacies and blurred boundaries makes it possible to solve 
private problems on a daily basis. At the same time, however, this ambiva-
lence also creates obstacles, or filters, that in the longer term impede the 
efficient implementation of public policy and may accordingly be harm-
ful to society in general. Societies do differ, as argued in the concluding 
remarks to the second volume, but the question of whether some coun-
tries are more informal than others should be answered with reference 
not only to modernity but also to ambivalence.
Let us sum up the four types of ambivalence and outline their impli-
cations for social and cultural complexity (see Table 0.2).
Tackling complexity
The informal patterns, identified in this collection, are not simply an 
outcome of organising material or advancing comparative agendas. 
What the evidence highlights is that, despite their banal nature, mar-
ginal significance and under- the- radar scale, informal practices are 
central to the workings of human societies, their resilience and stabil-
ity. Moreover, informal patterns, emerging from the comparative look 
at informal practices occurring in different contexts, point to the novel 
dimensions of our understanding of social and cultural complexity. 
I argue that ambivalence – one of the key determinants of social and 
cultural complexity – allows informal practices to remain overlooked in 
research and policy, while also being the key know- how and a widely 
shared open secret in society. Ambivalence enables one to master mul-
tiple identities, to navigate multiple moralities, and to make a smooth 
crossing between sociability and instrumentality (enacting friend-
ship that observers would categorise as a use of friendship – see amici, 
 amigos, 1.21 in this volume).
The ambivalence of informal practices is reflected in the majority of 
individual entries to the encyclopaedia, so it is fitting that ambivalence –  
substantive, normative, functional and motivational – should also be 
reflected in the structuring of the encyclopaedia. Structuring complex-
ity is a challenging task: entries cannot be organised consecutively, the 
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The inspiration comes from Slavoj Žižek’s thesis of the ‘return to 
the economy of gift’ and his discussion of the structures of world history, 
theorised by Kojin Karatani (2014), whose basic premise is the use of 
modes of exchange (rather than modes of production, as in Marxism) 
as the tool with which to analyse the history of humanity (Žižek 2014: 
149). Karatani distinguishes four progressive modes of exchange: (a) gift 
exchange, which predominates in pre- state societies (clans and tribes 
exchanging gifts); (b) domination and protection, which predominate 
in slavery and feudal societies (here the exploitation is based on direct 
domination, but the dominating class has to offer something in exchange, 
such as protecting its subjects from danger); (c) commodity exchange of 
objects, which predominates in capitalism (free individuals exchange not 
only their products but also their own labour power); and (X) a further 
stage to come, a return to the gift exchange at the higher level. This X is a 
Kantian regulative idea, a vision that has assumed different guises in the 
history of humanity, from egalitarian religious communities reliant on 
communal solidarity to anarchist cooperatives and communist projects, 
Žižek argues. The relevance of this vision of history lies, however, in the 
complexity of the architecture that Karatani introduces to his categorisa-
tion (quoted in Žižek 2014: 149):
At the level of exchange, the ‘pure’ gift co- exists with the complex 
web of gift and counter- gift. In the passage from stage to stage, the 
previous stage does not disappear; although it is ‘repressed’, the 
repressed returns in a new form. With the passage from A to B, gift- 
exchange survives as part of B, with the passage of B to C, A survives 
as nation/ community and B (domination) survives as the state 
power. In this model, capitalism is not a ‘pure’ reign of B, but a triad 
(or, rather, a Borommean knot) of Nation- State- Capital: nation as 
the form of communal solidarity, state as a form of direct domin-
ation, capital as a form of economic exchange. All three of them are 
necessary for the reproduction of capitalist society.
An important aspect of Karatani’s iterative, unfolding structure of world 
history is his depiction of the increasing complexity of human societies 
in history. The complexity is expressed in coexisting, multi- layer, multi- 
stage, multi- mode assemblages of solidarity, domination and economic 
exchange. In other words, the modes of community, power and market – 
of giving, protecting and transacting – are all co- present, intertwined 
and resisting clear categorisations. Žižek postulates the return of the gift 




















In that vein, I propose the fourth dimension to Karatani’s triad – re- 
distribution – that stems from the work of Karl Polanyi, Pierre Bourdieu, 
Janos Kornai, Jeremy Rifkin and others. Volume 1 starts with the discus-
sion of the much under- researched subject of economies of favours and 
a wider range of practices of redistribution, and follows up with human 
dependence on identities/ solidarity, transacting/ markets and power/ 
domination. The structure, emerging bottom- up rather than imposed 
top- down, devoid of chronological or geographical borders, has been 
an outcome but also a tool in organising the complex and ever- growing 
database of the Global Informality Project.
The method of knowing smiles
If Foucault’s Order of Things started from laughter, this encyclopaedia has 
grown out of a knowing smile – the smile of acknowledgement of an open 
secret about how things work. Informal practices escape regular atten-
tion by being the most routine aspect of societies’ social and cultural lives 
(Ledeneva 2011). Similar to Hannah Arendt’s formula of the ‘banality of 
evil’, it is the banality of informality that causes informal practices to be 
taken for granted by insiders and to remain unnoticed by outsiders. These 
are everyday practices associated with patronage, nepotism, favouritism 
and clientelism as well as the use of social connections to find employ-
ment and secure promotions, to influence official decisions, or to bypass 
formal procedures. Yet these practices stay in close proximity to some of 
the key challenges of the contemporary world – corruption, terrorism, 
illegal immigration, trafficking and cyber- crime. In other words, micro- 
practices and patterns of human interdependence often remain under 
the radar, while shaping large- scale phenomena (Granovetter 1982; Tilly 
2005). Informal practices channel personal interest but also facilitate the 
resilience capacity in the world – its default modus operandi.
It is often assumed that the hidden nature of informal practices 
makes them difficult and even dangerous to research. Yet where there 
is a will, there is a way:  in studying sensitive subjects associated with 
informal institutions, networks and practices, researchers encounter not 
only unwelcoming attitudes from respondents, but also methodological 
challenges associated with measurability and comparability, as well as 
pressures to move beyond disciplinary borders. And yet, research into 
informal practices is a growing field (Polese and Rodgers 2011; Giordano 
and Hayoz 2013; Kubik and Lynch 2013; Zigon 2013; Morris and Polese 
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Every entry in this collection has its own methodology and discip-
linary grounding. The conceptual entries – introductions and conclu-
sions to the clusters – offer methodological insights and generalisation, 
but the Global Informality Project overall addresses the following meth-
odological puzzles: how to trace practices that are elusive, how to over-
come the limitations of disciplinary perspectives and border- bound area 
studies. As Gerald Mars notes in his conclusion to Chapter 6, practising 
fiddlers tend to act covertly, thereby creating an area of research most 
of which is not open to direct enquiry. Before any research on part- time 
crime can proceed, it is vital to suspend (without necessarily abandoning) 
one’s own moral standpoint: impartial understandings can be achieved 
only if, like anthropologists, one lays one’s own values aside. Only then 
can the field be assessed from the standpoint of the actors involved.
My own ethnographic work started with the puzzle of distinguishing 
friendship from blat (use of friendship). I tried to draw a line between the 
relationship and the use of the relationship, but stumbled instead upon 
grey zones, varying significantly depending on whether the relationship 
was best defined by regime of affection, regime of status, or regime of 
equivalence, on what kind of favours were involved, at whose expense and 
in which context (Ledeneva 1998:  Chapter 5). With time, it became pos-
sible to identify, articulate, measure and compare blat practices in Russia 
(Ledeneva 2008), and to explore sensitive subjects and open secrets by 
the method of knowing smiles in other societies (Ledeneva 2011).
Knowing smiles are partly about smiling, partly about knowing. 
Knowing open secrets is partly about knowing, partly also about not know-
ing and not questioning. It is a sign of awareness of transgression but also of 
recognition that it does not need to be spelt out. Masked hostility – expressed 
through ribbing – towards the researcher ‘daring’ to articulate this is indica-
tive of these tensions. The semi- taboos against knowing, the complicity to 
leave things unarticulated, the ambiguities hidden behind open secrets are 
all pointers to sensitive subjects that invite innovative research.
The Global Informality Project open call included an invitation to 
participate in such an innovative endeavour and to contribute a short 
authored entry to the first Global Encyclopaedia of Informality (1,500 
words including bibliography). Each entry focuses on a single practice 
(under its colloquial name) and includes at least some of the following:
• Name, definition, etymology and its translation into other 
languages.
• How widely is it used?


















• Identify analogous practices, named differently in different coun-
tries (if possible).
• How does it relate to other informal practices (discuss similarities 
and differences if possible)?
• What are the implications of the chosen practice for politics/ econ-
omy/ society?
• Which method was or can be used for researching this practice?
• Give examples of the practice.
• How can the practice be measured?
• How does it develop and migrate?
• Which channels are currently available to policy makers to inte-
grate expertise on informality?
• Cross- reference and recommend reading.
The open secret about informality is the gap between colonial, hegemonic 
or global official discourses (top- down) and the ways in which things are 
done or viewed in practice (bottom- up). Exploring that gap between the 
declared principles (say, the principles of accountability, equality, fairness, 
zero tolerance) and the pragmatic shifts taking place while exercising 
them, is to emphasise the ways this gap is bridged in specific domains (see 
Potemkin villages, 6.30 Volume 2). Highlighting grey zones and blurred 
boundaries between top- down and bottom- up perspectives points to the 
key challenges for both researchers and policy makers. Commonplaces and 
micro- practices can sometimes reveal profound features of societies that 
elude us when tackled directly.
The method of knowing smiles can be illustrated by Sigmund 
Freud’s celebrated example of art forgery. To discover whether a painting 
is a forgery, the most effective way is to focus on minor details, such as 
how the painter depicts fingernails or the slope of a thumb. Most forgers 
can fake the major aspects of what is portrayed – it is the tiny details that 
give them away. Freud argued that the same is true of ‘trivial’ aspects of 
day- to- day life, such as slips of the tongue. The apparently trivial elem-
ents are key to understanding core dispositions of the personality, and 
I  am making the same argument about the ‘disclosure’ of open secrets 
that the knowing smile represents  – in Freud’s words, ‘secrets that we 
all know and the knowledge of which we always try to conceal from one 
another’ (Freud 1892– 3: 123).
In developing this point, our authors draw upon a variety of ‘masters 
of suspicion’ – Freud, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, Erving Goffman, 
Georg Simmel, Marcel Mauss, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu – and 
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be branded as societies’ open secrets, commonly smiled at knowingly 
when brought up in a conversation. So far, neither knowing smiles nor 
open secrets have been analysed in a comparative way, so this encyclo-
paedia provides a unique opportunity to ‘compare the incomparable’, or 
at least see them in various contexts.
Main (ambivalent) findings
informality is fringy but central
The evidence assembled in the project shows that informality matters 
in the workings of modern societies. We emphasise the key importance 
(if not predominance) of informality in the world, its variety and com-
plexity, as well as the possibility to identify key patterns used in informal 
interactions. We have created the first world map of informality, where 
the entries are shown in their local habitat and identified in their lan-
guage of origin. In the encyclopaedia, however, they are clustered with 
similar practices from all over the world, and thus are explained in both 
local and global contexts.
informality is universal but can be invisible
Poverty and development correlate with the scale of informality, and 
certainly make informal practices more visible. The more developed 
societies are, the less visible (and hidden behind the façades of formal 
institutions) are their informal norms. It is not that informality does not 
exist in developed societies, rather that the norms developing in these 
societies have pushed it out of sight. Such invisibility stems partially from 
legal norms  – informal practices tend to go either under or above the 
radar of the law – and partially from practical norms – the banality of 
informality that enables people to engage in behaviour that they do not 
necessarily find acceptable.
informality works but it is elusive
It is common for people living under the pressure of systemic corruption 
to point out the effectiveness of peer pressure, solidarities and informal 
shortcuts, both to legitimise the informal ways of getting things done and 
to euphemise the terms. For the outsiders, their behaviour is an exercise 
in double standards: they criticise corruption, but also engage in cor-






















and Jean- Pierre Olivier de Sardan have termed ‘an incessant alternation 
between condemnation and tolerance’ while researching the ‘semantic 
fields of corruption’ (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006: 11, 110).
informal practices are ambivalent but not necessarily hybrid
Forms of ambivalence include: substantive (when transactions are seen 
as substantially different by participants and observers); normative (i.e. 
when others do it – it is wrong, when I do it – it is right); functional (infor-
mal shortcuts are both a problem (subversive) and a solution (support-
ive of actors and systems); and motivational (whereby public or private 
motives are camouflaged as the opposite). For example, if a gift is seen as 
a bribe, it does not necessarily become a hybrid entity (a ‘brift’, if we use 
Abel Polese’s term), but it remains ambivalent: a gift for one and a bribe 
for another, enabled by the tension it produces. The ambivalent nature of 
informal practices makes the borders between relationships and the use 
of relationships, between need and greed, between us and them, between 
public and private easy to cross. In this collection, the ambivalent nature 
of informal practices becomes articulated in each entry, but also emerges 
from the clusters of entries that highlight the tensions outlined above.
constraints are disabling but also enabling
The variety and complexity of informal practices around the world illus-
trate not only the creativeness of human beings, but also the enabling 
power of constraints. In other words, just as informal practices can be 
viewed as both a problem and a solution, constraints can be seen as 
both a restriction and a resource. The multiple examples of cross- bor-
der activities and non- conformist behaviour included in this encyclopae-
dia substantiate this point. The perspectives on informality that focus on 
the subversive impact it has on formal institutions and political or eco-
nomic regimes often lead to predictions of the dissipation of informality 
and the rise of effective formal institutions (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; 
Kaufmann et al. 2011).
informality is context- bound, but the contexts are not necessarily 
country- or culture- specific
The literature on informality is grounded in geographical, socio- cultural 
and political- economic areas (Lomnitz 1988; Mandel and Humphrey 
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in post- socialist societies (Ledeneva 1998, 2006, 2013; Perry et al. 2007; 
Packard et al. 2012; Morris and Polese 2013; Williams et al. 2013; Gatti 
et al. 2014; Polese et al. 2014, 2016; Knudsen and Frederiksen 2015; 
Polese 2015). As the concluding remarks to the second volume show, the 
question of whether some countries are more informal than others is not 
as simple as it seems. A cross- discipline analysis and a ‘network’ perspec-
tive are essential to answer it. We took the case of Russia to illustrate this 
point. On the one hand, Russia has a reputation for informality, complex-
ity and unpredictability and, after all, has been the area of origin for the 
Global Informality Project. Russia offers a comprehensive range of prac-
tices that can be examined both in historical perspective and in contem-
porary contexts, which can only be represented by the multi- disciplinary 
network of researchers. It would not be possible to achieve a similar 
coverage for each country in equal measure in one publication, but a 
detailed coverage of one country points to where open secrets might be 
found in others. On the other hand, our take on whether some countries 
are more informal than others is that one should downplay geographical 
borders when dealing with informal patterns (the bottom- up structure 
of the volumes seeks to convey this point). Understanding such patterns, 
practices and paradoxes might be more important for grasping particular 
contexts than national stereotypes.
The dichotomies present both a problem and a solution for 
categorisation
‘Neither– nor’ or ‘both– and’ patterns of ambivalence dwell on dichotomies 
but also aim at circumventing them. For example, normative ambiva-
lence, associated with the double standards embedded in identities, soli-
darities and the fundamental divide into ‘us’ and ‘them’, makes it possible 
to turn constraints into opportunities. In his concluding remarks to the 
first volume, Zygmunt Bauman identifies the implications of the organis-
ing forces of modernity and argues that the divisive nature of dichotomies 
must give way to a cosmopolitan mindset in order to confront tendencies 
towards radicalisation and fragmentation, driven by divisive identity pol-
itics and religious beliefs. It is the potential of ambivalence that can be 
integrated into such policy thinking.
Visualising the invisible has proved very difficult
How does one visualise something that is supposed to go unseen, 


















hidden from the public eye, shared as an open secret and left unarticu-
lated or unacknowledged in official discourse. And yet this volume con-
tains pictures. Even if a photograph can hardly portray a practice or 
convey the ‘practical sense’ or ‘feel for the game’ associated with informal 
Table 0.3 Assumptions and counterintuitive implications for policy
Assumptions Counterintuitive implications for policy
Poverty and survival strategies Entrepreneurship and innovation
Underdevelopment of 
institutions
Informality dwells in grey zones and helps 
reproduce ambivalent patterns, but 
underdevelopment of institutions is only 
part of the story. The strength of social 
networks for building trust (back- up), 
survival kits (redistribution), safety- nets 
(solidarity, cohesion) and connectivity 
should be factored in
Socialism and post- socialism Informality is present in all societies under 
certain constraints and in particular 
contexts
Oppressive states and ‘weapons 
of the weak’
Gaming the system and ‘weapons of 
the wealthy’ are common in mature 
democracies
Formal is good, informality is 
bad
Formal is an enabler of the informal, 
including the conniving state. Informal is 
an enabler for the formal and should be 
used for channeling policies
There is good informality and 
there is bad informality 
(informal governance, 
informal networks, informal 
institutions can all be good 
and bad)
Social capital can be positive and 
negative
Informality can help produce measurable 
indicators for assessing models of 
governance
Social capital is ambivalent
Informality is about freedom Informality is an enabler but it also imposes 
limitations; informality is the basis of 
resistance capacity
Policies tend to rely on laws, 
written rules and norms
Policies can also rely on oral commands, 
tacit agreements and in- group 
relationships
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practices, it nevertheless depicts a particular context and negotiates the 
boundary between what can be made visible and what will remain as 
imagined, inferred or implied. As with the punch- line in a joke, some 
things are articulated while others are left to the imagination; it is per-
haps no accident that a few images come from satirical sources. The kal-
eidoscope of images assembled in the volumes depicts at least some of 
the daily circumstances in which such practices occur and illustrates the 
often mundane nature of their context. One could attribute some value 
to the regularity and frequency of images throughout the volumes, had 
their number not been limited and had it been easier to secure permis-
sion to reproduce copyright material. As things stand, we had to select 
images according to criteria that do not allow the reader to speculate 
on any correlation between the visibility of informal practices and their 
visualisation.
Stigmatisation of informality is counterproductive in policy – 
integrating complexity into policy will work
Let us outline assumptions about informality in Table 0.3 (on the left) 
and counterintuitive ways (on the right) in which informality can be 
taken into account in policy- making.
Overall, we claim novelty of this collection of practices that has 
never been seen together, yet also includes an impressive cross-discipline 
and cross-area bibliography on informality around the globe – a brilliant 
find in itself.
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Part I maps the blurred boundaries between sociable and instrumental 
in relationships – the ‘instrumentality of sociability’ in Chapter 1 and the 
‘sociability of instrumentality’ in Chapter 2. In exploring whether it is pos-
sible to separate a relationship from the use of that relationship, these two 
chapters highlight the ambivalent nature of relationships – seen by par-
ticipants as social, but by observers as instrumental, but indeed neither, 
or both. The substantive ambivalence of informal exchanges – where one 
cannot agree or disagree with either participants or observers – means 
that any single categorisation of the way in which gifts, favours, transfers 
and transactions are given, taken or exchanged would be reductionist.
The entries are organised in descending order from those seen by 
readers in a pilot study as being more social informal exchanges to those 
perceived as more instrumental. The entries focus on open secrets in 
societies related to the redistribution of resources. From economies of 
favours to the exchange of gifts and informal payments, the ‘elephant 
in the room’ here is the banality of informality, invisible because it is, 
on the one hand, everyday, routine, taken for granted, common and 
small, and yet, on the other hand, omnipresent and therefore volumin-
ous and influential outside its narrower context. The social contexts of 
gifts, favours and payments that defy clear borders between materiality 
and non- materiality, between pure gift and reciprocity, make such social 
exchanges particularly elusive and hard to pin down.
Chapter 1, ‘Neither gift nor commodity: The instrumentality of soci-
ability’, explores the myths about informal exchanges of favours. First, 
they are often seen as instrumental exchanges, while their social side 

























coin, quite literally the ambivalent currency serving the ‘economies of 
favours’ embedded in human emotions, while also fulfilling the import-
ant function of redistributing resources. Second, as Nicolette Makovicky 
and David Henig emphasise in their introduction, economies of favours 
play an essential role in times of societal change such as post- communist 
transitions. Makovicky and Henig stress the intrinsic link between econ-
omies of favours and the socialist idea with its emphasis on comradery, 
fraternity, collectivity and, under late socialism, opposition to the state. 
Third, Sheila Puffer and Daniel McCarthy dissect the assumption that 
economies of favours are grounded exclusively in shortages and red tape, 
making them operational mainly in transitional societies. Puffer and 
McCarthy argue rather for the instrumentality of favours in all societies, 
including those with individualistic values, competitive markets and 
strong institutions. The question of how the substantive ambivalence of 
favours unfolds in different political and socio- economic contexts leads 
us to contemplate what is post- socialist and what is global in economies 
of favours, and to reflect more generally on the context- bound nature of 
informal exchanges: regimes of equivalence, regimes of affection and 
regimes of status (Ledeneva 1998: 144– 55).
Chapter 2, ‘Neither gift nor payment: The sociability of instrumen-
tality’, focuses on practices perceived as more instrumental, less volun-
tary and more reciprocal than exchanges of favours. Again, instrumental 
payments tend also to be social. Euphemisms for instrumental exchanges, 
or the multitude of the ‘language games’ used in such exchanges, are of 
particular interest since they not only serve the purpose of polite con-
versation but also highlight the necessity to ‘socialise’ and ‘normalise’ 
instrumentality. Vernaculars of informality, as Makovicky and Henig 
argue, are essential for deception and self- deception, for adhering to the 
norms while playing them to one’s own advantage, and for talking about 
morally reprehensible exchanges in terms of morally acceptable patterns 
of sharing, tipping, or even charity. The fundamental principles of giv-
ing, and the issues around its interested or disinterested nature, are theo-
rised by Florence Weber in her conclusion to Chapter 2. Weber highlights 
the importance of timing, obligation of the recipient, domination of the 
donor, logic of antagonism or alliance, personalisation or anonymity, as 
well as the interconnectedness of public and private contexts in navigat-
ing the complexity of social exchanges.
The substantive ambivalence of currencies serving such social 
exchanges and residing in grey zones – neither gift nor commodity, nei-
ther gift nor payment, neither material nor non- material, neither public 



















as illustrated by the tensions between sociability and instrumentality 
revealed in different contexts. Bringing the blurring of the boundaries 
between sociability and instrumentality into focus sheds new light on 
how the ambivalence of informal exchange constructs and enables redis-






Neither gift nor commodity: the 
instrumentality of sociability
Introduction: economies of favours
nicolette makovicky
School of interdisciplinary area Studies, university of oxford, uK
and 
david henig
School of anthropology and conservation, university of Kent, uK
One of the most pervasive features of ‘actually existing socialism’ across 
Eurasia and the Eastern Bloc was the use of personalised connections 
in order to get access to goods, services and information. Known as blat 
in Russian, znajomości in Polish, and guanxi in Mandarin, this rich and 
multifaceted practice combined horizontal and vertical exchange rela-
tions to create ‘a distinctive form of social relationship or social exchange 
articulating private interests and human needs against the rigid control 
of the state’ (Ledeneva 1998: 7). Sociologist Alena Ledeneva (1998) has 
coined the overarching term ‘economies of favour’ to describe these social 
relationships and exchanges. Facilitating the flow of goods and informa-
tion between private individuals, state enterprises, and the bureaucratic 
structures of government, such relations of exchange formed part of a 
‘huge repertoire of strategies for obtaining consumer goods and services’, 
including working ‘off the books’, pilfering materials and tools from the 
workplace, and using enterprise resources for petty commodity produc-
tion and trade (Verdery 1996: 27). Beyond the straightforward exchange 
of scarce goods, economies of favour often consisted of individuals 
granting ‘favours of access’ (Ledeneva 1998: 35) by making professional 
connections, skills, education, medical care, and resources available to 




















the command economy, economies of favour thus existed in a symbiotic 
relationship with official economic institutions as a ‘grey’, ‘informal’ or 
‘second’ economy, which fed off the deficiencies of official economic and 
bureaucratic structures (Wedel 1992; Seabright 2000). While describing 
such practices as diversion of ‘public resources for private’ aims, Ledeneva 
notes that socialist- era economies of favour ‘resulted from the particular 
combination of shortages and, even if repressed, consumerism; from a 
paradox of equality and the practice of differentiation through privileges 
and closed distribution systems’ (1998: 36). Regarding the ‘second’ or 
‘informal’ economy as a structural outcome of the political economy of 
actually existing socialism, scholars and policy makers expected econ-
omies of favour to disappear together with their dysfunctional economic 
hosts soon after the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. Perceiving infor-
mal economic activities as corrupt, they confidently asserted that econ-
omies of favours would disappear as political and regulatory obstacles 
to free enterprise and globalisation were removed (Åslund 2004: 40). A 
number of economists even identified the socialist ‘second economy’ as 
containing the kernel of free market exchange, observing a tendency for 
networking practices to be employed in the service of budding entrepre-
neurial activities (Grabher and Stark 1997; Kornai 2000). Yet, a quar-
ter century after the end of communist rule, there is ample evidence 
that ‘economies of favour’ remain firmly embedded in the contempor-
ary social fabric, practices, and moral values of populations across the 
region. Informal exchange and personal networks continue to be a major 
source of foodstuffs, consumer goods, credit, property and access to 
employment, education, and medical care across the region (e.g. Bridger 
and Pine 1998; Day et al. 1999; Stenning et al. 2010; Morris and Polese 
2013). Scholars are still grappling with how to theorise instances of 
nepotism, low- level corruption, and pilfering of public resources (e.g. 
Giordano and Hayoz 2013; Morris and Polese 2015). And most worry-
ingly, research shows that attempts to consolidate liberal, democratic 
market society across the former Eastern Bloc have been accompanied by 
the formation of corrupt elite networks and a breakdown of the rule of 
law (e.g. Ledeneva and Kurkchiyan 2000; Wedel 2001, 2009; Ledeneva 
2006, 2013). In short, rather than removing informality from economic 
and political practices, post- socialist economic and political liberalisa-
tion appears to have provided fertile ground for its proliferation.
This persistence and flourishing of everyday economies of favour, 
as  well as large- scale political and economic fraud, has confounded 
the  expectations of academics and policy makers alike. As Gerald 




















economies of favour not primarily as a type of economic practice, but 
rather as a type of civic action: assuming that socialist society suffered 
from a ‘social vacuum’ created by the lack of civil society, the mistrust of 
state institutions, and concentration of power in the hands of the com-
munist parties, scholars saw economies of favours as an alternative polit-
ical arena enabling the general population to compete for resources. Yet, 
while they regarded the informal sector as a ‘source of autonomy from 
the state’ before 1989, they subsequently condemned the same practices 
as ‘negative social capital’ preventing the establishment of adequate con-
nections between formal institutions of governance and the population 
(Creed 2011: 113). Re- labelled as ‘corruption’, ‘clientelism’ or ‘nepotism’, 
practices of circumventing official procedures and a preference for face- to- 
face dealings were now seen as opposition not to an illegitimate state, but 
rather to the ostensibly democratic and open sphere of public civic culture 
and the rule of law. Indeed, by recasting ubiquitous practices of making 
a living and navigating the state bureaucracy in terms of ‘social capital’, 
development agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and glo-
bal financial institutions inserted the terms ‘informality’ and ‘economies of 
favour’ into a highly normative, globally circulating, deterritorialised lan-
guage of audit and accountability, together with terms such as ‘corruption’, 
‘transparency’, ‘trust’ and ‘legality’ (Haller and Shore 2005). This analytical 
terminology employed by policy makers imbued the concept of economies 
of favour with a moral burden not dissimilar from the use of debt rhetoric 
as a moral issue and a moral failure (see Graeber 2011).
This branding of economies of favour as a toxic legacy of social-
ism, in short, reflected ideal- type notions of social contract, civil soci-
ety and community shared by policy makers, rather than the nature 
of informal practices on the ground. In response, scholars from across 
the social sciences have sought novel ways to rehabilitate the term 
and to develop grassroots understandings of the conditions of ‘actu-
ally living post- socialism’. Anthropologists in particular have seized 
on the concept of morality as an analytical device for problematising 
the dominance of the normative, global language of audit described 
above (Humphrey 2002; Mandel and Humphrey 2002). One strand of 
this literature advocates taking local definitions and terminologies of 
corruption into account, suggesting that people may subscribe to an 
alternative moral order (Werner 2002; Wanner 2005) or operate with 
a ‘contextual morality’, which legitimises socially and legally ques-
tionable actions in given situations (Polese 2008). Another growing 
body of work considers ostensibly ‘corrupt’ actions within their wider 

























to welfare (e.g. Rivkin- Fish 2005; Sneath 2006; Stan 2007, 2012). 
Drawing on the classical anthropological juxtaposition of gift and com-
modity exchange, they document how moralities of exchange (Parry 
and Bloch 1989) shift with changing state and class configurations, 
as well as currency regimes. Beyond anthropology, recent research in 
the region has sought to recognise the heterogeneity of contemporary 
informal economic practices by employing ethnographic methods to 
uncover their role in the everyday, lived experience of citizens across 
the former Eastern Bloc (e.g. Morris and Polese 2013; Williams et al. 
2013). Some scholars have furthermore argued for the development 
of a new typology of informal economic practices in the region, which 
include not only self- employment, small- scale enterprise, and paid 
work undertaken outside the formal economy, but also practices of 
self- provisioning, unpaid formal and informal employment, and the 
phenomena of ‘paid favours’ between kin and acquaintances (Williams 
et al. 2013).
Alongside efforts to throw light on the full gamut of practices which 
make up contemporary economies of favour in Eastern Europe, Russia 
and Eurasia, there are increasing efforts to rehabilitate the negative image 
of informal economic practices in the region. Countering the prevailing 
discourse of ‘informality’ as corrosive to economic and political develop-
ment, scholars have recently taken a greater interest in examining how 
such practices might form the ‘seedbed for enterprise development and 
principal mechanism for delivering community self- help’ (Williams and 
Round 2007: 2321; Kideckel 2008). Rather than subscribing to conven-
tional perceptions of informal employment as exploitative, low- paid 
labour undertaken by those marginalised by the formal economy, schol-
ars are beginning to acknowledge that informal economic activities are 
often culturally meaningful to those who undertake them. Whether sub-
sistence farming or unregulated employment, such practices not only 
support livelihoods under the precarious circumstance of post- socialist 
restructuring, but carry a certain moral value by virtue of allowing indi-
viduals to make ends meet in the face of an increasingly uncaring state. 
As often as they are part of a ‘survival strategy’ developed by an impov-
erished population, practices of self- provisioning, domestic production, 
and petty trade may enact long- standing norms of household reproduc-
tion and domesticity (e.g. Makovicky 2009; Ries 2009). As Morris (2012; 
Morris and Polese 2013) has shown in the case of Russian workers, some 
may choose the precariousness of self- or informal employment over the 
lack of autonomy and benefits of waged employment. With the reality of 





















‘ “normal” working class existence’, workers’ ‘self- esteem … increasingly 
comes to be associated with non- dependence on the derisory returns of 
formal work’ (Morris 2012: 230).
Morris’ observation has recently been echoed by Caroline 
Humphrey (2012), who has questioned the very assumption that infor-
mal economic practices are primarily driven by the structural con-
straints of socio- economic inequality. Querying the degree to which 
post- socialist economies of favour should be understood in transac-
tional terms of costs and benefits (and should therefore be analysed 
solely as a matter of political economy), Humphrey argues instead that 
acts of doing favours form a ‘moral aesthetic of action that endows the 
actors with standing and a sense of self- worth’ (2012: 23). Her obser-
vation signals the fact that the study of these phenomena requires 
more than the re- contextualisation of socialist- era informal economic 
practices into the market- capitalist present. Rather, it requires a crit-
ical re- interrogation of the conceptual relation between the categories 
of ‘favour’ and ‘economies’ themselves. A new collection of studies has 
recently been published with the goal of addressing this issue (Henig 
and Makovicky 2016). The contributors to this collection start by ques-
tioning what a favour is, rather than employing it as a euphemism for 
corruption or informality. As such, they move away from asking func-
tional questions of exchange and reciprocity, towards interrogating the 
ethical and expressive aspects of human life. Examining favours, they 
posit, is a way of studying the moments of ‘ethical reflection, reason-
ing, dilemma, doubt, conflict, judgement, and decision’ that punctuate 
everyday life and experience (Laidlaw 2014: 23). Shifting the theoret-
ical emphasis from studying economies of favour to studying favours sui 
generis does not, however, mean that the contributors regard gratuit-
ous behaviour as uniformly benign or altruistic in nature. Neither do 
they see favours as operating ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the economic sphere. 
Rather, both Humphrey (2012) and Henig and Makovicky (2016) sug-
gest that favours constitute a distinct mode of action that has economic 
consequences, yet without being fully explicable in terms of transac-
tional cost- benefit analysis. Favours – and, by extension, economies of 
favour – have existential (as well as social and material) significance. 
They are constitutive of – rather than external to – the persons and 
relations of those who give and receive (Englund 2008: 36), being part 
and parcel of what the Enlightenment economist Adam Smith (1759) 
called the ‘sympathy’ that underpins social relations. These recent 
contributions to the debate surrounding contemporary economies of 









arise in a range of situations, and how they are central to the social 




In Russia, blat is a colloquial term to denote ways of getting things done 
through personal contacts, associated with using connections, pulling 
strings and exchanging favours. Just like other economies of favours – 
guanxi, jeitinho, kombinacja, pituto, vruzki, wasta and torpil, presented 
in this volume – blat practices are associated with sociability, i.e. main-
taining social contacts or networks, but also serve an instrumental pur-
pose of gaining influence or accessing limited resources. The blurred 
lines between sociability and instrumentality – the two sides of the 
coin in an exchange of favours – highlight the ambivalence of ‘favour’. 
In each particular case, the puzzle of distinguishing friendship from the 
use of friendship (blat) can be solved on the basis of frequency or con-
text: people who regularly draw on exchanges of this kind are seen as 
brokers (blatmeisters) rather than friends. More generally, drawing a line 
between the relationship and the use of relationship is indeed difficult. 
The complexity stems from the fluid nature of the context – regime of 
affection, regime of status, or regime of equivalence; the elusive nature 
of favours, as well as the wider set of political, economic and cultural 
constraints (Ledeneva 1998: 144– 55, Ledeneva 2016).
In the Soviet Union blat contacts were commonly used to obtain 
goods and services in short supply or to circumvent formal procedures. A 
school friend working in a food store saved the best cuts of meat for you; 
an acquaintance at the Bolshoy Theatre box office whose daughter you 
had helped to enter university put aside tickets for your parents. The term 
referred to routine, mostly non- monetary, give- and- take practices, often 
associated with mutual help, mutual understanding or cooperation of 
‘us’ versus ‘them’. The term itself originated in criminal jargon – perhaps 
in emphasising the conflict between insiders of the underworld (blatnye), 
and the authorities, legal order or political regime – and has carried nega-
tive connotations ever since. Blat is associated with anti-Soviet images in 
the satirical periodical Krokodil in the 1920s and 1930s. In Russian lan-
guage dictionaries, entries on blat also appeared in the 1930s. The word 
acquired a ‘new common vulgar’ usage in early Soviet times (Ushakov 
1935), but its meaning – ‘illicitly, by protection, by patronage’ – is reg-
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idiom ‘po blatu’ (‘through acquaintances’) was colloquially widely used 
but banned from official discourse. It certainly does not feature in any 
of the editions of the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia. As Joseph Berliner, the 
pioneer of the Harvard Interviewing Project, rightly observed: ‘If we 
were totally reliant on the written sources of the Soviet society, we might 
hardly have guessed the importance of blat’ (Berliner 1957: 184).
In the Soviet vernacular, the term embraced (1) vertical, or hier-
archical, patterns such as protection and patronage; (2) horizontal, or 
reciprocal, deals of the ‘I scratch your back, you scratch mine’ type; (3) 
go- between practices (asking on behalf of someone rather than for one-
self) and self- serving brokerage; (4) exchange of favours and access to 
resources associated with family, friendship and other binding relation-
ships; (5) patterns of sociability such as mutual help, mutual under-
standing and exchange of information (Ledeneva 1998). By the 1980s, 
blat favours became so ubiquitous that it was difficult for people to separ-
ate friendship from the use of friendship: friends were meant to help out.
Three features of the Soviet system can account for the pervasive 
nature of blat. First, central planning and the resultant economy of short-
age made favours of access to food, goods or services essential for personal 
consumption. Double standards emerged: although the routine re- distri-
bution of resources through personal channels was not illegal, it was not 
fully legitimate either, leaving it to circumstantial factors (the need, pur-
pose and scale) to define the legitimacy of each particular transaction. 
Blat favours were ‘regulated’ by a specific social circle and by a broader 
consensus on what should be tolerated in view of consumerism. 
Second, the monopoly of state property, whereby everything and 
nothing belonged to everyone, ensured that the blurred boundaries 
between the public and private were routinely crossed. Every gatekeeper 
with a discretionary power made a decision in favour of ‘us’, and thus rede-
fined the public– private boundary into the more negotiable dichotomy 
of ‘us vs them’. Third, the centralised, future- oriented and closed nature 
of the economy enhanced the ‘us and them’ mentality at all levels, nor-
malised the double standards, and enabled the so- called ‘misrecognition 
game’, whereby a blat transaction was viewed as friendship by its insiders, 
but as blat (re- channelling of public resources into a private network) by 
outsiders. Such ambivalence in perception was essential for sustaining an 
altruistic self- image while engaging in a self- serving economy of favours.
Blat practices were intrinsically ambivalent in their functions: they 
both served the regime and the people, while simultaneously undermin-
ing the regime and corrupting the people. In authoritarian regimes, the 



























underside that lubricated the rigidity of political and economic con-
straints. As people used to say, ‘the severity of our laws is compensated 
for by their non- observance’. Soviet blat effectively became the reverse 
side of the over- controlling centre, thus enabling both people and the 
regime to survive under formally pronounced but ultimately unenforce-
able rules. It was an indispensable set of practices that enabled the Soviet 
system to function, made it tolerable, yet also subverted it. The Soviet 
system was best encapsulated by an anecdote on the ‘six paradoxes of 
socialism’: ‘No unemployment but nobody works. Nobody works but 
productivity increases. Productivity increases but shops are empty. Shops 
are empty but fridges are full. Fridges are full but nobody is satisfied. 
Nobody is satisfied but all vote unanimously’. Practices of absenteeism, 
misreporting, accessing goods in short supply, unofficial redistribution 
of official privileges, and widespread cynicism, were the open secrets of 
socialism, commonly known but officially unacknowledged and rarely 
registered in written sources inside the country. They eventually led to 
the seventh paradox of the Soviet system: ‘All voted unanimously but the 
system has collapsed anyway!’
It is only since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 that people 
have been able to reflect on such practices (just as in the 1950s, those 
who left the Soviet Union were able to describe their blat experience in 
the Harvard Interviewing Project (Fitzpatrick 2000)). Blat developed 
together with the regime and reflected its changes. At first it addressed 
basic necessities such as food, jobs and living space, helping kulaks to 
escape exile or making it possible for Bolsheviks to christen their babies 
despite the party ban on religious rituals. Then came the more sophisti-
cated needs of late socialism associated with education, mobility, con-
sumerism and self- expression. But although there may seem to be a 
parallel between the way contacts were used for competitive advantage 
in Bolshevik Russia (e.g., in order to conceal class origins given the con-
straints of the Bolshevik demand for a proletarian background) and in 
post- Soviet Russia (where contacts could allow one to be ‘appointed’ a 
millionaire), the nature of the regime must be taken into consideration.
The post- Soviet reforms have undermined three basic parameters 
of the Soviet system that constituted blat. First, functioning markets 
for goods and capital have replaced the economy of shortage in which 
everything, whether foodstuffs, goods, services, or places in hospitals 
and cemeteries, was bartered in the economy of favours. Second, state 
property was increasingly privatised, putting a price tag on the ‘favour 
of access’. Third, the sense of security and long- term horizon associated 
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the misrecognition of the instrumental side of sociability more difficult. 
The cumulative outcome of all these changes was that a new shortage 
emerged in post- socialist Russia – money – and the blat know- how had 
to adjust to it. Not only have networks reoriented themselves to serve 
this new type of shortage (to make money, to safeguard, to invest and 
to export), the use of contacts has become monetised in the sense that 
money is now not excluded from personalised exchanges. The monet-
isation of favours is particularly pronounced in the private sector that 
emerged in post- Soviet Russia and significantly transformed the ‘non- 
monetary’ feel of the good old Soviet blat. Although the expression ‘by 
blat’ is still known and understood in present- day Russia and countries 
of the former Soviet Union, the assumption of continuity of blat prac-
tices is misleading (for ‘economies of favours’ associated with the term 
blat in other Soviet and post- Soviet republics, see Mars and Altman 1983; 
Schatz 2004; Babajanian 2008; Aliyev 2013; Onoshchenko and Williams 
2013).
Yet it is also misleading to assume a complete change. It was 
believed that once the centralised system ceased to exist, there would not 
be a need for alternative currencies or an extensive use of informal net-
works. Markets would take care of functions that used to be performed 
by informal networks. However, research shows that not only does the 
use of networks not diminish – it actually increases, especially in newly 
emerging sectors (Miller et al. 2001; Rose, 2001). The legacy of social-
ism is often blamed, and the Soviet grip is indeed part of the story. But 
one must not dismiss the functionality of informal practices for political 
regimes and their effectiveness for individual problem solving. In transi-
tional economies, the defects of markets are compensated for by infor-
mal networks; low levels of impersonal trust in state institutions shift the 
burden onto interpersonal trust. The reasons for the emergence of infor-
mal practices (survival, shortage, cornered behaviour) may not be the 
same as the reasons for their reproduction (vested interests, proactive 
manipulation). Both sets of reasons need to be considered to account for 
the fundamental changes in the use of networks in the post- Soviet period 
in Russia and for the purposes of comparison.
1.2 Jeitinho (brazil)
fernanda de paiva
duarte university of Western Sydney, australia
The word jeitinho literally means ‘a little way’, and denotes a Brazilian 

























sweet- talking. DaMatta (1991: 189) describes jeitinho as ‘a clever dodge 
to bend the rules’, and it can also be viewed as a tactic to deal with unex-
pected events or inconvenient situations. As well as denoting the prac-
tice in general, the word jeitinho can be used to request help in a specific 
instance. Just as in English one can explicitly ask, ‘Can you do me a 
favour?’, in Brazil one can ask for a jeitinho by saying ‘Da um jeitinho pra 
mim’ (literally ‘Give me a jeitinho’). Hence, one might ask for a jeitinho 
when one needs an extension of time to pay an overdue bill; when one 
needs a cash advance from the boss before pay day; or when told at the 
garage that one’s car will not be fixed before the weekend. This explicit-
ness reflects the fact that jeitinho is generally regarded by Brazilians as 
a legitimate social practice. It is considered a core element of Brazilian 
cultural identity (DaMatta 1984, 1991; Barbosa 1992). It is also perva-
sive: ‘there are no dimensions in Brazilian life that are not encompassed 
by jeitinho’ (Rega 2000: 60).
In terms of its defining features, jeitinho can be characterised as 
follows. It is a personalised practice used to deal with extraordinary or 
unforeseen situations, and typically takes the form of a cordial approach 
(it is perceived to be more effective when accompanied by a smile or a 
gentle tone of voice). It involves a conscious act of bending or breaking 
the rules, and typically seeks short- term rather than long- term benefits. It 
is normally a self- serving tactic, although can also be used altruistically 
to help others. With regard to ethical judgement, jeitinho can be valued 
both positively as a harmless problem- solving strategy, and negatively as 
ruthless manipulation for personal advantage.
A particular feature that distinguishes jeitinho from an ordinary 
favour is the fact that jeitinho engenders diffuse reciprocity (Barbosa 
1992). While a favour normally involves direct reciprocity between two 
people, jeitinho transactions entail a broader type of reciprocity based 
on the assumption that anyone can receive the benefits of an instance of 
jeitinho. As stated in a popular Brazilian adage, ‘Hoje é a vez dele; amanhā 
será a minha’ (‘Today it’s his turn, tomorrow it could be my turn’).
Writers such as DaMatta (1984), Levine (1997), Ramos (1966) 
and Rosenn (1971) conceptualise jeitinho more specifically as a strat-
egy to deal with the constraints of bureaucratic rules, which make it 
hard for people to solve administrative problems that emerge in their 
day- to- day life. In the words of Levine (1997: 81), jeitinho is ‘the “way” 
to grease the wheels of government or bureaucracy, so as to obtain 
a favor or to bypass rules and regulations’. For DaMatta (1984: 99), 
jeitinho is a Brazilian style of ‘social navigation’ that enables citizens 
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‘connect the personal with the impersonal’, allowing the harmonisa-
tion of opposing interests through the creation of temporary ‘relation-
ships’ between the person requesting the favour, and the person who 
can potentially grant the favour. Referring more specifically to work 
contexts, organisational theorists conceptualise jeitinho as an informal 
problem- solving mechanism used by employees to circumvent bureau-
cratic rules (see, for example, Amado and Brasil 1991; Freitas 1997; 
Prates and Barros 1997; Duarte 2006b). The personal versus imper-
sonal dichotomy is also assumed in this particular interpretation of 
jeitinho.
In Brazilian society jeitinho involves a social choice, and there is 
thus a ‘social weight’ attributed to it. In other words, Brazilians explicitly 
recognise jeitinho and value it as a means of solving problems, perceived 
as ‘essentially Brazilian’. It is taken for granted that jeitinho is utilised by 
everyone from the poorest to the richest (Barbosa 1992: 32) – and that 
the people involved in a jeitinho transaction are clearly aware that it 
is taking place. There is also an expectation in Brazilian society that a 
jeitinho will always be granted, considering that generosity, cordiality, 
warmth and empathy are regarded as core Brazilian attributes (Da Matta 
1984, 1991; Barbosa 1992; Buarque de Hollanda 1936/ 1995; Duarte 
2011). These characteristics are consistent with those underpinning the 
notion of simpatia, or a person’s ability to make others perceive them as 
charming, likeable and easy going. Establishing simpatia is fundamental 
to ensure that a jeitinho will be granted, considering that this practice 
involves coaxing a person to obtain the desired favour (Duarte 2011).
The assumption that Brazilian jeitinho is a benign social practice is 
not nevertheless universally shared. Levine (1997: 81) warns about the 
dark side of jeitinho, expressing the view that it ‘falls between legitimate 
favors and out- and- out corruption’. He draws attention to the fact that 
in Brazilian society jeitinhos are not always granted by someone who is 
a personal acquaintance. There are instances where favours are granted 
in exchange for ‘a tip or a larger pay- off’, which renders the practice of 
jeitinho similar to bribery. Indeed, Cavalcanti (1991) compares jeitinho 
to bustarella in Italy, speed money in India and baksheesh in Egypt – which 
are all forms of bribes or facilitation payments.
A number of similar practices to jeitinho exist in other Latin American 
countries. These include palanca in Colombia and pituto in Chile, both of 
which refer to useful connections used to obtain, for example, employ-
ment. Sociolismo in Cuba refers to the practice of using connections to 
access scarce resources, and is derived from the word socio, which means 














personal contacts to obtain preferential treatment is a common feature 
across Latin American cultures.
In conclusion, jeitinho can be conceptualised as a multi- layered cul-
tural practice, which exists in an ethical continuum that extends from 
a ‘positive’ pole where it possesses benign, friendly characteristics, to a 
‘negative’ pole highlighting exploitative and even corrupt characteris-
tics (Barbosa 1992; Duarte 2006a). It reflects the complexities of a soci-
ety that oscillates between a personalist worldview emphasising family 
and friendship, and a modern, individualistic ideology that emphasises 




Sociolismo means the use of social networks (family, friendship, or other 
network connections) in Cuban society to obtain goods and services that 
are in short supply due to state rationing and the inefficiencies of the 
command economy (Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004: 4; Díaz- Briquets 
and Pérez- López 2006: 135).
The name of the concept is derived from the root word socio, which 
in Spanish means ‘partner’, ‘member’ or ‘buddy’. The best simple trans-
lation for the word is roughly ‘buddy- ism’. Furthermore, the word socio-
lismo is a pun on the commonly known Spanish word socialismo, which 
in English means ‘socialism’ (Díaz- Briquets and Pérez- López 2006: 135). 
Sociolismo is based on three important concepts within Cuban soci-
ety: simpatía (likability), confianza (trust from familiarity) and ser buena 
gente (being a good person) (Díaz- Briquets and Pérez- López 2006: 135; 
Fernández 2000:  29). Damién Fernández views sociolismo as develop-
ing from the concept of lo informal (‘that which is informal’). He states 
that:  ‘Lo informal is composed of groups of individuals who know and 
like each other […] These groups bring together peers, superiors, and 
subordinates […] Informality depends on the possibility of bending 
rules and bypassing legal norms because I/ you am/ are special and real’ 
(Fernández 2000: 29– 30).
Cubans do not tend to use the word sociolismo explicitly when 
describing their own behaviour, but rather utilise normal words that 
carry an alternative, loaded meaning. Many of the words took on their 
second meanings during the ‘Special Period’ of the 1990s, a time of 
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partner, the Soviet Union (Weinreb 2009: 65). First, the verb luchar (‘to 
struggle’) changed from its original, communist meaning of ‘struggling’ 
against imperialism and capitalism, to ‘struggling’ to survive everyday 
life. Nowadays, the word implies the ability to use connections in order 
to adjust to shortages in daily life. Sometimes this word can mean tak-
ing a little extra from the government warehouse for a friend or sell-
ing such goods for a higher price to people that need them (Weinreb 
2009: 67– 8).
The second word within the lexicon of sociolismo is the verb 
resolver, which literally means ‘to resolve’ or ‘to settle’. However, within 
the context of sociolismo it means something more akin to finding some 
type of good and taking possession of it (Weinreb 2009: 69). It can also 
be described as a mechanism of ‘getting things done’ and ‘to make ends 
meet’ (Azel 2010: 69– 70).
Conseguir in the context of the language of informality means ‘to 
obtain’ or ‘to get’. It is comparable with the use of the Russian verb dostat’ 
in the context of the practice of blat in the USSR, which literally means 
‘to reach’, but within the context of informality took on the meaning ‘to 
obtain through the use of contacts or connections’ (Ledeneva 1998: 12). 
Interestingly, in everyday Cuban- Spanish, the word conseguir often 
takes the place of the word comprar (to buy), because obtaining a good 
in the shortage economy often requires some other means than simply 
going into a shop and buying it. Weinreb gives the following example:
People say, ‘Voy a conseguir oregano’ [‘I’m going to find some ore-
gano’], instead of ‘Voy a comprar oregano’, [‘I’m going to buy some 
oregano’] because in practice this undertaking means checking the 
availability of oregano in the aisles of dollar shops; asking about 
the availability of a secret stash kept behind the counter; finding 
out which neighbour has some available to borrow, barter, or sell; 
finding it growing wild on a bush, or giving up until word arrives 
that some has become available.
(Weinreb 2009: 72– 3)
Finally, the meaning of the verb inventor (‘to invent’) is stretched 
when used as part of the lexicon of sociolismo. The main connotation 
the term carries is the ability to make anything from nothing in order to 
survive (Weinreb 2009: 76– 8). Often it implies the ‘invention’ of a new 
way around a stifling law or restriction by the government. For example, 
as the Cuban economy tried to transition through the 1990s, the gov-
ernment experimented with some forms of market reform and capital-


















would allow privatisation and then decide to go back on its reform 
(Smith 1999: 49). This created an environment of ever- changing bureau-
cratic regulations, which in turn resulted in an ever- changing amount of 
‘invented’ loopholes to the system (Smith 1999: 58).
Even today, Cuba’s economy is still about 80 per cent controlled by 
the state (Bloomberg Businessweek 2012). Furthermore, the rationing 
of goods is still in effect, which creates country- wide shortages. This, 
in effect, creates the need for systems of informality and sociolismo. 
Cuba’s system of sociolismo is a product of the fall of European social-
ism. In the 1960s and 1970s, Cuba’s economy was growing at a rate of 
5 per cent per year (DeFronzo 2007: 220). However, by the 1980s the 
Cuban economy was beginning to stagnate, along with the economies 
of European socialist states. This is largely because Cuba was econom-
ically tied to the Soviet Union, being close trade partners and relying on 
cheap goods and financial help (Valdéz Paz 2005: 105). By the 1980s, 
Cuba was no longer able to fulfil its trade requirements and by the 
1990s the Cuban economy was in complete freefall (DeFronzo 2007: 
220). Under these conditions, Cuba’s second economy developed and 
is where the practice of sociolismo thrives. According to George Lambie, 
‘the state that supplied virtually everything to the population was sud-
denly disconnected from its main sources of provisions, and had to let 
people try to resolve their own shortages’ (2010: 173). In this context, 
the collectivist ideological slogans (e.g. see Figure 1.3.1) have devel-
oped individualistic connotations.
Another political issue in Cuba that creates a safe haven for socio-
lismo practices is the extensive abuse of power by the leadership in Cuba, 
as well as high levels of state capture by politicians who influence gov-
ernment policies for their own private gain. Because of the elite’s abuse 
of their power in the Communist Party and the ever- increasing tax lev-
els on the few privatised businesses on the island, everyday Cubans are 
frozen out of the system (Erikson 2007: 227). The general population 
faces shortages and cannot afford to shop at dollar stores; they are left 
to survive for themselves, thus leading to the expansion of sociolismo. 
The introduction of the US dollar as a legal currency in Cuba in 1993 
exacerbated this situation, leading to the greater stratification of soci-
ety, and sociolismo practices expanded exponentially (Erikson 2007: 
226). When societies become stratified, those in every stratum begin 
to stick with their own group, thus tightening their social connections. 
In addition, with the introduction of the US dollar sociolismo became 
international. With remittances coming into Cuba, the trust networks 
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even more deeply rooted. These trust networks, which are a vital base 
for sociolismo, transform social structures by making society more strati-
fied from bottom to top (Tilly 2007: 10). Because remittances play such 
a major role in the Cuban economy (and act as a vital source of income 
to individual Cubans), the trust networks in place to transfer these sums 




universidad nacional autónoma de méxico, mexico
Compadrazgo is a system of reciprocity in Chilean society, which involves 
ongoing exchanges of complimentary services (favores – favours), per-
formed and motivated within an ideology of friendship. Such favours are 
often of a bureaucratic nature and usually involve giving someone prefer-
ential treatment and thus compromising the rights and priorities of third 
parties, or of the community as a whole.
Figure 1.3.1 Murals in Santa Clara, Cuba. Translation: ‘To victory, 
always’.
Source: https:// flickr.com/ photos/ rvm_ 71/ 3213435069/ in/ album- 
















The popular term compadrazgo is a euphemism for this institution, 
which should not be confused with the ritualistic Catholic institution of 
God- parenthood that shares the same name. Compadrazgo is typically 
used to obtain something with greater ease and in less time than it would 
otherwise take. The desired end is usually legal, though the means may 
be less so. Such favours are given and received in a spirit of friendship 
and without apparent guilty feelings. It is important to note that the ini-
tial favour is bestowed without any overt thought of a specific reciprocal 
return. Nevertheless, both parties understand that the beneficiary of the 
favour is ‘indebted’ to the person conferring the favour, meaning the lat-
ter can draw on a favour in return when the need arises. An unwritten 
principle of compadrazgo is contained in the Spanish saying: ‘Hoy por tí. 
mañana por mí’ (‘For you today, for me tomorrow’).
Bureaucratic favours are the most common use of compadrazgo: 
acquiring certificates, licences, permits, transcripts, passports, identity 
cards, tax clearances and countless other ‘red tape’ items that would 
otherwise require many mornings spent queuing and chasing paperwork 
from one office to another. Compadrazgo may also be used in obtain-
ing special facilities at customs, waiver of military service, granting of 
import licences and other such bureaucratic awards. Pushing a friend or 
acquaintance to the top of a waiting list for scarce items or services that 
have long waiting lists is also common: telephone service, buying a car 
at wholesale price, scholarships and grants, service commissions abroad 
and so on.
Job placement is another common use of compadrazgo. President 
Ibañez (1956– 62) is popularly credited with saying in relation to fill-
ing a job position, ‘Between a relative and a friend I prefer the relative; 
between a friend and a stranger I prefer the friend’. Lower echelon jobs 
in the administrative bureaucracy, which are in great demand among a 
large and relatively unskilled segment of the middle class, are frequently 
awarded through compadrazgo. The actual process of job hunting con-
sists in mentally reviewing all one’s personal connections in order to 
locate someone who is close to the source of appointments in a given 
agency. Conversely, finding a person for a job opening involves going 
over the list of one’s relatives and friends in the hope of discovering 
someone suitable. Personal recommendations are vital and represent 
an important favour to the applicant. Compadrazgo may be regarded 
as the basic mechanism of job allocation in the irresistible growth of 
the low- level bureaucracy in Chile. Even highly qualified people do not 
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Credit in Chile is often beyond the reach of the middle class because 
of the high collateral required, but a well- placed friend in a bank or credit 
association can facilitate matters. A Caja is a credit union operated under 
the social security system; it is supposed to provide loans, but is chronic-
ally short of funds. With the help of compadrazgo, as soon as fresh funds 
for loans become available the compadre (friend) can be notified ahead 
of the general public and his application guided to the top of the pile 
so as to get it processed before the funds are exhausted. The provision 
of confidential ‘tip- offs’ based on inside information is a typical use of 
compadrazgo. None of this appears to the practitioner as strictly illegal 
since (as one respondent told the author), ‘no harm is done except to the 
people waiting in line, every one of whom would have done the same if 
he’d had the right connection’.
Lawyer informants claim there is no end to the use of compadrazgo 
in legal matters. Files get conveniently ‘lost’, charges are suspended or 
sidetracked, witnesses are coached, fines or bail are set at minimal levels. 
The case of marriage annulments is typical because the legal case hinges 
on a technicality, e.g. proving that the clerk who performed the wedding 
had no jurisdiction over the place of residence of the couple. Proof may 
be furnished by ‘witnesses’ who could be easily discredited unless the 
judge was willing to go along for the sake of friendship or compadrazgo. 
Characteristically, the spirit of the law counts for less than the spirit of 
friendship, as long as the letter of the law has been formally complied with.
What cannot be obtained through compadrazgo? According to 
informants, anything that goes against the ideology of friendship and 
‘decency’. Sexual advances made by a man as the result of granting a 
favour to a woman would be regarded as extremely gross behaviour. Any 
behaviour that infringes middle- class standards: theft, murder, taking 
advantage of women or vulnerable people, and in general acts against 
dignity and ‘chivalry’. Such acts would destroy the rationale of friend-
ship by degrading it into downright complicity. Compadrazgo has a moral 
code that sets boundaries on permissible favours and return payments. 
However, cheating the Treasury (hacerleso al Fisco) is not regarded as a 
morally contemptible crime.
In general a feeling of friendship or common liking (simpatia) is con-
sidered essential for any compadrazgo relationship. Compadrazgo is essen-
tially a personal relationship between individuals who regard themselves 
as social equals. They are people who are regarded as peers within the 
middle- class ideology of friendship. Compadrazgo is largely confined to 
the middle class because its members are best placed to offer favours, i.e. 






















individuals could not reciprocate in kind, having only their manual labour 
to offer, while the superior status of an upper- class member would be for-
feited through the exchange of such favours, which would amount to a 
tacit admission of social equality with the middle class. Exchange may still 
exist between individuals of different social levels, but it lacks the recipro-
cal elements of favour plus friendship characteristic of compadrazgo.
Fieldwork by the author has revealed that informants are quite 
ambivalent about their compadrazgo relationships. They tend to feel 
uncomfortable discussing personal benefits obtained, particularly finan-
cial, political or legal benefits. Favours that cut red tape are acknowl-
edged freely, but more important benefits are mentioned sheepishly and 
accompanied by apologetic explanations. Most informants agree that com-
padrazgo should not exist in an ideal society, but important individual dif-
ferences were observed in the degree of rejection. Some rationalised the 
use of compadrazgo as a response to scarcity and pointed out that it devel-
ops positive traits of friendship and mutual assistance. On the one hand, 
the ideology of friendship and unselfish assistance is viewed as positive 
and worth preserving at any cost. On the other hand, it is recognised that 
compadrazgo is unfair to others, and perhaps to society as a whole. Thus 
the ambivalence of attitudes appears to be grounded in conflict between 
the ideology of class solidarity grounded in friendship and reciprocity, 




In Chile, pituto relates to a common practice based on an influential rela-
tionship with someone, used to gain some advantage (commonly a job), 
regardless of merit. Pituto describes a comparative advantage that some-
one has, based only on their network’s connections or those of their inner 
circle. According to Bazoret (2006), social capital is of utmost importance 
in the practice of pituto, as it helps to generate access to a large, informal 
network of services. This allows someone to activate different connections 
according to the obstacles they face, such as bureaucratic red tape and 
the inefficiency of the labour market. In consequence, in Chile there is a 
collective consciousness of the importance of cultivating friendships since 
childhood, especially those that represent a comparative advantage to 
one’s real social and economic position. Thus one enters adulthood with 
a wide and diverse network to appeal to in times of need. Consequently, 
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society. We can observe that pituto is closely related to, but not limited by, 
the concepts of nepotism and cronyism. Bazoret suggests that pituto can 
be understood as: ‘a form of social regulation that entails a constant and 
systematic exchange of assistance, help and support between relatives, 
friends and acquaintances. It is capitalised as a symbolic debt, which gen-
erates a significant and mandatory reciprocity’ (Bazoret 2006).
Examples of the practice of pituto include obtaining an exemption 
from any kind of payment, getting a job without having competed for it, 
an enrolment in any setting without having applied for it, and superior 
or priority treatment in a public service of any kind, clearly differentiated 
from that received by ‘ordinary’ people. This meaning of the word pituto 
has not yet been incorporated into the Real Dictionary of the Spanish 
Language (RAE), although a related verb, apitutar (which effectively 
means providing a job by influence) is included. There is a second mean-
ing of the noun pituto, which is included in the RAE, a similar concept to 
the English term ‘moonlighting’: ‘casual work, economically convenient, 
that is carried out simultaneously with a stable job and that has no offi-
cial contract’ (Real Diccionario de la Lengua Española 2014).
There is another Chilean colloquial phrase that describes a similar 
phenomenon to pituto: tener santos en la corte (literally ‘to have saints in 
court’). Rivano Fischer (2010) explains the concept as having influences, 
resources or contacts in positions of power in order to make a profit or 
obtain a favour. While the meanings of tener santos en la corte and pituto 
are closely related, the main difference between them is that santos en 
la corte refers to having contacts of the highest hierarchical importance. 
Pituto, however, does not necessarily involve someone in a position of 
power, but simply a contact that a person is able to appeal to for help if 
necessary. Pituto is therefore a broader concept than tener santos en la 
corte.
Moreover, from the word pituto derives the concept of apitutado 
(adj/ n). Chile Transparente (2009), the Chilean chapter of Transparency 
International, describes an apitutado as:
a Chilean character who is the son, parent, cousin or friend of a 
person who holds a position of power in any public or private insti-
tution, who typically has no education, merit or sufficient prepar-
ation to do some work, but remains in that position with benefits 
that others usually do not have because of his kinship or friendship 
with the person in power.
Other derivatives of apitutado can be found in traditional Chilean 





















with a job or other benefit by influence’; and (2) apitutarse or in other 
words ‘to get a job through the influence of a third party with whom there 
is a close link’ (Academia Chilena de la Lengua 2010).
It has been argued that Chile still suffers dysfunction in terms of 
its development, its modern, strong capitalist economy coexisting with 
a social organisation belonging to the rural economy that favours some 
kinds of patronage and more widely pituto (Cleary 2009). The institu-
tionalised practice of pituto conflicts with meritocracy or the selection 
process based on the merits that a person may have. This situation clearly 
represents a threat to open and clean public and private procedures. 
While the levels of corruption in Chile are lower than those found in its 
Latin American counterparts (Transparency International 2014), it is 
still possible to observe such deeply rooted practices throughout Chilean 
society. Practices like pituto have a negative impact on the levels of trans-
parency and integrity in the country, affecting not only the quality of 
democracy but also society’s confidence in its public institutions. As a 
logical consequence of this situation, there is a general distrust of recruit-
ment processes – which are often thought to be based on pituto despite 
the efforts of the Chilean state to make them more transparent. The state 
has introduced a number of measures to prevent and disincentivise pituto 
in the public sphere. These include the creation of the Consejo de la Alta 
Dirección Pública (Council of High Public Administration) in 2003; the 
enactment of the Ley de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública 
(Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information) in 2008; and the 
creation of the Consejo de Auditoría Interna General de Gobierno (Council 
of General Internal Audit of Government) in 1997 (amended in 2005). 
Nevertheless, the practice of pituto remains deeply institutionalised in 
the behaviour of the Chilean population.
1.6 Štela (bosnia and herzegovina)
carna brkovic 
Graduate School of east and Southeast european Studies, Germany
and
Karla Koutkova
central european university, hungary
Štela is a term used in Bosnia and Herzegovina to refer to people, rela-
tions and practices implicated in obtaining public or private resources 
through a personalised connection. Štela implies either that the official 
procedure was circumvented, or that there was no official procedure for 
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The word štela can refer to a person (‘on je bio njena štela’, meaning 
‘he was her štela’); a particular act of exchange (‘dobila je posao preko 
štele’, meaning ‘she got a job through a štela’); or a pervading system of 
exchange (‘tamo ide sve preko štele’, meaning ‘there, everything runs on 
štela’). Given the historical legacy of the Austro- Hungarian monarchy 
which governed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878– 1918, the word štela 
may be related to the German verb stellen, meaning ‘to put, place or pro-
vide’, as well as to the German noun Stelle, meaning ‘a position or a place’. 
Veza, meaning ‘a relation’ as well as ‘a connection’, is another term used 
to refer to the same practice across former Yugoslav countries, including 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Some 95 per cent of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina considered 
štela to be ‘always’ or ‘occasionally’ necessary for accessing basic services 
such as employment, education, or health care, according to a United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on social capital and ties 
(Nixon 2009). The report provides quantitative and qualitative data on the 
overwhelming importance of štela in Bosnia and Herzegovina and suggests 
that most of the country’s residents understand its implicit ‘terms and con-
ditions’ in contemporary everyday life. Table 1.6.1 shows the responses of 
1,600 citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the question ‘When is štela 
useful?’ – for accessing employment, education, health care, public author-
ities, and services such as obtaining a visa and other official documents. 
Quantitative analysis of the data set shows little variance in terms of gen-
der, ethnicity, age or education background of the respondents.
perceived importance of informal networks in Bih in percentages
Ethnographic research reveals a pattern similar to that presented by the 
UNDP report (see Bougarel et  al. 2007; Grandits 2007; Vetters 2014). 
Table 1.6.1 Usefulness of štela for getting …
How useful is štela in 
getting…?










Always useful 85.7 80.1 79.4 76.9 75.1 74.6
Sometimes useful 8 10.7 12.8 14.1 14.4 13.4
Occasionally useful 1.2 2.2 2.8 3.1 4.6 4
Never useful 1.5 2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1
Don’t know/ No answer 3.5 4.9 3.7 4.5 4.4 5.8
Source: UNDP National Human Development Report 2009. http:// hdr.undp.org/ sites/ 






















Namely, residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina of different generations, 
ethno- national groups, genders or income have used štele to access pub-
lic and private resources throughout the 2000s and 2010s. This does 
not mean that identity differences were not important for redistribut-
ing access via any given štela, or that anyone could have asked anyone 
else to be their štela. On the contrary, people usually relied on those they 
already knew – friends and relatives, acquaintances, former classmates, 
or work colleagues – to access resources via a štela. Thus, although štele 
are widely used by all citizens across Bosnia and Herzegovina, they are 
firmly rooted in people’s existing social worlds, groups and experiences, 
reproducing existing social differences.
The term štela can refer to a wide spectrum of social relations. 
Obtaining a resource via a štela may involve a dyadic relationship in 
which there is one beneficiary and one intermediary, but it may also 
extend into a chain of connections among unequally positioned per-
sons. It is not unusual for people not to know all the others tempor-
arily connected by the same chain. In a similar manner, štela may 
refer to obtaining a resource through close relatives and friends, 
thereby reflecting meanings of kinship, friendship and love. However, 
it can also refer to temporary connections, forged on the spot among 
acquaintances, co- workers, or people who got to know one another 
through a third party.
The exact form each štela takes depends on the person who needs 
a resource, the contacts available to them, and the kind of resource that 
is needed. For instance, when people need to obtain an official document 
or gain access to a certain medical practitioner, they often look for a štela 
among colleagues, co- workers or friends of friends. However, when they 
search for employment, especially for permanent positions, the stakes 
are higher and it is more likely that a štela will be found among close 
relatives and friends. Therefore, when people look for a štela, they do 
not follow a culturally well- established set of steps or rules. As with other 
forms of sociality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, such as komšiluk (mean-
ing ‘neighbourhood’, see Sorabji 2007; Henig 2012) or raja (Šavija- Valha 
2013), there is no set number of drinks that has to be shared, or verbal 
formulas that should be exchanged, in order to obtain something via a 
štela. Rather, people engage in a calibration of possibilities – they use 
their existing social connections and relations and adapt their strategies 
along the way to a resource they need.
The 1992– 5 war and the subsequent post- conflict state- building 
processes brought an influx of foreign humanitarian relief and devel-
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UNHCR, UNDP, IOM, UNICEF, OSCE, and EU Delegation (see Pugh 2005; 
Helms 2013; Hromadžić 2015). The social dynamics within these organi-
sations brought to the fore the similarities between what the domestic 
employees understood as štela and what the foreign staff framed as ‘net-
working’ (Baker 2014). For the ‘internationals’, there seemed to be a clear 
difference between these two practices, whereby they considered štela to 
be backward and corrupt. For the local employees, however, the diffe-
rence between these two practices was marginal. Some of them found 
‘networking’ to be a way to reframe and translate the practice of štela into 
the language of the Westerners. Bosnia- Herzegovinian staff considered 
some of the practices in the world of the ‘internationals’ to be equivalent 
to štela, such as the allocation of internships through personal networks 
as gateways to future employment, or holding ko fol (literally ‘as if’ or 
‘fake’) recruitment procedures.
Štela largely provokes dissatisfaction, criticism and a certain sense 
of shame among people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although seemingly 
everybody uses štela, people often blame others for obtaining resources 
in this way and express their own powerlessness about it. Using a štela 
is perceived more as something to be ‘confessed’ than ‘bragged about’. 
The dominant perception is that there would be no need to obtain 
resources via a štela if Bosnia and Herzegovina were a ‘normal’ country 
(see Jansen 2015). That is, if it resembled a state in which jobs, health 
care, education, and social support were accessible to everybody. 
Similarly, the 2009 UNDP report indicates that its respondents shared 
a sense of hopelessness and resignation with the status quo: ‘(Štela) 
is considered normal … It is as widespread as if it were given by God 
(…) we cannot do anything about it (female, employed, two children, 
Sarajevo)’ (Nixon 2009).
When attempts to obtain a resource via a štela turn out to be unsuc-
cessful, people sometimes try to get what they need by offering monetary 
payments. Most of the respondents to the UNDP report outlined rough 
financial amounts to be paid should one not find štela brokers among 
people one knew well. Thus, a monetary payment for a resource easily 
takes place when it is not possible to obtain the resource through per-
sonal relations. Since štela is used to circumvent an official procedure 
(or compensate for the lack of such a procedure), monetary exchange – 
despite being conceptually different from štela exchange – is in practice 
never located too far away from it.
Štela does not usually involve monetary transactions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, but it does create a sense of gratefulness and indebt-































in return, such as a piece of jewellery, perfume, a painting or flowers. 
The financial value of such gifts depends on a range of factors, such as 
income level and whether there was a previously existing relationship 
with the person who helped. For instance, when family members help 
one to access a resource, their favour does not necessarily need to be 
reciprocated in the foreseeable future, because it is already embedded 
in a long- term relationship of give and take. However, when a štela 
is established through a third party, there is more of an expectation 
to reciprocate immediately by ‘rewarding’ the favour giver with a 
material (or sometimes even financial) gift upon obtaining the desired 
resource.
As in almost any other form of giving, helping people to obtain a 
resource via a štela reinforces mutual social obligations. Štela is not just 
a form of material exchange, but a practice that reproduces existing and 
creates new social connections between people. When people connected 
via a štela occupy similar positions of power (and therefore could pro-
vide access to similar kinds of resources), this could turn into a long- 
term cycle of reciprocal exchange. However, štela also often links people 
in unequal power positions. In such situations, štela usually reproduces 
existing power arrangements, by confirming that the person in a more 
powerful position (such as a doctor, a politician, a director of a com-
pany or a teacher) is the one who can help others via a štela. The sense 
of indebtedness and gratefulness for a štela to the more powerful person 
reconfirms existing inequalities and differences.
In addition to reproducing existing social arrangements, štela 
can also make new things happen. For instance, štela can contribute to 
increasing one’s own influence and power (Brković 2017). Some people 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, over time, have learnt how to serve as a štela 
for an ever- increasing number of people, doing so across multiple pub-
lic and private arenas (see Stubbs 2013). In being able to skilfully help 
others to access various resources by circumventing the official proced-
ure, they augment their own influence and power.
1.7 Veza (Serbia)
dragan Stanojevic and dragana Stokanic
university of belgrade, Serbia
The term veza (plural veze) literally means ‘connection’, and refers to 
the use of informal contacts in order to obtain access to opportunities 
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include information, services or goods for the benefit of an individual, 
group or organisation.
Where an individual is concerned, veze may be used instrumen-
tally to serve the purpose of personal consumption, interests or goals; 
this may include access to services such as medical care, or obtaining for-
mal documents such as a certificate, licence or permit. Veze ties may also 
be used by public or private organisations in order to secure privileged 
results. Connections in political, economic and everyday life may serve 
as a substitute mechanism enabling such organisations to influence other 
organisations’ decision- making procedures in ways that would not be 
possible using formal means alone.
A survey of young people (aged 19– 35) found that 25 per cent of 
recent graduates had used their parents’ veze to find a job (Tomanovic, 
et al 2012). According to the same survey, 24.6 per cent of all those in 
employment found their jobs by means of their parents’ veze. While grad-
uates are linked to their parents by strong ties, it is weak ties – parents’ 
contacts to whom the graduates themselves are unlikely to be bound – 
that are most likely to help them get jobs (Granovetter 1973, 1995).
Etymologically, the word veza derives from cohesion and binding 
exchange. The term may also refer to regular telephone communication 
(na vezi sa …) or to an emotional relationship between two people (u vezi 
sa …). The Dictionary of Serbian Language (Nikolić 2007: 134) gives sev-
eral meanings, but the closest to this informal practice is ‘mutual relations 
between people, something that connects them, brings them together: 
marital ties, friendship, love, cultural affinity, trade connections’. Veza 
may also mean ‘a close acquaintance, friendship with an influential per-
son’. The term’s connotations may also include intense relations that 
imply reciprocity and trust between actors based on mutually binding 
ties or the existence of a guarantor or mediator.
The term veze is often used as a euphemism for using contacts in 
order to get things done. The expressions used in this context are as fol-
lows: ‘I know the man’ (Znam čoveka), ‘See what can be done!’ (Vidi šta 
može da se uradi), ‘It will be taken care of’ (Biće sređeno) (Stanojevic and 
Stokanic 2014). Connections may facilitate both legal and illegal activ-
ities. In the vernacular, the term is used to embrace a wide spectrum of 
practices, from such trivial legal activities as passing on information about 
job vacancies (since for important jobs it is necessary to know the right 
people) or getting advice on the best doctor, through semi- legal activities 
such as exercising discretion and favouring a certain candidate at a job 
interview, to illegal practices such as fixed or unfairly awarded tenders. 





















is operationalised and used instrumentally (Tomanović and Ignjatović 
2004; Tomanović 2008; Cveticanin 2012). Other researchers have 
focused on the use of connections in the economy (Cvejić 2006; Babović 
2009; Stokanić 2009) and politics (Goati 2006; Pavlović 2007; Antonić 
2011; Vuletic and Stanojevic 2014; Stanojevic and Stokanic 2014).
In the political sphere, one speaks of političke veze (political con-
nections). Informal political connections have been especially important 
in the whole period of modern Serbian statehood (nineteenth century 
onwards), in particular during the monarchy (until 1945). All polit-
ical parties had kafanas, traditional restaurants or bars, where political 
strategies and tactics were organised and negotiated (Stojanovic 2012). 
Although the term političke veze predates the socialist period, its use 
took on a new importance during that era. The Communist Party con-
trolled the entire social system, and političke veze provided competitive 
advantages through access to information and state orders requiring 
party authorisation. Političke veze also reinforced certain individuals’ 
dependency on and loyalty to the Communist Party system by guaran-
teed privileges and personal promotion – something that also benefitted 
their family, friends and associates.
The years following the collapse of socialism, and especially follow-
ing the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in 2000, saw the introduction of 
privatisation and market reforms, and the move to a multi- party political 
system. Today, veze denotes not only connections to the ruling party, but 
also enhanced access to public resources through appointments, or the 
‘assisted’ winning of state tenders by private firms. The current situation, 
characterised by a shortage of resources and weak institutions, ensures 
that the state is a significant player in the field of opportunities. For this 
reason, political parties fight to secure a monopoly over state resources in 
order to secure their own political survival. The downside of such mon-
opolisation is a major redistribution of resources by means of informal 
channels. These channels include promising jobs to (potential) voters 
whose support could influence a large number of people to vote for the 
party in question, and guaranteeing private enterprises that they will 
receive concessions and state orders, even when the latter are supposedly 
awarded on a competitive basis.
Serbian opinion polls indicate that political engagement is per-
ceived as a social lift. This in turn leads to a high level of membership 
in political parties. The percentage of party membership in Serbia is 
among the highest in Europe – 12.2 per cent (World Values Survey Data 
2005– 8), and it has been at this level since the period of late socialism. 
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membership rates of individual parties vary significantly according to 
whether that party is in power (Goati 2006: 134– 6). This demonstrates 
that individuals have instrumental reasons for becoming party members.
A survey of young people in Serbia (Mojić 2012: 103) suggests that 
informal channels are seen as the most effective routes for social mobil-
ity. More than two- thirds of those surveyed said that knowing the right 
people was crucial, while about half saw political affiliation as key, and 
only one-third of young people saw education as important.
In the economic sphere, informal contacts are used to avoid 
state regulation and circumvent the constraints of formal institutions. 
Likewise, personal connections are used to circumvent formal proce-
dures. Entrepreneurs create safety nets of social networks to secure 
predictability in the economic sphere. Risks associated with illegal infor-
mal activities are avoided by creating personal relations with business 
partners and consumers. Circles of trust are based on already existing 
social ties – close neighbours, friends and relatives. Ethnic communities 
use family and other connections to establish ‘ethnic niches’ in certain 
sectors. For example, Bosniaks in Sandžak, south- western Serbia, used 
social networks to organise small firms to produce jeans (Stokanić 2009). 
By exploiting informal connections, entrepreneurs can secure reliable 
workers, raw materials, machinery, partners, distributers and con-
sumers. Meanwhile, consumers use informal networks to obtain goods 
and services in short supply.
Administrative connections are used not only to secure legal rights 
(obtaining information or administrative permits), but also to bypass 
legal procedures. Research indicates that administrative access plays a 
significant role in enabling businesses to function (Cvejić 2016). Serbian 
families use social networks in order to access vital resources such as 
health care or the police. In 2008, nearly half of those surveyed said they 
could rely on the support of at least three people in the case of an emer-
gency (Tomanović 2008). Some 40 per cent could rely on one or two such 
persons, while only 13 per cent had no individual on whom they could 
rely. As regards young people, 13 per cent of those surveyed said they 
used their parents’ contacts to solve administrative problems (Stanojevic 
2012).
Serbia’s economic and political elites are tightly intertwined. 
Informal ties provide members of the elite with financial support, con-
tracts and valuable information. Patron– client relationships connecting 
political and economic elites facilitate but also impede Serbia’s institu-



































Vrski means the use of personal networks, connections and infor-
mal contacts to obtain goods and services in Macedonia. Vrski in 
Macedonian can be translated as ‘connections’, and is related to the 
words vrska (connection) and povrzan (connected). The term therefore 
has various meanings and is used in several mostly benign contexts, 
from the ties between people or things to the government’s Ministry of 
Transportation (Ministerstvo za Transport i Vrski, with ‘vrski’ referring 
to the logistics relevant to transportation).
As a form of social capital, however, the term is scarcely written 
about within the country (such as in media) and there is in fact little 
academic literature on vrski in Macedonia. Rather, the term is used col-
loquially such as when discussing an individual of means, and its infor-
mal meaning is widely understood. If asked ‘How does s/ he have …?’ the 
reply will often simply be ‘vrski’ or an explanation of someone’s connec-
tions. For vrski are the connections one’s family has and as anthropologist 
Ilká Thiessen (2007) observed, they help individuals not only get a job 
but ensure that one will not be easily laid off. In fact, Thiessen noted that 
through vrski work may be given to someone who is not only unqualified, 
but may never perform the expected duties. ‘Who you know’ rather than 
expertise may thus often be the most important factor in acquiring work. 
Indeed, Keith Brown wrote of vrski: ‘the reported prevalence and import-
ance of vrski is at the heart of many Macedonian critiques of how their 
society operates: vrski underpin corruption, nepotism, the black market, 
and every other obstacle citizens face in negotiating everyday life’ (2006: 
74). Use of vrski can be both legal and illegal, and beneficial to an individ-
ual when successfully transacted, but a hindrance when formal mecha-
nisms for a procedure are disregarded due to a lack of such connections.
While the practice of vrski is seen as corrupting, the use of such 
informal connections is common and many Macedonians will instinct-
ively call upon the contacts of friends and family in order to assure a 
beneficial outcome. Such situations typically include acquiring work, 
accessing a public service (such as getting their child into the best school 
or completing a bureaucratic procedure), or obtaining a particular good. 
Shared origins are very important in a small nation such as Macedonia 
and in the capital Skopje, where many inhabitants are only one or two 
generations removed from their ancestral villages and towns. Therefore, 
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Once a connection is made, enacting the use of vrski often includes 
meeting the connection outside in public or just outside of their office 
(so as to be escorted in and better assisted). The individual soliciting the 
favour may bring a small gift (e.g. a package of Turkish coffee, chocolates 
or a bottle of brandy) as a token of appreciation. Occasionally, a bribe 
(mito) is necessary in the transaction, though this is not common for 
most Macedonians engaged in such informal transactions. Conversation 
about their connection is important as well, because the closer the con-
nection the greater the likelihood of the service or favour being suc-
cessfully obtained. In fact, the individual providing the service may feel 
particularly obliged to lend their assistance if the individual seeking 
such help has been sent by a particularly important acquaintance (e.g. 
a mayor, godfather, or someone to whom they are indebted). The prac-
tice is thus cyclical, and helps maintain a social fabric and ‘economy of 
favours’ (Ledeneva 1998) comprised of cooperative, overlapping struc-
tured behaviour.
The use of vrski has had a negative effect on the provision of state 
services under the post- socialist restructuring of government and the 
economy. The state has intentionally exited from providing a number of 
formerly state- run services by implementing privatisation programmes. 
Privatisation has taken place due to the pursuit of free market princi-
ples, but also, arguably, in order for politicians and their vrski to profit 
privately. Through transferring responsibility to the private sector and 
ceasing to provide services, the state has opened up opportunities to the 
owners of private enterprises, who are made aware of these opportun-
ities through their network and connections. Consequently, politicians 
and their acquaintances have appropriated state capital through the pri-
vatisation of its services, from utilities to higher education to agriculture. 
As an example, when the state’s largest winery was privatised and taken 
over by an investment holding firm, political figures including the (state- 
appointed) director of the winery as well as local and national political 
figures personally profited from the transaction. In particular, the former 
winery director acquired enough income to build a villa and small winery 
of his own (Otten 2013).
Another form of corruption induced by vrski between the public 
and private sectors is closely linked to the English- language concept of 
‘kickbacks’. If a government agency is looking to contract out a particu-
lar service, a bureaucrat may use vrski networks to commission a private 
business that provides such services. However, both the bureaucrat and 
the business owner will expect personal gain from the engagement and 


























vrski combined with self- gain are lamented but expected, and should be 
factored into budgeting for a public– private partnership. Vrski thus com-
bines with the interaction between public and private sectors to facilitate 
such kickbacks.
‘Informal’ economic practices have been defined by Hart (2009) 
as those falling outside of or that are invisible to bureaucratic form. He 
therefore states that ‘the task is not only to find practical ways of harness-
ing the complementary potential of bureaucracy and informality, but 
also to advance thinking about their dialectical movement’. Further, Hart 
asserts that neoliberal globalisation has expanded the scope of infor-
mal activities, so that there must be an examination of the social forms 
that organise them and their relation to governments, corporations and 
international agencies. Vrski should therefore provoke concern about 
the development of what Saskia Sassen (2014) calls ‘predatory forma-
tions’: mixes of elites, global networks, laws and government policies, all 
of which help constitute a ‘brutality’ in the modern global economy and 
the ‘expulsion’ of mass numbers of individuals from a decent standard 
of living. Indeed, to return to the case of the former winery director, his 
gain was a loss to many others in the community, and his villa was one 
in which he had to essentially hide out due to anger by the wine region’s 
residents over the winery’s privatisation.
Within the Southeast European region, personal networks are uti-
lised in a comparable manner to Macedonian vrski, and in the neighbour-
ing Slavic- speaking countries the terms are similar: vruzki (връзки) in 
Bulgaria (see Chavdarova 2013) and veze (везе) in Serbia. All of these 
practices can involve bribes, gifts and other forms of potential corrup-
tion, and are thus seen as unfair practices by those who do not benefit 
from them to the extent of others. Such favours help create significant 
privileges for individuals connected to the ruling powers and state appar-
atus who continue to benefit from the transfers of wealth occurring 




Vruzki means connections or ties in Bulgarian. The term denotes a set of 
informal rules for building and maintaining personal commitments and 
loyalties in a formal environment; these are the rules by which a social 
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of vruzki exchanges are the ‘favours of access to goods and services in short 
supply’ (Ledeneva 1998). Vruzki work to reduce social risk and guaran-
tee privileged access. The phrase zadejstvam vruzki (literally, to activate 
connections) is similar to the British idiom ‘pulling strings’. It emphasises 
the active element in vruzki. It is the action- taker, vruzkar (връзкар), who 
uses vruzki and thus engages in the practice of vruzkarstvo.
Vruzki may be based on long- term relationships that are direct 
and dyadic (that is, between a pair of individuals), or that are mediated 
and linked into a chain on a short- term basis. The norms of reciprocity 
prescribe some delay in reciprocation and some asymmetry in value. 
Vruzki are guided by the norms and ethics of interpersonal relations in 
general and of extended family and kinship in particular. The latter are 
manifested in a much- used colloquial word shurobadjanastina, which 
points to the nepotistic usage of vruzki in the search for employment or 
professional promotion. This term consists of two parts, each denoting 
brothers- in- law:  brothers of wives (shurej) and husbands of wives’ sis-
ters (badjanak). Already a tongue- twister, shurobadjanastina is actually 
a shortened version of zetjo- shuro- badjanakisum, where the add- on zetjo 
denotes son- in- law. The first use of this term dates to 1880, when the 
columnist Zahari Stoyanov published a satirical article, ‘Do you know 
who we are?’ (Stoyanov 1880/ 2002: 211). According to Stoyanov, vru-
zkarstvo was set to become an essential institution after the liberation of 
Bulgaria from Ottoman rule in 1878 and the subsequent unification of 
the Principality of Bulgaria and the then- Ottoman province of Southern 
Bulgaria in 1885. In Stoyanov’s words, ‘The Unification had first of all to 
be accomplished in the triple union:  zetjo- shuro- badjanakisma’ (1880/ 
2002: 214).
As an informal institution, vruzki create shared expectations among 
the parties to the exchange as to how their private roles in personal rela-
tionships (family, friends) interweave with their public, socio- profes-
sional roles. As a result, two mechanisms emerge through which vruzki 
function: either the instrumentalisation of personal relationships, or the 
personalisation of social relationships. The primacy of personal relation-
ships in daily life has long been part of tradition and culture in Bulgarian 
society, but these relationships are also moulded by institutional factors 
characteristic of the European periphery, such as deep distrust of public 
institutions and blurred boundaries between the public and the private 
spheres (Giordano 2003).
The personal trust that underlies vruzki relationships has a reverse 
side: distrust of the faceless ‘Other’. In his seminal analysis of daily life 






















articulated popular wisdom and expectations as follows: ‘Everybody is a 
crook until proven otherwise’ (emphasis in original); ‘Treat everyone like 
a crook; the burden of proving otherwise … rests on him/ her’ (Hadjiiski 
1945/ 1974: 29). To counterbalance the culture of low impersonal trust, 
personal trust relationships are introduced into the formal environment. 
These personal channels help to overcome systemic and societal mistrust 
by creating overlap between the private and the public spheres. Vruzki 
may lead to the accumulation of positive social capital, but they may also 
reveal the detrimental effects of negative social capital, such as exclusion 
of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on individ-
ual freedoms and ‘downward levelling norms’ (Portes 1998: 15).
The content and specific manifestations of vruzki depend on con-
crete historical conditions. During Bulgaria’s socialist period (1946– 90) 
vruzki closely resembled Russian blat, defined as ‘use of personal networks 
for obtaining goods and services in short supply and for circumventing 
formal procedures’ (Ledeneva 1998: 1). And while scholars refer to vruzki 
as the ‘second network’ (Rajchev 1985: 13– 36), folklore emphasised their 
primary importance. As one popular saying had it, ‘Without vruzki, a per-
son can neither be born nor die’ (Benovska- Sabkova 2001: 174).
Bulgaria’s post- 1990 transition to a market economy changed 
the modus operandi of vruzki, as they evolved from an instrument of 
consumption maximisation into an instrument of utility maximisa-
tion (Chavdarova 2013). The logic can be traced back to the way in 
which vruzki functioned as early as Bulgaria’s first capitalist period 
(Chavdarova 2001; Benovska- Sabkova 2003) but remains relevant in 
the post- socialist period, when the indicators of impersonal, or soci-
etal, trust hit a new low (ESS 2009). The hardship suffered by ordin-
ary people during Bulgaria’s transition from socialism to the market 
partly explains why vruzkarstvo has remained so vital. The shortages 
of goods and services that typified the socialist economy were replaced 
by shortages of money, jobs and trustworthy partners. Compensating 
for these deficiencies became a highly significant and widely spread 
factor in vruzki exchanges. Recurrent exchanges of favours have 
shaped expectations and rules of behaviour. The rules implicitly postu-
late that utility is expected to increase when impersonal relationships 
become personal (Chavdarova 2014).
The notion of vruzki does not by definition mean violating the 
established formal procedures, even though everyday usage of the 
term often carries a negative connotation. Such widely used phrases as 
‘doing/ obtaining/ arranging something in the second way’ indicate that 
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not mean avoiding the formal. Like most informal practices, vruzki fall 
between clear categories such as legal and illegal (permitted/ prohibited 
by law), or licit and illicit (socially perceived as acceptable/ unaccept-
able) (van Schendel and Abraham 2005). The reciprocal exchange of 
favours of access might be legal/ licit (such as the exchange of profes-
sional favours) or illegal/ illicit (when social ties are used as, for exam-
ple, a means of practising corruption, clientelism or nepotism). While 
legal/ licit informal practices imply predominantly symmetrical rela-
tions between the counterparts, asymmetrical links prevail in illegal/ 
illicit practices. The latter are usually power relations aimed at the covert 
redistribution of resources. Thus, although vruzki obey the principle of 
reciprocity, the term may also have substantial hidden redistributional 
effects at the macro- level and support both profit- and rent- seeking types 
of behaviour.
The outcomes of the use of vruzki may converge with those aimed 
at by formal institutions or they may diverge from them (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004). On the one hand, vruzki may guarantee contracts, facili-
tate transactions and reinforce the mechanisms of reputation, thereby 
supporting the public order. On the other hand, vruzki could overthrow 
formal mechanisms since they may help create hidden monopolies and 
uphold unfair competition.
Vruzki are found in all areas of contemporary social life in Bulgaria. 
Much empirical research – mostly sociological and ethnological – has 
been done since 1989 on specific aspects or practices related to vruzki. 
There is still, however, a need for more theoretical work that would place 
vruzki in comparative perspective with blat in Russia, kombinowanje in 
Poland, veze (везе) in Serbia (see 1.7 in this volume), meson in Greece 
(Benovska- Sabkova 2001: 227) and torpil in Turkey (Rutz and Balkan 
2009: 62; see 6.10 Volume 2).
1.10 Natsnoboba (Georgia)
huseyn aliyev
research center for east european Studies  
(forschungsstelle osteuropa), Germany
The South Caucasian republic of Georgia has been known for the spread 
and importance of informal practices for centuries (Shelley et al. 2007). 
Until the late Soviet period, similar to its South and North Caucasian 
neighbours, the bulk of Georgian informal practices thrived within tightly 
knit kinship networks, sustained by extended patriarchal families. Such 

















and tribal societies in other parts of the world, yet were also undermined 
and transformed by the decades of collectivisation, urbanisation and 
social reorganisation associated with Sovietisation (Aliyev 2015: 77– 8). 
The gradual retreat of extended traditional families into rural enclaves 
gave rise to informal networks of connections and acquaintances, which 
became instrumental in rapidly transforming the social milieus of 
Georgian urban metropolises. The widespread use of contacts and net-
works, known as natsnoboba, also transliterated as nacnoboba, became 
typical.
Natsnoboba translates from Georgian as ‘acquaintances’ and, simi-
larly to Chinese guanxi (‘acquaintances’) or Korean gwangue (Yang 1994; 
Gold et al. 2002), refers to an extensive individual network of connections 
and contacts. The use of natsnoboba belongs to a ‘bigger family’ of informal 
practices – Russian blat (Ledeneva 1998), Arab wasta (Cunningham et al. 
1994) and Brazilian jeitinho (Amado and Brasil 1991) – which rely on the 
instrumental use of connections, friends and acquaintances. Among the 
most notable regional equivalents of natsnoboba are Azerbaijan’s tanisliq 
and Armenian tsanot networks, which are similarly based upon loosely 
knit groups of remotely connected friends and acquaintances. The term 
natsnoboba has two subtly different meanings in the Georgian language, 
which means that researchers must analyse any use of the term in context. 
First, natsnoboba can refer to the strategic use of contacts: one’s informal 
network of acquaintances and familiar individuals, including colleagues 
and remote friends, but excluding close friends (the latter are consid-
ered part of closer and more intimate megobroba (friendship) groups). 
However, the word natsnoboba can also be used in a more general sense, 
to refer simply to one’s acquaintances in the sense of people one happens 
to know, with no implications of ‘networks’ or ‘useful contacts’. This dual 
use of the term makes it challenging to determine specific types of infor-
mal relations when referred to in the media.
The rise of reciprocal networks of acquaintances is a relatively 
recent phenomenon, especially when contrasted with kinship or friend-
ship networks, which were at the core of Georgian social relations for 
centuries. Due to de- traditionalisation and social standardisation pro-
cesses enforced by Soviet authorities, networks of acquaintances became 
part of urban life under Soviet rule. As with many other socialist soci-
eties, shortages in the Soviet command economy and the pervasive 
interference of the Communist Party into the private sphere accelerated 
the spread of informal networks in Georgia. The decline of traditional 
kinship structures, particularly in urban areas, and the steady appear-
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Expanding one’s informal contacts beyond the limits of relatively narrow 
family and kinship groups enabled Georgians to access resources outside 
of their immediate friendship ties. Given the lack of empirical data on 
natsnoboba, it is difficult to establish when exactly they became an inte-
gral part of Georgian social life. Reliance on networks of connections and 
acquaintances was best documented in studies of the Georgian informal 
scene in the late communist period (Mars and Altman 1983). Georgian 
films of that period (e.g. Mimino 1977, Tbilisi and Her Citizens 1976) also 
allow us to conclude that the rise of natsnoboba was associated with 
urbanisation, modernisation and atomisation of Georgian society under 
‘developed socialism’.
Natsnoboba became particularly instrumental during the immedi-
ate post- communist period, when economic hardships and the weakness 
of state institutions forced the population to rely extensively on private 
safety nets. Of these, access to public goods distributed through natsno-
boba networks was one of the key assets for every Georgian.
The tough economic environment of the 1990s often necessitated 
Georgians to maintain complex networks of acquaintances, which could 
be used in the search for jobs, receiving preferential treatment at state 
institutions, and other forms of problem solving. With the decline of 
kinship networks and the gradual shift of Georgian social organisation – 
particularly in urban settings – towards nuclear family groups, natsno-
boba networks function as an essential element of private safety nets. As 
revealed during fieldwork conducted by the author in the Georgian cap-
ital city Tbilisi, natsnoboba networks have largely replaced kinship and 
extended family structures in their daily significance.
One of the key reasons behind the rise of natsnoboba in contempor-
ary Georgian society, along with urbanisation and modernisation, is the 
potential of open- ended networks. The use of natsnoboba allows individ-
uals to expand their connections beyond fairly narrow groups defined by 
kinship or close friends. By developing ‘weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973), 
natsnoboba contacts enable Georgians to access public goods and ser-
vices inaccessible through their own networks – the feature essential for 
the effectiveness of the economy of favours.
A typical natsnoboba network consists of several ‘layers’ of con-
tacts. The core of the network normally comprises an individual’s 
well- known acquaintances. The next layer is composed of occasional 
acquaintances, remote neighbours, work colleagues and former class-
mates. The final layer includes individuals with whom the immedi-
ate network- owner may not be personally familiar – they are friends 





















favours, the network- owner may have to deal with a wide range of 
individuals or a number of links in the chain of contacts in order to 
achieve the desired goal. Unlike smaller and more intimate friendship 
groups, natsnoboba extends across several circles of contacts. Although 
each individual’s list of natsnoboba contacts may include dozens or 
even hundreds of names, there would be only occasional interaction 
with most of these people. As one informant from Tbilisi stated to the 
author, ‘it is very important to maintain these [natsnoboba] networks, 
even if you are never going to contact most of them’. This means that 
the accumulation of contacts and expansion of one’s network functions 
as a form of private safety net, which can be invoked in case of emergen-
cies. Regardless of previous cooperation (or the lack thereof) between 
the network members, each contact may potentially be expected to pro-
vide a favour when asked.
Employing natsnoboba connections almost always generates the 
need for a reciprocal favour, even if not directly. Sometimes these favours 
take the form of a gift including monetary gifts (krtami), sometimes they 
necessitate a return favour. The nature of reciprocity in each natsno-
boba relation depends on the proximity between network members and 
the importance or value of the favour. Although natsnoboba may pave 
the way for a bribe, the underlying principle of using ‘acquaintances’ is 
to secure access to public goods or services, which cannot be acquired 
through a straightforward offer of a bribe. For example, prior to the 2003 
Rose Revolution, receiving a land register or extending one’s passport, as 
well as many other official documents, often required using natsnoboba 
in order to access officials in state institutions.
The extensive institutional reforms implemented by President 
Mikheil Saakashvili specifically targeted the use of informal prac-
tices, including use of natsnoboba in dealings with formal institutions. 
Streamlining the workings of state institutions, reducing their central-
isation and bureaucracy and simplifying application procedures for 
acquiring official documents have significantly undermined the import-
ance of natsnoboba in this domain. Numerous informants interviewed 
by the author in 2013– 14 stated that since the mid- 2000s neither they 
nor their family members have employed natsnoboba to receive pref-
erential treatment at state institutions. Nevertheless, natsnoboba con-
tinues to play an important role in the educational sphere and search 
for jobs (Aliyev 2014: 30). For instance, as reported by the Caucasus 
Barometer (CRRC) survey conducted in 2013, over 30 per cent of 
respondents indicated that using informal connections remains ‘the 
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still widely used as community- based mechanisms of support and 
coping with hardship in urban areas, where for many Georgians the 
availability of kinship connections became even more limited in the 
post- communist period.
1.11 Tanish- bilish (uzbekistan)
rano Turaeva
max planck institute for Social anthropology, Germany
Tanish- bilish is an Uzbek term for networks/ contacts used for extract-
ing both material and non- material resources, or just for ‘getting things 
done’ (ishingni bitirish). Tanish- bilish literally translates as ‘acquaint-
ance- known’, and may thus be considered a form of social capital. Schatz 
has described tanish- bilish as ‘access networks’, but claims they are often 
mistaken for clan networks (Schatz 2004: 62). In tanish- bilish networks, 
families and other forms of kinship play a primary role in terms of affili-
ation and strength of ties. However, other ties cross cut or overlap within 
the networks, including sub- ethnicities, regional identity, clan identity, 
professional belonging and various kinds of friendships (tanish, dost, 
chin dost). Tanish refers to an acquaintance, dost or jora to a friend and 
chin dost to a close friend.
Etymologically the term tanish- bilish consists of two full words: 
tanish (acquaintance), and bilish, which is a gerund form of the verb 
bilmak and can be translated as ‘getting to know’. It can also be written 
in unhyphenated form – tanish bilish. Related terms in other Turkic lan-
guages include tanish orqilu in Kyrgiz, tanis bilu in Kazakh, daniş biliş in 
Turkmen, tanysh- bilish in Tatar, and tanysh- bilish in Kumyk (Alekseev 
2011: 1).
The Uzbek Explanatory Dictionary (2007: 664) defines tanish- bil-
ish as, ‘Individual(s) who know each other and have some degree of 
contact’ (‘Bir- birini tanijdigan va ma’lum jihatdan aloqa munosabati bor 
shahs(lar)’). It gives the following example of usage: ‘Well, doctor, now-
adays whichever institute/ university you go to only the children of tan-
ish- bilish pass the entrance’ (‘Endi, dohtir, hozir qaysi institutga borsangiz, 
tanish- bilishning bolasi kiradi’). The term can also be found in Uzbek say-
ings, proverbs and songs. The Uzbek proverb Bir ko’rgan – tanish, ikki 
ko’rgan – bilish can be translated as ‘once seen is tanish, twice seen is bil-
ish’. The meaning is that tanish- bilish can be established having met a 
person just once or twice. In contemporary Uzbek poetry one can also 
find such sayings as: ‘one can buy tanish- bilish but not friends’ (‘tan-



















Burilish featured a song called ‘Tanish- bilish’, sung by Ruslan Sharipov 
and Dilshod Abdullaev, which included the lyric ‘If one has tanish- bil-
ish one can accomplish any task, achieve things and from there on, my 
friend, you handle it’ (‘Tanish- bilish bular borki bitar har bir yumush, dos-
tum buyogini ozing kelish’).
The term tanish- bilish is used both as a noun to refer to the networks 
themselves, and as a verb for describing the actions/ exchanges involved. 
As an example of the former, the travel writer Christopher Alexander 
relates the following comment by a newly made local acquaintance, who 
offered to help Alexander when he was struggling to find a place to live 
(2009: 34):
I understand that it is very difficult for you newcomers without tan-
ish bilish here in our country, and yet you are our guests and you 
have come to help us. I have lots of tanish bilish and I will help you 
find a house. Come and live in my house until we find somewhere 
for you to live.
The term tanish- bilish may also be used as a verb for describing how 
something was achieved, for example, ‘How did your daughter pass the 
university entrance exams, did you do tanish- bilish or did she enter by 
herself?’ (‘Qanaqa qilib kirdi okishga qizingiz, tanish- bilish qildingizmi yo 
ozi kirdimi?’).
There are two important aspects of tanish- bilish networks, which 
are central to understanding their content and functioning principles. 
First, there is the hierarchical dimension of social relations. Generational 
differences often overlap with social status, which is known locally as 
katta (big) and kichkina (small). Kichkina refers to a person who is gen-
erally perceived to occupy a lower social position, and katta a higher 
one. Particular duties and responsibilities are expected of individuals 
according to their perceived status within a given community. For 
instance, younger females of any family are always expected to help 
and cannot appear in public: if they are guests they stay in either the 
kitchen or a separate room with the children and other young women. 
Elderly people are always respected, while young men are expected to 
earn money and support their families. Both of the terms are relative to 
the person or community by which the individual is perceived. In one 
relationship or context a person can be kichkina and in another katta. In 
both contexts the status of individuals depends on the social relations 
with others.
Second, there are the dimensions of strength and duration of 
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superficial, vaqtincha/ temporary) and more intensive and long- term 
(boshqacha, muhim). These are based on various reciprocities: balanced 
(qaytarish garak), generalised (ot dushi, savab, sadaqa) and negative 
(paydalanish). In bardi- galdi (short- term) relations mainly two kinds of 
reciprocities are chiefly involved: qaytarish garak (balanced) and payda-
lanish (negative reciprocity), whereas in muhim (long- term, important) 
relations ot dushi, qaytarish garak (balanced) reciprocities predominate 
(see Sahlins 1972 for studies on reciprocity and exchange). ‘Qaytarish 
garak’ is literally ‘must be returned’ and could be compared to a balanced 
reciprocity; ot dushi/ from the soul (in other words, ‘with pleasure’) is syn-
onymous to a balanced reciprocity; savab and sadaqa are part of religious 
almsgiving as an obligation of every Muslim (har bir musulmon burchi). 
Paydanalanish literally means ‘to make use of’ and can be compared to 
negative reciprocity; it has a negative connotation that resembles free- 
riding. These different types of reciprocities are important in any kind of 
exchange but particularly important to distinguish for tanish- bilish net-
works of exchange. For instance, if one uses the very important type of 
contacts in one’s tanish- bilish then this would suggest a form of balanced 
reciprocity.
Tanish- bilish networks usually have a strategic character and are 
used to extract resources of various kinds while avoiding formal rules 
as much as possible, as well as to solve problems. They enable infor-
mal exchanges that resemble the Soviet practice of blat, inasmuch as 
exchanges are based on favours of different kinds and not limited to infor-
mal payments (‘I scratch your back and you scratch mine’) (Ledeneva 
1998, 2006). Blat is described by Ledeneva as an informal exchange 
within personal and kinship networks, through which both material 
and non- material capital flow. Sometimes tanish- bilish is translated into 
Russian as po blatu, for instance in media reports.
One of the strategies used within tanish- bilish exchanges is what 
can be called the ‘politics of naming’. This strategy involves naming a very 
influential person or key official within the relevant sphere/ field where 
one needs to ‘get things done’ (ishni bitqazish) as a door opener or a prob-
lem solver. A typical example of this strategy is if one gets caught by traf-
fic police in Uzbekistan. The first thing a driver does is demonstratively 
telephone someone either real and influential, or somebody fake who 
pretends to be an important person. The second step is to offer the phone 
to the police officer. If the strategy is successful the driver will be free to 
go without punishment; if it is not, more phone calls are made and as a 























Informal networks have long played an important role at all levels 
of social and economic interactions not only in Uzbekistan but in Central 
Asia in general (Schatz 2004). Under Soviet rule they were particularly 
important as the elite was divided into regional clan groups, which played 
a decisive role in the political development of Uzbekistan. Although the 
Soviets influenced the social and political make- up of the Central Asian 
societies, undermining pre- Soviet social structures, they also had to 
work with those structures to some extent. Clanship together with other 
kinship and friendship networks played a crucial role in people’s orien-
tations within their professional and social lives, and in Uzbekistan in 
particular political leadership was designed around clans and regional 
belonging (Carlisle 1986).
Tanish- bilish networks are strongly based on the principle of 
patron– client relations. Clientelism governs these networks’ efficiency. 
Eisenstadt and Roninger (1980:  48, 1984) identified such variables as 
hierarchy, asymmetry, inequality, autonomy, spirituality, power, kinship 
and friendship when analysing patronage and clientelism. The patron– 
client relations they described are the relations of power and asymmetry, 
which direct the flow of resources and structure societal relations. If 
the social status of a person who is seeking to use tanish- bilish is lower 
(kichkina) than that of the person providing the favour, then by defin-
ition the latter acts as a patron and the former as a client in this specific 
transaction. The same client and the same patron can very well exchange 
their roles depending on the circumstances and also depending on who 
is providing the service for whom.
Post- Soviet social and economic crises coupled with growing 
uncertainties about the future have led people to rethink their sur-
vival strategies and social navigation through societal and political 
systems. Trust networks of tanish- bilish served to support the needs of 
their members and reproduced social relations of patronage and cli-
entalism. Regional groups which formed during Soviet rule (Carlisle 
1986) have persisted as the basis of tanish- bilish networks. Since 
the state legal system and state administration collapsed or became 
defunct after the collapse of the Soviet Union, alternative (informal) 
systems of patron– client relations have served as an alternative space 
for ‘getting things done’ in post- Soviet Central Asia. The networks of 
tanish- bilish have filled the void left by the state legal system and state 
administration, to accommodate the basic needs of ordinary people, 





























university of california, Santa barbara, uSa
The Chinese word guanxi literally means ‘relationship’ or ‘connection’. It 
also refers to an important aspect of contemporary Chinese culture: the 
need to ‘use’ guanxi, or call on personal or social connections to get things 
done, acquire a scarce commodity, or gain access to an opportunity. In 
this sense, guanxi is a dyadic social exchange relationship, in which one 
person helps the other, and in return, the other owes a social debt. Thus, 
guanxi in practice is like a gift exchange between two persons, in which 
there is affect or good feelings (renqing), a mutual obligation to help the 
other, and reciprocity, or the expectation of repayment at a later date. 
Gifts, favours and banquets are the objects of exchange, and the debt may 
sometimes be repaid after several years.
When a person is socially adept in the deployment of guanxi, he or 
she is said to be skilled in guanxixue, which means ‘the study of’ or ‘the 
art of cultivating guanxi’. While relying on social connections is true of 
every society, most scholars would agree that this practice is more preva-
lent and more discursively elaborated in contemporary China than many 
other places in the world. Certainly, ‘the art of guanxi’ is more import-
ant in China than ‘connections’ in modern Western societies, where indi-
vidualism and self- reliance are emphasised. For these reasons, ‘guanxi 
studies’ have become a cottage industry in China Studies, generating 
many academic papers in the fields of anthropology, sociology, business 
management, political science and history. While the study of informal 
relations tends to be peripheral in many other academic contexts, in 
English- language China Studies, guanxi is a recognisable theme, since 
non- Chinese scholars have seen guanxi as a prominent feature of contem-
porary Chinese culture.
In contemporary China, guanxi channels are deployed for a myriad 
of situations and needs: to get a job; to acquire a scarce commodity; to 
get a child into a good kindergarten or sought- after school; to get into a 
high- quality hospital; to get official approvals and permits to start up a 
business; to get a lighter sentence for crime; to avoid penalties for violat-
ing the birth control policy; to connect up to electricity, water and gas for 
new buildings or residences; and so forth. Thus, guanxi are often used to 
skirt around the cumbersome bureaucracy, or to reach a government offi-
cial, clerk or person in charge of giving permission or making selections 





















Guanxi practices grow out of the traditional Chinese cultural empha-
sis on social relationships and the interpersonal ethics of obligation and 
reciprocity. The Confucian classical texts are filled with discussions of the 
reciprocal duties and obligations of different social roles and relationships, 
and the ethics and etiquettes of gift- relations and host– guest relations at 
rituals and banquets. However, Taiwanese culture stems from the same 
traditional culture, but guanxi practices there are not as pervasive as in 
Mainland China. Prior to Taiwanese people re- establishing contacts with 
Mainland China in the 1990s, the term guanxixue was not used in Taiwan. 
In my own work (Yang 1994), I have suggested that guanxi in China was 
produced out of the political- economic structures of Maoist state-socialist 
society, where the state took charge of all social organisations and human 
activities, and goods, jobs, housing and life opportunities were all allo-
cated by the state. Guanxi culture was thus born out of the need to get 
permission from so many gatekeepers, whether state officials or clerks, 
controlling all social paths and opportunities. It proliferated due to its 
assuming the burden of replacing the missing market mechanism in the 
Maoist state-socialist order. It is not surprising that the societies of the 
former Soviet Bloc also came to rely on blat, a Russian term that refers 
to an informal exchange quite similar to guanxi (see 1.1 in this volume).
In contemporary Chinese society, most people rely on the help of 
well- positioned friends, relatives, former classmates, persons from the 
same hometown, co- workers and other connections to help them get 
through life. These are long- term relationships that already have built- in 
obligations for mutual help and reciprocity. If one needs the help of an 
influential person, but there is no prior relationship, then a new guanxi 
must be initiated and carefully cultivated. Often the help of guanxi inter-
mediaries are necessary to introduce one to a targeted person who may 
grant a favour. Once the introduction is made, one needs to cultivate the 
relationship over some time, with friendly visits or conversation, and 
gift- giving or a banquet, before a request can be made with decorum. 
Culturally, there must be a crucial temporal delay in between the gift 
offering and the request or repayment. The offering of the gift, favour 
or banquet must be couched in terms of friendship, rather than naked 
instrumentalism, so that sociality, affect and utility coexist as key com-
ponents of guanxi. Otherwise, without sociality or affect, the relation-
ship would be considered a simple barter or bribery, which are culturally 
disparaged.
Although there is a fine line between guanxi and bribery or corrup-
tion, most Chinese do distinguish guanxi from bribery. The native dis-
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relationship or on the exchanged favour or gift. If the relationship has 
been going on for a respectable length of time and the two people are 
on good terms, then it seems natural that one friend would want to help 
the other. However, if there is little or no prior relationship between the 
requestor and the granter of the favour, and cold hard cash or some costly 
material good is proffered in exchange for granting the favour, then it 
would be dubbed an act of bribery. If the gift recipient is currently hold-
ing office as an official, the monetary value of the gift is high, and the 
favour is granted in his or her capacity as a serving official, then this 
would be a case of official corruption.
Yunxiang Yan (1996) has observed that existing scholarship places 
too much emphasis on instrumental guanxi, whereas the bulk of Chinese 
guanxi have more affective resonance and are guided less by instrumen-
tal motivations. This is the case in some rural village contexts where the 
traditional emphasis on harmonious and affective social relations can 
still be found. However, given that guanxi served many functions of the 
missing market economy during the Maoist era of state command econ-
omy, one can also say that guanxi has become more instrumentalised in 
China, especially in urban areas. In the post- Mao era, instrumentalism 
has further increased with the logic of profit, and many rural areas have 
been penetrated by new market and industrialising forces, and there is 
mobility of rural people into urban areas. Thus, even rural guanxi have 
been greatly instrumentalised. When guanxi are instrumentalised, first, 
the emphasis shifts from the cultivation of affective social bonds to the 
object of exchange, the gift or favour given or received. Second, the 
intervening time between the presenting of the gift and the expected 
repayment is shortened. Thus, highly instrumentalised guanxi move 
closer to bribery, and this process has become more frequent in post- 
Mao commercial society, with a resultant increase in bribery and official 
corruption.
There have been debates about whether the introduction of a 
market economy and a legal system in the post- Mao era has resulted in 
a decline in the use of guanxi in China (Gold et al. 2002; Yang 2002). 
Most scholars agree that there are no signs that guanxi has declined 
overall and, ironically, its practice may have actually increased in certain 
domains. Although guanxi is no longer needed to purchase most goods 
that are now readily available in the stores bulging with consumer prod-
ucts, a vast arena of new needs and desires has opened up that still cre-
ates a dependence on one’s guanxi network. Yanjie Bian and others have 
collected quantitative data in eight Chinese cities to show that in finding 

















in the post- Mao era: from 24 per cent in 1979, to 45 per cent in 2002 and 
thereafter (Bian 2012: 150– 1). Evidently, the new market economy must 
still adapt itself to the existing political economic structures and culture 
of China.
In the Maoist era, the most skilful guanxi practitioners were often 
the ‘supply agents’ (caigouyuan) who worked for state or collective fac-
tories, and needed guanxi to acquire raw materials. While this occupa-
tion has declined with the development of private enterprises, today’s 
private entrepreneurs still need guanxi for success in business. They need 
guanxi with key officials to get business permits, purchase real estate or 
rent space, waive labour or environmental regulations, get connected to 
the electricity grid and water sources, arrange transport routes, get pass-
ports and exit permits to go abroad, etc. So long as the state in China 
continues to wield such influence and control in the economy and all 
domains of life, and state- owned enterprises continue to represent a sig-
nificant portion of the Chinese economy, there will be a need for gift- giv-
ing and guanxi to soften up those officials and clerks so that they may 
grant favours and opportunities.
Yet economic prosperity and the increasing globalisation of the 
Chinese economy have indeed brought changes to guanxi culture. The 
post- Mao increase in instrumentalised guanxi that blurs boundaries 
between guanxi and bribery has already been mentioned. The second 
change has been in the nature of the gifts given in return for expected 
favours. Whereas in the 1980s, it was enough to give cigarettes, alcohol 
and banquets to officials, now there is gift inflation and the ‘sexualisation 
of guanxi’. Male entrepreneurs trying to cultivate guanxi with officials 
will sometimes invite them to enjoy the women working in massage par-
lours, karaoke nightclubs and brothels. Thus, a variety of women’s sexual 
services have become the new ‘gifts’ of guanxixue. Tiantian Zheng (2009) 
and John Osburg (2013) have written about the cementing of masculine 
bonds between entrepreneurs and officials as they get together to talk 
business and enjoy women at these establishments. The third change can 
be found in the increasing transnational dimension of guanxi. Not only 
Chinese capital and businesses expand across the globe, but also Chinese 
educational and cultural networks extend overseas, thus enabling 
Chinese both inside and outside China to gain new opportunities abroad 
through transnational guanxi networks, which now may even include 
non- Chinese. Finally, with new social media technologies, personal 
guanxi networks have found a new medium to activate their members 
and expand their geographical and social reach. The technical proper-
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messages to one’s personal contacts, is uniquely favourable to the per-
sonal network form of guanxi. Scholars have just started to study the 
confluence of guanxi and WeChat networks, and how these have been 
increasingly significant for the local mobilisation of public protests and 
street demonstrations in China.
1.13 Inmaek/ Yonjul (South Korea)
Sven horak
The peter J. Tobin college of business, St. John’s university, 
new york, uSa
Inmaek means ‘people entangled like vine’ in Korean (Yee 2015: 38), and 
refers to a network of social ties and relationships one develops in the 
course of life (Horak 2014). Although distinctively Korean, inmaek ties 
can be described as equating with and having an identical construct to 
the much studied Chinese guanxi (Yang 1994; Luo 2000; Fan 2002; Ho 
and Redfern 2010; Lin and Ho 2010; Luo 2011) or blat in Russia (see 
1.12 and 1.1 in this volume). Although inmaek ties can be established 
purposefully, they can also emerge without any instrumental inten-
tions (Horak 2014). The social connection is conventionally developed 
between individuals from the same home town or alumni, people who do 
military service together (a relatively strong tie in Korea), ex- colleagues 
of a workplace who remain connected, or between people who share a 
hobby or are members of the same sports club. In contrast to the pillars 
of yongo – family, region and alumni (see yongo, 3.5 in this volume), the 
pillars upon which inmaek ties are based are more diverse. These include 
the notions of affection and loyalty between individuals (Lew 2013), and 
forging informal personal relationships as an important factor in inter-
personal transactions in business, politics and society as a whole (Kim 
2008). Ties can be interrelated and develop dynamically, i.e. inmaek can 
serve as a fundament to develop so- called yonjul ties. Yonjul describes the 
informal ties between people that are oriented towards a certain goal. 
The ties of yonjul serve as a means to an end and hence yonjul is purpose- 
based. The term yonjul can be translated as a ‘relationship’ or ‘connec-
tion’ to someone, implied by the yon. The syllable jul means ‘string’ or 
‘rope’ (Horak 2014). As shown in Figure 1.13.1, the bases of yonjul ties 
are diverse and can overlap with inmaek ties, although yonjul ties may 
also be established through other direct or indirect connections (Horak 
2014: 90).
Compared to inmaek, yonjul has a rather negative connotation. 



















unethical purposes, so that in Korea the term is often used to describe 
corrupt actions of various forms and types: bribery, cronyism, favourit-
ism, etc. (Kim 2000; Lee 2000; Horak 2016). Yonjul relations are particu-
laristic and exclusive (Kim 2000; Yee 2000a). A typical characteristic has 
been described as ‘its facilitative function of backdoor rent seeking’ (Lee 
2000: 369). Yonjul relationships are regarded as high trust ties extended 
to single individuals or relatively small communities, which are more 
amenable to control by peer pressure than larger ones. The rules of reci-
procity, commitment and loyalty are pronounced and can be perceived 
by the individual as more binding than formal rules and regulations, 
such as corporate codes of conduct. In other words, moral obligations 
exert greater influence on relationships than formal rules (Lee 2000; Hitt 
et al. 2002; Park 2004; Horak 2015a). However, in contemporary soci-
ety, yonjul and its ramifications have been viewed negatively (Yee 2000a, 
2000b; Cha 2003; Horak 2015b). It has been criticised as an unfair prac-
tice, since in- group membership largely determines social progress for 
the individual, rather than their competence, skill or merit. In particu-
lar, it is criticised for bypassing and weakening formalised laws, rules 
and regulations, thereby clouding decision- making that is perceived as 
becoming less predictable. Today, yonjul is largely perceived as the root 
cause of bribery, cronyism, favouritism, corruption and all sorts of unfair 
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amoral (Kim 2000; Horak 2016). Furthermore it is seen as the major fac-
tor blocking societal progress.
In sum, yonjul can be regarded as the dark side of informal social 
ties, whereas inmaek represents the bright side as it promotes the estab-
lishment of positive social capital across society. Nevertheless, what both 
share is a focus on interpersonal ties that characterise Korean society. 
Korea is often described as a relational society (Kim 2000; Horak 2015a) 
in terms of the way in which sociability is entangled with affection or 
instrumentality. In economic transactions, for instance, personal senti-
ments are taken into account, thus rational decision- making is seldom 
detached from personal factors. Solving problems in a business setting, 
for example, will always include personal ties and consideration of the 
relationships between the people involved, as they are regarded as an inte-
gral part of the solution to a problem. Conventionally a third party may be 
consulted to act like an intermediary or broker towards conflict resolution.
What is the basis of the affective relationships that distin-
guish Korean society from Western countries? In the West, the age of 
Enlightenment promoted a rational fact- based scientific approach to 
problem solving and, in parallel, Christian ideals supported inclusion 
and open communities based on the ideals of mercy and charity. In 
Korea, scholars regard shamanism as the first spiritual belief to have 
had a deep influence on the Korean mentality (Choe 2007; Seo 2013). 
Shamanism establishes a transcendental connection between nature 
and its creatures. According to Hahm (1986: 286), ‘the individual was 
always considered to be in a partially interlocking or mutually inter-
penetrating position with other human beings as well as the Material 
World. The individual was always viewed in the context of his affection 
network’. Confucian ethical philosophies, later introduced to Korea, 
are compatible with the shamanistic mindset. Confucianism essentially 
proposes an order principle that regulates relationships between inter-
connected people according to family principles, rather than between 
persons exercising individual rights. In Confucianism, family- like mor-
als are extended to other social relationships in a society, for instance, 
between business leaders and employees, professors and students, or 
between friends. To establish community spirit based on family values, 
an intimate or emotional bond is necessary.
Inmaek establishes an emotional bond between people and empha-
sises sociability as the essence of humanity. It describes social ties between 
two or more people in a network, connected either directly, or indirectly 
through others. A direct connection implies a stronger tie, whereas an 




















be established (and instrumentalised as required) by means of an indir-
ect connection that already exists through informal group membership. 
Quantitative measuring of the strengths of informal ties is problematic, 
as such ties may be dormant, invisible or regarded as a highly private 
subject (Ledeneva 1998). Accordingly, whether inmaek ties can be con-
sidered strong becomes an empirical question. However, scholars assume 
that both contact frequency and duration are important variables in 
determining the strength of inmaek ties. Furthermore, reciprocal actions 
are important in the maintenance of inmaek ties. Examples of this include 
the trading of information that is not publicly available, an exchange of 
favours, or one of a variety of other unregulated exchanges (Yee 2015). 
While interpersonal interactions are generally embedded in Confucian 
ethics, inmaek requires adherence to particularistic ethics in specific 
contexts. These include loyalty and acceptance of patronage within the 
principles of the social hierarchy determined by Confucian norms of 
behaviour. Dyadic and network- based inmaek relationships follow quasi- 
family ideals that distinguish them from relationships with outsiders. 
Similar to the divisive principles of yonjul, insiders are viewed as quasi- 
family members and are treated with benevolence and care, whereas out-
siders do not receive special attention. Inmaek implies a moral obligation 
to the group; more successful members are compelled by peer pressure 
to help less successful members (Yee 2015). Inmaek is often used with 
good intentions, for example, to help less fortunate people secure a job 
or promotion, although this sometimes results in the employment of per-
sons who lack suitable qualifications or skills. In principle inmaek ties can 
be seen as positive relational capital as they are open to new members, 
promote the advancement of communities, and feature mutual help and 
social exchange – thus, inmaek has the potential to promote public good. 
Conversely, inmaek can become a negative force if it results in communi-
ties of small exclusive cliques that support each other for personal gain at 
a cost to others, acting in opposition to universal codes of conduct.
1.14 Taps  (azerbaijan)
leyla Sayfutdinova
university of eastern finland, finland
Tapş is an informal practice of obtaining favours on behalf of others, 
widely practised in Azerbaijan. While nearly any resource can be 
obtained through tapş, access to capital, jobs, promotions and grades in 
the education system are the most common objects of the practice. A typ-
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for the supplicant (B) from a third party (C). A typical example of a tapş 
transaction in an educational setting would be someone calling his/ her 
acquaintance at the university and asking to help a child of his/ her ‘close 
acquaintance’ pass an examination. The person making the phone call 
in this case serves as an intermediary between the student asking for the 
grade and the university professor who can provide the favour.
The word tapş is of Azerbaijani origin and comes from the verb 
tapşırmaq, which means to entrust something or somebody into someone 
else’s custody, hence the inherently polyadic structure of tapş transac-
tions. The word tapş was also adopted in Bakuvian urban Russian vernacu-
lar, and has been widely used colloquially, including the Russified verbal 
forms of  ‘to entrust’ (tapshanut’) or ‘to be entrusted’ (tapshanut’sa), 
although this use has not been recorded in any dictionaries.
Tapş is similar to a range of other network- based informal practices, 
such as Soviet blat, Chinese guanxi, Bulgarian vruzki, and Arabic wasta 
(Cunningham and Sarayrah 1994; Ledeneva 1998, 2008; Hutchings and 
Weir 2006; Chavdarova 2013). Like blat and vruzki, tapş became wide-
spread under socialism when it served to circumvent the structural con-
straints (especially conditions of shortage) of the Soviet economy and 
centralised distribution of resources (Ledeneva 1998: 37). In common 
with blat, tapş was used to gain private access to public resources; it is also 
often described in the rhetoric of help and mutual support. These com-
monalities, as well as the fact that Azerbaijan was integrated in the Soviet 
centralised system of distribution, have led some scholars to subsume 
tapş within blat (Aliyev 2013). In this perspective, blat is understood as 
a generic Soviet practice of which tapş is a specific instance. However, 
such a view glosses over the differences between the two practices and 
empties blat of its specificity as a non- hierarchical practice based on sym-
metrical reciprocity (‘you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours’).
Tapş differs from blat, its closest analogue, in several significant 
respects. First is the structure of the exchange transactions. Although 
blat, as well as vruzki and guanxi, can involve circular chains of favours 
with many intermediaries, in its most basic form blat is a dyadic transac-
tion between two people, one of whom provides and the other of whom 
receives a favour. Tapş, on the other hand, is always a polyadic practice. 
The most basic form of tapş is a triadic transaction, necessarily involving 
an intermediary. Hence another Russian euphemism for this practice in 
Baku: poprosit za kogo- to (to ask for someone).
The second important difference between tapş and blat stems 
from their embeddedness in differently configured social networks. 





























or less symmetrical reciprocity between participants (Ledeneva 1998: 
52; Fitzpatrick 1999: 63). In contrast, while some tapş transactions can 
involve a horizontal connection or two, for example between colleagues 
or friends, they are usually embedded within the hierarchical patronage 
networks and involve vertical patron– client ties. Often, the intermedi-
ary (i.e. the person who obtains the favour) and the supplicant are in 
a patron– client relationship; the intermediary and the person providing 
the favour are also in a vertical patron– client relationship. These patron-
age networks, commonly, although inaccurately, referred to as ‘clans’, 
permeate Azerbaijan’s society from top to bottom, and are usually kin-
ship- based (for an analysis of the role of patronage in Azerbaijani pol-
itics see Guliyev 2012; for an ethnographic description of how political 
patronage interacts with kinship networks in rural Azerbaijan see Yalçın- 
Heckmann 2010). Depending on the status of the person obtaining the 
favour, tapş can be described as ‘low’ or ‘high’.
The triadic structure of transactions and embeddedness of tapş in 
patronage networks puts it close to the Middle Eastern practice of wasta. 
According to Cunninghan and Sarayrah (1994), wasta ‘involves a pro-
tagonist intervening on behalf of a client to obtain an advantage for the 
client’ and thus, like tapş, it is as a minimum a triadic transaction that 
involves an intermediary. Wasta is said to have originated in the prac-
tices of mediation between conflicting tribes; although in modern times 
the use of wasta has become much broader, the networks based on kin 
remain the primary sphere in which wasta is embedded (Cunningham 
and Sarayrah 1994; Hutchings and Weir 2006). Similarly, in Azerbaijan, 
tapş is sustained by the persistent importance of kinship and quasi- 
kinship networks based on place of origin, often described as ‘clans’ 
(Guliyev 2011; Aliyev 2013).
Finally, while blat is said to be waning in the post- Soviet period, 
the practice of tapş remains as strong as ever. In post- Soviet Russia blat is 
being replaced by monetised, ad- hoc bribery, as opposed to the person-
alised, long- term relationships of reciprocity that used to sustain it in the 
Soviet period (Ledeneva 2008). In Azerbaijan, by contrast, the strength-
ening of patronage networks in the post- Soviet period and the practice 
of patronage control over distribution of considerable state wealth pro-
duced in the oil sector of the economy makes tapş a primary channel for 
gaining access to the distribution of these resources.
The role of tapş in Azerbaijan’s politics, economy and society is 
highly ambivalent. Like any other informal practice, tapş reduces the 
transaction costs of the actors. As a practice based on traditional kinship 
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a form of resistance to the individualism and alienation that Western- 
style modernisation brings. It also allows disenfranchised individuals 
and groups to access some state- controlled resources through intermedi-
aries, bridging otherwise disconnected networks. At the same time, tapş 
is a particularistic practice that undermines the development of univer-
sal norms and generalised trust. Tapş also interacts with other practices 
from Azerbaijan’s rich repertoire of informality, including various forms 
of corruption. Although many tapş transaction are ad hoc in nature and 
involve asking for individual favours in time of need, there can be more 
permanent arrangements, such as ‘protection’ for entrepreneurs. Known 
in Russian as krysha (literally ‘roof’) and in Azerbaijani, arxa (literally 
‘the back’), it refers to patronage protection by state officials against both 
legal taxes and the extortion of bribes. While this use of tapş undermines 
the universalistic logic of market competition, it does enable business 
activity to take place that would otherwise be impossible in Azerbaijan 
(Safiyev 2013b). Tapş favours can also sometimes be reciprocated by 
gifts or informal payments, which links the practice to bribery (hormet, 
referring to payments made out of gratitude for an action already done, 
or ruşvet, referring to payments that are offered or demanded for future 
actions). In other cases, tapş can serve as an alternative to bribery, by 
providing access to advantage which would otherwise require monetary 
payment. For example, in Azerbaijan’s highly corrupt educational system 
having tapş can protect students from extortion of informal payments by 
instructors and teachers.
The research on informal practices in Azerbaijan is limited, and 
there have not yet been any significant attempts to conceptualise tapş 
as a practice specific to Azerbaijani society. This is, however, a common 
feature of informal practices – scholars often point out that informal 
practices are insufficiently researched despite their pervasiveness and 
influence (Ledeneva 1998; Hutchings and Weir 2006). Although there is 
at present no research focusing on tapş specifically, several studies deal 
with various aspects of tapş in the more general context of informal prac-
tices. A variety of methods have been used for this research, including 
interviews (Aliyev 2013; Safiyev 2013a, 2013b), ethnography (Lepisto 
and Kazımzade 2008) and surveys (Hasanov 2009; Aliyev 2013; Sadigov 
2013). Ethnographic methods in particular would be useful for under-
standing the complex structure of tapş transactions and the interaction of 
vertical and horizontal ties involved in them. However, like other infor-
mal practices, tapş is difficult to measure because of its hidden nature 
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In Kazakhstan, an influential figure with strong personal connections 
enabling him to achieve objectives in informal ways is called an agashka. 
This term is formed from the word ‘aga’, the Russianised version of the 
Kazakh word ‘agha’, meaning an elder male relative such as an older 
brother or uncle, and the Russian diminutive suffix ‘- shka’. Agashka is in 
wide currency mostly among Russian- speaking Kazakhs in contemporary 
Kazakhstan, but not generally used in the Kazakh language. The term is 
typically associated with a wealthy Kazakh male of middle or old age. 
However, the most important characteristic of an agashka lies in his abil-
ity to use informal connections to circumvent official procedures and to 
provide favours for his closed circle of family, friends and clients. Thus, 
the term agashka can be applied to any individual who functions as a 
patron by using personal contacts with those in official positions, irre-
spective of age or ethnic background. Its female version tateshka in most 
cases simply means an elder female relative or elder (middle- or old- 
aged) woman, but is also a woman with strong connections, or a spouse 
of an agashka. Agashka’s closest synonym is perhaps the word krysha 
(‘roof’ or ‘cover’) in Russian.
Agashka, in the usage we observe today, came into common use in 
the 1990s. While the term is not recorded in dictionaries of the Russian 
or Kazakh languages, analysts and journalists in Kazakhstan have 
made some attempts to describe the phenomenon of agashka (some-
times suffixes are added to specify reference to the general phenom-
enon:  agashkizm, agashizm or agashestvo). While precise definitions of 
agashka vary somewhat among observers, there is agreement that it is an 
informal status. A typical agashka is a government official with a loyal fol-
lowing of subordinates (whom he helped to get employed), enjoying the 
use of a high- class official car for private purposes. However, the source 
of an agashka’s influence is not based on his office per se but rather his 
personal relationships with those in power, from high- ranking officials in 
the central government to heads of local administration. Although most 
agashki hold or have held an official position in the state or an organisa-
tion connected to it, their ability to exert influence does not necessarily 
correspond to the level or sphere of the official post.
The term is a pejorative word and reflects the widespread view of 
the prevalence of nepotism and clientelism, as well as a critical or self- 
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‘Bez agashki ty kakashka, a s agashkoi - chelovek’ (‘You are shit without 
agashka, and you are a person with agashka’) suggests that ordinary citi-
zens in Kazakhstan believe that people must have good connections to 
live a normal life. The same is suggested by a variant of the phrase, which 
replaces kakashka with bukashka (a small insect). Indeed, from get-
ting a job and promotion in the government sector or national compan-
ies, obtaining or renting housing constructed under state programmes, 
receiving state- funded medical treatment, to securing credit from the 
local government or a bank loan, the power of connections and patronage 
dominates in many key areas of life (Sharipova 2013; McMann 2014). 
Despite state procedures officially being fair and equitable, in reality 
decisions are often made informally when state resources are distrib-
uted. Success in business largely depends on whether one has a solid and 
influential patron in official positions or connected to officials. Agashka is 
key to winning a tender for public works projects or state purchases. In 
addition, maintaining good relations with law enforcement institutions 
with the authority to control business (police, customs, prosecutors, etc.) 
is critically important.
Agashka as an informal institution reflects values and practices 
rooted in the Kazakh culture. In the traditional Kazakh society, the elders 
of the kin community bore the responsibility for taking care of its mem-
bers. Mutual assistance among kin members is not only a socially imposed 
obligation, but also viewed as distinct characteristics and ethnic markers 
of the Kazakhs. In such cultural settings, using one’s official position for 
the sake of family or extended family is often taken for granted. Under the 
Soviet planned economy, kinship ties with high trust and reciprocal obliga-
tion served as a web of networks, providing access to a variety of resources 
that were difficult to obtain through official channels (Schatz 2004).
In its present form, however, agashka is also the product of the 
post- Soviet expansion of market relations, which brought changes to the 
function and nature of informal networks developed under the socialist 
economy. Following the introduction of market principles in the 1990s, 
those with financial resources increasingly prefer to invest money in 
expanding their practical networks beyond the kinship divisions (Rigi 
2004). One of the most widespread perceptions with respect to agashka 
people is that their children have an advantage in getting a national schol-
arship to study overseas, or seeking a job in the public sector or national 
companies. Agashka’s network of favours, however, is not limited to fam-
ily and kinship ties. Here, the simple definition by Kazakhstani political 
analyst Dosym Satpaev is relevant: ‘Agashka is a person whose connec-






















2014). Thus, the major criterion for agashka in post- Soviet Kazakhstan 
is affiliation to certain financial sources, or a group of common material 
interests in which a variety of ethnicities, clans and regions can be rep-
resented (Satpaev 1999; Schatz 2012; Umbetalieva and Satpaev 2012).
Figure 1.15.1 Cartoon representation of agashka, by Vladimir 
Kadyrbaev.
Source: Dosym Satpaev and Erbol Zhumagulov, Legenda o 









Transparency international eu office, belgium
Załatwianie (verbal form: to załatwić something) is a Polish euphemism 
describing a range of informal behaviours carried out mostly to obtain 
benefits by avoiding the use of arduous legal activities or formal norms 
(Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN 2007). In a rough translation, the phrase 
‘załatwić something’ means ‘to get something done’ or ‘to get something 
done in an easier way’; it is related to the verb ułatwić, which means ‘to 
do something easier’. The etymology of załatwić derives from the word 
łatwy (easy) with the prefix ‘za’, which means that something has been 
done and/ or completed. The word załatwić has its origins in Slavonic 
languages, but its final form has only developed in Polish (Słownik Języka 
Polskiego PWN 2007). Therefore, załatwianie cannot be directly trans-
lated into any other language.
Other meanings of the word załatwić include the phrase ‘załatwić 
someone’, which means to eliminate (kill) or to professionally disable a 
person, i.e. to thwart their professional aims, such as being promoted. 
The phrase often appears in Polish criminal films, but also in discussions 
about murders, when people instead of saying, ‘he killed him’, rather use 
the phrase ‘on go załatwił’, which can be translated as ‘he made him that 
way’ or ‘he made him dead’. In the second case, a person who wishes to 
załatwić another can, for example, spread some compromising informa-
tion about them so they cannot be promoted (a tactic particularly used 
among politicians) (Słownik Języka Polskiego PWN 2007).
Załatwianie also has other meanings such as ‘excretion’, and is very 
often used by schoolchildren, for whom any other word associated with 
this particular bodily function seems vulgar or inappropriate. It is usual 
for a school pupil to ask a teacher if they can ‘załatwić się’, which means 
‘załatwić myself’ or ‘take care of myself’. More generally, in the Polish 
language the word załatwić plays the role of a replacement word for 
uncomfortable phrases such as ‘to corrupt someone’ or ‘to kill someone’. 
It conveys the sense that the result will be obtained using informal meth-
ods, which should not be discussed in detail because of their obvious bru-
tality or unethical nature.
Most frequently people can załatwić something via other people 
(relatives, friends, acquaintances) who are in a position that enables 
them to help provide or enable it. For example, one can załatwić a med-
ical examination or a priority appointment with a doctor if one knows 





























also possible for some people to załatwić something on behalf of others 
if they are in a position of power. Very often parents try to załatwić a 
first job for their adult children (e.g. just after graduation), exploiting 
their social networks and position on the labour market. This is still a 
very common practice in Poland (Tomaszkewicz 2012).
Załatwianie, like Russian blat, is therefore a kind of social system 
based on certain relationships among people (Ledeneva 1998). A per-
son with a wide social network and large number of friends has greater 
scope to załatwić than someone with a smaller number of connections. 
Consequently, more people want to establish relations with such a per-
son as they are perceived as a valuable friend who can załatwić a lot 
(Wedel 2001). However, unlike blat, załatwianie does not rely solely on 
the social networks and position within a group of people, but also on an 
individual’s tacit knowledge of how to get things done: how to approach 
certain institutions and/ or people, and generally how to act in differ-
ent situations in order to załatwić things. Sometimes a person does not 
even need a specific social network to achieve his/ her goals – less than 
knowing people, it is important to be aware where and how things can be 
done, and then undertake specific actions (e.g. bribery, blackmailing) in 
order to obtain goods (Wedel 1986).
The word załatwianie became particularly popular in Poland during 
the communist period, where there was no easy access to goods and soci-
ety relied on informal practices and networks (Morris and Polese 2013). 
Some argue that the exclusive nature of załatwianie comes from the era 
of Partitions (1795– 1918), during which Poles could only rely on other 
Poles as they had been surrounded by ‘enemies’ (the authorities of the 
invading states) (Pacan 2009). It was better therefore to ‘get something 
done’ within the inner circle than to ask for help from external sources 
such as the Russian authorities, who would most probably be unhelpful 
or even worsen the situation.
According to an official report on Poland’s social situation (Czapiński 
and Panek 2009), the practice of załatwianie is still used by the majority of 
Polish society. It has a negative impact on general societal trust, which con-
tributes to the lack of social integration and difficulty of creating civil society 
among the Polish population. Czapiński suggests that when an individual 
wants to załatwić something with another person or a group of people, 
they are all connected by a common secrecy and benefits, but also by a 
common guilt. In consequence, the trust can only exist within the group, 
and those outside the circle come to be considered as untrustworthy. The 
circles that try to załatwić things are everywhere and have very much the 
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order to obtain goods together, but rather stick to their own social groups 
because of the lack of trust in outsiders (the thinking goes: why would we 
załatwić it somewhere else when we can do it with ‘our’ people?). To a 
large degree, therefore, Polish society consists of multitudes of these exclu-
sive informal self- help groups, which does not allow for mutual integration 
and the increase of general societal trust (Kamiński 1997).
Załatwianie on an individual level is almost always profitable; how-
ever, in a wider social context załatwianie, like many other informal prac-
tice, sacrifices long- term societal benefits for short- term private returns. 
Załatwić- ing a job for a friend always implies the rejection of a more suit-
able candidate; załatwić- ing a deal with a company impedes free  market 
competition. Another negative impact of załatwianie is in reinforcing the 
conviction within society that the most effective way to get things done is 
by informal means, while official procedures will probably be a waste of 
time and inefficient. People therefore often opt to do something through 
załatwianie in the first instance and, if that fails, fall back on formal meth-
ods (although sometimes the order is reversed: when the formal methods 
fail, people turn to informality). In many cases, people perceive those who 
try to obtain goods through the formal channels as fools: if they do not 
know how to załatwić it, they must be either lazy, or not well- connected 
enough to know someone who can załatwić it for them (or both). There is 
a phrase in Polish: ‘on nie potrafi niczego załatwić’, ‘on niczego nie załatwi’. 
This literally translates as ‘he cannot get anything done’, relating to a 
person who is not effective in his aims; does not know how to approach 
certain people (or does not know them at all); and/ or is too righteous or 
clumsy to reach his goal using informal methods (Wedel 1992).
Through efficiency improvements in the public sector and the 
‘Westernisation’ of Polish society, methods of załatwianie are grad-
ually being replaced by formal and legal practices, especially among 
the younger generation (Kulesza 2000). Nevertheless, this is part of a 
lengthy process of ideological transition from Soviet practices to Western 
norms of formality. The phenomena of nepotism, bribery and cronyism 
still operate within Polish society and załatwianie is a convenient and 
widely used umbrella term for them (Tumiłowicz 2009).
1.17 Vitamin B (Germany)
ina Kubbe
Tel aviv university, israel
In Germany, the term Vitamin B is used colloquially to denote the vari-
























context stands for Beziehungen, which means relationships, contacts and 
connections. The term is also used to mean networking or, in its most pro-
nounced form, favouritism. Vitamin B may for example be used to refer to 
an influential personal relationship that enables an individual more easily 
to get a desirable position in the professional sphere. Such informal rela-
tionships may be either private or professional, but they usually originate 
from social networks that have developed during schooling, internships 
or studies (student fraternities, university alumni associations), shared 
hobbies (sports clubs, gyms) or social events (conferences, weddings). 
These relationships often include family members such as cousins, broth-
ers- and sisters- in- law, and so on.
Just as the vitamin B that is found in food regulates vital parts of 
our cell metabolism and is essential for human health, Vitamin B plays an 
important role in social life, especially in the work environment. It oper-
ates through various channels such as the exchange of useful informa-
tion (learning about jobs or about other candidates running for office). 
Practices similar to Vitamin B can be found almost everywhere. In Russia, 
for example, the practice is called blat and is defined as ‘the use of per-
sonal networks for obtaining goods and services in short supply and 
for circumventing formal procedures’ (Ledeneva 2009: 257). Already 
in 1651 Thomas Hobbes described the phenomenon in his Leviathan: 
‘To have friends, is Power’ (Hobbes 1909: 66) or, as the blogger Danny 
Ferguson put it, ‘It’s not what you don’t know; it’s who your college room-
mate knows’ (Nadler and Schulman 2006).
From an ethical point of view, the use of Vitamin B has a potential 
dark side (Bourdieu 1989; Plümper and Schimmelpfennig 2007; Gurr 
2014). It is commonly seen as neither good nor ‘fair’ if someone exploits 
relationships or contacts to gain informational advantage (Dederichs 
1999). Such behaviour is viewed as unethical because one person’s ben-
efits usually come at the expense of others who lack such networks (Lin 
2000). At the same time, however, Vitamin B can have the opposite effect. 
When a group of relatively disadvantaged people cluster together, the 
result may be that all the members of the network suffer socially or eco-
nomically, for example, from closed recruitment opportunities or unfair 
pricing agreements (Flap et al. 2000; Spence et al. 2003).
In German, it is common to say that ‘Eine Hand wäscht die andere’ 
(‘One hand washes the other’), the English equivalent being ‘You scratch 
my back and I’ll scratch yours’. In everyday speech, it is also common to 
say ‘Ich habe den Job über Vitamin B bekommen’ (‘I got the job thanks to 
Vitamin B’). Indeed, a substantial proportion of individuals, in Germany 
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employment. A study by McDonald et al. (2012) found that more than 
half of the Germans studied had used informal contacts in order to secure 
at least one job; 40 per cent of them had done so even without engag-
ing in an active job search, compared to just 27 per cent of US workers. 
According to Germany’s Institute for Employment Research (2017), one 
third of all vacancies that were filled in 2013 were assigned by means of 
personal contacts; moreover, this trend was rising. Research also shows 
that the benefits of personal contacts in a job search depend on the size 
of the institution or company, on an individual’s qualifications and on his 
or her gender. The largest share of new hires via personal networks are 
found among German micro- entities. Furthermore, vacancies that are 
filled by means of Vitamin B tend to be those that require either very high 
or very low qualification levels. One in three unskilled or low- qualified 
workers in Germany owes his or her job to friends or relatives. At the 
same time, Vitamin B is also used to fill highly paid and leading positions; 
this suggests that, if all the applicants for a particular job are equally well 
qualified, Vitamin B is likely to provide the leap of faith that will secure 
the post. Men remain more likely than women to secure an appointment 
by means of Vitamin B because they usually have better connections (‘old 
boy network’).
Vitamin B is based on trust and reciprocity (mutual exchange) and 
the logic of how it works is simple: if Person A and Person B get along 
well together, there is a high probability that Person C, who is also well 
connected with Person B, will also get on well with Person A; this will be 
the case in both private and professional relations. Accordingly, Vitamin 
B is shorthand for an individual’s social capital, the value of all social 
networks and the inclinations that arise from them to do and to get things 
for and from one another.
Social capital has been defined as ‘investment and use of embed-
ded resources in social relations for expected returns’ (Coleman 1988; 
Lin 2000: 786). It is conceptualised as the quantity and/ or quality of 
resources that an actor is able to access or use through his or her location 
in a social network (Lin 2000). Following Putnam (2000), who distin-
guishes between bridging and bonding social capital, Vitamin B refers to 
bridging social capital and is linked to what network researchers refer 
to as ‘weak’ ties. These are loose connections between individuals who 
may provide one another with useful information or new perspectives, 
but who do not usually provide emotional support. (Bonding social cap-
ital, by contrast, is found between individuals in tightly knit, emotionally 
close relationships, such as family and close friends.) One advantage of 




















circles’ members may be very similar and therefore less useful, whereas 
networks whose members are dispersed and dissimilar are more likely to 
generate new information.
At times, Vitamin B is seen as a euphemism for corrupt practices, 
closely linked to favouritism, nepotism, cronyism and patronage, where 
power is abused in favour of one’s community of friends, family, asso-
ciates or co- religionists (Nadler and Schulman 2006). It follows that 
Vitamin B can undercut the transparency, equality, fairness and account-
ability that should be part of the hiring and contracting practices of 
responsible companies and institutions. Proponents argue that it is not 
wrong to hire or appoint someone you already know, as long as they are 
well qualified. It is, however, often difficult to define the precise point at 
which the border between the legitimate use of Vitamin B is crossed and 
favouritism or corruption takes over. Universities and certain other pub-
lic institutions have adopted procedures that aim to reduce the influence 
of informal relationships. Members of an appointments committee are, 
for example, required to declare a conflict of interest and to leave the 
room when discussion turns to a candidate who is personally known to 
them. Such practices are as yet rare, however.
1.18 Jinmyaku (Japan)
Sven horak
The peter J. Tobin college of business, St. John’s university, 
new york, uSa
The Japanese term jinmyaku loosely translates as ‘personal connections’. 
The word jin stands for ‘person’ and myaku translates as ‘vein’, as in a 
geological vein of mineral deposits. Jinmyaku is of paramount import-
ance in business and politics and is vital in other aspects of life. Members 
of a jinmyaku network support and help each other in terms of career 
progression and in making decisions. Having a large jinmyaku network 
consisting of influential members is said to be ‘a symbol of security and 
status’ (Erez 1992: 57). Establishing jinmyaku is a lifetime process, which 
starts early in life at a child’s school. Whereas the Japanese are known 
to be rather reserved towards people they do not know, an introduction 
by a third person through jinmyaku can open doors and help in debates 
or negotiations where rational arguments alone cannot secure an agree-
ment (Mitsubishi Corporation 2011).
In comparison with Westerners, Japanese people in general are 
considered to be less sociable in terms of establishing social ties through 
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persons who belong to a different organisation or community (Nakane 
1965; Scarborough 1998). In terms of ascribing trust and sociality, 
Japanese people tend to distinguish between in- and out- groups. The 
depth and prioritisation of relationships tend to correlate with their 
duration, thus long- term relationships are maintained on a preferential 
basis. This is in direct contrast to the ways in which social ties are formed 
in the West, where people meet less often and frequently move accord-
ing to career demands, which requires them to develop new social ties 
in their new place of residence. Westerners tend to establish affinity to 
others on the basis of shared traits and interests; the Japanese do so on 
the basis of shared affiliations, obligations or allegiance. Accordingly, 
the resulting focus on personal relationships, both formal and infor-
mal, means that Japan has often been described as a ‘network society’ 
(Kumon 1992).
In business, the development of large jinmyaku networks is con-
sidered of utmost importance in decision- making, both as an external 
source of information gathering for the firm, as well as for career pro-
gression (Gilbert 2003). Jinmyaku relationships relate to relationships 
within the company between superiors, peers and subordinates, and 
also to external relationships with customers, decision makers in other 
organisations and government officials. Tact and skill are required to 
develop jinmyaku. Within an organisation, important factors include 
the duration of membership of the network, loyalty and seniority, as 
well as the care of subordinates and mentoring. The ability to be sen-
sitive to and adequately relate to a situation is also required. As is 
common in Japanese organisations, decision- making and problem 
solving involves a large amount of informal coordination, information 
exchange, the involvement of various stakeholders and the reconcili-
ation of interests and negotiation before a formal decision is made. 
The final decision is frequently the official result of what has previously 
been agreed informally. A trusted jinmyaku network is a precondition 
for the informal coordination of this process (Suzuki 1989). To com-
plete an important project or task, or to progress in one’s career, job- 
related skills are important, but a large jinmyaku network is of equal 
significance. Given both, it is possible to strengthen one’s position as a 
trusted member of an organisation.
The typical flow of communication in Japanese firms is character-
ised by a strong top- down attachment, according to corporate hierarchy, 
which is determined by seniority (Erez 1992: 51). Frequent direct com-
munication with lower ranked employees is encouraged, as is involve-




















Japan are expected to be approachable. Whereas the decision- making 
process originates at the top of the hierarchy, the bottom- up approach 
ensures that each employee is involved, informed and able to contrib-
ute to the solution. This ensures consensus among employees and is con-
sidered to improve the quality of decision- making. It is usual for middle 
management to formally trigger a decision- making process by circulat-
ing a document to be signed (by stamp) by each manager involved (the 
so- called ‘ringi system’), to show approval. Simultaneously informal 
discussions take place to exchange ideas, reach consensus and convince 
others, with the aim of attaining compromise among the decision mak-
ers involved (Erez 1992). Jinmyaku is a precondition for influencing and 
reaching decisions. In the first instance it is applied internally within a 
company; however, as private and business spheres are not separate in 
Japan, jinmyaku is also part of informal meetings outside of the work-
place. Interactions include dinner or drinks meetings and weekend sport-
ing activities with colleagues, superiors, suppliers, subcontractors and 
other external stakeholders.
Jinmyaku is important in an external context, as seen in the prac-
tice of former retired government officials becoming managers of 
large businesses, usually at 55– 60 years of age. This practice is com-
mon in Japan and is known by the term amakudari (天下り–descent 
from heaven, derived from ama meaning heaven and kudari meaning 
descending). Through amakudari, the government is able to influence 
and control decision- making within a company; in return, the company 
benefits from close ties to the government through the retired bureau-
crats (Kevenhörster et al. 2003). This practice has often been associated 
with corrupt activity as the government- officials- turned- managers help 
to acquire public contracts, delay inspections and ensure various forms 
of preferential treatment through their jinmyaku network within the 
administration (Suzuki 1989; van Wolferen 1993).
1.19 Jaan- pehchaan (india)
denise dunlap
The university of massachusetts lowell, manning School  
of business, uSa
The age- old practice of facilitating business by exchanging favours is 
referred to in India by the Hindi words jaan- pehchaan. Batjargal (2007) 
defines jaan- pehchaan as ‘Hindi networks’, while other scholars define it 
as ‘[getting] something done through somebody you know’ (McCarthy 
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‘to know’, ‘to be acquainted’, ‘wise’, and ‘intelligent’, while pehchaan may 
be translated as ‘recognition’ or ‘identity’.
While best known in northern India, jaan- pehchaan is known 
throughout the country’s 20 officially recognised languages. These 
include Assamese, Bengali, Dogri, English, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, 
Konkani, Malayalam, Oriya, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, 
Manipuri, Mizo, Urdu and others. Jaan and pehchaan are the most com-
mon variants; also common are jan, jān, pahċān, pehechan and pehchan. 
In 1965, Mohammed Rafi, one of India’s most admired singers, popular-
ised the term throughout India with his song ‘Jaan Pehechaan Ho’. The 
song begins with the lyrics, ‘Jaan- Pehechaan ho, Jeeana Asaan ho’, which 
may be translated as ‘If I knew you through contacts, references or know- 
hows, then life would be easier’. It was featured in the Bollywood film 
Gumnaam (‘Unknown’ or ‘Anonymous’).
Zhu et al. (2005) examined how Indian businesspeople assess rela-
tionship- building in the context of jan pehchan, or ‘right connections’, 
and found that they prefer the more indirect style of developing connec-
tions with ‘the right people for doing business’ (p. 75). McCarthy et al. 
(2012) reported a dearth of research on how jaan- pehchaan connections 
are used in business in India. This result was not surprising given the 
widespread unwritten and oral manner in which personal communica-
tions are used in business across India.
To help fill this gap in the scholarly literature, the author conducted 
a series of interviews from 2009– 14, asking over 30 Indian executives 
employed in India by US and other foreign multinational firms to describe 
how jaan- pehchaan relationships are used in both business and personal 
settings. The interviewees described jaan- pehchaan as an umbrella term 
for social capital used within specific socio- cultural groups and related 
networks in India. They further noted that the trust developed within 
jaan- pehchaan relationships can lead to the use of favours to accomplish 
professional or routine personal tasks, and in worst- case scenarios may 
spill over into bribery. The interviewees also revealed that using jaan- 
pehchaan is an accepted way of doing business and that developing nurt-
uring relationships, especially with close acquaintances, through the use 
of in- group favours, lends a helping hand to those seeking jobs, business 
loans or contracts.
One interviewee, a 52- year- old Indian working for a US multi-
national company, offered the following example. He had a particularly 
important contact working at an Indian company, engaged in a similar 
kind of industry. Initially, their relations were purely business related. 














two men were of approximately the same age and social background. 
The contact had a son who wanted to enrol in a graduate engineering 
programme, and approached the interviewee to identify good schools 
and help secure a place. By contacting his own former classmates who 
now held academic teaching posts, the interviewee was able to secure 
a place for the son and satisfy his contact’s request. Once this ‘favour’ 
was granted, reciprocity was expected. Predictably, this took the form 
of the contact providing privileged information about how the US multi-
national might better position itself against local Indian competition. 
Explaining that such favours are common in India, the interviewee 
added, ‘This is how the network grows’. He considered such exchanges 
of favours to be entirely ethical since no law was broken. ‘Neither of us’, 
he said, ‘subverted the system’. Contrasting favours with bribery, he 
stressed that ‘Bribery is different because it is an attempt to subvert and 
break the law’.
These interviews highlight the instrumental role that jaan- 
pehchaan plays in Indian business relationships. In this respect, and 
taking account of the high rates of growth occurring in key sectors 
of India’s economy  – agriculture, industry and the service sector  – 
Indian managers are finding themselves in an increasingly open busi-
ness environment. They are, as a result, having to re- think how best 
to use jaan- pehchaan to advance their companies’ business interests in 
future (Zhu et  al. 2005). One interviewee commented that until the 
early 1990s the expectation was that, when jaan- pehchaan was used 
within the intimacy of sambandhi (close family ties), reciprocity of 
favours was the expected norm. The same had been true in business. It 
followed that those who lacked strong personal relationships found it 
hard to advance either their personal or their business interests. Today, 
the interviewee noted, following efforts by the state to liberalise the 
economy, such reciprocity is no longer ‘always’ required or expected. 
In the past, he implied, jaan- pehchaan played an even more critical role 
in lessening the opportunity costs borne by millions of Indian citizens 
who had to navigate around India’s slow, inflexible and bureaucratic 
rules of government.
It seems unlikely, however, that the importance of jaan- pehchaan 
connections will decrease substantially, given the collectivistic nature of 
India’s society. This has developed over centuries and is based on criteria 
such as caste, gender, language, religion and sect, rural or urban com-
munity, philosophy and culture. The caste system, dating back several 
centuries, served as a system of social stratification in which succeed-
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integral to their group identity. It centred on the teachings of Hinduism, 
which in this respect acted less as a religion and more as a way of life. The 
varna (class, social order) system referred to the four social classes into 
which society was divided. Each varna – Brahmins (religious leaders and 
administrators), Kshatriyas (the ruling elite and the military), Vaishyas 
(farmers, craftsmen and merchants) and Shudras (labourers and serv-
ants) – had its own ‘order of life’ which promised, if correctly observed, 
to enable the individual to break free from the bondage of material 
life and realise their true spiritual identity. Within each group, mem-
bers formed links, through either marriage (sambandi) or occupation, 
whereby they protected and fostered their relationships and businesses. 
Meanwhile certain groups, known today as Dalits or Harijans, were trad-
itionally regarded as untouchables and excluded from mainstream soci-
ety altogether.
The varna system continues indirectly to shape business even 
today. For instance, India’s Tata Group is both a successful multi-
national conglomerate and a modern example of a successful company 
that continues to be largely controlled by the Vaishya community of 
businessmen.
India is not and should not be viewed as a homogeneous country 
when it comes to developing, fostering and using jaan- pehchaan connec-
tions. For instance, there are many in- group bonds across India and each 
forms well- established networks with norms, based on trust, that offer 
not only identity but also protection, leading to conscious and uncon-
scious preference giving. A lack of cohesion among these various in- group 
networks or jaan- pehchaan connections can create serious difficulties 
for outsiders trying to navigate through this complex system (Schuster 
2006). The social capital and trust embedded within these complex con-
nections are multi-layered and cannot be easily replaced by traditional 
Western business contracts. Not having the ‘right’ jaan- pehchaan connec-
tions has been and continues to be a significant handicap for foreign busi-
nesses operating in India.
To conclude, all those interviewed by the author confirmed that 
the practice of developing jaan- pehchaan connections remains essential 
for successful business and that those without such connections, espe-
cially foreign firms, will find themselves at a significant disadvantage. 
Understanding the nature of these time- honoured relationships and how 
they work is therefore critically important since the loyalty shared within 
them can fundamentally influence the ability to achieve personal and 























Aidagara is a Japanese term used generally to mean that a social rela-
tionship exists between two persons. However, the meaning of the 
relationship is actually rather more complex. Hamaguchi’s theory of 
methodological contextualism helps to explain the difference between 
aidagara and social relations (Hamaguchi 1985). Methodological indi-
vidualism, according to Hamaguchi, assumes that the boundary of an 
actor as an individual does not include his or her interaction with another 
actor. In other words, he or she can exist as a singular entity. When he or 
she then interacts with another actor they get involved in social relations 
with the other actor (see Hamaguchi 1985:  fig.  2). Hamaguchi argues 
that methodological individualism cannot capture important character-
istics of social relations in Japan and proposes using methodological con-
textualism instead.
Methodological contextualism, in contrast to methodological 
individualism, assumes that the boundary of an actor covers his or her 
relations with another actor (Hamaguchi 1985: fig. 3). Such actors are 
called contextuals or relational actors in methodological contextualism. 
Contextuals, in contrast to individuals, cannot exist without their rela-
tionship with another actor, because the relationship is a part of his or 
her self. Furthermore, contextuals do not think that they can fully control 
their relationship with another actor, while individuals think that their 
relationship with another actor is in their full control.
This relationship between contextuals is called aidagara in the 
Japanese cultural context. Then the difference between aidagara and 
social relations in methodological individualism becomes clear. A social 
relation is one between independent individuals, while aidagara is a kind 
of social system in which contextuals interact.
The most important characteristic of aidagara is that the Japanese 
do not think that aidagara between them is a result of their intention, 
because they do not think that they can control it. Rather, they think that 
it is created by a power beyond them, which they call en (Hamaguchi 
1985). En is thought to be an unobserved power that realises aidagara 
between people. Thus the Japanese use the word to positively interpret 
their new relationship with another person. For example, two Japanese 
businesspersons who encounter each other at a business meeting would 
say, ‘Koremo nanika no go- en desuraka kongotomo yoroshiku onegaishi-
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En is also referred to in wedding ceremonies such as in ‘En ni meguma-
rete kekkon surukotoni narimashita’ (‘Good en made us get married’).
In contract situations, en is also used when a person does not want 
to maintain associations with another person. A businessperson who 
wants to sever his or her links with a potential business partner politely 
would say, ‘Go- en ga nakatta to iukotode’ (‘We should not enter the busi-
ness, because we do not share en’). He or she implies that ending their 
association is not because of his or her intention, but because of the lack 
of en.
Thus aidagara is believed to be the embodiment of en, which the 
Japanese believe (or pretend to believe) that they cannot control. These 
characteristics are different from those of similar concepts such as guanxi 
and social capital. Guanxi is a Chinese word expressing social relation-
ship. It was thought to exist only in China during and after the Cultural 
Revolution, but Lin (2001) argues that it exists in other countries and 
at other time periods, implying that it is a general concept. He defines 
guanxi as follows (Lin 2001: 159):  ‘guanxi are enduring, sentimentally 
based instrumental relations that invoke private transactions of favors 
and public recognition of asymmetric exchanges’. What is important 
in this definition is that guanxi is instrumental. For example, if person 
A wants to conduct business in a city in China, he or she needs to find a 
person (person B) who has large social networks of locals in the city and 
needs to establish a relationship with him or her. If person A succeeds 
in establishing a relationship with person B, he or she may then utilise 
person B’s networks to conduct business. Person A, in this case, intends 
to establish a relationship with person B in the expectation of using the 
relationship as an instrument.
This makes guanxi different from aidagara. The Japanese do not 
believe that they can intentionally establish aidagara between them-
selves and another, acknowledging that it is not their personal intention 
but en that creates aidagara. As mentioned above, they refer to en inten-
tionally only when they want to end their aidagara.
This difference is also found when aidagara is compared with social 
capital. Social capital is a technical term in social sciences expressing 
social relations (see Portes (1998) for an excellent review of the con-
cept). Specialists in the study of social capital are roughly divided into 
two camps when it comes to how social capital is created among people. 
Some scholars such as Coleman (1988) argue that social capital is a by- 
product of past interactions among people. For example, suppose that 
two close friends decide to be business partners and establish a new com-















business together at some future time. Becoming good business partners, 
according to Coleman, is a by- product of their friendship. In contrast, 
other specialists in the study of social capital, such as Burt (1995), argue 
that social capital can intentionally be created. Japanese businesspeople, 
for example, attend ‘business cards exchange’ parties (neishi kokankai in 
Japanese) to become acquainted with people in other industries, in the 
expectation of creating new business opportunities. Thus they intention-
ally try to create social capital. This second group of scholars investigates 
social capital as a tool with which actors try to realise a goal.
Although they share some common characteristics, aidagara and en 
differ from social capital in two ways. First, aidagara is not necessarily a 
by- product of a relationship. As previously mentioned, two businessper-
sons meeting each other for the first time would believe their aidagara 
was established thanks to en. Furthermore it is important to note that aid-
araga is not intentionally created. These differences make it challenging 
for outsiders who attempt to interpret relationships between Japanese 
people through the Western model of social capital, which does not work 
in the same way in Japanese society.
1.21 Amici, amigos (mediterranean and latin america)
christian Giordano
university of fribourg, Switzerland
Amici and amigos are the Italian and Spanish words for friends, which, in 
the Mediterranean and Latin America context, may indicate a specifically 
instrumental use of friendship ties. Friendship is a recurring theme in 
social sciences and in sociology in particular. Some of the classic soci-
ology authors have often delved into this topic closely connected to the 
question of basic interpersonal relations and of cohesion and solidarity 
among human beings. With reference to interest for the sociological as 
well as anthropological issue of friendship, first and foremost we ought 
to mention authors such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, Niklas 
Luhmann and not least Anthony Giddens, among others. All of these 
authors, who may be considered experts on this theme, share a decid-
edly occidental concept of friendship, i.e. that the emotional aspect is 
the primary characteristic of this relationship between two individuals. 
In his now classic text Runaway World (Giddens 1999: 61), Giddens 
formulated the hypothesis that sexuality, love, relationships between 
parents and children as well as those between friends follow the same 
development models in the globalisation process. In a possibly too opti-
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‘almost everywhere’ (Bell and Coleman 1999: 1). This would imply that 
the Occident’s emotional friendship would become a universal phenom-
enon. Empirical evidence, however, suggests a rather different scen-
ario since in specific societies this type of evolution is not observable or 
remains rather marginal because instrumental friendship, as defined by 
American anthropologist Eric J. Wolf with reference to Latin America and 
Central America in particular (Wolf 1968: 1 ff.), is predominant. In line 
with Eric J. Wolf, in this entry we will highlight how this type of infor-
mal dyadic relationship is very common also in Mediterranean societies, 
yet present also in specific African societies. Consequently, instrumen-
tal friendship cannot be regarded as a sociological exception or a mere 
ethnographic oddity.
Before concentrating on the characteristics of instrumental friend-
ship, those of emotional friendship need to be considered. In fact, instru-
mental friendship can only be defined by contrast with the emotional one 
(Reina 1959: 44 ff.; Wolf 1968: 10). The latter occurs when two individ-
uals exchange intangible reciprocal favours: spiritual, moral, romantic, 
abstract, sentimental, psychological. Sociologically speaking, emotional 
friendship arises when two individuals help each other in specific cases 
in which one of them needs intangible, emotional support in specific 
situations of tension, stress or pressure from their community (Wolf 
1968: 10). Thus, emotional friendship is a form of solidarity preventing 
someone from feeling alone or neglected. In most cases, an emotional 
friendship is a private and intimate psychological relationship gener-
ally involving only two individuals. Instrumental friendship, instead, is 
a socially broader phenomenon since it has a more public quality (Wolf 
1968: 12).
Instrumental friendship in Mediterranean and Latin American 
societies is a symmetrical extra- kinship and extra- family relationship. 
Therefore, it is a dyadic relationship between two individuals with 
roughly the same social position and the same economic means. There 
can be no class or social strata difference between friends. Note that these 
relationships occur primarily among men. Age difference appears to be 
irrelevant (Magnarella 1975: 168). Far more important, instead, is that 
there must not be a disproportionate social gap, a great difference in 
prestige or a conspicuous class disparity between the two partners of the 
dyadic relationship.
Crucial to instrumental friendship is the symmetry and resulting 
transactional nature of the relationship. In fact, the important aspect of 
dyadic friendships, especially in Mediterranean societies, is not so much 












that these forms of mutual favours are missing, but rather that they are 
secondary. Far more important, in fact, is the symmetrical exchange of 
the more material opportunities that may arise from intermediations 
with important contacts and acquaintances in high places and in posi-
tions of power. In Mediterranean and Latin American societies, a person 
experiencing some problem with the administrative justice or state bur-
eaucracy will try to influence the outcome of a legal action or to obtain a 
favourable ruling by mobilising a close friend who he presumes or is sure 
has the right friends for the task.
Yet, as previously mentioned, Mediterranean and Latin American 
instrumental friendships are always transactional because favours ren-
dered must be honoured by corresponding counter- favours. For example, 
if a person wins a lawsuit or is granted a licence to open a bar or a shop 
through the good offices of a friend, the latter will ask the former to return 
the favour, if the need arises, in order to obtain a sought- after public con-
struction contract. Instrumental friendships are characterised precisely 
by this logic based on the transactional symmetry of favours. In Italy’s 
Mezzogiorno in particular, it is quite unremarkable and no one tries to 
conceal the fact that friends with ‘important acquaintances’ are mobi-
lised to better one’s own and one’s family economic position. Neighbours 
and others in general would be amazed or become suspicious if some-
one turned down a friend’s practical help on mere moral or sentimental 
grounds. This type of person might even jeopardise his reputation and 
consequently be regarded as a fool or, worse still, as someone blatantly 
honourless. He would be deemed unable to adequately protect his own 
family’s interests from the treacherous risks posed by his rivals and more 
in general by the public sphere, i.e. local administration, state bureau-
cracy and so on.
These observations point up that material and instrumental trans-
actions between friends are in accordance with current social norms and 
conventions; therefore, society regards them as ‘normal’ and ‘rational’ 
interactions. To the single actors, friends who utterly reject any instru-
mental transaction seem ‘abnormal’ and ‘deviant’. In a sense, Western or 
Euro- American societies appear as a ‘topsy- turvy world’ to Mediterranean 
and Latin American actors, and certainly not a desirable ideal. Yet, we 
need to underscore that instrumental friendships have a multiplex char-
acter, i.e. they are not based on single, predetermined and unchangeable 
roles (Boissevain 1974: 30 ff.). The exchange of favours and counter- 
favours touches many aspects of everyday life; thus, the informal struc-
ture of the single roles within a dyadic relationship between instrumental 
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be regarded as an essential extension of a nuclear family and relatives, 
and those who do not conform to this type of relationship’s social norms 
will be censured by their community. The logical outcome in such cases 
is public ridicule or marginalisation.
At this point, we need to underscore that the term friend, under-
stood as a person of whom one can ask a favour that will then be 
reciprocated with a comparable favour, has an extremely positive con-
notation. Indicative of this state of affairs is the Mafioso rhetoric in 
Sicily in which the term friend of friends (amici degli amici) defines 
a relationship, not free from mutual instrumental favours, between 
members of the same Mafia group or even between a boss and his 
personal political connections. The alleged ritual kiss between Mafia 
boss Totò Riina and Italy’s former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti 
would have corroborated the prosecution’s thesis of their instrumental 
friendship.
With reference to instrumental friendship, we cannot focus solely 
on an analysis of this dyadic relationship. The societies we are exam-
ining are socially extremely complex and their members are integrated 
into highly diversified informal coalitions in which other types of inter-
personal relationships are observable. These latter along with instru-
mental friendships broaden and enhance the highly personalised and 
essential network of a single individual or nuclear family. In this entry, 
we will focus on two basic types of relationships. The first of these rela-
tionships, aside from instrumental friendship, is godfatherhood (Italian 
comparaggio, Spanish compadrazgo, Greek koumbaria, Balkan kumstvo), 
i.e. the relationship between godparent and godchild that is particularly 
significant within the Christian world of Europe’s south and south- east 
and in all of Latin America. In the Islamic Mediterranean world, where 
godfatherhood does not exist, functionally similar relationships can be 
observed.
The second type of interpersonal and dyadic relationship that 
extends the ties of solidarity and protection beyond the limited context 
of instrumental friendship is the relationship between patron and client. 
These two roles may also overlap. The patron often institutionalises his 
informal role by taking on the role of godfather as well. The comparaggio 
institution in Calabria has been cornered by powerful politicians linked 
to the electorally strongest parties and by high- ranking bureaucrats. 
Politicians try to acquire as many godchildren as possible in order to con-
trol the votes of entire families, and to secure extra votes that can win 
them the election (Piselli 1981: 210 ff.). The crucial feature of these two 



















godfather and patron are acknowledged as individuals on the higher 
rungs of the social ladder, with more prestige and more opportunities 
than their godchildren and clients.
In brief, instrumental friends are primarily middlemen who ensure 
an increase of their partners’ informal social capital (Bourdieu 1980: 2– 3). 
Clearly, the principle of reciprocity applies, i.e. whoever performs a 
favour will expect an analogous counter- favour, otherwise instrumental 
friendship can turn into rivalry, if not enmity.
Conclusion: managing favours in a global economy
Sheila m. puffer and daniel J. mccarthy
d’amore- mcKim School of business, northeastern   
university, uSa
A broad view of favours across the globe (as illustrated by the wide array 
of practices across 19 countries provided in the content of this chapter) 
raises questions about the relationship between ‘economies of favours’ in 
post- socialist countries, discussed in the introduction to Chapter 1, and 
the ubiquitous nature of the exchange of favours in developed countries. 
The use of personal contacts for getting things done is extraordinarily 
important in everyday life for citizens of most countries as they seek infor-
mation or access to institutions such as those in education and health 
care, and especially, as empirical data suggest, in seeking employment 
or advancement in one’s career. The phenomenon also features promin-
ently in the conduct of business in emerging or transitional economies, as 
well as international business and management.
Emphasis on managing favours is important as it is usually man-
agers who effectuate the practice in a global business environment by 
seeking contracts, as well as licences to operate and various types of 
permits. ‘Favors span a number of issues such as corporate growth strat-
egies, foreign direct investment, joint ventures and other alliances, multi-
national headquarters- subsidiary relations, knowledge transfer, human 
resources management, and business ethics’ (Puffer, McCarthy and Peng 
2013: 321). In addition, the use of favours by managers in emerging 
markets ‘impacts their organizational outcomes of firm growth, legit-
imacy, and reputation, as well as […] can facilitate or inhibit the inter-
national expansion of their firms’ (Puffer, McCarthy, Jaeger and Dunlap 
2013: 329). The realities of dealing with various governments and bur-
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business arena of developing nations. However, they may also manifest 
themselves in developed economies, often resulting in lobbying govern-
ments, bureaucracies and elected officials, thus generating practices 
involving paying for favours, yet legalised in those environments.
Although the use of favours is not limited to transition economies, 
McCarthy et al. contend that it is ‘more deeply ingrained culturally, 
more frequently employed, and more positively viewed in those environ-
ments having formal institutions with relatively weak legitimacy, more 
so than in developed economies’ (2012: 27, 28). In fact, several man-
agement scholars have identified systematic cultural differences between 
developed and developing countries which have an impact on manage-
ment practices and firm behaviour (see Jörgensen et al. 1986 in Puffer, 
McCarthy, Jaeger and Dunlap 2013: 329; Jaeger 1990; Hoskisson et al. 
2000; Aycan 2004).
According to von Weltzien Hoivik (2007), outcomes from using 
favours in developed economies are likely to be less predictable than 
in emerging economies where cultural traditions generally place more 
pressure on the grantor of the favour to see that the desired outcome is 
achieved. For instance, regarding a job reference, the expectation in the 
US is that the person granted a favour is likely to gain an interview but 
not necessarily to be hired, while in emerging economies such as Brazil, 
Russia, India and China, being hired would be expected. Another exam-
ple would be the permeability of lines between personal and business 
relationships in China, in contrast to the West, where they are separated 
by norms and rules regarding conflicts of interest.
Economies of favours can be viewed as part of the informal econ-
omies, defined as ‘commercial activities that occur at least partially out-
side a governing body’s observation, taxation, and regulation’ (AoM 
call 2012). Although the informal economy is not regulated by societal 
institutions in the same way as the formal economy, it is not similar to 
the black market or shadow economies, where practices and transac-
tions are basically instrumental and less defined by social capital and 
social exchange (Bruton et al. 2012). The importance of sociability is 
often a fundamental lens for viewing favours, yet insufficient by itself 
and should be viewed in the context of network theory, transaction cost 
theory, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, and ethical perspectives 
around the topics of agency theory and integrative social contracts the-
ory (ISCT).
In fact, the very definition of favours might need a change. We 
propose to understand favours as ‘an exchange of outcomes between 





















commonly understood cultural tradition, with reciprocity by the receiver 
typically not being immediate, and where the process and outcomes 
would not generally be considered bribery within that cultural context’ 
(McCarthy et al. 2012: 27, 28). A cross- disciplinary outlook is essen-
tial in driving this change. For decades, favours fell into the themes 
of anthropology (Malinowsky 1922; Mauss 1990/ 1950), sociology 
(Homans 1958; Blau 1964; Burt 1992; Scott 2008), and economics 
(Polanyi 1957; North 1990). According to Blau, in contrast to economic 
exchange, the social exchange of favours ‘entails unspecified obliga-
tions’ and ‘involves favors that create diffuse future obligations … and 
the nature of the return cannot be bargained’ (Blau 1964: 93). This 
view from an eminent sociologist contains many of the elements of the 
proposed, more complete, definition of favours. The cross- discipline 
consensus is that the use of favours is fundamentally anchored in the 
culture with its social traditions, referred to as an informal cultural- cog-
nitive institution (Scott 2008).
The definitions of favours seek to distinguish them from bribery, 
but the boundaries between the two are blurred. On the one hand, 
accepting the culture for favours can lead to bribery: favours may not 
constitute bribery per se and are generally not illegal in most coun-
tries, but they can result in negative consequences for the society, such 
as creating an uneven playing field for various actors (especially those 
excluded from the networks within which favours are exchanged). On 
the other hand, Puffer, McCarthy, Jaeger and Dunlap (2013: 329) note 
that:
favors may, in fact, be used to avoid paying bribes that carry asso-
ciated costs and potential penalties. In contrast to favors, brib-
ery involves a payment in money or in kind, with the expectation 
of something in exchange that requires unethical behaviour on 
the part of the recipient of the bribe (Luo 2002; Rose- Ackerman 
2002), and is considered illegal as well as unethical in most 
countries.
To place the proposed definition of favours in perspective, favour 
exchange in China has been categorised as a social norm, while bribery is 
seen to be a deviation from the social norm (Luo 2002).
Favour exchanges are defined by both culture and the stage of devel-
opment of a country’s formal institutional system that ‘can lead to differ-
ent perceptions regarding the ethicality of using favours. In developed 
economies where agency theory is fundamental to explaining corporate 
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managers would often consider some transactions involving favors to be 
unethical’ (McCarthy and Puffer 2008: 13). McCarthy et al. (2012: 4) 
posit that:
In emerging economies, however, agency theory has far less impact 
on business and managerial behaviour because strong, legitimate 
formal institutions are required to effectuate the principles of that 
theory, and those are generally lacking in those economies. [Thus] 
the use of favors in such economies is based in the cultural- cog-
nitive institutions that fill the void created by the weak legitimacy 
of formal institutions in those countries. Individuals thus are often 
faced with a pervasive bureaucracy due to the communist or colo-
nialist pasts of these countries. Thus we posit that the ethicality 
of using favors, including those used to achieve business goals, is 
highly dependent upon the context, particularly the country and 
its cultural context, and more specifically the communities within 
that country.
In fact, as McCarthy and Puffer establish (2008: 14– 15):
although often claimed to be an amoral theory, agency theory is 
used in practice by some Western businesspersons to judge the eth-
icality of corporate governance and other decisions and behaviours. 
Some critics thus argue that it must be considered in the context 
of morality: ‘Most agency theorists, despite the denials, make moral 
claims. Moreover, these moral claims are open to challenge’ (Bowie 
and Freeman 1992: 21). Those authors conclude that ‘an adequate 
theory of agency needs assistance from ethical theory’ (Bowie and 
Freeman 1992: 21).
In contrast to agency theory that is usually based in some form of 
capitalism in developed economies, the consideration of ISCT may be 
preferred to judge the ethicality of favours and transactions involving 
those practices, particularly in undeveloped or developing economies. 
This is because ISCT takes into account the cultural- cognitive institutions 
of individual countries based on their historical traditions and values 
(McCarthy and Puffer 2008: 14– 15):
ISCT acknowledges the legitimacy of many local norms, doing 
so in an inductive fashion by observing behaviours and recog-
nizing underlying cultural values. ISCT recognizes what ‘is’ in 
the context of a local community as the basis for legitimacy of 
















the theory’s priority rules, rather than what ‘ought to be’ as the 
basis for ethical legitimacy. Local norms will generally prevail as 
the ethical standard if they are ‘consistent norms’ that are more 
culturally specific, reflecting cultural variations (England 1975), 
provided they meet the tests of consistency noted above (Carroll 
2004; Donaldson and Dunfee 1999; Spicer et al. 2004).
In summary, rather than the more rigid interpretations of the 
appropriateness, and even ethicality of practices such as favours inher-
ent in agency theory, ISCT provides an appropriate level of flexibility for 
those behaviours by recognising their cultural- cognitive foundation, but 
with limitations. Thus this theory is far more appropriate and useful for 
judging ethicality of practices such as favours in developing economies, 
and can often be applied with value in developed economies.
The various practices presented in this chapter fall under an over-
arching umbrella of favours, although the practice in different coun-
tries may manifest itself in numerous and varying ways. The definition 
of favours, differentiated from bribery, has proven to be a useful tool 
with which to review the entries in this volume and to relate them to 
the different cultural, legal and institutional environments. While rec-
ognising the ubiquitous nature of such practices, we also acknowledge 
significance of the cultural- cognitive institutions, inclusive of a coun-
tries’ historical and cultural traditions and values. Given that devel-
oped economies have more stable and legitimate formal institutions, 
they might be less reliant on such informal institutions as exchange of 
favours, even as the increasing complexity of modern societies seems 
to produce an unintended consequence for seeking informal shortcuts.
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What do ‘beans for the kids’ in Kinshasa, ‘a glass of wine’ in Paris, and 
‘little carps’ in Prague have in common? ‘Variations in local cuisine’ may 
spring to mind, and rightly so. However, they are also ways of referring to 
informal economic practices – described by many as corruption or brib-
ery – in each of these places. And as with regional variations in cuisine, 
informal economic activities come in many culturally diverse guises and 
with many different labels that reflect local customs, histories and prac-
tices. Language, in short, is a constitutive part of all semi-legal and illegal 
practices, as well as the models of informality through which scholars 
have studied them. What, then, can expressions and euphemisms like 
these tell us about the way informal economic and political activities are 
practised and understood in different cultural and institutional contexts?
Academics, policy makers, and third- sector actors have until 
recently paid very little attention to local vocabularies of informality, 
preferring instead universal definitions of corruption, which take lit-
tle account of the socio- economic or cultural difference across time, 
space and context (Haller and Shore 2005). Paying attention to the use 
of local idioms for informal practices can provide a fruitful method for 
questioning such ‘one model fits all’ approaches to investigating infor-













phenomena. Because they often take place in the ‘grey zones’ that exist 
between the legal and illegal, and the moral and immoral, language and 
gesture are important vehicles for expressing that which must remain 
unsaid (Brković 2015). Taking local expressions and uses of language 
seriously can thus provide greater insight into the ‘knowing smiles’ and 
‘open secrets’ (Ledeneva 2011) through which various forms of official 
and unofficial exchanges operate, as well as the spaces of ‘productive 
ambivalence’ created by such transactions (Stan 2012). As such, they 
can be an effective tool for studying not only the socio- economic and 
political context in which these practices take place, but the manner in 
which the economy itself is imagined, expressed and contested by policy 
makers and citizens alike. Finally, by situating vernacular idioms within 
their wider communicative context of embodied expressions – including 
gestures, jokes, local forms of gift- giving, and kinship idioms – we can 
appreciate the particularity of different traditions and language ideolo-
gies that shape the ways in which people act and make valuations and 
judgements (Lambek 2010; Henig and Makovicky 2016).
Although they reveal considerable variation in approaches and atti-
tudes to informal practices, local euphemisms from across the world all 
have one thing in common: an aesthetics of deception. They work to deflect 
attention from a corrupt practice or minimise its importance. Whether 
it happens on the street, or in the boardroom, informality rests on the 
abuse of power and privilege. But popular euphemisms often deny this 
reality and present corrupt behaviour as altruistic ‘favours’ for friends. In 
Azerbaijani, the word commonly used for bribe (hörmət) is inter- change-
able with the word for respect. An official requesting a bribe (hörmətimi 
elə) will therefore ask you to ‘do him a favour’ or ‘pay him some respect’. 
In many regions, what is technically ‘illegal’ may in fact be acceptable 
or even moral. In China, for example, health care workers and govern-
ment officials might expect a ‘little token of gratitude’ (yidian xinyi) for 
their services. As it is said in Russia, ‘you cannot put “thank you” into 
your pocket’ (‘spasibo v karman ne polozhish’). The language of bribery is 
also closely related to that of gifting. In Hungary, doctors and nurses can 
expect a ‘gratuity’ (hálapénz) from their patients in the form of an enve-
lope containing money, while in Slovakia the term pozornosť denotes 
a token of appreciation given in dealings with officials, including pub-
lic services such as health and education. In Poland, gifts in kind turn a 
faceless bureaucrat into an ‘acquaintance’ (znajomość) who may be able 
to ‘arrange things’ (załatwić sprawy) for you in the future. Such expres-
sions tell us two things. One is that these ‘tokens of gratitude’ are not just 


























that people excuse their own behaviour as altruism while accusing others 
doing the same of showing unfair or illegal favouritism.
Like beauty, then, financial and moral corruption exists in the eye 
of the beholder. Popular phrases used for speaking about corruption are 
often poetic or metaphorical. Some make reference to unmarked enve-
lopes and other means of concealment. The well- known English phrase 
describing money being passed ‘under the table’, for example, also exists 
in French (dessous de table), Farsi (zir- e mize), and Swedish (pengar under 
bordet). Other expressions emphasise movement. In Hungary, ‘oiling 
money’ (kenöpénz) is paid to officials to grease the wheels of bureaucracy, 
while the Russians know it is sometimes necessary to put something on 
the palm of an official’s hand (‘polozhit na ladon’ or ‘dat’ na lapu’) in order 
to move things along. Other phrases work to deflect attention from a cor-
rupt action or to minimise its importance. The Swahili expression kitu 
kidogo (‘something small’) is a good example of this. In the Ivory Coast 
the police used to ask for a pourboire (the cost of a drink), comparing 
the size of the bribe to that of a small tip. In sub- Saharan Africa, customs 
officers ask for l’sk for du carburant (‘petrol money’). The Brazilian term 
for a bribe – a ‘little coffee’ (um cafezinho) – also doubles as the term for 
a tip in the conventional sense. The universal popularity of tea and cof-
fee as metaphors for bribes points to another way euphemisms function 
to conceal the true nature of a corrupt transaction. In Afghanistan and 
Iran the expression for a bribe is poul- e- chai, meaning ‘money for tea’. In 
both countries, tea- drinking is an essential part of social life. Asking for 
‘money for tea’ thus carries the suggestion that the bribe will be shared 
with others.
In other words, euphemisms allow people to talk about corruption 
in terms of morally positive actions such as sharing, tipping or even char-
ity. Some expressions – such as ‘beans for the kids’ – appeal to the char-
ity of the victim by claiming a bribe will be passed onto someone else. 
Indeed, across the globe, many euphemisms draw on local traditions of 
food provisioning and cooking, as the entries on ‘feeding’ in Russia (korm-
lenie, 7.1) and ‘eating’ in Tanzania (kula, 7.2) in this encyclopaedia show. 
In Kenya you might be stopped by traffic policemen and asked to con-
tribute to ‘tea for the elders’ (‘chai ya wazee’ in Swahili). In North Africa, 
you may be stopped and asked by the traffic police to sponsor their next 
kahwe, or coffee. In Turkey, the police would rather you give them ‘cash 
for soup’ (çorba parası) – soup is traditionally eaten at the end of a night of 
heavy drinking. The phrase ‘a fish starts to stink at the head’ (‘balık baştan 
kokar’) also comes from Turkey, reminding us that petty bribes at street- 




























and institutions. In the same vein, Mexican officials looking to earn a kick-
back for arranging a business deal will demand they are given ‘a bite’ (una 
mordida). This seemingly universal use of metaphors that connect petty 
corruption with food indicates the degree to which such practices are con-
nected to both a pragmatic need for survival, as well as an obligation to 
share or distribute a windfall with friends and relatives.
Finally, large- scale corruption and fraud has its own vocabulary, 
often created by the media. ‘Cash for questions’ in British politics comes 
to mind, as well as the Italian ‘tangentopoli’ (‘bribesville’) scandal in the 
early 1990s. Combining ‘tangente’ meaning kickback, and ‘ poli’ mean-
ing city, the term referred to kickbacks given to politicians for award-
ing public works contracts. The term Fimi Media (see 6.5 Volume 2) 
emerged in Croatia from a political scandal surrounding the marketing 
agency of the same name, and has come to refer to any misuse of public 
funds and power by political parties in the country. In Hungary, the term 
‘Nokia- box’ became a symbol of corruption in 2010 after the Head of the 
Budapest Public Transport Company, Zsolt Balogh, was caught handing 
over cash to the Deputy Mayor of Budapest, Miklos Hagyo, in a Nokia 
box. Since then, ‘Nokia box’ has also became a sort of ‘unit of measure-
ment’ – meaning 15 million Fts., the size of Mr Balogh’s original bribe. 
In the Czech Republic, the terms ‘little carps’ (kapříci) and ‘fish’ (ryby) 
were used as coded language during a large corruption scandal in Czech 
football. In communication between the managers, referees and players 
a ‘little carp’ also operated as a unit of measurement, meaning 1,000 CZK 
per ‘fish’. Indeed, even for established criminal gangs, references to food 
and animals can provide a convenient vehicle for secret communications. 
When several members of the Italian Cosa Nostra were arrested in the 
summer of 2015, it was revealed that they had communicated with the 
mafia boss Matteo Messino Denaro via coded messages left on a farm in 
western Sicily. One read: ‘I have put the ricotta aside for you, will you 
come by later?’ and another: ‘The sheep need shearing’.
2.1 Okurimono no shûkan (Japan)
Katherine rupp
yale university, uSa
In Japan, okurimono no shûkan is the practice of giving gifts. There is not 
a single, generic word for ‘gift’ in Japanese; rather, there are hundreds 
of terms for specific kinds of giving. Okurimono no shûkan is extremely 
important in Japanese society, and people invest substantial amounts 
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overwhelmed by their gift- giving obligations that they make deals with 
their friends not to invite each other to their children’s weddings, or they 
avoid telling their neighbours if they go on a trip in order not to have 
to bring back presents for them. One Tokyo taxi driver, when circum-
stances forced him to return briefly to his hometown in Niigata, stayed 
in a hotel and let only very few people know of his presence, because 
he could not fulfil his various gift obligations (Norma Field, personal 
communication).
Okurimono no shûkan is an important social practice not only at 
the personal and household levels, but on the national, macroeconomic 
level too. Japanese people spend a lot of time, worry and money on gift- 
giving, and it thus accounts for a significant share of consumer spending. 
For example, 60 per cent of the annual profits of Tobu department store, 
one of the biggest department stores in Tokyo, come from ‘summer’ and 
‘winter gifts’ (ochûgen and oseibo, Miura Seiichi, Vice President, Tobu 
Department Store).
A major avenue for social mobility in Japan is through bribery and 
patronage. The distinctions and continuities between ‘gift’ and ‘bribe’ 
are subtle and complicated. People give summer and winter gifts to their 
bosses, to the teachers of their children, to their doctors. At their sons’ 
weddings, parents give huge sums of money to the bosses of their sons 
when those bosses perform as ‘go- betweens’ or ‘matchmakers’ (nakôdo) 
and serve other important functions in the couples’ lives before, dur-
ing and after marriage. Parents and spouses pay the equivalent in yen 
of thousands of dollars to doctors (particularly surgeons) who care for 
their loved ones. Bureaucrats in Japan have wide authority to make pol-
icy, grant licences and dispense lucrative contracts, sometimes with very 
little accountability, and people in industry naturally seek their favours. 
Politicians receive donations from industry, and intercede with the bur-
eaucracy to secure projects on industry’s behalf.
All of these practices can be considered okurimono no shûkan. The 
grey area between gift- giving and corruption is very complex. The notion 
of bribery (wairô) is certainly present in Japanese society. In her own 
research, the author came across two instances of people who refused 
to participate in okurimono no shûkan because they found it repugnant. 
In one instance, a middle- aged woman refused to make a cash gift to 
the surgeon who performed a complicated operation. When it became 
absolutely clear that she was not going to hand over the large sum of 
money, the quality of her care declined precipitously, and she eventu-
ally died in the hospital. Her daughter related this harrowing experi-

























lighter note, an elderly man who worked as a stockbroker for many years 
refused to participate in seasonal giving, which he believed often serves 
as a ‘cover’ for bribery. He once returned a box of live shrimp that had 
been sent to him by a client. The shipping clerks were so disconcerted by 
his refusal of this gift that they returned it to him, by which time all the 
shrimp were dead.
Bribery between government and construction company officials is 
extremely hard to investigate, although the author at times came close to 
accessing pretty specific information by interviewing the wife of a con-
struction company president. Often, large amounts of cash are concealed 
within boxes containing seasonal gifts (such as traditional Japanese 
sweets). These large cash amounts – sometimes the equivalent in yen of 
tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars – are made before the gov-
ernment official grants a particular favour and would be considered by 
most Japanese to be bribes. However, the perceived line between ‘gift’ 
and ‘bribe’ varies from one individual to another, and the pressure to par-
ticipate in all kinds of okurimono no shûkan is fierce. There are individ-
uals who resist, but they often find themselves in the minority.
Many of the practices comprising okurimono no shûkan originated 
in other parts of Asia. The seasonal cycles have correlates in China, as 
do many of the numerological and divinatory aspects of Japanese gift- 
giving. Examination of Japanese gift practices leads to a deeper explor-
ation of networks and social relationships in Japanese society, and, at the 
same time, to a more detailed understanding of processes of borrowing 
and transformation in the history of Asian cultural interchange.
Very many gifts take the form of cash, the prototypical commod-
ity form. Even when gifts are objects other than cash, in numerous 
instances it is prescribed that they be as impersonal as possible. The giv-
ing of gifts is subject to a calculus of value based on monetary price, for 
precise attention to monetary cost is integral to the negotiation of cer-
tain relationships. When one receives a gift from a department store, for 
example, there is a code printed on it, and this reveals how much the 
gift cost. Japanese florists report that when they deliver flowers, recipi-
ents enquire how much the flowers are worth (Rupp 2004). The reason 
why the receiver is so concerned with the price of the gift is that in many 
cases, a return gift is necessary, and in order to make the appropriate 
type of return gift, it is essential to know the cost of the original gift.
From one point of view, the cash value of gifts and the cash given at 
these exchanges has nothing to do with buying and selling. Rather, it is 
connected to notions of auspiciousness, encompassment and alignment. 
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units of odd numbers. Some sums of cash that are technically even – such 
as 10,000 yen or 100,000 yen – are considered as odd numbered units of 
one. The cords used to tie the envelopes are made from odd numbers of 
strands; the cord with the highest number of strands, nine, is appropriate 
for a very auspicious event, such as a wedding. The envelopes that con-
tain the money are folded in such a way that left is placed over right and 
top is placed over bottom.
These internal ‘rules’ governing okurimono no shûkan stem from 
the philosophy of yin and yang. In terms of position, top and left are 
yang, bottom and right are yin. In regard to numbers, odd is yang, even 
is yin. Every odd number greater than one contains within it both an 
even number and an odd number (e.g. 3 = 1 + 2). Odd numbers are 
preferred to even numbers because a hierarchical principle is at work, 
in which ‘the elements of the whole are ranked in relation to the whole’ 
(Dumont 1980: 66). The inferior becomes a member of the superior, the 
even is subsumed within the odd. In philosophical discourse, the rela-
tionship between yin and yang is not represented to be hierarchical, but 
in many forms of practice, the flourishing of the natural and social worlds 
is accomplished only when disorder (yin) submits to order (yang).
The number of strands in the cord that ties the envelope, the odd 
numbered units of bills the envelope contains, the way the envelope is 
folded, are all material embodiments of the encompassment of yin by 
yang, of female by male, and the life that flows from that hierarchical 
ordering (see Figure 2.1.1). Precise measurement, both in terms of the 
emphasis on odd units of bills and on the cash value given, enables and 
underscores this encompassment. Gifts to male employees are of con-
siderably higher cash value than gifts to female employees. Unequal 
treatment of male and female itself underscores the importance of repro-
duction, because within this symbolic system, it is through the combin-
ation of male and female in unequal relationships that life is believed to 
be created and sustained.
Hierarchical ordering is believed to nurture life, and refusal to syn-
chronise one’s giving and receiving with this larger system is considered 
inward- looking and selfish. The strong pressure to conform is probably 
related to certain Chinese derived beliefs that moral human action con-
sists of alignment with the cosmic order; lack thereof results in disorder 
in the realms both of nature and society. This may be why so many indi-
vidual Japanese people devote so much time, energy and money to giv-
ing and receiving, and feel pressure to perform ‘correctly’. Performing 
correctly means taking each particular instance of giving and linking it 















frameworks of specialty items from faraway places, and hierarchical 
orderings of human beings, department stores, or numbers. In this con-
text, monetary and quasi- monetary signs are important for giving in that 
they are apprehended as specific quantities that are auspicious because 




The Chinese word songli means gift- giving (song meaning ‘giving’, li 
meaning ‘gift’). Songli denotes the use of relations in the form of social 
exchange and is often related to guanxi, a dyadic social exchange rela-
tionship (see guanxi, 1.12 in this volume). While guanxi refers to the 
social connections that can get things done, songli indicates the means 
whereby these goals may be achieved.
In Chinese, li may mean ‘rite’, ‘courtesy’ or ‘gift’. The relatively mod-
ern meaning of gift comes from its ancient usage as rite and courtesy. 
Gift exchange has always played a crucial role in human society, and the 
Chinese have since ancient times regarded the ritual of songli as indis-
pensable etiquette. The Book of Rites, or Li Ji, a Confucian classic, states, 
Figure 2.1.1 The top of a bamboo box given to guests at a wedding 
as a return gift and envelopes with different meanings – one is for an 
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for instance, that ‘Courtesy demands reciprocity; courtesy is given but 
does not come back; it cannot be maintained. Given and not returned, 
there is no courtesy’ (Li Ji 2013). Courtesy visits among the upper 
social classes should normally be accompanied with gifts. Ancient gifts 
included meat, wine, jade or silk (Yang 1994: 224). Since reciprocity is 
highlighted in the code of Confucian ethics, recipients will always give 
something in return to the donor of a gift in order to keep the balance and 
maintain the harmony of their relations.
Deeply rooted though it is in traditional Chinese culture, songli 
has transformed dramatically in contemporary China. The function of 
‘maintaining courtesy’ has gradually faded away and utilitarianism has 
become the dominant logic governing the practice.
In general, songli is an important way to build and maintain social 
networks, strengthen personal connections, accumulate ‘social capital’ 
that can be ‘cashed in’ in times of need, reach goals and receive favours 
from relevant individuals. Since songli comprises both expressive and 
instrumental features, it can sometimes be difficult to distinguish one 
from another. Usually, it is the degree of intimacy, the interaction dynam-
ics and the purpose of gift- giving that determine various songli strategies 
and logics.
For instance, when songli is practised within a close circle of rela-
tives and friends, donors often use gifts to express goodwill and cement 
social bonds. They may not necessarily expect immediate ‘repayment’ 
from the recipients; rather, they tend to see songli as an ‘investment’ 
from which they may benefit in the longer run. When songli is practised 
between two persons with weak social ties but with certain interests at 
stake, the donor may expect direct or concrete ‘payback’ from the recipi-
ent. It is, for example, common for patients and their relatives to give 
gifts, often in the form of a ‘red packet’ (money in a red envelope) to the 
medical doctors in charge of their case, in anticipation of special treat-
ment and extra care (this is especially the case when surgery is required). 
Parents give gifts to their children’s teachers on Teachers’ Day, hoping 
that their children will receive more attention and special consideration 
at school.
Reciprocity and instrumentalism are not the only logics driving 
songli. Sometimes people give gifts because of normative concerns or as 
a result of peer pressure. In China the songli culture is so prevalent in the 
job market and the workplace that it has become to some extent a ‘hid-
den rule’. A survey conducted jointly in 2006 by China Central Television 
and a recruitment website found that 26 per cent of college graduates 
























job, and that songli and dinners accounted for 8 per cent of the total cost 
of their job hunting activity (Images.zhaopin.com 2015). Those who got 
jobs with the help of intermediaries gave gifts or meals to the intermedi-
aries to express their gratitude, while other interviewees said that, since 
‘red envelopes’ and songli were in some cases the only way to secure a 
desired job, they felt they had no choice but to take that path (Images.
zhaopin.com 2015).
In modern- day China, songli may take various forms. Gifts may 
include money; goods such as wine or cigarettes; an invitation to tea or 
dinner; a VIP card to a golf club; or a trip to a well- known resort. The suc-
cessful practice of songli usually implies the agreeable acceptance of the 
gift, a strengthened bond between donor and recipient and the eventual 
granting of the desired favour.
To go smoothly, songli requires delicate handling. Traditional 
holidays such as the Spring Festival and the Mid- Autumn Festival pro-
vide excellent opportunities since the givers need no extra ‘excuses’. 
Weddings and housewarmings are often occasions when ‘red packets’ 
are presented (Mack 2014). Before engaging in songli, an experienced 
donor will always conduct in- depth research into the potential recipient’s 
hobbies and preferences in order to ensure that the gift will please. When 
presenting the gift, the donor often employs a euphemism such as ‘This 
is a little token of my gratitude’ to disguise the utilitarian nature of songli 
and to make the story sound plausible.
The association between songli and guanxi reflects China’s trans-
formation from a planned to a socialist market economy. In the early 
transition period of the 1970s and 1980s, the underdeveloped nature of 
the economy led to a shortage of goods and, as a result, the state played a 
dominant role in the allocation of scarce resources. Ordinary people gave 
gifts in an effort to ‘skirt around the cumbersome bureaucracy’ and to 
reach the officials who controlled access to desirable goods or opportun-
ities (Yang 2002). At that time, songli was mainly to satisfy basic personal 
needs.
With the introduction and blossoming of the market economy in 
the 1990s, songli came to be used more to pursue opportunities and 
resources for self- development and welfare, such as better kindergartens, 
schools, jobs and hospitals. At the same time, most of the high- quality 
social resources still remain within the control of the state.
Yang observes that guanxi flourishes in the business and urban- 
industrial sphere where private or foreign entrepreneurs need to engage 
with the officials who control state contracts, access to favourable 
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Naturally, the nurturing of guanxi in such realms is often accompanied 
by the practice of songli.
As explained above, the use of songli in the common gift- exchange 
mechanism usually involves a two- way flow of gifts between two individ-
uals regardless of their relative social status (Li 2011). When used within 
the context of guanxi, however, songli typically entails a one- way flow of 
gifts – from the weak to the strong, the subordinate to the superior, and 
not vice versa. Moreover, ‘repayment’ often takes the form of permissions 
and opportunities rather than of tangible gifts. In the guanxi context, 
moreover, the recipient of the gift is often someone whose right to use, 
allocate or redistribute certain public resources enables him or her to use 
official authority to grant favours and opportunities. In such cases, the 
boundary between songli and bribery becomes blurred.
Examination of songli in China sheds light on the popular gift- giv-
ing culture across Asian societies. Like China, South East Asian countries 
also use the ‘red- envelope’ together with other songli strategies in order 
to cultivate interpersonal relationships. There are, for example, signifi-
cant parallels between the Japanese gift- giving practice of okurimono 
no shûkan (see 2.1 above) and China’s songli. Both are instrumental in 
nature, stay in the grey zone between bribery and gift- giving, and reflect 
the overall structure of power.
China’s current anti- corruption campaign has had a huge impact on 
songli strategies towards government officials. In fear of being accused of 
bribery and abuse of power, officials tend to refuse or return gifts given by 
those who want favours from them. Sexual propositions, which used to 
be presented as gifts to the officials at nightclubs or saunas to strengthen 
the so- called ‘brotherly bond’ between the businessman and the official 
(Yang 2002), are now labelled as ‘power- sex deals’ (quan- se jiaoyi) and 
their use has fallen sharply as a result of the anti- corruption campaign. 
Similarly, luxury goods presented as gifts to officials or business partners, 
which in the past could amount to hundreds of thousands of yuan, have 
been categorised as bribery. Such exchanges are now labelled as ‘power- 
money deals’ (quan- qian jiaoyi) and can result in severe penalties. As a 
result, many luxury brands have recently reported a sharp fall in sales 
in China (News.xinhuanet.com 2013; Finance.people.com.cn 2014). In 
such circumstances, skilful gift- givers now tend to choose gifts that are 
hard for investigators to measure or to track down.
New technologies and operational tactics have also been adopted. 
For instance, the social network app WeChat (weixin) enables users to 
transfer money in the form of ‘e- red packets’ to their Wechat contacts. 




















e- red packet a potential new songli tool. The original function of the e- 
red packet was social networking and entertaining, especially during the 
Chinese New Year celebrations. Nowadays, however, it serves more as 
a reliable electronic instrument for the transfer of funds. As such, it has 
gradually developed into a songli technique. Similarly, the rapid develop-
ment of online shopping in China offers donors more choices, while the 
express courier- service ensures the fast delivery of various forms of gifts. 
Meanwhile, the use of shopping cards and e- shopping allows recipients 





Chinese people regularly give a red paper packet or envelope (hongbao) 
filled with money (always in notes) as gifts for weddings, birthdays, New 
Year celebrations and other important events. Normally, it is given as 
‘luck money’ by the older generation to the younger generation, or by 
a superior to subordinates, or by married colleagues to unmarried col-
leagues on the first working day after the New Year (Huang 2003: 1– 24). 
The sum of money in the hongbao is not fixed and it is based on the rela-
tionship between the giver and recipient, i.e. the closer the relationship, 
the greater the sum of money given. The hongbao culture is also com-
monly found in other Chinese societies; analogous practices include lishi 
in Hong Kong and ang pow in Singapore.
In present- day China, however, in certain circumstances hongbao 
can also be considered a bribe. Although bribery worldwide is usually 
related to monetary reward and to unethical behaviour, in China, where 
there is a distinctive and historical custom of hongbao, a case of bribery 
is harder to distinguish as it depends entirely on the context in which 
the money is given. The widespread practice of giving money as a gift 
can be traced back to the Song Dynasty in the twelfth century, when giv-
ing money, or lishi, was first recorded. One thousand years ago Chinese 
parents gave their children 100 coins called yasuiqian in the belief that it 
would bring them luck and that they would live to be 100 years old (NLB 
Singapore 2005). The first use of the term hongbao seems to have been in 
the nineteenth century.
In contrast with many other countries in the world that are influ-
enced by a spiritual tradition that perceives money as something dirty 
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belief, has no such inhibition. Contemporary Chinese culture is not influ-
enced by spiritual values and as a consequence money is not negatively 
connoted. As a result, Chinese people are generally very money oriented 
and consider that money can bring them the two most important things 
in life  – fame and power. Some Chinese people even regard money as 
a crucial criterion in determining social status, believing that the richer 
you are, the higher your social standing. Such money- oriented culture 
can be traced back to ancient times. The Chinese people have had a long- 
standing tradition of burning paper money in ancestral veneration. The 
offering of money is made to the spirits and then the paper is set alight to 
transfer it to the afterworld.
In recent times, hongbao has become a commonly used tool in 
China for developing guanxi (an instrumental network of relationships –  
see 1.12 in this volume), with the specific aim of gaining preferential 
treatment. The boundary between hongbao being given as a gift or as a 
bribe has become blurred. For example, in the context of education it is 
common for parents to give their child’s teachers a hongbao on Teachers’ 
Day to show their appreciation. In this instance parents give hongbao as 
a manifestation of gratitude, and as such, the practice is considered eth-
ical. However, it is also possible for the donating parents to use this act 
to convey a subtle expectation of receiving some advantage or preferen-
tial treatment for their child, such as personal attention or better grades. 
In this situation, the giving of the gift of hongbao may be regarded as 
a bribe. Similarly, one might give hongbao as a wedding gift to the son 
or daughter of an influential government official. The hongbao is given 
straightforwardly as a wedding gift. However, if shortly after the wed-
ding, it turns out that the government official will grant a government 
permit to the donor for some business expansion the gift might rightly be 
construed as a bribe.
Since giving hongbao as a bribe most commonly serves the inter-
action between businessmen (bribers) and officials (bribe takers), it is 
easy to see how the private/ public boundary is routinely crossed. In China, 
under the duress of law and social norms, officials are reluctant to accept 
bribes, so self- justification strategies come into play (Huang 1987).
Businessmen use two main ‘self- justification’ strategies during 
hongbao- giving, employing a variety of subtle measures to disguise the 
bribes as gifts, thus outwardly behaving in a normative manner. First, 
businessmen do not give hongbao to officials direct – instead they find an 
intermediary to act as a third party. In instances where a businessman 
and official have not yet established a relationship, the use of an inter-





















mutual trust, no matter how much an official was desirous of receiving 
a bribe, it would be refused. In order to be successful, in a premeditated 
sequence of events, the businessman will give hongbao to relatives or 
close associates of the official he wishes to bribe. Then, at a later date, 
once relationship ties are better established, he will ask the intermedi-
ary to deliver hongbao to the official he originally wanted to bribe. Even 
though the official might be fully aware of the real nature of hongbao, 
presented in this way as normative gift- giving behaviour between parties 
who have close relationships, the official is able to accept it. The culture 
of hongbao dictates that the recipient should not open the envelope in 
public, nor show too much eagerness to receive it. This allows officials 
to feel ‘obliged’ to accept the offering, as refusing a gift is considered 
inappropriate and discourteous. However, once the ‘gift’ is accepted, it 
opens the door to future demands of bribery in return for benefits.
The second criterion businessmen use to give legitimacy to hongbao 
is to ensure that it is given only at specific times and in specific spaces. 
Businessmen wait and use the traditional Chinese holidays such as New 
Year, the Spring Festival and important family functions such as wed-
dings as opportunities to give hongbao bribes disguised as gifts. The nor-
mative gift- giving practice of the special occasion allows bribery to be 
transformed into acceptable gift- giving. In the absence of laws regulating 
gift exchange between officials, or where laws are barely enforced (as 
is the case in China), bribery in the form of hongbao becomes practic-
ally impossible for officials to resist. The space in which it is given also 
plays an important role in the transformation from bribe to gift. In busi-
ness, the most common location for hongbao- giving is within the officials’ 
homes (Lee 2009: 85– 106). Since homes are the officials’ private space 
rather than workspace, hongbao given in a domestic setting can be simply 
validated as an interaction between friends.
In Chinese society, the practice of ‘gift- return’ has long been 
regarded as an intrinsic feature of gift- giving. Therefore, the ‘gift- return’ 
between the officials and businessmen produces an artificial form of gift- 
giving. In a further pursuit of the ‘self- justification’ strategy employed 
by officials keen to avoid gaining a morally disadvantageous status for 
having accepted hongbao, the official may symbolically reciprocate 
with a gift of little value, such as a self- made painting or drawing (Yue 
2012: 102– 5).
Because of the moral ambivalence of hongbao, using legal criteria to 
determine whether hongbao is a gift or bribe is difficult. Therefore, other 
criteria should be applied. Gu examined the boundary between hongbao 
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is determined on the basis of the exchange involved in hongbao, rather 
than the character of the social relations between the actors involved. If 
the exchange involves material interest and short- term reciprocity only, 
then the hongbao is classified as a bribe (Gu 2001: 5– 9). Such an argu-
ment is further elaborated by Lin’s study of the interaction between busi-
nessmen from Hong Kong and politicians from Mainland China, in which 
he points out that giving hongbao as a gift to someone one is connected 
to within a network should not be instantly reciprocated, as this would 
be considered impolite or even offensive; rather the gift is expected to 
be repaid in the future (Lin 2006: 80– 7). At a future time, a genuine 
hongbao recipient will always return a hongbao containing exactly the 
same amount of money as they were originally given. In contrast, when 
hongbao is given as a bribe, the hongbao taker will not reciprocate with 
money; rather, they will repay the gift in another form, such as in a lucra-
tive contract or in the gift of valuable resources or land offered at below 
market prices.
The implications of hongbao are twofold. Hongbao may be econom-
ically beneficial in the short term and as such can be positively connoted. 
In China, where elaborate bureaucracies make it hard to get access to 
limited resources, hongbao can be seen as a useful mechanism for ‘greas-
ing the wheel’, or cutting through red tape and serves as ‘speedy money’ 
(Yang 2001: 87– 102).
In China, although most people condemn bribery in its broadest 
sense, and acknowledge that it is illegal, it is so closely related to per-
fectly legal and ethical behaviours that this very ambivalence makes 
it very easy for a cynical bribe- giver to argue that he is not guilty of 
wrongdoing – he is simply presenting a gift to a friend. In the long term, 
however, the moral ambivalence of hongbao hinders the progress of anti- 
corruption processes in China.
2.4 L’argent du carburant (sub- Saharan africa)
Thomas cantens
clermont School of economics, auvergne university, france
In some African Customs administrations, ‘fuel money’ (l’argent du car-
burant or le prix du carburant) is a metaphor designating a small sum of 
money given to officials. The term most likely originates from the pre- 
paid fuel coupons given to civil servants to cover their transportation 
costs on official business. L’argent du carburant usually takes the form 
of something that is represented as personal, immediately and individu-

















with the very raw material of corruption – money – which distinguishes 
them from spending administrations. Moreover, they are a powerful 
State apparatus: according to the 2011– 12 Annual Report of the World 
Customs Organisation, out of 26 African countries that have disclosed 
their figures, the customs service collects between 15 per cent and 96 per 
cent of total tax revenues, with an average of 45 per cent. In compari-
son, the customs services of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries collect between 0.6 per cent and 52 per 
cent of tax revenues, with an average of 21 per cent.
Instances of l’argent du carburant may be overtly corrupt in 
nature: for instance, when a customs official is inspected by colleagues 
from the internal audit service, the latter may demand the ‘money for the 
fuel’ (that he has consumed to come to the audited staff) to draw up a 
favourable report. But more often the term refers to cases in which there 
is no real material exchange or extortion. Rather, l’argent du carburant 
serves more as a goodwill gesture to facilitate smooth long- term working 
relations between the parties. In a customs office, forwarding agents who 
present declarations regularly give l’argent du carburant after the declar-
ation has been processed by the customs officer, without a fraud having 
been concealed or the processing sped up. Declarations are allotted to 
inspectors automatically and at random, so this gift remains ‘personal’. 
The sums are relatively small compared to the amounts of duties and 
taxes paid, and are recorded as ‘miscellaneous expenditure’ on invoices 
the forwarding agents submit to their clients. When asked how much 
they give, some forwarding agents refer to a very elaborate scale accord-
ing to the nature of the goods passing through customs – a sign of the 
institutionalisation of this type of payment.
In principle, service users who do not give l’argent du carburant do 
not suffer any adverse effects other than a reputation for stinginess. In 
fieldwork conducted by the author in Cameroon, no respondent stated 
that a person who had not handed money over had been discriminated 
against on subsequent occasions. The forwarding agents interviewed 
were too verbose to fail to mention any penalties they would have 
incurred had they not offered such payments. L’argent du carburant is 
thus more of a custom than a source of corruption.
L’argent du carburant is part of a wide range of practices of dona-
tions with nothing in return that occur in day- to- day social relation-
ships. When visiting headquarters for a meeting, one customs officer 
who had obtained a very gainful position (i.e. one that provides plenty 
of opportunity to earn extra money, both legally through bonuses as a 
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his mission per diems to a colleague and friend, telling him it was for his 
‘fuel’. Another, who no longer works at the port, was given an envelope 
by a forwarding agent with whom he had ceased to have any relations, 
for old time’s sake. Fuel money also facilitates relations between subor-
dinates and their bosses, who, deprived of contact with users because of 
their position, cannot increase their income like their subordinates do. 
This is referred to as ‘giving account’. Although l’argent du carburant is 
not a form of bribery (in that it is not given for an immediate result in 
return), nor should it be considered a ‘gift’, given out of gratitude with no 
expectation of anything in return. Rather, l’argent du carburant facilitates 
connections that may be exploited subsequently.
Although in practice such connections may never be used, they can 
be employed if necessary. In the case of relations between a boss and his 
subordinates, it is similarly not certain that a subordinate will need his 
boss to cover him in an event of a problem, or that the boss has means to 
control his subordinates’ real activity. However, the main role of l’argent 
du carburant may be to ensure what Gluckman (1955) called ‘peace in 
the feud’, i.e. the constraint of conflict by custom.
The environment of customs administration is indeed fundamen-
tally combative in nature, due to the conflicting interests of the actors 
involved. Such competitive interactions take place both between service 
users and customs officers, and among the officers themselves. Service 
users aim to pay as little as possible, while officials seek either to maxi-
mise revenue to meet monthly targets (and thus advance their career), or 
Figure 2.4.1 At the customs.



















to take the highest possible bribe in the light of the risk taken. Customs 
officers also compete with each other to be appointed to the best posi-
tions (Cantens 2012). L’argent du carburant is one of many unofficial 
practices that anticipate or resolve the conflicts among officials and 
between officials and taxpayers, a form of courtesy that finds its legitim-
acy in the latent conflicts. Other practices exist, such as various kinds of 
negotiation of the tax pressure on the big taxpayers and on the ‘informal 
sector’ (Cantens 2013; Cantens et al. 2014).
L’argent du carburant can turn into a major issue when change or 
innovation – for instance, a technical reform – breaks the equilibriums. In 
Cameroon in 2008, when a new IT (information technology) system was 
installed that allotted declarations at random according to workloads, 
certain customs officers began to process them as quickly as possible by 
settling them without fully checking. This meant that the system would 
allot them more declarations so that they could increase their income 
though l’argent du carburant. This fast- tracking created informal income 
inequalities among customs officers working in the same office, result-
ing in some officials blowing the whistle on this malpractice among their 
colleagues. The system has now been adjusted to resolve this problem. It 
could be said that to some extent the system of l’argent du carburant has 
led to a legal improvement, since the ‘bad’ customs officials do now spend 
more time on controlling declarations. As with l’argent du carburant, all 
informal practices related to money generate competition among offi-
cials, as well as creating fragile equilibriums. At border offices where the 
trade traffic is low, a collectivisation of l’argent du carburant has been 
reported: the figures of the amounts given to each official are recorded in 
a book and the total amount is shared among officials according to their 
hierarchical rank on a weekly or monthly basis.
L’argent du carburant challenges some of the common assumptions 
of policy developers and researchers. On the one hand, it is legally cat-
egorised as a ‘corrupt’ practice: most penal codes classify the receipt of 
money that is not officially explicitly sanctioned as corruption. On the 
other hand, this kind of practice does not easily fit in with the conceptual 
framework of policy makers, whose definitions of corruption are often 
narrower than the law itself. Payments that are not extorted or unoffi-
cially exchanged for a service are generally considered from perspectives 
that can be either pragmatic – the importance of the informal practice 
is related to its cost for the taxpayers – or symbolic – the conformity of 
officials’ action to Weber’s ideal- type bureaucracy. L’argent du carburant 















1432.4 l ’argent du carBurant  (Sub-Saharan africa)
143
in part based on what is acceptable in a society and the individual free-
dom to respect what society considers as acceptable or not.
Providing quantitative estimates for the amounts paid in bribes and 
carburant is not such a difficult task for ethnographers. Estimates given 
by respondents – both officials and intermediaries – for typical amounts 
paid can easily be cross- checked. Such respondents often talk candidly 
because they are keen to ‘explain’ what corruption is and the extent to 
which such payments compensate for the weak salaries of civil servants. 
For example, in Cameroon in the 1990s, officials’ wages were reduced by 
75 per cent as part of ‘structural adjustment plans’, which understand-
ably gave rise to a feeling of entitlement to informal payments as a means 
of fair compensation.
Quantitative measurement of carburant is important for challen-
ging the usual distinction between ‘major’ and ‘petty’ corruption, based 
on amounts and beneficiaries. This typology has been roundly criticised 
as an ideological construction by Western societies (Amselle 1992). The 
case of customs administrations in sub- Saharan Africa reinforces such 
criticism:  in Cameroon, the total amounts collected under ‘petty’ cor-
ruption  – including l’argent du carburant  – significantly exceeded the 
amounts reported in the press in ‘major’ corruption cases between 2006 
and 2010. In addition, the ideological distinction between ‘petty’ and 
‘major’ corruption may serve the idea that the higher status someone has 
in society, the higher the amount of bribe should be to consider him as 
‘corrupt’.
Another difficulty in defining practices as ‘legitimate’ or ‘corrupt’ 
is that official procedures are always permeated by unofficial practices. 
An example of this official– unofficial dynamic arising from l’argent du 
carburant is the ‘protocol’, a formal but local institutional agreement 
between the administration and the private sector. Aware that the issu-
ing of documents or the fulfilment of minor administrative action gave 
rise to intentional bottlenecks and payments of money, customs officials 
concluded ‘protocols’ with their private sector customers: an agreement 
defining the sum to be paid according to the action performed or the 
document provided. The amounts are collected together from forward-
ing agents or hauliers and divided among customs officers according to 
a fixed transparent scale. The managers of these enterprises preferred 
a protocol to a confrontational relationship with the customs officers. 
Moreover, the managers never actually knew whether their representa-
tives gave the entire sum to the customs officer or kept part for them-
selves; thus the firms’ relationship with their forwarding agents could 




















informal payments. A ‘protocol’, on the other hand, provides them with 
transparency.
If a state institution detects an informal threat to its power that it is 
unable to eliminate, then it will create or co- opt unofficial practices to try 
and regain some degree of control. The ‘protocol’ is an example of this – 
given that the customs authority lacks the means to eliminate the prac-
tice of l’argent du carburant, it standardises it and regains some degree 
of control over it in the form of the ‘protocol’. Such state pragmatism is a 
kind of ‘reason of state’. In this respect, addressing corruption by forcing 
actors to live up to idealised, abstract rules that are not recognised as 
legitimate precisely because they are so far removed from everyday prac-
tice is not realistic.
2.5 Paid favours (uK)
colin c. Williams
Sheffield university management School, uK
The term ‘paid favours’ refers to acts of one- to- one material help within 
wider kinship, friendship and neighbourly networks that are reimbursed 
with money. For example, a friend offers you a lift in their car, so you give 
them ‘money for the petrol’. As a general rule, the sum paid bears little 
relation to the market price: the closer the relationship between you and 
your friend, indeed, the less likely is it that the fee will conform. So far, 
this practice has been discussed mostly in relation to the UK and other 
Western economies (Williams 2009).
The provision of one- to- one material help within wider kinship, 
friendship and neighbourly networks has been recognised as an import-
ant coping practice ever since the seminal studies by Stack (1974) and 
Young and Wilmott (1975). Indeed, the idea that social relationships 
form a community resource has become popularised in recent decades by 
the burgeoning social capital literature (Coleman 1988; Gittell and Vidal 
1998; Putnam 2000). Unlike the earlier focus on the benefits derived 
from close ties between people who already know each other (‘bonding’ 
social capital), the later literature, following Granovetter (1973), has 
highlighted how the ‘strength of weak ties’ between people who do not 
know one an other very well (‘bridging social capital) is just as useful as a 
community resource (Gittell and Vidal 1998; Putnam 2000).
The traditional assumption has been that, when help is provided 
on a one- to- one basis within the extended family or social and neigh-
bourhood networks, such help is provided on an unpaid basis (Pahl 
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narrative is that making monetary payments would shift such commu-
nity exchange from the non- market sphere of reciprocity into the mar-
ket realm. This is premised on the notion that monetary transactions are 
always market- like and profit- motivated. Such a reading of monetised 
exchange not only prevails across a range of economic perspectives from 
the neo- classical to the Marxian (Harvey 1989; Sayer 1997; Ciscel and 
Heath 2001), but is reinforced by a ‘formalist’ anthropological tradition 
that views exchange mechanisms in advanced Western societies as less 
‘embedded’ than those in pre- industrial societies. Viewed through this 
lens, the idea is that there has been a separation of the ‘economy’ from 
‘culture’, resulting in exchanges in Western societies being ‘thinner’, less 
loaded with social meaning and less symbolic than traditional exchanges 
(Mauss 1966).
Over the past few decades, however, this conventional ‘thin’ read-
ing of monetary exchange as always conducted under market- like rela-
tions for the motive of profit has been subjected to critical scrutiny by an 
array of analysts (Zelizer 1994; Carrier 1997; Crewe and Gregson 1998; 
Carruthers and Babb 2000; Crewe 2000; Lee 2000; Kovel 2002; Williams 
2005; Gibson- Graham 2006). As a result, the formalist anthropology 
approach and economistic discourses that adopt a ‘thin’ understanding 
of monetary exchange have begun to be challenged from a ‘substantiv-
ist’ anthropological position and institutional economics approach that 
adopts a ‘thicker’ understanding of monetary exchange in which trans-
actions are viewed in terms of social norms and values, and as being 
socially, culturally and geographically embedded (Davis 1992; Zelizer 
1994; Bourdieu 2001; Slater and Tonkiss 2001; Comelieau 2002).
Studies providing ‘thicker’ descriptions of the relations and motives 
involved in monetary exchange have focused upon what Leyshon et al. 
(2003) term ‘alternative economic spaces’, investigating car- boot sales 
(Crewe and Gregson 1998), nearly- new sales and classified advertise-
ments (Clarke 1998, 2000), second- hand and informal retail channels 
(Williams and Paddock 2003), inflation- free local currency schemes 
such as local exchange and trading schemes (Lee 1996; Williams 1996; 
Williams et al. 2001), sweat- equity currencies such as time dollars (Cahn 
2000; Seyfang and Smith 2002; Michel and Hudon 2015) and small 
horticultural nurseries (Lee 2000).
Studies conducted in various UK localities have begun to unravel 
the relations and motives involved in one- to- one material help within 
wider kinship, friendship and neighbourly networks where payment was 
involved (Williams and Windebank 2000; White 2009, 2011; Williams 
















the introduction of money into transactions between kin, friends and 
neighbours as shifting such exchanges from the non- market sphere into 
the market realm – on the grounds that monetary transactions are always 
market- like and profit- motivated – this is not the case. Williams (2009) 
found that in just 5 per cent of cases did the recipient paying wider 
kin, neighbours or friends assert that their primary motive was to save 
money, and that in only 7 per cent of cases did those recompensed with 
money for supplying material help to wider kin, friends and acquaint-
ances assert that they undertook the task primarily to make money. If 
they were not engaged in such paid exchanges primarily for monetary 
gain, why was money changing hands?
When asked why they offer or accept payment to or from wider kin, 
friends or acquaintances, most assert that it is a ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ 
thing to do. In other words, there is a self- evident culture of paying for 
favours. The only time payment does not occur is in situations when it is 
unacceptable, inappropriate or impossible. It is unacceptable, for exam-
ple, in situations where the favour is too small to warrant a payment 
(when a screwdriver is loaned), inappropriate when the social relations 
mitigate against payment (such as when the recipient cannot afford to 
pay and has no choice but to offer a favour in return) and impossible in 
situations where the supplier would not accept a payment because they 
wanted to receive in return a specific favour that only the customer could 
provide (e.g. babysitting). In all other circumstances, monetary payment 
was the norm in community exchange.
The first common reason for giving or receiving payment is to 
prevent relations turning sour if a favour is not reciprocated. This 
use of money to avoid the need for reciprocity is particularly preva-
lent among elderly people, single- parent families and multiple- earner 
households, that is, those who perceive themselves as potentially una-
ble or incapable of repaying a favour. By paying, they see themselves as 
offsetting the need to reciprocate while still maintaining and/ or con-
solidating their social support networks. Suppliers similarly often pre-
fer to be paid, once again to avoid a souring of their relations with the 
recipient if the favour is not returned. Consequently, money is acting 
not only as a substitute for trust, but also a lubricant to facilitate com-
munity exchange.
The second reason for paying for favours relates to a ‘redistribu-
tion’ motive. Often the primary reason why somebody asks for a favour 
is because they want to be able to give money to the person doing the 
work. Such ‘redistributive’ rationales usually apply more when kin con-
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supplier some much needed spending money, such as when they are 
unemployed. Asking for favours and paying for them is thus a way of 
giving money, especially to kin, in a way that avoids all connotations of 
charity, even if this is the objective. As Kempson (1996) has revealed, 
most people avoid accepting charity at all costs. This is well under-
stood. As a result, someone wishing to give money to another asks for a 
favour from them and then gives the person money in return for ‘helping 
them out’.
This redistributive motive is similarly present when examining the 
motives of those supplying favours to wider kin, friends and neighbours 
for money. Often they do the work because they recognise that the recipi-
ent would not be able to do it. This applies not only when skilled crafts-
men supply favours to wider kin, friends and neighbours but also when 
the unemployed, early retired and so on use their free time to help out 
others suffering from time- famine.
Generally, the fee paid for favours is not the market price. Indeed, 
the closer the social relations between customer and supplier, the likelier 
is it that the fee will diverge from the market price. By the same token, 
the greater the social distance between customer and supplier, the closer 
is the fee likely to move towards the market norm. The fee is also more 
likely to diverge from the market price when redistribution is the primary 
rationale of the recipient. When the motive of the supplier and customer 
is to prevent relations from turning sour if a favour is not repaid, the fee 
is often little more than a token- gesture.
Paid favours, in consequence, are not market- like exchanges moti-
vated by monetary gain, and the social relations involved are akin more 
to unpaid mutual aid than to market- like relations. By the same token, 
the motivation behind paid favours is grounded not in desire for profit 
so much as in unpaid mutual aid. Whether these paid favours prevail in 
other societies beyond the UK has been seldom if ever investigated.
2.6 Egunje (nigeria)
dhikru adewale yagboyaju
university of ibadan, nigeria
Egunje is a form of involuntary giving. Colloquially, the extorted ‘gifts’ 
are ‘cursed’ by the donor, who does not want the recipient, most com-
monly a predatory official, to enjoy them. Egunje is a pejorative term that 
refers to the fact that the given ‘gifts’ are not really gifts under certain 
circumstances. It conveys popular displeasure, particularly because the 























service from an official. Officials who receive egunje can include secur-
ity personnel, medical personnel, judicial staff, petrol station attendants, 
school teachers, marriage registry officials, public servants in charge of 
core services such as import licences, planning approval, allocation of 
agricultural inputs and other resources, and other types of bureaucrats.
The practice of egunje derives from traditional practices of gift- giv-
ing shared by most of the prominent ethnic and tribal groups in Nigeria. 
Among the Yorubas of south- western Nigeria (one of the three dominant 
ethnic nationalities), gift- giving (ore or ebun) is an age- long practice that 
is encouraged to further strengthen communal living. The term ore or 
ebun stands for a legitimate, open and voluntary gift signalling goodwill 
(Akinseye- George 2000: 7). The worth of a gift (ore or ebun) is not in its 
size or quantity, but in the spirit of kindness that is supposed to be behind 
it. Although kindness may be given in response to the request of a recipi-
ent, it is generally regarded more honourable when it is volunteered by 
the donor. Givers of ore or ebun are expected to be blessed by God, as 
reflected in the popular expression: ‘givers are never short of (anything)’. 
Ore or ebun can be given in the form of a tip (dash) to appreciate a ser-
vice rendered. It may also be given in the form of support for expenses 
incurred by individuals or families organising ceremonies, such as funer-
als, weddings, house commissioning and child- naming, in which a large 
number of invited guests will be fed and entertained.
The Hausas of Northern Nigeria distinguish between voluntary gifts 
that are generally regarded as tips (dash) and involuntary ones, which 
can be described as tribute or bribe. The Hausas disparage the involun-
tary ones, using such terms as ‘eating of nose’ (hanci), or ‘plugging of 
mouths’ (toshiyar baki) (Auwal 1987: 293). Alongside egunje among the 
Yorubas and hanci and toshiyar baki for the Hausas, other euphemisms 
have emerged to denote the necessity of paying public officials: ‘public 
relations’, ‘welfare package’, gworo, and kolanut. ‘Public relations’ and 
‘welfare package’ in their original sense may be used to mean hospitality, 
and are used here as an adulterated adoption of the terms. Gworo (kola-
nut in the Hausa language) is used in a subtle reference to the common 
hospitable practice of offering kola nuts to guests.
While viewed as involuntary and extortive, such forms of trib-
ute are linked to the practices of lobbying in Nigeria’s recent democ-
ratisation under the Fourth Republic (1999 onwards) (Abolarin 2005; 
Ribadu 2005). Lobbying, essentially carried out through various meth-
ods of political advocacy for certain interests, involves applying pres-
sure to public officials (especially legislators) to influence pending 
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(Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. 1980; Bello- Imam 2005). Although 
lobbying can be associated with cases of bribery (e.g. the ‘Abscam’ and 
‘Koreagate’ cases in the USA, see Rodee et al. 1983: 176), the prac-
tices of lobbying are not only regulated in most advanced democratic 
systems, but also monitored by political opponents and the press. The 
situation in Nigeria, where a culture of impunity for lobbying prevails, 
is rather different. Thus, during the alleged attempt in 2006 by the 
Obasanjo administration to change the constitution to legalise a third 
presidential term (the ‘Third Term Agenda’), many independent tele-
vision stations reported cash- filled ‘Ghana- Must- Go’ (GMB) bags as 
evidence of bribes paid to those national legislators who ostensibly 
refused to agree on the tenure extension allegedly requested by the 
president. Pushing for involuntary decisions by means of bribes was 
also referred to as egunje.
The open demand for egunje among police, border and airport offi-
cials points to a practical norm (Olivier de Sardan 2011), as does the 
ubiquity of egunje offerings by ordinary Nigerians, who do not want to 
be unnecessarily delayed or unjustly penalised by government officials 
in these extortive agencies. Despite its resemblance to petty corruption, 
egunje is viewed as a legitimate ‘survival strategy’ by a significant section 
of society. It is common for people living in countries with systemic cor-
ruption to point out that such shortcuts save time, effort, and get work 
done, while also using euphemisms for bribes.
The culture of gift- giving among the Yorubas, Hausas and several 
other recognised ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has probably always had 
an element of solicited or forced giving. However, the notoriety of egunje 
seems to have coincided with the so- called ‘politics of settlement’ under 
the Babangida military regime of 1985– 93. The practice continued una-
bated under the subsequent Abacha and Abubakar military regimes, 
and up to the Fourth Republic, albeit in varying degrees. The ‘politics 
of settlement’ is a form of political patronage established by the mili-
tary government, where it lavishly deploys state funds to enrich polit-
ical sycophants, and buys off or tarnishes potential opponents. Needless 
to say, such a corrupt regime ran contrary to the original spirit behind 
the culture of gift- giving in traditional societies of Nigeria. The corrupt 
mutation of political patronage grew to a larger scale, encompassing 
political clientelism, personal rule and evidence of gross economic mis-
management (see Jackson and Rosberg 1998). Democratising systems 
like Nigeria’s Fourth Republic is hardly possible, as the democratic 
institutions do not tackle the deep- rooted neo- patrimonial relation-
















campaigns for transparency, accountability and disclosure against pol-
itical opposition.
The practice of egunje has multiple implications at every level  – 
individual, institutional and societal – which will have a profound effect 
on Nigeria’s future if not effectively addressed. These include the ero-
sion of the public good, institutional and societal trust; the debasement 
of personal, social and political values; and increased economic and 
business costs.
Although the acceptance of egunje as a practical norm coexists 
with disapproval of corruption, it nevertheless gradually erodes trust in 
state institutions. This is particularly relevant for the disadvantaged seg-
ments of the population that can fall prey to populist politicians. If one 
cannot afford egunje in situations where official support, endorsement 
or approval by the state is essential for family survival, one loses confi-
dence in a system, becomes eager to sell one’s vote, and has to resort to 
self- reliance. In other words, aggrieved citizens often take the law into 
their own hands when unsure that government agencies will act appro-
priately without egunje – as in the case of the suspected pepper thief in 
the Ejigbo area of Lagos State who was widely reported in 2014 to have 
been tortured by market leaders, and the many cases of gang battles as 
well as ‘jungle justice’ against suspected petty thieves. Such ‘help your-
self’ practices and anti- social behaviour are rapidly increasing in many 
parts of Nigeria, especially where the aggrieved feel that security and law 
enforcement agencies are unlikely to do justice without egunje. There is a 
danger that this could lead to a crises of legitimacy in the Nigerian polit-
ical system. The country’s past military regimes suffered great problems 
of legitimacy, if not illegality (Yagboyaju 2011), and this has continued to 
be the major challenge that has confronted the three successive civilian 
administrations (of Obasanjo, Yar’Adua and Jonathan) in the country’s 
relatively recent history, since the military regimes gave way to the civil-
ian government in 1999.
In the process of selecting leaders or representatives, such values as 
integrity, service, hard work and humility used to be the essential qual-
ities for a person who embodies good values and is acknowledged as such 
by peers and neighbours (omoluabi). Among the Yorubas of south- west 
Nigeria, a leader or representative of the people is supposed to, first and 
foremost, be an omoluabi. In contemporary times, particularly since the 
spread of ‘stomach infrastructure’ (a euphemism for the ‘politics of the 
belly’), voters have gradually come to expect more and more egunje and 
other forms of inducement from political aspirants and party candidates. 
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views or values are, most probably will emerge as the leader – with detri-
mental consequences for the future of Nigeria.
Egunje has unduly increased the costs of doing business in Nigeria, 
especially in public procurement. On the basis of several cases investi-
gated and prosecuted by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) between 
2000 and 2014, it has been reported that egunje constitutes the major 
factor in corruption and associated trends in Nigeria.




Baksheesh is prevalent across the Middle East, North Africa and sub- 
continental Asia; it is even reported in the Balkans. Where translated 
into English it can be variously described as ‘tipping’, ‘bribery’ or ‘giving 
alms’, depending on the context (Delahunty 1997). Often it is simply left 
untranslated. In its native context, the concept lies somewhere between 
these three senses, having commonalities with other informal financial 
practices that result in the ‘greasing of the wheels’ (see l’argent du car-
burant and všimné/ pozornost’, 2.4 and 2.11 in this volume) – although it 
almost always refers to a cash payment, rather than an exchange of goods 
or services, especially in modern times (GR Reporter 2014).
The term itself has Persian origins, from the verb ‘to give’ – bakšīdan 
(Cannon and Kaye 2001). It appears to have been first described in the 
English language by Samuel Purchas in 1625, referring to a manuscript 
dating from 1600 (Purchas in Cannon and Kaye 2001). The Persian term 
is widely acknowledged to have Sanskrit roots  – ‘bkiksha’ or ‘bheeks’, 
which also have the same meaning as baksheesh (Carstens 2014). Not 
only is the term listed in English- language dictionaries including the 
Oxford English Dictionary, it has migrated to European languages, where 
it can vary in meaning according to the three broad contexts described 
above. In the Albanian, Serbian, Bulgarian, Romanian, Macedonian 
and Turkish languages, a ‘baksheesh’ means ‘tip’ in the conventional 
Western sense. In Greek, ‘baksisi’ can refer to a gift in general, while in 
French and German the term ‘bakschisch’ means a small bribe. Likewise 
in Romanian, the term is typically used as a euphemism for a bribe 
(Carstens 2014: 77).
The original sense of the term appears to be closely correlated with 




















search of alms – is first described in the Kurma Purana, a Hindu religious 
text first appearing in written form between 550 and 850 AD (Collins 
1988). The author of this entry has personally experienced specific 
requests for baksheesh where no service has been rendered, from street 
beggars in Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Pakistan and Yemen. Baksheesh as a 
form of spontaneous and specific generosity is however distinct from the 
third Pillar of Islam, which is an annual charitable donation of a propor-
tion of one’s wealth (zakat).
Conversely, baksheesh is often encountered as a gratuity, on top of 
a solicited fee paid for goods or, more commonly, services. In this sense 
it lies somewhere between a tip and bribery: it is closer to an accepted 
emolument to facilitate the speedy or higher- quality provision of the 
desired service. The practice is so commonplace that it is an accepted 
cultural phenomenon, which Westerners often find peculiar. Joseph 
Campbell, the American mythologist, has documented what he saw as 
the pervasive influence of this practice on all aspects of Indian social 
and political culture, which he referred to as the ‘Baksheesh Complex’ 
(Campbell et al. 1995).
For example, in Afghanistan, Yemen and other countries, obtain-
ing a driving licence through the official application process may be 
sped up with the judicious use of baksheesh, namely small cash incen-
tives to one or more officials involved in the process. It is important to 
note that this is distinct from simply buying the licence by paying off 
a single government official. The latter would constitute circumvent-
ing the official process entirely, and thus even locals would regard 
it as bribery. A baksheesh payment will most likely be suggested by 
the officials who are facilitating the process, although they may also 
allude to long waiting times or potential complications in the process, 
in order that the applicant might then volunteer baksheesh to speed 
things along. The size of the baksheesh payment is modest and (e.g. 
in Afghanistan and Yemen) not fixed: it is decided according to the 
financial status of the applicant. Poorer people would pay less bak-
sheesh than richer people. In some countries, it would appear that 
the fee is fixed: in Lebanon, for example, the baksheesh for a replace-
ment driving licence was reportedly $7 USD in 1999 (Transparency 
International 2003).
What exactly is considered baksheesh varies according to the 
country and the context in which it is encountered. In some countries, 
such as Egypt, tipping a waiter would be considered baksheesh (indeed, 
in Egypt it is common for gratuities to be requested on top of services 
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driver). In Afghanistan by contrast, tipping a waiter for good service is 
not considered baksheesh. Such tipping is not an established practice in 
Afghanistan: in the context of discussions on the concept of corruption 
with Afghans, locals indicated puzzlement as to why in Western society 
this practice was widely established. They noted that the waiter did not 
represent a significant obstacle to the provision of the service, and was 
paid a salary for his work. For many Afghans, providing a tip to a waiter 
seems as perverse as bribing an official does to a Westerner.
Baksheesh often falls into a grey area between an innocent gesture 
showing appreciation of good service, and a corrupt practice to obtain 
preferential treatment. Nevertheless, sometimes the practice descends 
into outright bribery. In Afghanistan it is common, especially in rural 
areas, for policemen to ask for money at security checkpoints. No actual 
infraction needs to have occurred; indeed, drivers will often pay the 
policeman a small amount as ‘tea money’ (which is regarded as distinct 
from baksheesh), partly in recognition of their extremely low and ill- 
disbursed salaries. The amounts are so small that Afghans, who have a 
culture of charitability, will usually pay if asked, although if someone did 
refuse they would almost certainly be allowed to proceed with no further 
hassle. However, some policemen will stop truck drivers from proceeding 
past a checkpoint until a far more sizeable amount has been paid. In such 
circumstances, this might euphemistically be referred to as baksheesh, 
although this is partly shame avoidance by both parties to disguise what 
it really is, namely a bribe. Although giving ‘tea money’ is tiresome, it does 
not overstep the boundary of what is ethically and culturally acceptable 
to the same extent as asking for a large sum. Yet in other countries, even 
small- scale ‘tea money’ is termed as baksheesh: in Morocco, over 80 per 
cent of business respondents admitting giving baksheesh ‘to avoid has-
sle’ from traffic police and the gendarmerie (Transparency International 
2003: 208).
Baksheesh has thus entered common parlance in many countries 
to denote outright bribery, and hence can also refer to far larger- scale 
corruption in business processes – even if culturally it might not be con-
sidered as outright ‘bribery’ by locals familiar with the ways of doing 
business in that environment, or by foreign entities who have oper-
ated in the environment long enough to simply consider the practice as 
necessary to maintain goodwill (Jacoby et al. 1977; Cavico and Mujtaba 
2010). Baksheesh poses a dilemma for Western companies operating in 
countries where it is the norm, as it is often unclear whether it consti-
tutes a ‘corrupt practice’ under anti- corruption laws, for example, the 


















of baksheesh for such companies are a matter of much debate in the legal 
and academic literature.
Generally speaking, baksheesh where it is encountered is simply 
considered to be part of ‘doing business’, whether it be for a company 
facilitating a delivery through customs, or an individual seeking a per-
mit (e.g. in Lebanon a building permit for a residential house can cost 
more than $2000 USD (Della Porta and Vannucci 2012)). Cumulatively, 
however, it can be argued to have a significant retarding effect on an 
economy. When the Mozambican government clamped down on bak-
sheesh among customs officials (over a hundred customs officials were 
dismissed for taking baksheesh in 1997), tariff revenues increased by 
50 per cent in two years (Economist.com 1999). Yet, despite the large 
cumulative impact that baksheesh may have on an economy, its effects 
are not as immediately obvious as those of ‘grand’ corruption. As such, 
locals tend to make a conceptual and normative distinction between 
cash backhanders (bribes) to powerful officials, for example in order to 
secure a large construction contract (Cavico and Mujtaba 2010), and 
the multiple smaller payoffs to various low- level officials that allow the 
construction project to proceed (baksheesh) – even though the over-




university of education freiburg, Germany
Magharich’ refers to a traditional gift- giving practice in Armenian cul-
ture, which in more modern times has also become a euphemism for a 
bribe. Thus, the word magharich’ is used to characterise two substantially 
different practices, with the meaning shifting according to the context 
of use.
In its original meaning, magharich’ means a gift given by a per-
son who receives good news on personal matters, to a friend, relative, 
neighbour, or to the person who conveys the news (Hayots slezvi barbar-
rayin bararan 2007: 17). The first appearance of this word in Armenian 
dictionaries can be dated to 1944 (Malkaseants 1944:  244), where it 
was presented as a synonym of the word avetcheq, which means a gift 
given to a person who brings good news (Raffi 1970, see also Aghayan 
1976:  960; Jamanakakic hajoc lezvi bats’atrakan bararan 1974:  468). 
Essentially, the magharich’ gift is given because the recipient of the good 
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receiver of the magharich’ might not even expect anything in compen-
sation for the service. The same meaning holds where the beneficiary 
offers a magharich’ to friends, neighbours or relatives, in order for them 
to share joy, good fortune or happy news. A typical example of this type of 
magharich’, especially in Soviet Armenia, was money given to midwives 
who brought news of a successful delivery and announced the gender of 
the newborn. Armenian fathers were especially generous when the new-
born was a boy. Another example is giving money to a doctor following 
successful surgery.
In the modern sense of the word, magharich’ is simply a ‘camou-
flage’ word for a bribe. To give a magharich’ or to ask for magharich’ com-
monly means to bribe or to solicit a bribe. Many examples of the use of the 
word magharich’ in this sense can be found in the Armenian media. For 
instance, in a report on a high profile court case, a witness was quoted as 
saying that he gained employment because his mother gave magharich’ 
to the accused, a former head of a government agency (Hetq.am 2004).
The use of ‘camouflage’ words to describe bribery- related practices 
can be found in different countries. In this context the use of the word 
magharich’ is very similar to the notion of ‘envelopes’, which is widely 
used in a number of countries including China, France and Latvia, or ‘un 
petit cadeau’ (a little gift) in North Africa. The word magharich’ in this 
meaning is also comparable to the Persian word baksheesh (see 2.7 in this 
volume), which is widely used in many Middle Eastern countries to mean 
‘tip’ and ‘alms’ as well as ‘bribe’ (The Economist 2006).
In Armenia it is widely believed that the term magharich’ (in the 
original sense of gift- giving) is an Armenian word that has migrated 
to wherever Armenians went in the former Soviet Union and beyond. 
However, both the word and the same definition of the practice are found 
in other languages too. The etymological roots of the word magharich’ 
might come from an Arabic word maḫāriǧ, which literally means costs 
and expenses (Wikipedia.ru). The use of the word in Russian (in modern 
Russian: magarych; in old Russian: mogorets’, mogorets’’, magarets’’) dates 
back to the beginning of the sixteenth century (Slovar’ ruskogo yazika 
XI– XVII vv 1982: 230). The word can also be found in Dal’s esteemed 
Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language (Dal’ 1863– 
6), where it is described in both contexts: first as a gift, mostly in the form 
of alcohol, given after a good deal has been concluded; and second as a 
bribe.
In Russia, examples of the use of magharich’ in both meanings (gift- 
giving and bribery) have been documented by a number of researchers 























people in the regions of Kazan, Don and Tula (Kiselev 2009; Krasnov 
2010; Skryabina 2011). The word featured in the tsarist police force’s 
anti- corruption plans in the second half of the nineteenth century and the 
beginning of the twentieth century (Salnikov 2009: 171– 4). Interestingly, 
while describing the functioning of the legal and social autonomy of the 
Cossacks in the Russian Don area, Krasnov draws attention to the prac-
tice of ‘putting out magharich’’ (in form of alcohol) at village meetings, 
to solicit support of the most articulate and dominant representatives 
of the community. These ‘speakers- shouters’ (krikuni) often had more 
influence than the village elders, and supplying the magharich’ to them 
could influence their view and help to achieve the desired outcome. 
This practice of influencing the process of community decision- mak-
ing in Cossack villages in the Don region has become enshrined in the 
saying ‘Without magharich’ a person from the Don wouldn’t make any 
speeches’ (‘Bez magarichej net u dontsa i rechej’), widely used from the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Krasnov 2010: 45). Moreover, the 
elders (atamans) in the Don region ‘put out magharich’’ in order to be 
elected as heads of their communities (Riblova 2008). This local practice 
has been satirised in the film Election Day (Den’ vyborov 2007). Other typ-
ical examples in contemporary Russian discourse include, ‘Hey, friend, 
they say your daughter got married, so you owe us magharich’’, meaning 
that the father of the bride should buy drinks or a meal for friends or 
colleagues in accordance with the tradition; or ‘I got a place at university 
– the magharich’ is on me!’, referring to the willingness of a student to 
share their joy with friends by offering them a drink.
In the most recent linguistic analyses, magharich’ is viewed as a type 
of a bribe alongside other colloquial terms such as peshkesh and baksheesh 
Figure 2.8.1 Local representations of magharich’. Drawings by Sona 
Minasyan and Sveta Ghazaryan.
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(Shaev 2013:  863– 6). Similarly, Nona and Robert Shahnazaryan refer 
to the word magharich’ as a form of bribe in their discussion of alter-
native economic relations, family relations and forms of corruption in 
the communities of the Caucasus. They also identify other euphemisms 
for bribery such as ‘to show respect’ (uvazhit’), ‘to sweeten’ (podslatit’), 
‘to feed’ (kormit’), ‘to cajole’ (umaslit’), and ‘to thank’ (otblagodarit’) 
(Shahnazaryan and Shahnazaryan 2010: 68). It can be concluded that 
the meaning of magharich’ has evolved in the Soviet and post- Soviet 
contexts.
The traditional unsolicited gift- giving as a token of gratitude 
turned into all kinds of informal add- ons to underpaid professionals in 
Soviet Armenia. The practice of compensating doctors and teachers for 
their inadequate pay and giving magharich’ for good service was widely 
perceived as appreciation, and to some extent the state connived in the 
practice. Although morally dubious and illegal, informal payments were 
often perceived by both donors and recipients as fair and necessary under 
the constraints of the Soviet regime. However, following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, such practices have become regarded as a form of cor-
ruption. In 2013, according to Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, Armenia was ranked 94– 101 out of 177 countries on 
the basis of payments for services in the public sector (Transparency 
International 2014). No study to date has examined the ambivalence of 
informal payments – associated with blurred boundaries between trad-
itional gifts and monetary payments – in the context of the Armenian 
tradition of magharich’. It is a cultural tradition that conflicts with inter-
national measurement of corruption, and the reinvention of such ‘tra-
ditions’ can lead to dangerous territory that ‘camouflages’ pragmatic 
needs, greed and extortion. Further research on magharich’ is needed in 
order to better understand the boundaries between traditional gift- giv-
ing practices and corruption in Armenia.
2.9 Kalym (russia)
Jeremy morris
university of aarhus, denmark
‘Kalym’ exists as an informal word for a panoply of informal and unde-
clared work practices that approximate the term ‘moonlighting’ in 
English. While often the term denotes work related to one’s formal job 
and skills, kalym has a wider meaning than moonlighting because it 
can refer to any opportunity for short- term work in the informal econ-

























and tactical engagements with undeclared work in Russia that exists for 
many, particularly in manual or blue- collar work (Morris 2011, 2013). Its 
wide currency as a word also highlights the ubiquitous nature of informal 
work and employment.
In the Global North ‘moonlighting’, as its name suggests, is more 
often associated with informal contracted work or informal illicit 
employment (Schneider 2009), and therefore sometimes has less of 
an opportunistic ring to it and more of an association with one’s pro-
fession and skills- set. In addition ‘moonlighting’ has less of a work-
ing- class or manual labour marker to it, being used in relation to both 
trades, blue- collar work and highly qualified professions such as medi-
cine or teaching (Li et al. 2000; Sliter and Boyd 2014), household service 
work (Sundbo 1997), and not always referring to undeclared work, but 
to legal portfolio work or multiple jobholding. In various tax enforce-
ment jurisdictions moonlighting is synonymous with, or translated as, 
‘undeclared work’ as an illegal part of an existing formal employment. 
Thus, the term moonlighting is more often translated simply as ‘black 
Figure 2.9.1 Forklift driver holds up money as if to say, ‘Is this all 
I’m worth? I can get a lot more moonlighting.’ Photo courtesy of Sergei 
Lavrov.
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work’ (Schwarzarbeit) or ‘undeclared work’ (Sort arbejde). Nonetheless, 
analogous usages occur to the term ‘kalym’ – in German: ‘Pfusch’ – which 
indicates undeclared ‘moonlighting’ work using employer resources dur-
ing paid working hours. The literal meaning of ‘Pfusch’ is ‘botch’, rather 
like the term ‘khaltura’ in Russian, also sometimes used as a synonym for 
‘kalym’, but also indicating rushed, poor quality work.
In Russia and other post- socialist societies, kalym is often used also 
to mean additional, supplementary income from working informally in 
a way related somehow to one’s primary employment. However, it has 
the additional nuance of unforeseen opportunity. Blue- collar workers 
use kalym in particular to refer to any moonlighting job using skills, con-
nections or even materials related to formal work. For example, using 
a formal- job works truck to informally deliver building materials (off 
or on the clock!) is kalym. The worker may get more money per hour 
from this kalym than from formal work. He may even have an informal 
‘employment’ (i.e. unregistered and undocumented as a legal entity) on 
the basis of his access to a truck in his formal job. This case of kalym 
stresses the semi- perpetuating informal work environment dominated 
by a social network of current and former workmates (Morris 2013: 52). 
The extent of a horizontal social network is important for exploiting 
kalym opportunities at the same time as skills and resources (access 
to a truck) that enable vertical social networking (soliciting work from 
potential clients). In this case kalym comes to resemble informal ver-
sions of trades well known for their formal self- employment basis in the 
rest of the Global North: plumbers, carpenters, car repair, etc. The diffe-
rence here is that perhaps the majority of trades work in Russia is in the 
shadow economy and may well be accompanied by a less well- paid for-
mal job, in a factory, for example. By contrast, kalym is used by Russian 
white- collar workers in a similar sense to ‘moonlighting’ in the West. 
In addition, semi- or unskilled workers are more likely to use the term 
for any opportunities for extra earning – typically in construction work, 
or manual handling odd jobs for cash without any necessary long- term 
perspectives.
As can be seen by the above examples, kalym practices, at any level, 
are illustrative of the ‘portfolio’ nature of incomes (see Rose 2000), and 
the relative reduction in importance of single breadwinning wages. 
And in a sense this echoes the particular dualist structure of Soviet- 
era and contemporary Russian formal wages with their small base and 
large, discretionary, bonuses. Thus any worker actively seeks the poten-
tially more lucrative moonlighting opportunities, connected or discon-















the rural, poorest and least skilled. For those at the bottom of society, 
moonlighting opportunities are more to do with mutuality and barter 
arrangements with cash less likely to figure than alcohol as currency 
(Rogers 2005).
Some see moonlighting as a necessary insurance policy, whether 
because formal incomes are too low, protecting against shocks to income 
in formal work (due to the threat of furlough, holding back of bonus 
elements), or an alternative to precautionary savings in an uncertain 
inflationary environment (Guariglia and Kim 2004: 290). In any of these 
cases, it turns out that moonlighting emphasises the long- term rational 
economic calculation of individuals and households – ironically the com-
plete opposite of the opportunistic ‘ducking and diving’ it is associated 
with. Indeed, in some low- pay blue- collar contexts, formal employers 
acknowledge the need for employees to engage in moonlighting, with 
unwritten rules about the amount of time off workers can take to use for 
kalym (Morris 2011: 626).
Fundamentally, like other forms of undeclared work, kalym high-
lights the basic tension between interpretations of the ‘right’ to work and 
receive income in addition to taxed earnings, and the right of the state 
to know and tax forms of work. But in addition, the Russian context of 
kalym is the cementing and extension of social network ties, the oppor-
tunity to build skills set out from existing work competencies, and not 
least a sense that one’s labour is valued over and above the often low 
paying formal jobs.
2.10 Mita (romanian Gabor roma)
péter berta
ucl, uK
Among the Romanian Gabor Roma, mita is a sum of money that, 
depending on the context, can be interpreted as a wage (to a broker, 
etc.), a success fee, a compensation, a gift as an expression of grati-
tude, a gift for persuasion (bribe), and a gift as a representation of joy. 
The word mita entered the Romani dialect of the Gabor Roma from 
the term mítă of Slavic origin. In the Romanian language, the word 
has negative connotations, and correspondingly, offering, giving and 
receiving a sum of money called mita is regarded as a negative or at 
least a morally ambivalent practice. The Dictionary of the Romanian 
Language defines mítă as a ‘bribe’, or ‘sum of money or gift received by 
someone or offered to someone in order to win her/ his good will, espe-
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obligations … Without bribe = honest, just, incorruptible’ (Academia 
Română 2010: 637– 8).
Instances of cash gifts for persuasion (bribes) can be found both 
among members of the majority Romanian society and the Gabor Roma 
(Precupeţu 2007; Moldovan and Van de Walle 2013). A significant diffe-
rence is that among the Gabor Roma mita also has meanings that are 
morally unmarked (wage, success fee) or valued positively (compensa-
tion, a gift as an expression of gratitude, or a gift as a representation of 
joy). In the following, only two meanings attached to mita by the Gabor 
Roma will be analysed: a gift given informally for persuasion (bribe), and 
a gift given as a representation of joy.
Offering a cash gift for persuasion (bribe) is a practice occasionally 
used in order to assert economic and social interests (to handle situations 
of economic competition, for conflict management, etc.). In situations of 
interethnic encounters between Gabor Roma and non- Roma, a gift for 
persuasion can speed up administrative procedures, help to circumvent 
formal proceedings for minor misdemeanours (such as traffic offences), 
and in some cases can also help to place individual Gabor Roma building 
contractors in an advantageous position in the state or local government 
tenders for construction work.
In interactions between Gabor Roma, cash gifts for persuasion are 
generally given as part of competition for prestige among individuals and 
families (‘Roma politics’ – Ŕomani politika in Romani, see Berta 2014; 
Szalai 2014). This strategy is often used in the politics of marriage. The 
Gabors practise ethnic endogamy and arranged marriage (often of chil-
dren) is organised and supervised by parents and grandparents. When 
a marriage is arranged it establishes a multifunctional marital alliance 
between the families of the young couple (xanamikimo in Romani). 
There is often intense competition between Gabor Roma parents/ grand-
parents for marital alliances with prestigious and influential individuals, 
who likewise seek an appropriate marriage partner for their child/ grand-
child and allies for themselves. In such a competitive context, a secretly 
offered cash gift is frequently used as a means of inducement for a poten-
tial co- father- in- law (xanamik in Romani). Mita is given with an intention 
to persuade the recipient to accept the giver’s proposed marital alliance 
and not that of someone else. In proprietary contests for marital alliances 
with extremely high reputational profit, the secretly given gift for persua-
sion can amount to several tens of thousands of US dollars. Mita- giving is 
thus an informal practice that can be interpreted as a source of dynamism 






















Strategies of informal offering of a cash gift for persuasion also take 
place in other contexts of intraethnic social and economic competition 
among the Gabor Roma. For example, mita may be offered to persuade 
the recipient to give up his intention to buy a house or a building site that 
the giver would also like to purchase.
In certain cases, mita is regarded as a gift given as a representa-
tion of joy (ărămajandîko in Romani). Such gifts are normally given 
on the occasion of a marriage or engagement, or as part of certain eco-
nomic transactions (mainly the purchase of antique silver beakers and 
roofed tankards regarded as prestige goods, and credit deals involving 
the pawning of such prestige objects (Berta 2014)). A common feature of 
these gifts is that they are handed out publicly.
The distribution of mita as an expression of joy handed out at 
weddings is governed by a certain informal code. The sums of money 
for this purpose are pooled by the parents of the young couple, and the 
host generally requests an older, influential man to distribute them. The 
latter does this by making an unspoken classification of the guests into 
gender and age groups. The most important principles of distribution 
are: (1) men can expect to receive a larger sum than women of the same 
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age; (2)  the gender groups are also differentiated by age:  the biggest 
sums go to the oldest men, middle- aged men receive less, and the young 
men even smaller sums, with adolescent boys and male children at the 
end of the line with the smallest sums. The same age/ generation prin-
ciple is applied in the case of women. Sometimes the person trusted with 
distributing the sums names the exact amount aloud when the cash gift 
is presented so that everyone present can hear.
According to the Gabor Roma’s interpretation, the purpose of gift- 
giving at weddings is to enable the parents to ‘publicly share with the 
guests the joy’ they feel about the marriage and the marital alliance. The 
distribution of cash gifts is also a practice thanking the guests for coming, 
and often serves to establish, demonstrate and reproduce social close-
ness and solidarity between the giver and the recipient. Furthermore, 
gift- giving at weddings is a widespread form of conspicuous consumption 
or display of economic prosperity and a socially required and rewarded 
strategy for maintaining public image (through mita- giving, parents 
marrying off their children demonstrate to the assembled guests their 
commitment to the Gabor Roma ethic of sociability, and so on). It is not 
unusual for the total value of such cash gifts at a wedding to approach or 
exceed 2,000 Euros.
Although these wedding gifts are presented publicly, the scope 
of publicity is limited in respect of both ethnicity and social distance. 
With a few exceptions – such as the presence of an anthropologist – only 
Gabor Roma attend Gabor Roma weddings, and participation is usually 
restricted to those who have been invited in advance by the parents of 
the young couple. Consequently, from the perspective of the Romanian 
state, the distribution of mita given as a representation of joy at a wed-
ding is an informal, invisible transaction, similar to the giving of gifts for 
persuasion (bribe).
The set of tropes (see below) used by the Gabors and associated 
with cash gifts for persuasion (bribe) and cash gifts defined as expres-
sions of joy draw special attention to two dimensions of mita- giving. One 
is the relationship of mita- giving to publicity, and the other to the Gabor 
Roma ethics of managing social relations and interactions (i.e. morality).
The Gabor Roma attach two attributes to mita when given publicly: 
table (that is, the mita is given at or above the table; here the ‘table’ is a ref-
erence to the hospitality accompanying joyful events); and ‘white’ (parni). 
In contrast, mita given in secret is associated with such attributes as ‘stolen, 
concealed’ (čordani), and ‘black’ (kali). The set of tropes constructed by 
the Gabors represents the moral dimension attached to the gift- giving by 

























gift- giving, and ‘black’ (kali) for gift- giving that is morally stigmatised or is 
considered to be morally ambivalent. Thus the attributes ‘black’ and ‘white’ 
may refer to gift- giving in the context of both publicity and morality.
To sum up, cash gifts interpreted as expressions of joy among the 
Gabor Roma are linked principally to arranged marriage (often of chil-
dren) and marriage politics, and to the prestige consumption organised 
around antique silver beakers and roofed tankards. These practices 
are informal, ethnicised and gendered elements of the post- socialist 
Romanian society and economy. The distribution of cash gifts repre-
senting joy is a widespread phenomenon among the Gabors, playing a 
significant role in the conceptualisation of certain social identities and 
relations. Due to their multifunctionality and social significance, the 
Gabor Roma often refer to the giving of mita (in the sense of an expres-
sion of joy) as an ethnic identity practice symbolically distancing and 
differentiating them from the Romanians and Hungarians living in 
Romania.
2.11 Pozornost', d'akovné, všimné (Slovakia)
andrej Školkay
School of communication and media, bratislava, Slovakia
In Slovak, the words pozornosť (attention), ďakovné (gratitude) and 
všimné (a colloquialism meaning ‘expressing gratitude by means of a 
small gift’ or ‘kickback’) all refer to ways of expressing gratitude for offi-
cial or unofficial services. These practices are sometimes seen as an inno-
cent expression of gratitude, but sometimes as a bribe, which explains 
their ambivalent character.
The term všimné best describes ambiguous interactions. It is used 
today as a euphemism for a bribe, as in the blog headline: ‘Love is such 
všimné from Heaven, a little bribe, in order to survive life …’ (Láska je 
také všimné zhora, malý úplatok, aby sa život dal vydržať, a ako vieme, 
darovanému koňovi sa na zuby hľadieť neodporúča) (Anonymous 2013). 
Twenty- five years ago, všimné was defined as a jocular term referring to 
voluntary payment for a service provided (Hegerová 1991: 330).
The term pozornosť, by contrast, was dissociated from ‘bribe’ by 
the sociologist Iveta Radičová (who served in 2010– 12 as Slovakia’s 
first woman prime minister). Emphasising that it has long been cus-
tomary in Slovakia to visit a notary, teacher, priest or mayor bearing 
a small gift, Radičová argued that there is a clear distinction between 
such traditional ‘elementary decency’ and paying bribes (Topky.
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distinction. Just as the tradition of paying tribute for state services was 
once criminalised (Lovell et al. 2000), in modern societies the size of 
the gift is usually regulated by anti- corruption legislation. Small gifts 
and payment, however, remain a matter of individual discretion. Even 
this is not always unproblematic, however, and much depends on the 
context. For example, Slovak courts frequently hand down heavy pen-
alties for bribes as small as 5 to 10 Euros paid for putting someone on 
sick leave without genuine medical justification. These penalties may 
include a suspended prison sentence and a fine of several hundred 
Euros. While such sentences have been criticised as too harsh by blog-
gers and the press, Judge Hrubala has pointed out that, taken together, 
such corrupt practices can cost the state and society huge amounts of 
money paid out in the form of health and social benefits from public 
insurance funds (Hrubala 2015).
As a result of the fact that parts of today’s Slovakia were under 
Ottoman rule in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Turkic 
word baksheesh was commonly used in Slovakia at least until the 1920s 
to denote such practices as tipping a waiter (Makarová 2005). It was also 
used to denote a small bribe paid to someone in authority. (Indeed, it is 
used in that sense in many other countries to this day, see entry on bak-
sheesh, 2.7 in this volume). Since the 1980s, Slovak terms have come to 
dominate and for 20 or 30 years baksheesh ceased to be used. Recently, it 
has begun to be used again, but only in the context of travel on holiday to 
North Africa or the Middle East.
It is telling that the standard dictionary of the Slovak language, 
published in 1987, included only one of the three words discussed here – 
pozornosť. Among other meanings, the dictionary included the infor-
mal meaning of ‘an object (vec) given to somebody to show affiliation, 
thankfulness’ (Doruľa et al. 1987: 327). The 1987 edition of the diction-
ary (which included all the words judged most likely to be used at that 
time by high- school graduates) contained no entry for either ďakovné 
or všimné. This suggests either that these terms were morally ambigu-
ous, and/ or that they were not frequently used. The 2003 edition of the 
same dictionary (which listed the 60,000 words most frequently used at 
that time in everyday speech) defined the term všimné as a jocular way of 
referring to a small bribe, while ďakovné received no mention.
Today, ďakovné is still used relatively rarely. It seems to have an 
archaic connotation. Indeed, linguistically similar terms can be found 
in a dictionary published in 1825 (Lexicon Slavicum 1825). By contrast, 





















of the spread of informal practices and corruption in the Slovak public 
services.
Všimné can also be found today in the popular online dictionary, 
Slovnik Online. There it is defined as a clear case of a bribe but is also 
likened to tipping, a relatively small amount of money given for services 
rendered. Because tipping is not seen as reprehensible, the moral mean-
ing of všimné remains ambivalent: unacceptable when associated with 
bribery but acceptable when associated with tipping.
The same ambivalence can be found in the use of pozornosť, loosely 
defined as ‘appreciation of someone’s attention in official relations’ or – in 
a simpler sense, ‘a present given without expectation of recompense’ or 
‘something given as an expression of gratitude’ (Slovnik Online). Where 
informal practices are concerned, ‘official relations’ might include public 
services such as health care, education or registering official documents. 
As measured by the Global Corruption Barometer 2013, the frequency 
with which such practices are carried out in Slovakia is similar to those in 
the Czech Republic and Italy as well as many countries around the world.
The relatively low approval ratings enjoyed by Slovakia’s public ser-
vices appear to confirm the negative impact of practices such as pozornosť. 
Slovakia’s ratings lag behind those of many other developed countries. 
A study conducted over the period 1995– 2009 compared the perform-
ance of nine public services in 28 developed countries. Comparing out-
comes (‘what is achieved?’) and financial efficiency (‘at what price?’), 
the study found that Slovakia scored on the low side as regards public 
administration, health care, housing, economic affairs and infrastruc-
ture. Similarly low scores were reported in the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. In line with their relatively low perform-
ance, public confidence in the public sector in the Central European 
countries was also found to be below average (Jonker 2012: 17).
In Slovak media mini- surveys, one can find questions related spe-
cifically to the practice of všimné (see, for example, the daily newspaper 
SME during the 2014 presidential election campaign). The fact that this 
term was selected for inclusion in the questionnaires, and in the possible 
responses that were offered, indicated the moral ambiguity of the term. 
When asked whether they had ever offered a všimné, four presidential 
candidates replied ‘No’, while three replied ‘Yes’ with reference to giv-
ing všimné to a doctor or physician. However, even some of those who 
responded in the negative admitted to having given some presents (such 
as a box of chocolates) to a doctor after they or their family had received 
medical treatment. One presidential candidate considered všimné to be a 
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consensus among the candidates over the reading of všimné or its positive 
or negative connotations (SME.sk 2014).
This casts doubt on the impartiality of Slovakia’s publicly- funded 
health care. Some physicians claim to have refused all presents from 
patients – though giving such gifts is common practice in Slovakia – 
while others see no problem in accepting small gifts. It is telling that 
opinion poll data reveal that health care is generally seen as Slovakia’s 
most corrupt sector (Transparency International Slovensko 2014a). In 
some hospitals, informal norms of všimné apply, though the word is not 
officially used. For example, a payment of up to 20 Euros may be seen as 
an acceptable way to express gratitude for good care, with higher fees 
being acceptable for special privileges such as choosing which surgeon 
will carry out one’s operation (Krempaský and Vražda 2012).
Some of these morally ambiguous practices are increasingly con-
tested. For example, when an online discussion was initiated in 2015 on 
the web portal modrykonik.sk by young mothers who had paid všimné, 
pozornosť or dakovné when giving birth, this was picked up on and 
reported on the agenda- setting portal SME. This was not just an acknow-
ledgement of the importance of the issue, but also a contestation of the 
legal status of this social norm, and an investigation was launched by 
the Special Prosecutor’s Office (Burčík 2015; Gécziová 2015). The moral 
ambivalence of the issue was clearly reflected both in media reports and 
in online discussions, where journalists and bloggers drew attention to 
the ambiguity of the words ďakovné, pozornosť and všimné by putting 
them in quotation marks.
Another focus of public discussion was the way in which the word 
pozornosť can cover illegal non- monetary privileges or rewards that 
may amount to bribery, such as membership of an exclusive club, privi-
leged service at an airport, or a state award. Pozornosť was also used 
in a report on a corrupt Chinese general, who preferred to receive gold 
rather than a monetary bribe, leading to the headline, ‘Mercedes full of 
gold as pozornosť’ (Sladkovská 2014).
Because of their elusive nature, the practices of personalisation 
implied by the use of ďakovné, pozornosť and všimné remain under- 
researched. On the one hand, they may imply only an enhanced qual-
ity of services that are in themselves legitimate. On the other hand, 
the personalisation of state services is generally viewed by the state as 
corruption. As long as one of the parties is willing to cooperate with 
the police, this type of minor crime is easy to prosecute; it also makes 
for popular newspaper reporting. But, while hundreds of minor or 





























year, far fewer cases of large- scale corruption do so (Transparency 
International Slovensko 2014b). Petty corruption also provides 
moral cover for more serious crimes by top politicians or influential 
businesspeople.
Morally and practically, much depends on whether gifts are volun-
tary, expected or even extorted, and whether they are presented before 
or after a service, such as a medical operation. However, all cases of 
ďakovné, pozornosť and všimné seem to hinge on the need to personal-
ise a relationship in order to secure preferential treatment. This suggests 
defects in the functioning of impersonal institutions, which in turn justi-
fies personalisation to some extent. On the other hand, getting preferen-
tial treatment at the expense of others will always be morally dubious. 
In early 2015, the Slovak government abolished fast- track access to 
doctors on the grounds that it was prejudicial to the poor and to those 
who were prepared to wait patiently for treatment. Interviewed on tele-
vision Dr Peter Lipták, a physician, admitted having received thousands 
of gifts from patients, including flowers and small amounts of money. 
He strongly denied that either could be considered a bribe. At the same 
time, he claimed that he needed these voluntary gifts in order to finance 
his medical practice (Turanský 2015). The case was widely discussed in 
the media and was investigated by the police. In the end, Lipták was not 
charged with either corruption or tax evasion. But his story illustrates 
how the informal practices examined here are evolving: they are being 
publicly discussed in the media, investigated and transformed into new 
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‘Biombo medico’, more commonly referred to as ‘biombo’, is a term for a 
Japanese- style bamboo curtain (Figure 2.12.1), but in the Costa Rican 
context it is used to refer to an illegal payment made to a medical pro-
fessional in exchange for providing preferential treatment to a patient 
or a patient’s family within the state- funded health care system. 
According to an official report on the Costa Rican health care sector 
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to longer waiting times for consultations or treatments. The payments 
enable them to leapfrog waiting lists for surgery, to see specialists and 
to receive diagnostic tests and treatments usually reserved for emer-
gencies. The report defines biombos as ‘illicit agreements between doc-
tors and patients, to overcome administrative barriers and to access 
certain benefits and to solve the recurrent problem of the shortage of 
medical supplies’. The report argues that the practice ‘promotes cor-
ruption of the [health care] system in general and places the needi-
est people at a clear disadvantage’ (Organización Panamericana de la 
Salud 2003: 34).
While the practice of securing preferential treatment from health 
care providers is common not only in Costa Rica, and similar practices 
are to be expected in other countries with similar health care systems, the 
use of the term biombo appears to be limited to Costa Rica. This can be 
explained by the near universal state- owned and run health care system 
that exists in Costa Rica, whereas in other Latin American Countries (or 
Figure 2.12.1 Although biombo in Costa Rica is used to mean a small 
bribe, usually paid to a medical professional, in the rest of Latin America 
(and the world) it is a Japanese- style folding screen used as a room 
divider.
Source: https:// flickr.com/ photos/ linkogecko/ 13609293284. © David 











Central America) there are factors that mitigate the need to engage in 
biombo-type exchanges.
Although no formal method is used to measure the extent of the 
use of biombos by medical personnel, by 2008 it was believed to have 
become a sufficiently significant issue for the Código de Moral Médica 
(Medical Moral Code) to be modified to specifically prohibit the practice. 
As a deterrent, the state introduced penalties, which ranged from a ver-
bal warning to the suspension of a medical licence (Nuevo Código Moral 
Médica 2008).
Since the changes in the Medical Moral Code in 2008, the prac-
tice has, perhaps, become less common, but it remains virtually impos-
sible to measure. It is a hidden practice, does not involve large amounts 
of money, there is an immediate benefit in return for the payment and 
it is viewed by most people as a normal cost of doing business, rather 
than being considered a form of corruption. Consequently, the payment 
of biombos does not register on any of the government’s illicit income 
measurement mechanisms, nor does it merit the attention of Costa Rica’s 
investigative journalists who have previously been able to expose major 
corruption scandals by tracking the spending habits of relevant gov-
ernment officials. The prohibition of biombos might also have changed 
the nature of the practice as it necessarily became more sophisticated. 
Currently, as an increasing number of doctors practise in both the pri-
vate and state health care sector, they enjoy an increased level of con-
trol; patients might be obliged to pay for several private consultations 
and tests at a private clinic before they can undergo a major procedure at 
a public hospital.
Interestingly, the openness of access to the Constitutional 
Chamber of the Supreme Court may have helped limit the practice. 
The Constitutional Chamber provides two deterrents:  first, individual 
patients who have to endure long waiting times for procedures, special-
ist visits or access to medication can petition the court (without hiring 
a lawyer) in order to pursue a quick, low- cost, personal resolution. In 
this context, there is no need to pay a biombo to move up the waiting 
list; instead they file a free, quick amparo (protection) claim with the 
Constitutional Chamber. This litigated approach may have the potential 
to produce similar results and ethical problems as the biombo. Although 
litigation is completely legal, it has been argued that it produces compar-
able unethical medical outcomes (Wilson 2014).
A second deterrent diminishing the incidence of biombos is 
related to the first: the low- cost access to timely judicial resolutions. 
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denounce the doctor to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme 
Court. In this instance the court can level significant penalties against 
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In Mexico, mordida is a widely used ‘euphemism’ for a petty bribe (Morris 
2003). The word literally translates as ‘bite’ from Spanish. While the ori-
gins of this euphemistic use of the word are contested, probably the most 
recurrent explanation given by Mexicans is that it alludes to police offic-
ers and other public officials being seen as dogs, on the lookout for an 
innocent citizen to ‘have a bite of’. It is significant that several studies 
(Del Castillo and Guerrero 2003; Bailey and Paras 2006: 64) have found 
that mordida is the one practice consistently identified by Mexicans as 
linked directly to corruption, whereas average citizens appear to struggle 
with articulating the meaning of corruption in a more abstract sense (Del 
Castillo and Guerrero 2003).
Mordida can be distinguished from another term that also trans-
lates into English as ‘bribe’ – soborno. Some authors have pointed out 
a subtle difference in meaning between the two terms (e.g. Coronado 
2008). While soborno is presumed to be a serious crime (involving large 
amounts of money), mordida refers to commonly occurring, petty trans-
actions associated with the ‘folklore of corruption’ pervading Mexican 
popular culture (Covarrubias González 2003). In this latter connotation, 
mordida may be understood as one of many practices from the toolkit of 
informal strategies that Mexicans often employ in order to deal with a 
state that is perceived as undemocratic, unfair and even abusive. Other 
examples of such informal strategies used in Mexico include the use of 
personal connections to insiders or influential people in order to obtain 
preferential treatment (palancas), resorting to persons who are paid to 
do others’ administrative transactions, frequently through use of per-
sonal contacts inside the organisation (coyotes), and giving gifts (regalos) 
(Coronado 2008).
There are several reasons why the mordida is a pervasive practice 
in Mexico, preconditioned by inconsistent rules, inconsistent enforce-
ment of the rules, rules exploitation and extortive rule- making. First, 
the mordida is widely viewed as necessary because of the perception 




















people feel they are left with no choice but to find an arrangement 
through extra- legal means (Morris 2003). Furthermore, excessive red 
tape is often exploited by unscrupulous bureaucrats, who arbitrar-
ily come up with endless requirements to complete an administrative 
process. For instance, it is not uncommon for people seeking everyday 
public services (renewing a driving licence, obtaining a birth certificate, 
regularising a land title, applying for construction permits, etc.) to be 
asked to present documents never mentioned before or listed anywhere, 
or to be sent through an endless succession of queues. Alternatively, as 
Coronado (2008) narrates, the public official can also play upon the 
possibility that the applicant’s documents may ‘get lost’ or the proced-
ure could be ‘delayed’; it is not uncommon to ask for a ‘tip’ after the 
paperwork has been submitted, ‘whatever you would like to give for the 
judge’s cooperation’ (‘ahí lo que quiera dar para la cooperación del juez’). 
The overall effect of these patterns is to create a sense of unpredictability 
when citizens engage with state officials. Not surprisingly, in some cases 
citizens resort to a mordida as a preemptive action just to avoid time- 
consuming procedures.
Besides being linked to excessive and costly bureaucratic proce-
dures, the mordida can also take the form of an outright coercive act. 
Perhaps the most common example of this involves law enforcement 
officers threatening severe consequences from (sometimes even minor) 
traffic violations or other misdemeanours. The mordida is, then, often 
offered out of fear of the consequences that would befall the individ-
ual should he or she fail to ‘appease’ the officer. In such cases, the act 
of bribing arises from the perception that law enforcement officers can 
and do commit abuses of power with impunity. As LaRose and Maddan 
(2009) recount, in the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 the 
victors pursued strategies to centralise power, which led to the develop-
ment of a police force with great autonomy and little oversight. Since 
then, the commonly held view is that the police remains a tool of polit-
ical oppression rather than a law enforcement institution (LaRose and 
Maddan 2009; Alvarado Mendoza and Silva Forné 2011). Such beliefs 
themselves are a factor contributing to the willingness of citizens to settle 
legal issues informally through a mordida rather than having to face the 
criminal justice process. Therefore, as Del Castillo and Guerrero suggest, 
the bribe is often rationalised by citizens as a means to buy security (Del 
Castillo and Guerrero 2003).
There are specific rituals associated with giving a mordida, which 
most Mexicans are familiar with, and which determine how to negoti-
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mordida comes at the point where the public officer has made it clear that 
the citizen’s situation is serious and it often involves phrases such as ‘Is 
there no other way?’ (‘¿no habrá otra manera?’) or ‘How can we reach an 
arrangement?’ (‘¿cómo nos podemos arreglar?’). At which point usually 
an amount is mentioned.
Not infrequently, some negotiation is involved before agreeing on 
the price of the bribe. This is an interesting moment because it often opens 
up an informal space between the citizen and the public officer. Thus, the 
process of negotiating the amount of the bribe can involve both parties 
appealing to each other on the basis of the hardships each must face in 
their personal lives. For example, criminologist and blogger Christina 
Johns has written about a strategy she and her husband devised to lower 
the amount of the mordida while travelling around Mexico:  she would 
pretend not to speak Spanish and when her husband ‘translated for her’ 
what the police officer wanted she would hysterically start screaming ‘No, 
no, no, no!!’ In her analysis, this strategy consistently worked because 
police officers would empathise with the husband, who apparently had to 
contend with a difficult ‘foreign woman’ (gringa) (Johns 2014).
In spite of the fact that ‘paying the way’ is known to be widespread, 
and the amounts are often trivial, the language used during an actual 
Figure 2.13.1 Policemen.
Source: https:// flickr.com/ photos/ aztlan/ 489061694/ . © Alan 















transaction should be careful and respectful: one does not make any dir-
ect reference to the act of bribing or call it by its name. There is a mutual 
understanding that the transaction needs to be discreet. For example, 
when dealing with a traffic officer, the money is often hidden inside the 
traffic rulebook before it is handed over.
The amounts paid for mordidas seem to be related either to 
the value of the prospective fine, in the case of traffic violations and 
other misdemeanours, or to whether the service can be obtained else-
where, in the case of bureaucratic processes. Furthermore, mordidas 
to evade sanctions typically involve higher amounts of money than 
those intended to speed up a process. According to data reported by 
Transparencia Mexicana (2011), the average cost of a mordida in 2010 
was 165 MXN (about 12 USD). Transparencia Mexicana also found that 
in the same year, more than 32 billion Mexican Pesos’ (2 billion USD) 
worth of mordidas were paid in order to access or expedite public ser-
vice provision.
At the national level, there are several measures that quantify the 
prevalence of the mordida in Mexico. The Índice Nacional de Corrupción y 
Buen Gobierno published by Transparencia Mexicana ranks 35 public ser-
vices according to the frequency with which households have reported 
having used a mordida to obtain a service (Transparencia Mexicana 
2011). Another available data source is the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP): it conducts surveys every other year, includ-
ing questions on the prevalence of mordidas given to police officers and 
other public officers. The results are published in a searchable database 
(LAPOP 2014).
The mordida probably represents the most palpable incarnation 
of a corrupt political system for average Mexicans who, partly due to a 
sense of vulnerability vis- à- vis public authorities and partly due to a lack 
of trust in the formal legal mechanisms of the state, widely resort to this 




Coima is a colloquial term for a bribe. It is commonly used in the 
Southern Cone – the southernmost areas of Latin America – in par-
ticular in Argentina. It is defined as ‘gratification [or] gift with which 
to bribe an employer or an influential person’ or simply as ‘bribe or 
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1925– 2016). Also used, though to a lesser extent, are the verb coimear 
(to give or receive a bribe) and the nouns coimera (fondness for bribes) 
and coimero (one who gives a bribe). ‘Backhander’ may be coima’s 
closest English translation, given its underlying informal, illicit and 
immoral nature.
The Spanish word coima originally denoted a concubine or pros-
titute, and probably had its roots in the Arabic word for girl, quwaima. 
The word coima arrived in South America under Spanish colonial rule 
when it was used to describe a rake- off – a share or small fine paid 
to the keepers of often illicit and clandestine gaming houses (Collins 
Spanish–English Dictionary; Dictionary of the RSA 1925– 2016). 
Since colonial times coima has been used to denote the fastest and 
indeed sometimes the only way to ‘get things done’ (Soca 2012), 
often therefore fulfilling a practical and necessary function in day- 
to- day life. The practice of coima in the form of payments to low- and 
medium- ranking officials follows established informal rules and tar-
iffs, which are part of what Calcagno (2000) dubbed ‘the folklore of 
public administration’.
There has been a steady increase in the recorded use of the term 
coima over the last century both in and increasingly beyond the bor-
ders of Argentina to neighbouring countries such as Uruguay, Ecuador, 
Peru and, eventually, to all of Latin America (Collins Spanish-English 
Dictionary). Meanwhile, other countries developed their own terms, 
such as ‘bite’, mordida in Mexico, ‘tie’, corbata in Colombia, ‘bottle’, 
botella in Cuba and ‘rattle’, matraca in Venezuela.
What might today be labelled ‘state capture’ by a bloated and 
opaque public administration was observed by the journalist Giuseppe 
Bevione in Argentina in 1910. He wrote then of coima as ‘The only way to 
get something out of the bureaucracy is by offering a tip. … It opens all 
doors’ (Bevione 1910). A century later, in 2012, 6 out of 10 Argentines 
interviewed said they had been asked or forced to pay coima at least once 
in the previous year in an administrative or institutional setting (Lodola 
and Seligson 2013). According to Ruth Sautu and colleagues (2004: 93) 
coima occurs only occasionally, usually in order to obtain or accelerate a 
one- off administrative transaction, such as the issue of a passport, or to 
avoid a fine for a minor legal transgression. Again according to Sautu, 
citing Argentine opinion surveys and interviews, one of the most typical 
instances of coima involves bribing a police officer over a traffic violation 
(Sautu et al. 2002).
The size of coima is significant. Calcagno (2000) distinguishes 



















corruption’, corrupción mayorista. Coima used to be distinguished from 
larger bribes (known as comisión, retorno or soborno) in that coima referred 
to an occasional, ‘petty’ transaction involving a ‘reasonable’ payment. 
Today, however, coima is increasingly used to describe any type of bribe, 
regardless of its frequency or size. For while the act or practice of coima 
may remain occasional, those affected by it are often part of a stable social 
fabric that upholds a consistent and habitual pattern of corrupt behav-
iour (Sautu 2004). Over time, coima has come to play a crucial role in the 
working patterns of a greater regulatory system of social relations: while 
the traffic offender resorts to coima to pay an occasional bribe to a police 
officer and thereby avoid a formal penalty, the officer on the receiving 
end engages in coima on a regular basis.
As José Sarrionandia pointed out, the embeddedness of coima in 
social relations extends far beyond state politics; the term bribe (soborno) 
only approximates to the true meaning of coima since it does not capture 
the common acceptance of and even enthusiasm for coima among soci-
ety at large. Sarrionandia issued the following warning to any traveller to 
Argentina (1964: 4):
You may call it white- collar gangsterism or South American oppor-
tunism, but the reality is that coima is already furtively insinuated 
at customs. It can be seen in the inquisitive look of the customs offi-
cer who is about slowly to search the visitor’s luggage … The diffi-
culties and inconveniences are summed up when a covetous offer 
presents itself. In two gambits [as in a poker game], an arrange-
ment can be reached for everything.
For Sarrionandia, coima is rooted in anti- social attitudes generated by 
deep- seated distrust and mutual suspicion and enforced by complexly 
regulated yet inefficient public services in a precarious environment 
of economic shortage. In the context of asymmetrical relations of pol-
itical, economic, social or institutional power that generate benefits 
for some but disadvantages for others, informal unwritten rules and 
punitive mechanisms uphold and perpetuate coima as an informal 
practice (Sautu 2004). This is reflected in the Argentine expression 
pasar la factura (pass the bill on), which refers to the act of exclud-
ing those who refuse to pay a bribe from official administrative pro-
cesses, such as issuing a passport. Another sanctioning mechanism is 
the deliberate delay of administrative procedures by public officials, or 
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Coima has a coercive element because it is rooted in social bonds 
and societal relations, requiring an act of exchange between the giver 
and the recipient that resembles the act of exchanging gifts, favours and 
other forms of reciprocity while ultimately helping to form and strengthen 
social ties based on a sense of obligation. In the words of the Argentine 
writer Roberto Arlt, ‘We live in the coima empire, the realm of trickery, 
the land of villainy … Coima is everywhere: invisible, certain, effective, 
precise. … And those who do not engage in coima, tolerate coima’ (Arlt 
1929). Nearly a century later, Eric Calcagno wrote that Argentines had 
become indifferent towards the incidence of coima at almost any level, 
and that, as a result, corruption of almost any size had ceased to shock 
them. Coima and corruption was a ‘settled and accepted custom’, as a 
result of which the country had entered an ‘advanced stage of decompos-
ition’ where coima had become an institutionalised mode of social regu-
lation and part of a larger ‘system’ (Calcagno 2000).
The practice of coima has also been captured by Argentine cartoon-
ist Quino, creator of the comic series Mafalda. Quino said of his character 
Manolito that ‘out of his interest in money and his little preoccupation 
with culture, [he] has become the prototype of the [Argentine] political 
class’ (La Razón 2015).
2.15 Chorizo (latin america)
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The literal translation of chorizo is sausage, but the term is frequently 
used in Costa Rica and across Central America to refer to a wide range 
of corrupt acts. Such acts include those in which government officials 
accept personal financial gain from private factions seeking contracts 
from public institutions. In general the term is used when two or more 
actors participate in an illegal transaction involving considerable sums 
of money. These types of transactions are generally associated with large 
infrastructure projects or public procurement purchases. In some Latin 
American countries chorizo is implied by alternative terms such as trin-
quete, trance, movida or chanchullo when referring to corrupt public/ pri-
vate transactions.
Chorizo, as used in Costa Rica and Central America, covers a wide 




















It can be used to refer to acts that appear on the surface to comply with 
all requirements of the legal framework, and to be completely legal, 
but actually confer an illegal advantage. For example, an international 
company hired José Maria Figueres, a former President of Costa Rica, 
as a consultant shortly after he left office. He was hired to facilitate the 
company’s introduction into the Costa Rican market and was paid a fee 
of approximately 1 million US dollars. There was nothing illegal in his 
actions as, given that he was no longer President, he could charge what-
ever he liked for his services and could not be prosecuted for doing so. 
However, once the story appeared in the press, it became a major scan-
dal and he was forced to resign his position as director of a multilateral 
organisation. His was an act of chorizo.
Chorizo is a frequently used expression in conversation and polit-
ical discourse, but less commonly found in written Spanish. It is how-
ever sometimes used in the media, especially in the front- page headlines 
of popular newspapers. For example, the headline, ‘The Real Culprits of 
Chorizo of the Border Trail La Trocha are Exposed’, referred to a major 
new road running along the border between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, 
initiated under an emergency executive decree. Because of its emergency 
status, the project was allowed to proceed via fast track procurement, 
without the usual accountability agencies’ oversight, which resulted in 
massively inflated prices. Another headline, ‘13 Million Colones Chorizo 
in 19 Hospitals’, detailed the purchase of 13 million colones of non- exist-
ent medical supplies for state- owned hospitals.
There are two possible origins of the word chorizo for corrupt acts. 
The first explanation points to a nineteenth- century Spanish use of the 
term to describe corrupt politicians (‘chorizos’). In recent times, this 
meaning has been extended to refer to any kind of thief and enjoyed 
popular usage in Spain, but in Latin America it retains only its original 
meaning. The etymology of chorizo, according to this version, is that it 
came to Spanish from the Caló language, which was influential in the 
early development of the Spanish language. In Caló, the word for ‘thief’ 
was chori, hence chorizo.
A second explanation for the origin of the word chorizo is its associ-
ation with the sausage- making process: meat is forced into a membrane, 
and periodically the membrane is tied with a cord, forming a long chain 
of sausages. In this instance each tie (un amarre) symbolically repre-
sents the closing of an irregular transaction. The sausage links signify the 
interconnectedness of the separate events. Corruption is possible only if 
a number of people are involved in a business and each of them keeps 
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medium- level officials, and the secretary, the driver and others who are 
all linked to other private individuals outside the business.
While it is very difficult to measure the extent of the practice, the 
large data collection and analysis by the anti- corruption unit at La Nación, 
the country’s leading daily newspaper, formed the basis of investigations 
into incidences of chorizo. Investigators examined the official salary and 
assets data of public officials and looked for anomalies in the lifestyles 
of the same public officials. One of these investigations uncovered the 
fact that a mid- level employee at the state insurance agency (CCSS), 
the agency that covers the massive state- owned health care system, was 
clearly living beyond his means. As the investigation progressed, the offi-
cial’s ties to companies winning lucrative contracts with his agency and 
his ties to a former President (Rafael Angel Calderon) revealed a sub-
stantial corruption scheme involving public servants, current and former 
politicians, a medical equipment importer, and a major medical equip-
ment manufacturer in Finland. As a result of the investigation, which 
linked the parties together, the former President and many of his associ-
ates were imprisoned and fined (Wilson 2014).
2.16 Aploksne, aploksnı te (latvia)
iveta Kažoka and Valts Kalnins
centre for public policy proViduS, latvia
The literal meaning of the Latvian word aploksne is ‘envelope’ – a com-
mon word whose primary meaning is similar in every language. It might 
therefore seem surprising that, during the years 2005 to 2014, less than 
half of all mentions of ‘envelope’ in the Latvian print media referred to a 
flat paper container for letters or documents. Equally often, the word was 
used to denote the all- too- common problems of tax- avoidance and lack of 
employment contracts in the context of labour relations (e.g. ‘wages in an 
envelope’, aplokšņu algas). In a fifth of all the articles, the meaning shifted 
again, this time to refer to corrupt practices in the health service – unoffi-
cial, sometimes illegal, cash payments to doctors, hospital nurses and other 
health care providers. A similar concept exists in countries bordering Latvia 
– for example, unofficial payments to doctors in Russia and Lithuania are 
also associated with the idea of an envelope (konvert, in Russian, vokelis in 
Lithuanian) – and in the Greek language (fakelaki – ‘little envelope’).
Unofficial payments in the health care sector are referred to as 
‘envelopes’ even in cases when the physical object itself – an envelope – is 
not present. There is, nonetheless, a common expectation in Latvia that 





















This holds true whether what is being made is a gift or bonus payment, 
or whether cash is being shared outside the context of regular daily trans-
actions. Banknotes do not, therefore, change hands directly, but through 
an intermediary in the form of an envelope. Such a practice is considered 
to be both more convenient (banknotes are less likely to get lost) and 
more polite.
An envelope as a container does not of course discriminate between 
a legitimate birthday gift and a bribe. Over the years, the meaning of 
the term ‘envelope’ has undergone a semantic change in the Latvian lan-
guage. Today, it has the secondary meaning of ‘illegal’ and/ or ‘unofficial’ 
payment. This secondary meaning refers not to the envelope itself as a 
physical object, but rather to its contents and the purpose those contents 
are intended to serve (e.g. reducing the waiting time for a medical exam-
ination or encouraging a more benevolent attitude from medical person-
nel). A content- analysis of media articles from 2005 to 2014 finds that 
the term ‘envelope’ may refer not only to bribery in the health care sys-
tem (though health care is clearly dominant) but also to bribes paid to 
judges, journalists, local officials and members of parliament.
Sometimes the term is used in its diminutive form ‘tiny envelope’ – 
aploksnīte. In Latvian, diminutive forms often convey a sense of endear-
ment, and do not necessarily refer merely to the smallness of an object. 
There might therefore be an even larger amount of cash in an aploksnīte 
than in an aploksne. However, the choice of the word aploksnīte in the 
context of unofficial payments is usually sarcastic: it may serve as a means 
of creating ironic distance and of protecting oneself against the danger of 
being seen to be engaged in illegal activity. In Latvian, the word for a 
bribe also has a diminutive form (‘bribe’, ‘little bribe’ – kukulis, kukulitis).
Unofficial payments in the health care system are part of the leg-
acy of the Soviet era. In Latvia, just as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, 
all health workers were state employees, and health care was a highly 
centralised public service, free at the point of delivery. Physicians’ offi-
cial salaries were deliberately kept low – below the average wage of a 
factory worker, for example (Barr 1996). The quality of the care pro-
vided was notoriously low. This explains why patients were willing to 
pay extra to physicians (Barr and Field 1996). Over time, unofficial pay-
ments from patients in the form of cash or gifts became the rule and an 
unofficial system of fees- for- services became common. A  survey con-
ducted among physicians in Estonia indicated that, during the Soviet 
era, unofficial payments by patients for services that were supposedly 
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With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the newly independent 
states, Latvia included, were forced to reform their health care systems. 
This was not an easy task, given the shortage of public resources and the 
prevalence of the Soviet tradition of unofficial payments to physicians. 
The World Bank and other institutions identified informal, unreported 
and sometimes illegal payments to doctors as characteristic of health 
care systems in both Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Lewis 2000). The 
problem was aggravated by another legacy of the Soviet era: generally 
lenient public attitudes towards petty corruption. Such attitudes have 
persisted into the present. In 2015, for example, approximately one- third 
of Latvians questioned said that they considered corruption to be justi-
fied in cases where there was no other way of solving a legitimate prob-
lem. A similar proportion of Latvians said they did not object to someone 
defrauding the state, given that the state did not provide any service of 
value (KNAB 2015). In 2013, 72 per cent of Latvians said they consid-
ered it acceptable to make a gift to a civil servant in order to get a needed 
service from public administration. Latvia scored more highly in this 
respect than any other European Union (EU) member- state (European 
Commission 2014).
The general confusion associated with changes in values and insti-
tutions that followed the break- up of the USSR makes an ‘envelope’ a 
particularly fitting symbol of the times. The amount of cash placed in an 
envelope is not immediately apparent; neither is the nature of the trans-
action. Is it a gift? Is it an undisclosed payment? A tip? A bribe? If it is a 
bribe, has it been extorted? The term aploksne covers all such eventual-
ities, thereby conceptually placing each individual case in a grey zone 
of semi- legality and semi- legitimacy. When asked in 2002 whether an 
envelope was a form of corruption, almost one- half of Latvians surveyed 
denied that this was the case (CIET International 2002).
In the early 2000s, however, informal payments to doctors did begin 
to be generally perceived in Latvia as a serious problem. Media coverage 
of aploksne peaked in 2007, when a former doctor who had admitted hav-
ing received envelopes throughout his career was elected as President of 
Latvia. By then, a consensus had emerged as to what forms of envelopes 
were unacceptable, and doctors were prohibited from demanding unoffi-
cial payments. There still remained a grey zone in cases where no such 
demand had been made: the so- called ‘gratitude’ or ‘thank- you’ money 
(Latvian – pateicība). Such ‘gratitudes’ were frequently given to doc-
tors or nurses before a service, which cast doubt on their fully voluntary 






















expect to get worse treatment than a patient who had already expressed 
his or her ‘gratitude’ in the form of an envelope.
Analysis of media usage of the term aploksne indicates a steep 
decline in recent years. In 2006– 7, for example, the term had been found 
four times more frequently than was the case in 2015. The resultant 
decline in media attention has been so rapid that it even seems that the 
term may be on the verge of obsolescence.
Improvements in living standards in general and the health care 
system in particular have led to a situation where fewer people in Latvia 
now say that they feel the need to bribe their doctors. The number of 
respondents who say they expect to pay a bribe to health care workers 
(3 per cent) is now only slightly above the EU average (2 per cent), 
and considerably lower than in neighbouring Lithuania (21 per cent) 
(Special Eurobarometer 397 2014). Recent public- awareness raising 
campaigns have spread the message that all kinds of unofficial payments 
to public  sector health care workers are unacceptable, even when they 
are intended as an expression of gratitude for a job well done.
It might therefore not be surprising if in the not- so- distant future 
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Fakelaki (literally ‘little envelope’; plural fakelakia) is the Greek term for 
a small envelope of money that is used to secure various services such as 
medical treatment in hospitals or at doctors’ surgeries, legal documents, 
preferential treatment in public services (local council, electricity com-
pany, police) or a driving licence. Fakelakia may also be given as gifts on 
the occasion of marriages, baptisms or birthdays.
The word fakelaki is often used in popular discourse to imply cor-
ruption, bribery or obtaining something by illegitimate means. That said, 
the fakelaki is an accepted part of everyday life in many parts of Greece, 
being so commonplace that local people do not perceive it as corruption 
in the Western sense. This is partially to do with the ambiguous nature 
of the fakelaki as something between ‘bribe’ and ‘gift’ in local perception. 
The multivalent contexts in which fakelakia are given, and the confla-
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Fakelaki has become infamous since the outbreak of the Greek eco-
nomic crisis of 2009. As of October 2015, this had resulted in three bail-
out packages amounting to €295 billion administered by the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (known as ‘the Troika’) in return for economic reform and restruc-
turing by Greece (Knight 2015a). International media have repeatedly 
highlighted the fact that fakelakia, meson (use of contacts), patronage 
and clientelism (Campbell 1964) in economic transactions are long- 
standing examples of the ‘bad economic practice’ that provoked Greece’s 
economic crisis. The Troika set numerous policy goals to be implemented 
in Greece and aimed at eradicating the ‘fakelaki culture’ and promoting 
what bureaucrats in Brussels and Berlin term ‘economic modernisation’.
Fakelaki is also connected to a work culture that perceives the vari-
ous documents issued by authorities as ‘papers’ that you need to pay a 
price for in order ‘to buy’. Anthropologists working in Greece have found 
that patients have been denied emergency medical treatment, building 
permits have been denied and university degrees withheld due to the 
inability to pay the amount required in a fakelaki. At the other end of the 
spectrum, it has been noted that politicians, civil servants and building 
companies have obtained office and/ or paperwork through significant 
fakelaki payments that have been made ‘under the table’. Some particular 
cases of fakelaki payments have become infamous after being caught on 
camera as subjects of investigative journalism. Transparency International 
(TI), the global non- governmental organisation that campaigns against 
corruption, reports that individuals and companies can bribe inspectors 
and evade taxes through the payment of fakelakia. In 2012, TI asserted 
that the average bribe paid to a public servant in Greece amounted 
to €1,228 (US$1,372). TI puts the average ‘cost’ of a driving licence in 
Greece as between €100 and €300, while getting surgery in a hospital can 
cost anywhere between €100 and €30,000 (www.transparency.org).
The practice of giving fakelakia is linked to local conceptions of 
people in positions of power ‘eating money’. In 2010, Greece’s then dep-
uty Prime Minister Theodoros Pangalos announced to reporters that 
‘together we ate it’ (mazi ta fagame). He was referring to the €310 billion 
public debt Greece had built up during 30  years of economic prosper-
ity since its accession to the European Economic Community in 1981. 
With this slogan, Pangalos was trying to sell a notion of collective respon-
sibility for the debt. He asserted that, since the 1980s, Greeks had ‘got 
fat’ from government handouts, an almost unregulated banking sector 
that facilitated handsome personal loans, a stock- market boom, lucrative 























kickbacks. It was common knowledge that people in positions of author-
ity ‘ate money’ (fagane lefta), and the culture of the little white envelope 
stuffed with money was part of everyday life.
In a comparative context, in West Africa fear of hunger and fear 
of the insatiable appetites of the political business elites are described 
as ‘twin demons’ (Argenti 2007:110). As Jean- François Bayart (1989) 
points out, in Cameroon, myriad subtleties of the trope of eating encom-
pass every form of political life, especially the accumulation of wealth by 
means of crime, graft and corruption. Both Bayart and Nicolas Argenti 
explore local idioms that construe the belly as the source of power. In 
Greece, the fakelaki is inextricably linked to money- eating and the insati-
able appetites of people in power to ‘get fat’ on the money of the general 
population (Knight 2015b). Even so, the provision of fakelakia in return 
for services and in contexts of gifting continues to occupy an import-
ant and morally ambiguous place in local imaginings of socio- economic 
transactions.
2.18 Cash for access (uK)
Jonathan Webb
university of Sheffield, uK
In the United Kingdom, ‘cash for access’ denotes the exchange of money 
between two or more parties, with the donor seeking to gain access to an 
office holder and the recipient facilitating access in exchange for money. 
The term is most frequently associated with cash given to Members of 
Parliament (MPs), parliamentary aides or ministers who agree to use 
their connections with office holders to secure meetings in exchange 
for money. The term cash for access emerged in the wake of the 1998 
‘Lobbygate’ scandal involving Tony Blair’s political advisor, Derek Draper. 
While the term appears to have been created shortly after the scandal, 
with its first use occurring in 1998, it has now entered common political 
parlance to describe the exchange of money for access to office holders. 
Despite its contemporary origins in the British media, cash for access is 
closely associated with the linguistic term ‘open door’ (OED 2015). Often 
individuals embroiled in cash for access cases use terminology that sug-
gests a particular sum of money can ‘open the door’ or ‘open doors’ to the 
office holder in question (BBC 2010).
Cash for access is part of a wider set of informal practices known as 
‘cash for favour scenarios’. Cash for favour scenarios are defined by the 
clandestine exchange of money for some type of privilege (Rowbottom 
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British political and journalistic lexicon are ‘cash for questions’ and ‘cash 
for honours’. The term ‘cash for questions’ was coined in the wake of a 
1994 political scandal, in which two British MPs were accused of taking 
money from lobbyists to ask questions in parliament that would benefit 
the lobbyists’ cause. Cash for honours refers to the awarding of life peer-
ages to those who donated or loaned large sums of money to the govern-
ing political party, and is particularly associated with a political scandal 
of the same name under Tony Blair’s administration in 2006– 7. The main 
feature that distinguishes cash for access from other cash for favour sce-
narios is that in cases of the former, financial inducement merely secures 
access to the office holder and does not guarantee a ‘result’ or ‘benefit’ in 
return. Mere access to a politician may not directly influence their deci-
sion- making. In contrast, other cash for favour scenarios directly influ-
ence the actions of the office holder. For example, in the 1994 cash for 
questions scandal, the money received by the MP Neil Hamilton directly 
influenced Hamilton’s line of questioning in parliament (Farrell et al. 
1998: 83).
‘Cash for access’ is broader in scope than other ‘cash for favour’ 
practices. The term covers a range of practices – from the corrupt and 
potentially illegal, to others that are more ethically ambiguous, and 
widely and openly practised as part of political life. A distinction can be 
made between cases in which an individual agent personally pockets the 
money and those where the beneficiary is an institution – typically a pol-
itical party. All the major UK political parties use fundraising events such 
as balls and dinners, which often include tickets costing several thousand 
pounds to be seated on the same table as eminent politicians. For exam-
ple, the Labour Party was criticised in 2014 for allowing wealthy donors 
to attend a gala dinner at £15,000 per head without having to publicly 
register their names. At a similar event held by the Conservative Party 
in 2015, guests were invited to bid up to tens of thousands of pounds to 
have dinner or partake in other social activities with various politicians. 
Such events are often criticised by the media, but this does not appear to 
affect the practice of them.
Although cash for access is closely associated with the institu-
tional practices of UK politics, similar practices occur in other countries. 
In China, for example, some cases of shouhui can involve the exchange 
of money for access to office holders. Shouhui refers to the practice of 
office holders receiving unsolicited money in exchange for undertaking 
a specific action (Kwong 2015: 15). Despite shouhui cases often having 
a cash for access element, the practice is closer to other more illicit cash 



















requires a certain set of institutional mechanisms to occur, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that in addition to the UK, its occurrence has been noted 
in other Westminster political systems such as Australia and Canada 
(McMenamin 2013: 135; Jabour 2015).
Despite the relatively recent emergence of the term itself, cash for 
access as a practice can be seen as a historically embedded phenomenon 
within parliamentary life. Historical accounts of individuals able to buy 
access to office holders stretch back to at least the early twentieth cen-
tury. For example, Winston Churchill used his parliamentary connections 
to secure access to senior office holders for Burmah Oil in 1923 (Jones 
1991: 164). It is not always parliamentarians who receive the money that 
is exchanged in cash for access cases – they can involve any individual 
that has connections to an office holder, who seeks to provide access for 
personal profit. For example, the 1998 ‘Lobbygate’ case involved the par-
liamentary aid Derek Draper offering access to ministers to ‘those who 
could make their case’ (Theaker 2004: 77). Other high- profile cases that 
have been exposed by the media include the 2010 cash for access scandal 
involving the Duchess of York; the 2012 cash for access scandal involving 
MP Peter Cruddas; and the 2015 scandal involving MPs Malcom Rifkind 
and Jack Straw – both former foreign secretaries.
The perception of cash for access cases has changed dramatically 
since the early 1990s. A series of high- profile scandals in both the Major 
and Blair governments has made the general public increasingly critical 
of ambivalent parliamentary practice (Farrell et al. 1998: 80– 94). While 
the majority of these scandals were not cash for access cases, ambivalent 
practices in general have become associated with a deviant parliamen-
tary culture rife with ‘sleaze’ (Flinders 2015: 244). Consequently, cash 
for access has become associated with a wider set of practices that is per-
ceived as degrading British politics and undermining the transparency of 
political conduct.
One institutional mechanism that may have increased the num-
ber of cash for access cases over time is the role of the party system in 
British politics. Since 1950, only three MPs have entered the House of 
Commons without any party political affiliation (Flinders and Matthews 
2012: 337). Because political parties act as the vehicle into parliament, 
any decline in grassroots political party membership is likely to affect 
the ability of parties to remain competitive. Traditionally, political par-
ties have relied on a broad membership base to mobilise and generate 
donations. As the links between political parties and wider society have 
fragmented in the post- war era, traditional support in the form of public 










1872.19 korapSen  (papua neW Guinea)
187
in a funding gap for political parties (Abbott and Williams 2014). As a 
consequence, private donors are increasingly filling this funding gap. 
Often the large sums donated by individual donors or businesses are 
conditional on access to office holders. In the words of Tony Blair’s for-
mer Director of Policy Geoff Mulgan: ‘It is fairly obvious that if you are 
a funder you are more likely to have a meeting with advisers, a meet-
ing with ministers, a meeting on occasion with the Prime Minister’ 
(Friedman 2013: 141).
As a consequence of the shift in political party funding, cash for 
access cases are likely to increase. While the general public is increas-
ingly sceptical of current parliamentary practice, political life in the UK 
remains relatively free from corruption and cash for access should not 
always be perceived as corrupt practice. The increased occurrence of 
cash for access is best understood not as the degradation of politics but 
rather as a reaction to institutional change (Richards et al. 2014: 21). 
One mechanism that could be used to reduce the reliance of political par-
ties on private donors is the expansion of the Short Money state funding 
for political parties. This would allow the state to further regulate polit-
ical party funding. However, given that the general public opposes state 
funding for political parties and there remains a reluctance on the part of 
politicians to extend what are already seen as generous state subsidies, 
the cash for access dilemma is likely to be perpetuated (Johnston and 
Pattie 2014: 23).
2.19 Korapsen (papua new Guinea)
Grant W. Walton
development policy centre, crawford School of public policy,  
anu college of asia and the pacific, The australian national 
university, australia
Those writing about Papua New Guinea (PNG) sometimes pass off the 
term korapsen as the local equivalent of the English word ‘corruption’, 
commonly understood as the ‘abuse of power (or public office) for pri-
vate gain’. For example, an article in the international magazine Time 
conflated the two words and assumed that, ‘[e] ven the humblest citizens 
know what korapsen is’ (Feizkah 2002: 1). What is ‘lost in translation’ 
here is the difference between the local knowledge, embodied in this 
distinctly Papua New Guinean word korapsen, and the presumed conno-
tations of the increasingly globalised term ‘corruption’. While these hom-















New Guineans, the local term korapsen has taken on a more informal 
meaning than its English counterpart.
Officially, there is no equivalent for the word corruption in PNG’s 
lingua franca, Tok Pisin. The Jacaranda Dictionary and Grammar of 
Melanesian Pidgin (Mihalic 1983), the most comprehensive guide on 
the language, does not include an entry on korapsen. Nor does the more 
recent Papua New Guinea Tok Pisin English Dictionary (Baing and Volker 
2008). In turn, translators have avoided using korapsen in literary works. 
The Tok Pisin version of the Bible, the Buk Baibel, does not appear to use 
the word. For instance, in the English Bible, Isaiah 1:4 reads, ‘Ah, sinful 
nation, a people loaded with guilt, a brood of evildoers, children given to 
corruption’. This line is translated into: ‘yupela ol manmeri i nogut tru na 
pasin bilong yu i nogut olgeta’ (The Bible Society 1993: 896), where nogut 
olgeta (‘completely bad/ useless/ no good’) fills in for the word corruption 
(John Burton 2009, personal communication). Thus, korapsen is quint-
essentially an informal word, which is most prevalent in its spoken form, 
rather than in written pidgin. Nevertheless, the term does sometimes 
appear in print – particularly at the growing number of anti- corruption 
events and in Tok Pisin news outlets, such as Radio Australia’s Tok Pisin 
news service and the local PNG paper the Wantok Niuspepa – where it 
is used to describe behaviour and organisations. As an example of the 
latter, Zimmermann highlights how the Wantok Niuspepa translates the 
National Fraud and Anti- Corruption Squad to ‘Nesenel Fraud na Enti 
Korapsen skwat’ (2010: 124).
In analysing results of a household survey conducted with over 
1,800 respondents, I have shown that many Papua New Guineans asso-
ciate korapsen with ‘harmful activity’ (Walton, 2015). Yet, somewhat 
paradoxically, respondents were less likely to equate it with ‘unaccept-
able’ behaviour. Respondents were presented with nine scenarios that 
depicted a range of different types and scales of possible corruption. They 
were asked to rate – on a scale of one to four – the degree to which each 
scenario was a form of korapsen, harmful or unacceptable. They were 
more likely to rate scenarios as totally unacceptable, rather than harm-
ful or as korapsen – with the latter two categories highly correlated. This 
suggests that for many Papua New Guineans korapsen can be acceptable, 
even though they acknowledge that it causes harm.
The ambivalence that some Papua New Guineans hold towards 
korapsen became especially apparent in focus group discussions con-
ducted around the country in 2008 (Walton 2009, 2013, 2015). While 
many respondents defined the term similarly to modern definitions 
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courageously, spoke about the functionality of korapsen. When discuss-
ing a scenario depicting a candidate bribing a citizen in return for their 
vote, many argued that such transactions were necessary due to cultural, 
social and economic pressures. For some, the candidate was not at fault 
as long as everyone in the community was given money; they believed 
that this scenario was unacceptable if money only went to a few. Voters 
themselves are thus actively engaged in such illicit transactions, often 
demanding that candidates and representatives distribute state largesse 
directly to the community rather than through the state.
This response needs to be understood in the context of PNG’s com-
munally oriented culture (Larmour 2012). The vast majority of land in 
PNG is communally held and cultural norms stress the importance of 
reciprocity for maintaining relationships. These values often trump the 
rules and laws of the state, particularly where the state is weak and inef-
fective (Walton 2015). Indeed, respondents in remote areas, particularly 
women, who are often economically and politically marginalised and 
more engaged in the informal sector, suggested that they would accept 
money in exchange for their vote because it was one of the few times 
they benefitted from the state. This resulted in an ambivalence towards 
korapsen, in that respondents had a sense that it was considered ‘wrong’, 
but the benefits it brought meant it was often supported.
Korapsen is also tied to more informal activities that do not involve 
people in positions of power (an important prerequisite for modern def-
initions of corruption, see Walton 2015). Results from the household 
survey showed that the scenario most aligned to korapsen involved a 
woman selling sex and drinking ‘homebrew’ (homemade alcohol). This 
suggests that korapsen in part reflects the ‘decay definition’ of corrup-
tion (Walton 2015), which has its origins in ancient Greece. Indeed, the 
ancient Greeks defined corruption as both individual and institutional 
decay (Bratsis 2003; Walton 2015). Individual decay includes ‘the cor-
ruption of the mind by which the ability to make sound judgments and 
pursue the good has been impaired’ (Bratsis 2003: 12). The strong link 
between korapsen, prostitution and homemade alcohol suggests the 
concept is thus strongly linked to individual decay in the minds of many 
Papua New Guineans.
Institutional decay involves the deterioration of social and political 
institutions. Again, the focus groups conducted across PNG captured this 
interpretation. Some respondents said that korapsen occurs when the 
‘one talk’ (in Tok Pisin wantok, see 3.8 in this volume) system – a social 
institution of reciprocity within kinship groups – benefits particular indi-
























been criticised within PNG for causing corruption; particularly because 
its focus on maintaining kinship ties means citizens prefer distributing 
state resources to relatives rather than following state bureaucratic rules. 
But for some respondents, the wantok system was in decay, not because 
it challenged the rules of the state, but because it could create inequal-
ities within the community, and thus was not living up to its ideal institu-
tional function. In identifying the wantok system as a form of korapsen in 
this sense, respondents’ perceptions reflected the institutional side of the 
decay definition. Thus, while korapsen is a uniquely Papua New Guinean 
word, it resonates with other interpretations of its root word (‘corrup-
tion’) found in pre- modern Western thought.
There might be reservations about seeking to understand korapsen 
through its vernacular meaning. As homonyms, ‘corruption’ and korapsen 
are indeed difficult to distinguish. Even speakers of Tok Pisin would find 
it difficult to articulate whether they were referring to the English or 
Tok Pisin meaning; and the research (Walton 2009, 2013, 2015) did not 
try to distinguish the two. However, if one is sensitive to the meaning 
of korapsen shared by local communities – whereby the definition of the 
concept is determined by the views of Papua New Guineans – it is easy 
to see that korapsen and ‘corruption’ are related but distinct concepts. 
The latter focuses on wrongdoing by those in positions of power, where 
‘wrongdoing’ is determined by the rules and laws of the state. In a dis-
tinctly Papua New Guinean sense, korapsen is associated with informal 
practices necessary for the daily workings of the community and reflects 




Bustarella is the diminutive of the word ‘envelope’ (‘busta’), and may 
be translated literally as ‘little envelope’. The term has its roots in the 
Neapolitan dialect, and refers to an envelope in which money is hidden 
in order to facilitate favours or smooth a process. It thus equates with a 
kickback or bribe. In the context of corrupt practices in Italy, bustarella 
has become a term commonly used to represent the brazen exchange of 
favours, which encompasses not only the exchange of money or offshore 
funds, but also refers to ‘arrangements’ such as the offer of yachts for 
holidays, the gift of new luxury cars, apartments, the payment of mort-
gages, the promise of prostitutes, free holidays and the payment of hous-
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Cultural references abound. In the song ‘A bustarella’, by the Italian 
film actor and comedian Nino Taranto, 1950s Italy is described as the 
‘Land of Plenty’ (‘il Paese della Cuccagna’), where you just need a busta-
rella (‘brown envelope’) to satisfy your greed. In the book ‘Il male italiano’ 
(‘The Italian disease’), prosecutor Raffaele Cantone describes the impres-
sion of Italy he gained as a result of his investigation of Expo 2015 in 
Milan. The year preceding the opening of the Expo saw the rise of corrupt 
practices with regard to contracts on buildings and infrastructure, and 
clear evidence of nepotism and clientelism (La Repubblica 2015).
The Italian political system has long been recognised as ‘dis-
tinctive’ in relation to party domination at the local level. Bustarella 
has been a widespread feature in land development and contracts; 
a mechanism described as ‘an extensive system of bribes and kick-
backs to party officials … [where] parties [can] penetrate the bureau-
cracies, and share the heights of the economic power. This power is 
passed down to local party officials and technocrats, so that they may 
enjoy significant autonomy vis- à- vis incipient local- growth activists’ 
(Molotch and Vicari 1988: 203– 7).
Institutional arrangements for preventing the use of bustarella in 
political parties and government authorities can be effective in prin-
ciple, but due to constantly evolving structures and external pressures 
they do not tend to be effective in practice. The practice of bustarella 
itself is so prevalent because it is able to thrive and flourish on a small 
scale, often falling within the ‘grey area’ of corruption (Heidenheimer 
and Johnston 2002: 33). In general, only a minority in society wants 
to see the practitioners punished, and even then only in instances 
regarded as ‘severe violations of community moral or legal norms’ 
(Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002: 33). As a rule bustarella helps 
speed up a process, such as an exchange of services, or may be used as 
a means of successfully accomplishing work. Further evidence of the 
practice can be found among public officials. In Rome, for example, 
construction workers were intercepted discussing the corrupt work of 
an officer who had asked for a bustarella of nearly 8,500 Euros in return 
for processing papers relating to security (Il Fatto Quotidiano 2015). In 
another example, a private agency was investigated after it was found 
to be controlling the funeral services offered within four hospitals in 
Rome (Il Messaggero 2014).
The case of Mafia Capitale (Guerra 2014) shows the extent to which 
a ‘greasing’ system involving bustarella and a clientelistic culture com-
bine to support a criminal mafia- type network. Approximately 200 mil-



















December 2014, and some 46 politicians, administrators and business-
men were put on trial. All appeared to be members of a criminal network 
that extended across Rome’s administration. Money originally intended 
for community centres for refugees and basic city services was embez-
zled through bustarella and other corrupt schemes. In a wire- tapped 
phone conversation, Salvatore Buzzi, Head of the 29 June Co- operative, 
which provided services to the homeless and marginalised of society, was 
recorded boasting that the network had made €40m from the misuse of 
funds for ‘gypsies and immigrants’, and that it was ‘more profitable than 
trafficking drugs’. Buzzi’s secretary, arrested for her involvement in the 
case, confessed that she had been responsible for arranging bustarelle on 
behalf of her boss (Guerra 2014).
Italy was ranked joint fifteenth (out of 28) on Transparency 
International’s Bribe Payers Index (2011), which ranks the world’s 
wealthiest and most economically influential countries according to the 
likelihood of their firms to partake in bribery abroad (China and Russia 
being 27th and 28th). The attitude of government leaders to bribery 
and bustarella gives some indication of why this is so. In 2013 the then 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi declared in a televised interview that 
bribery should not be regarded as criminal activity but merely a form 
of ‘commission’: ‘[B] ribes are a phenomenon that exists and it’s use-
less to deny the existence of these necessary situations […]. These are 
not crimes. We’re talking about paying a commission to someone in that 
country. Why? Because those are the rules in that country’ (Transparency 
International 2013). Berlusconi made this statement regardless of the 
fact that in 2000 Italy (along with 38 other countries) had signed and 
ratified the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, a step that was seen as being key to 
halting global corruption.
The Italian government headed by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
(February 2014– December 2016) also suffered from bribery- related 
scandals. In March 2015, the Infrastructure and Transport Minister, 
Maurizio Lupi, was forced to resign following an investigation of kick-
backs and other unspecified matters connected with infrastructure 
projects and the high- speed railway system. Thus, despite the fact that 
bustarella is a widespread practice in Italy, it is still subject to sufficient 
moral disapprobation to end political careers. The minister’s son alleg-
edly accepted a €10,000 Rolex watch for the ‘honour’ of granting the 
giver some work experience. The minister’s response was ‘I didn’t have 
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Prevention of opportunity has been suggested as the most success-
ful tool to combat small cases of corruption like bustarella, thus stopping 
them from expanding into to a well- functioning system of corruption. It 
is noted that while there are costs to detecting a case at an early stage, 
it is more challenging when the case becomes ‘too big to be ignored’ 
(Brytting et al. 2011: 243). The best solution is to maximise the risk of 
getting caught, since ‘a good record of detecting fraud when it occurs acts 
as a deterrent and reduces the likelihood of other frauds’ (Brytting et al. 
2011: 244). Yet Italy may be regarded as ‘a model of the failure of ordin-
ary institutional mechanisms to control corruption in advanced society’ 
(Vannucci 2009: 234). This was starkly demonstrated by the ‘Clean hands 
affair’ (Mani pulite), a nationwide judicial investigation into systemic pol-
itical corruption in the 1990s that led to the demise of the so- called ‘First 
Republic’. Gherardo Colombo, one of the main prosecutors in the ‘Clean 
hands affair’ asserted that, ‘the culture of this country is based above all 
on cunning and privilege. Since the statute of limitations and other laws 
were changed or annulled, we have arrived at a complete renaissance of 
corruption’ (Moore 2007). This is perhaps unsurprising in a country that 
has often failed to establish one of the key principles of a healthy demo-
cratic state: the mutual independence of the judiciary and politics.
2.21 Dash (nigeria and other West african countries)
daniel Jordan Smith
department of anthropology, brown university, uSa
One of the most common informal transactions in Nigeria is the dash. 
A  dash, as it is called in Nigerian English and Pidgin English, may be 
a gift or a bribe; indeed its ambiguity is part of its function. The wide 
spectrum of circumstances in which it occurs and the range of meanings 
associated with it attest to the complexity of the social work it does. In 
its most benign occurrence, to give someone a dash is to offer a present, 
with no strings attached. In this form, a dash is even more generous than 
a gift, because it is given with no expectation of reciprocity. Most gifts, as 
Marcel Mauss (1925) famously showed, come with obligations. The giver 
creates a social relationship with the recipient that is not easily forsaken. 
In contrast, in some cases when Nigerians speak of a dash, they refer to 
a present given freely. A passer- by might dash money to a beggar; a man 
might dash children a soccer ball. Because so many gifts come with obli-
gations, a dash of this sort is especially welcome.
However, in many instances in Nigeria a dash is a cover and a 




















and demands ‘a dash’ to buy cigarettes, for example, the driver will 
experience the request as something close to extortion. If the dash is not 
given, the police officer will demand documents, open the car’s bonnet 
to look for the engine number and most likely invent some infraction to 
delay the journey until something is paid. In this case, the dash is even 
more resented than a bribe, because nothing is gained by paying except 
freedom from harassment. More typically, when state officials request a 
dash – or citizen service- seekers offer one – it is expected that the dash- 
as- bribe will produce a favourable outcome for the giver.
Somewhere in between the dash as a present with no strings 
attached and the dash as a levy or bribe sits a whole range of dashes that 
look more like gifts in that they come with some anticipation of reci-
procity, whether it involves a specific return gift or action, or a more gen-
eralised expectation of future mutual generosity. Despite the diverse set 
of transactions and the variety of motivations and expectations associ-
ated with them, almost all dashes are characterised by the way in which 
they socialise or make personal forms of transaction that could otherwise 
be interpreted in more anonymous, impersonal terms. As noted, in its 
most positive valence a dash signals a pro- social, freely undertaken act of 
generosity. Somewhat paradoxically, this more positive aspect is closely 
connected to the role dashes play in euphemising and enabling transac-
tions that might be – and often are – interpreted by Nigerians as corrup-
tion. Situating the dash in relation to corruption provides a revealing 
perspective both on the range of semiotic interpretations of the behav-
iour and on the nuances of how Nigerians understand and navigate so- 
called corruption.
On the one hand, Nigerians are commonly frustrated and express 
considerable discontent over the fact that state officials expect a dash 
to provide services that ought to be a routine part of their job. In many 
instances, ordinary Nigerians feel aggrieved that civil servants expect a 
dash to issue a driver’s licence, release a pension payment, or pass along 
one’s job application to someone higher up. The fact that the requested 
(or at least implicitly expected) dash is really just a bribe couched in more 
pro- social terminology rankles. Nigerian citizens resent having to pay 
bribes and recognise that the euphemism of a dash protects corrupt offi-
cials and corruption itself. To ask for or to offer a dash invokes moral rules 
different from those that supposedly govern the bureaucracy. Nigerians 
understand both sets of rules, but they also recognise the ruse.
On the other hand, despite their awareness of the ruse and the fre-
quent anger it generates, ordinary citizens are often agents in deploying 
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otherwise formal and official transaction. If Nigerians are in a hurry, if 
they seek an outcome that the official rules would not easily accommo-
date, or if it simply appears that formal procedures will stymie their goals 
because officials always expect something ‘on top’, Nigerians commonly 
take the initiative to personalise the transaction by offering a dash. To the 
extent that a dash symbolises and enables a more personal and informal 
interaction with the state, it is often welcomed as much as it is resented.
Based on a comparative study of corruption in three other West 
African countries, Giorgio Blundo and Jean- Pierre Olivier de Sardan 
(2001a) developed a useful typology of forms of corruption that maps 
reasonably well onto the Nigerian scene. The seven basic forms they 
identify are (1) commission for illicit services, (2) unwarranted pay-
ment for public services, (3) gratuities, (4) string pulling, (5)  levies 
and tolls, (6) sidelining and (7) misappropriation. In Nigeria, all but 
sidelining and misappropriation are instances in which a dash might 
occur, and the spectrum of corrupt behaviours illustrates well the 
social work that dashes accomplish in their more nefarious incarna-
tions. Briefly, commission for illicit services refers to the payment by 
users to officials who then grant access to unwarranted advantages. 
For example, a contractor might provide money to a government offi-
cial to ensure that he receives a job in a process supposedly based on 
competitive bids, or an importer might pay a customs official to under-
estimate the value of his goods in order to reduce a tariff. Unwarranted 
payment for public services involves an official forcing a user to pay 
for a service that is ostensibly provided for free, or inflating the cost 
of a routine job. In Nigeria, people commonly pay extra money for 
basic services such as the issuance of passports and birth certificates. 
A gratuity is also a kind of payment for services, but usually after the 
fact, and is commonly couched in the idiom of a ‘thank you’. Nigerians 
typically call such a gratuity ‘a dash’, and do not always think of it in 
the same terms as a bribe. String- pulling on one’s behalf would also 
typically be followed up (or preceded) by a dash. As noted above, lev-
ies extorted by police or other officials are frequently euphemised 
as dashes. But, as Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2001a) point out, 
a dash makes sense only in an environment where officials diligently 
doing their jobs without the demand for a bribe are the exception and 
deserve a reward.
Understanding the dash helps elucidate the nuances and complex-
ity of official corruption in Nigeria. A dash is the lubricant that enables 
actors to make the mechanisms of bureaucracy more personal, not only 






















by building on and reinforcing a moral economy that facilitates corrup-
tion, even in situations where citizen and bureaucrat are, in fact, com-
plete strangers (Joseph 1987; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Olivier de Sardan 
1999; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2001b; Pierce 2016). Actors on both 
sides of the exchange are frequently more comfortable operating in an 
informal idiom of accountability that humanises the transaction between 
citizen and state. As much as Nigerians sometimes lament the system 
that makes the dash so ubiquitous, many will admit that they would also 
feel lost without it.
Conclusion: ‘interested’ vs ‘disinterested’ 
giving: defining extortion, reciprocity and pure gifts   
in the connected worlds
florence Weber
École normale supérieure, paris, france
In Chapter 2, we find a wide variety of giving. Examples range from 
ceremonial gifts in Japan and China to ritualistic giveaways among 
Gabor Roma and instrumental payments in sub- Saharan Africa and the 
Philippines. To analyse each practice, as well as to discover their simi-
larities and differences, we need to be aware of the key principles of 
giving.
The work of the French anthropologist Marcel Mauss focused on 
the way in which the exchange of gifts between groups and individuals 
builds social relationships, alliances and solidarity, but also antagonism 
and hierarchy. Mauss identified two fundamental elements. On the one 
hand, an essential lapse of time separates the first gift (the opening gift in 
an exchange of gifts) from the counter- gift (the return gift). On the other, 
the gift raises the status of the donor and lowers that of the recipient. It 
was on the basis of these two points – made repeatedly in Mauss’ text – 
that Pierre Bourdieu deduced the existence of a third principle – personal 
dominance. In Bourdieu’s view, this raised doubts about the very possi-
bility of a ‘free’ or ‘pure’ gift, that is, a gift made without expectation of 
reward.
In his analysis of simple reciprocity between two partners, Claude 
Lévi- Strauss stressed both the peaceful and balanced nature of the rela-
tionship and the instantaneous character of a gesture of exchange such 
as, for example, the exchange of wedding rings between husband and 
wife at their marriage ceremony. Such a symbolic gesture does not come 


























it lacks an essential element – the length of time that separates the gift 
from the counter- gift and supposedly establishes the donor’s personal 
dominance – but also because the identity of the two rings symbolises 
the equality of the two spouses.
For Bourdieu, it is the time lapse between the gift and the counter- 
gift that distinguishes the Maussian gift from the instantaneous exchange 
of two equal goods. Such instantaneousness characterises three other 
types of exchange: market and monetary transactions, market and non- 
monetary transactions (when, as in barter, strict equivalence of goods 
is sought by the partners), and ritual transactions (when the goods 
exchanged are identical, as in the example of the wedding rings). It is the 
time lapse that allows the donor to lower the status of the recipient, who 
is compelled to remain for a certain time in the donor’s debt, even when 
this is hidden under the guise of generosity with no ulterior motive. In 
this way, Bourdieu subscribes to the view proposed by Mauss: that of fic-
tion and the social lie. It is also the time interval that establishes a paral-
lel between gift and debt: the recipient becomes dependent on the donor, 
is obligated to him and becomes his inferior.
Further ethnographies of gifts (Weber 2000; Zelizer 2005; Testart 
2007) enable us to make a clear distinction between two forms of cir-
culation: ‘transaction’ and ‘transfer’. A transaction entails the obligation 
to repay and remains incomplete until repayment is made. A  transfer, 
on the other hand, entails no obligation to repay, even in a sequence of 
repeated transfers.
Let us therefore reserve the term ‘transaction’ for services that 
entail an obligation to repay, be they market and monetary transactions, 
non- monetary market transactions, or ritual/ ceremonial transactions. 
We may also introduce the notion of a ‘half- transaction’ for unsettled 
dues. Such incomplete transactions take various forms: financial credit, 
commercial debt or ceremonial transactions; unsettled relations between 
a mutual insurance company and its subscribers, between an insurance 
company and its clients, or between social security and its beneficiaries. 
In this volume, for example, ‘petrol money’ in sub- Saharan Africa would 
be a half- transaction, whereas okurimono no shûkan in Japan, songli in 
China and magharich’ in Armenia would count as ritualistic gifts or cere-
monial transactions. Creating a time lapse between the gift (payment) 
and the counter- gift (required service) by making gifts on specific dates 
(Christmas, birthdays, weddings) reduces their instrumentality and 
highlights their sociability.
Let us reserve the term ‘transfer’ for services that do not entail the 























repeated provision of services. A simple transfer could be a ‘disinterested’ 
or ‘pure’ gift if the donor felt free to give or not (see ‘enactment’ in Sneath 
2006). It might also, however, be a theft or an ‘extorted gift’, where 
physical violence or emotional blackmail is involved, where the donor is 
forced to give, or where no return is implied.
We may then qualify a relationship maintained between the same 
two partners as ‘a chain of services’ or a succession of transfers and/ or 
transactions. There are three levels of analysis with which we can look at 
the chains of services presented in this chapter: the nature of the relation-
ship between the two partners, the form of the circulation of goods (sin-
gle or double) and the nature of repayment (monetary or not). Testart 
(2007) emphasises the crucial difference between exchanges with an 
obligation to repay and those without.
This fundamental distinction enables us to read Mauss’ text in all 
its complexity while also explaining the distinction between the systems 
of exchange he studied in Polynesia. On the one hand, the system of 
market exchanges (‘barter’  – gimwali) consists of transactions related 
to ordinary goods during which the relationship between the two part-
ners is equal and where there is equivalence between the two goods in 
terms of both turn- taking and measure. On the other hand, the system 
of giving material possessions in return for immaterial status (potlatch – 
as practised among some native American peoples of the west coast of 
North America) consists of repeated transfers linked by the logic of an 
antagonistic personal relationship in which each actor is eager to offer 
a more beautiful present than the one he receives, since the alternative 
is to accept a relationship of dependence. Between those two, the sys-
tem of ritual giving (kula – the exchange system practised in Papua New 
Guinea) consists of transactions related to specific ceremonial objects. 
Under this practice, ‘armbands’ (mwali) are exchanged for ‘necklaces’ 
(soulava) during which the relationship between the partners is defined 
as a political alliance.
With potlatch and kula, Mauss explored a whole range of possible 
services where what matters is the personal relationship embodied by 
the thing given, in contrast to services where interchangeable goods 
flow between interchangeable individuals, thereby making it possible 
to relegate personal relationships to the background. These include 
market transactions (monetary or in kind) and simple anonymous 
transfers (monetary or non- monetary). In this volume, entries related 
to forced giving or extortion of gifts, such as egunje in Nigeria or mor-
dida in Mexico, add a new type of personal domination – that of extort-
















informal payment and remain dependent on the recipient to deliver the 
service).
In Western societies there also exist services that involve personal 
relationships in terms that imply superiority on the part of the donor 
(charitable donations as well as political relationships of clientelism); in 
terms of rivalry (when public buildings testify to the superiority of their 
sponsors, and the practice of patronage); or in terms of alliance (such as 
customer loyalty cards where personal relations are used to build trust in 
commercial transactions and are materially rewarded).
Many entries in Chapter  2 emphasise the importance of ritual in 
giving. More generally, rituals carve out in the flow of social life a space – 
a ‘social scene’ (Weber 2001) – with its own specific rules. This enables 
transactions and transfers, whose instrumental nature might even make 
them look like bribes to outsiders, to become socially acceptable in their 
own setting. A  solemn opening ceremony  – an acknowledgement of 
mutual understanding between the parties – affirms the Goffmanesque 
distinction between ‘stage’ acts and those that remain ‘backstage’. The 
formulae of politeness open and close an interaction. They frame the 
context, constitute societies’ know- hows and allow, among other things, 
the distinction between transactions and transfers.
Such an ethnographic analysis of non- market services relates 
to theories of Connected Worlds (Zelizer 2005; Dufy and Weber 2007) 
that attempt to analyse individual practices stretching between differ-
ent social scenes. They focus on the institutional construction of these 
scenes and on the individual ways of joining them. Interested and dis-
interested giving coexist in our modern societies, just as market and gift 
coexisted among the indigenous peoples studied by Mauss, and as kula 
and gimwali coexisted in those studied by Bronislaw Malinowski (1922). 
Such coexistence results from multiple norms and moralities of behav-
iour with respect to different social scenes.
Finally, it is important to emphasise the policy implications of 
Mauss’ concept of the gift. Shifting from scientific observation to polit-
ical issues, Mauss rejected the personal, inegalitarian charity that had 
until then formed the cornerstone of social policy, dismissing it as ‘the 
unconscious and injurious patronage of the rich almsgiver’ (Mauss 2001: 
84). This paved the way for a reconceptualisation of the idea of social 
services and citizens’ rights in modern society, moving away from the pri-
vate welfare practices described in Chapter 3. Mauss’ thinking laid the 
foundation for France’s modern social security system, based on the prin-
ciple that the state and society have obligations to workers and their fam-























in a social state, not only when they are contributing to the economy by 
actively working, but throughout their entire lives.
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Among the four modes of human interaction discussed in this volume – 
redistribution, solidarity, market and domination – solidarity may sound 
the least contentious. Yet the comfort of belonging, of sharing an iden-
tity, also means the exclusion of others, and double standards for ‘us’ 
and for ‘them’. Kinship and local communities reward members with a 
safety net and support, but also limit individual rights. Social networks in 
so- called open access societies are declared open, yet are equipped with 
hidden social filters. The double standards applied to ‘us’ and to ‘them’, to 
insiders and outsiders, differ considerably depending on the context, but 
a common pattern is the ambivalent nature of belonging: enabling but 
also constraining. The modern transformation of identity politics reveals 
the traps of belonging and the unintended consequences of strong ties, 
often resulting in conformity and cohesion not necessarily conducive to 
openly declared freedoms and values.
Entries in Part II explore the identity- based forms of belonging 
and solidarity. The perspective of normative ambivalence is grounded 
in the fundamental divide into ‘us’ and ‘them’, based on identities and 
the associated play of inclusion and exclusion. It enables us to reveal the 
open secrets of identities, shaped by lineage, community or consumption 
(whether religion, music or art) as well as multiple identities emerging 
in complex societies with their constellations of coexisting rural, urban, 
local and global mindsets. The entries are organised by strength of obliga-
tion within social circles, termed the ‘lock- in effect’: from the traditional 
grip of kin ties and observance of customary laws to the more voluntary 
forms of belonging; from traditional values to those of self- expression; 




























Chapter 3, ‘Conformity: The lock- in effect of social ties’, assembles 
evidence of the ambivalence of the informal lock- in effect that identities, 
associations and solidarities can produce. In his introduction, Eric Gordy 
points to the ambivalent nature of identities. These are neither imagined 
communities nor social facts. They are both socially construed percep-
tions of shared culture, history and memory, and linked to concrete his-
torical and social phenomena. Informal practices enhance the perception 
of shared belonging to a group, but can also undermine it. In conclusion, 
Christian Giordano offers a variety of theoretical paradigms of solidarity, 
and points out that informality together with its specific coalitions, net-
works and personalised relationships has a questionable, if not notorious, 
reputation. These aspects are often regarded as pre-modern or dysfunc-
tional because they foster or serve as the foundations for social phenom-
ena such as favouritism, nepotism, cronyism, patronage and corruption. 
Yet they are also the enactment of identities, solidarities and so- called 
social capital. Thus it is not enough to distinguish between functional and 
dysfunctional associations, good and bad networks, positive and nega-
tive social capital; it is essential to see the substantive ambivalence of 
personal relationships (Part I).
Chapter 4, ‘The unlocking power of non- conformity: Cultural 
resistance vs political opposition’, focuses on the informal practices 
associated with non- conformism and cultural resistance. It explores the 
grey zones between cultural resistance and political protest by illustrat-
ing – somewhat provocatively – what informality means for actors in 
terms of creativity, innovation and self- expression. Practices of cultural 
resistance and non- conformism can be aligned with Barbara Misztal’s 
conceptualisation of informality as freedom (Misztal 2000). In his intro-
duction, Peter Zusi highlights an important distinction between cultural 
resistance and political opposition. Whereas opposition implies a tug- of- 
war or a zero- sum game, with the advantage of one coming at the dis-
advantage of the other, resistance by contrast does not operate through 
clear dichotomies. Resistance is multivalent and poly- directional, and its 
forms of expression are often complex and informal.
Accepting that various forms of resistance are more common than 
political opposition, in his conclusion, Jan Kubik takes issue with the 
ambiguities of accommodation, resistance and rebellion. Why do people 
not challenge political systems that they do not accept and want to see 
reformed as often as might be expected? Why does accommodating 
quiescence prevail most of the time and why is open rebellion so infre-
quent? How does opposition express itself? The ambivalent discovery in 




























development and freedom for self- expression. Cultural resistance to the 
classical schools has, for example, been the impetus behind many of 
Russia’s major contributions to the global cultural scene: the Silver Age, 
modernist avant- garde, musical innovation, non- conformist art in the 
1960s, among others.
Yet informality also produces freedom within the constraints that 
allow for the evolution of the classical schools through artistic repos-
session and accommodating symbiosis. In these contexts, the simul-
taneously subversive and supportive role of informal practices is best 
understood by reference to functional ambivalence (Part III). The focus 
on normative ambivalence in Part II enables us to envisage how infor-
mal channels serve in practice to enact both inclusion and exclusion, 
conformity and non- conformity, accommodation and resistance, thereby 
resulting in both lock- in and unlocking effects.
The remaining questions include:  Can identities that are non- 
divisive, and not diminishing the other, be as strong as those that are 
divisive? On what basis can non- divisive identities rest or be construed? 
Which constraints are particularly conducive to creating shortcuts? And 
how do certain types of political and economic constraints correlate with 
forms of innovation, risk- taking and talent development? Finally, the 
theme of fluidity of multiple identities leads to the challenge of measur-
ing normative ambivalence and assessing its role in re- shaping solidari-

















Conformity: the lock- in effect of   
social ties




The entries in this chapter all deal with informal practices of regulation 
that derive their authority from the perception of shared membership in a 
group. The perception of shared identity plays a highly visible role in most 
popular understandings of group, political and institutional behaviour. It 
has also been prominent in social science from the first generation of schol-
arship in the field, with Emile Durkheim (1912) theorising that religion, 
ritual and law can be traced to the need of societies to ‘represent them-
selves to themselves’, and Max Weber specifying the importance of ‘ethnic 
membership [which] does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group 
membership of any kind, particularly in the political sphere’ (1909: 389).
The category of collective identity has been applied in various ways 
to the understanding of social and political phenomena, most frequently 
ethnic solidarity and nationalism. While a group of theorists does exist 
(e.g. Smith 1991) that makes an effort to trace collective identities to 
an ahistorical ‘time before time’ and argues for their underlying reality 
in contrast to variable social forces, there is a greater consensus among 
researchers that perceptions of shared culture, history, memory and iden-
tity can be traced to concrete historical and social phenomena. The attri-
bution of these phenomena varies: from the coalescence of elites around 
a legitimating principle (Anderson 1983; Breuilly 1993), the need of 
expanding markets and administrative structures to draw on a base of 





















projects (Hobsbawm 1990; Billig 1995), to rejection of rigid understand-
ings of shared identity as a form of aggressive propaganda (Dimitrijevic 
2001; Lieven 2004). Regardless of the historicity or ahistoricity of shared 
identities, their power in the reinforcement of boundaries and enforce-
ment of rules is readily apparent. The old dictum of W. I. Thomas (1928) 
seems to apply: if people ‘define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences’.
Informal practices would appear to belong largely to the realm of 
what Durkheim (1895) identified as ‘social facts’, which establish, routin-
ise and reaffirm the importance and meaning of group memberships and 
identities by means of the performance of rituals, in particular rituals 
involving acts of mutual recognition or, conversely, exclusion or antip-
athy. In most cases the content of the performance involves the group 
member confirming membership in the group through an act of conform-
ity, which simultaneously affirms the primacy of the group as a reposi-
tory of value and commonality. Among the benefits of a performance that 
involves well recognised symbols is that an activity carrying low prestige 
(such as crime) can be associated with institutions carrying much higher 
prestige (such as religion or nationality).
The shared identities affirmed in this set of performances func-
tion, in the first instance, as expressions of a relationship to the polit-
ical and institutional environments that provide the context for their 
performance:  as sources for the organisation and expression of pol-
itical power, and sometimes as mechanisms enabling resistance to a 
hostile or competing political power. Such informal practices have 
functioned as resources enabling the maintenance of symbolic resist-
ance, in particular under regimes that have been hostile to religious 
(Ash 1990) or ethnic (Simic 1973) expression. In some authoritarian 
contexts in particular, certain informal arenas such as sport, especially 
football (Mills 2010; Brentin 2016), function as an auxiliary arena 
in which otherwise discouraged expressions of ethnic solidarity are 
encouraged or tolerated, in the hope that they will remain confined to 
a controlled sphere.
Informal social practices of mutual recognition of group member-
ship may also function as mechanisms allowing for the enforcement of 
social exclusion and discrimination. The informal mechanisms engaged 
to maintain discrimination in housing, for example, may range from 
subtle encouragement of cultural similarity and the channelling of 
announcement of availability through heritage- based informal social 
institutions (Gans 1962) on through the establishment of clandestine 
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social boundaries can function both through subtle recognition of com-
monality in areas such as taste and aesthetic preference (Bourdieu 1984), 
on through aggressive discouragement of the presence of visible ethnic 
markers (Wilson 2012). A developing body of social theory assesses the 
totality of these practices as contributing to the development of a per-
manently excluded underclass (Wacquant 2008).
Shared identity functions as a source of solidarity and resource 
of enforcement in groups dedicated to illegal activity, encouraging the 
maintenance of different types of codes of silence, helping to assure the 
acquiescence and sometimes the support of communities with large 
populations of co- ethnics in the operation of illegal enterprises, and pro-
moting loyalty and obedience within groups (Sanchez- Jankowski 1991; 
Gambetta 1993). The phenomenon is well enough known that it is, for 
example, frequently rendered and performed as a principal dramatic 
element in popular entertainment revolving around the theme of organ-
ised crime, possibly most famously in the series of films dramatising 
the professional and family activity of an imaginary Sicilian- American 
crime syndicate, The Godfather. These types of dramatic portrayals, while 
open to the criticism that they reinforce ethnic stereotypes, could also be 
assessed as contributing to the useful mythology that activities such as 
organised crime are in some way symbolically representative of an ethnic 
community, and consequently on some level legitimised or protected by 
this association.
It is not necessarily the case that all perceptions of shared iden-
tity follow lines that are expected or lead in the directions of conformity 
that are expected. It can particularly be the case that when ethnic iden-
tity is strongly associated with an identifiable material interest, entry 
into the identity group may become extraordinarily fluid. This has been 
documented both in states undergoing changes in imperial or colonial 
control, where people may recognise an advantage in entering or leav-
ing an ethnic community (Freyre 1947; Roudometof 2001), and in con-
temporary consumer societies, where people respond to changing social 
conditions that make some memberships appear at times to be more 
appealing (Waters 1990). Well- documented cases include the distribu-
tion of Chinese identity in Jamaica (Patterson 1977), which over time 
loses any connection with family origins in China and instead comes to 
represent access to informal business and financial resources. With the 
post-communist rounds of accession of states in Europe to membership 
in the European Union and changes in access to visa- free travel, it has 
been possible to witness the discovery or rediscovery of ethnic roots 




















The examples listed in this Encyclopaedia tend to underline the 
mixed character of group membership and group norms, operating on 
several levels. The encouragement of perceptions of belonging, through 
practices and rituals related to their reinforcement, functions both as a 
source of norms and, in some instances, as a source of power under con-
ditions of social or political subjection. At the same time, the same sets of 
practices can also function as means of subordination of the individual to 
imposed identities, and flattening of the diverse social landscape into a 
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Adat is a term used to describe a system of Chechen customary laws 
and norms practised in the North Caucasus among ethnic Vainakh and 
the diaspora. Although variations of the practice exist between differ-
ent clans, in essence adat encapsulates what it means to be Chechen 
(nokhchalla). Heroic tales of war and the struggle for independence are 
an inseparable part of Chechen culture (Johnson 2008). Adat traditions 
influence several aspects of social life and inform practices of hospital-
ity, relations between men and women, and the custom of blood revenge 
(see ch’ir, 3.2 in this volume). While today Chechens feel their Chechen- 
ness and adat are under attack by Wahhabist influences and the power 
of Russian rule, adat remains paramount in defining Chechen social and 
cultural norms (Gendron 2009; Souleimanov 2015).
The Vainakh, the ancient natives of the Caucasus, were pagan, prob-
ably Zoroastrian peoples whose religion centred on family and worship 
of ancestors (Cremer 2012: 198). In the late fourth century, Christians 
were the first to attempt to convert these peoples, though they met with 
little success. Arabs of the Umayyad caliphate brought the Sufi tradition 
of Islam to the region in the mid- seventh century (Yemelianova 2015); 
however, Islam did not become established among the Vainakh until the 
nineteenth century. Adat therefore pre- dates Islamic traditions (Cremer 
2012: 199). Over time, some elements of Islamic law (shari’a) became 
enmeshed in traditional adat, and some variation is found between clans 
(Johnston 2008; Yemelianova 2015). While similar customary laws exist 
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manner in which Zoroastrian and early Christian components were inter- 
woven with shari’a resulted in a unique version of Chechen Islam and 
culture (Yemelianova 2015).
Through a clan- based system of blood ties (relationships forged 
by birth), laws were upheld and agreements (ittifaqs) forged. All social 
conflicts were litigated in this way: from rape and murder, to the use 
of land and water resources, and importantly, pronouncements con-
cerning the common defence of the land (Cremer 2012: 199). Clans 
are further broken down into branches (gar) and yet further into fam-
ilies (nekye). This clan structure remains today. Each clan is autono-
mous and controls the affairs of their own blood members. No clan is 
viewed as having higher status than any other; there is no hierarch-
ical leadership over all the clans (Layton 2014: 68– 9). In contempor-
ary Chechnya, loyalty seems to be increasingly displayed at branch 
level of gar or families (nekye) (Souleimanov 2015). Given the hori-
zontal nature of their society, adherence to adat is what maintains the 
Chechen social order in a society, which in their view lacks legitimate 
vertical authority. Individuals therefore assume a heavy responsibility 
for ensuring the honour of their clan and/ or family (Layton 2014: 69; 
Souleimanov 2015).
Adat is seen as highly disciplined, and as such, outsiders are not 
expected to adhere to its laws and norms for themselves; it is a burden 
unique to the Vainakh. Modesty, self- restraint, and sobriety are key 
personal codes for both sexes. Mothers teach their daughters to cook, 
to serve their husbands and to keep the home spotless in readiness to 
receive guests at any time (Layton 2014: 77, 95– 7). Fathers teach their 
sons to take care of their future families, respect their mothers and elders, 
to be generous of spirit, and to be strong both personally and physically 
(Layton 2014: 95– 7; Souleimanov 2015). Boys live at home until they 
have sufficient money to start their own family. They are not allowed to 
date, as doing so would dishonour the family.
Until marriage, virginity is a requirement for both males and 
females, though loss of virginity for a man is not considered as scandal-
ous an event as it would be for a woman. A woman who lost her virginity 
out of wedlock would, as a consequence, be banished from her family, or 
in an extreme case (in violation of Russian law), if a family or group felt 
that their honour had been tarnished, the end result might be an honour 
killing (RFE/ RL 2015). On the day of marriage the only exceptions made 
for the lack of female virginity are in instances of divorce or widowhood. 
It is customary for the family to arrange a marriage and a dowry is given 




















Adat is not strict in relation to religion. Embedded in the 
Chechen code of honour (nokhchalla) is the notion of the importance 
of personal freedom, as well as the freedom and independence of 
others (Johnson 2008). As a result, issues surrounding religiosity are 
left to the individual. Chechen Muslims are allowed to drink alcohol, 
though women would only do so in private in the company of other 
women. It is understood that in society some people may be unable to 
accomplish, or have difficulty in, praying five times a day; this is seen 
as an internal struggle for the individual concerned and privacy of 
individual choice in this matter is preserved. The main exception to 
this point of view concerns the celebration of Ramadan and the Feast 
of the Sacrifice. In these instances it is considered that the values 
these holidays instill exemplify adat in decrying greed and placing 
importance on generosity (Layton 2014: 71). It is thus imperative 
that the collective should experience these shared religious and 
social events together. Even non- believers avoid announcing that 
they are not honouring these holidays for fear of being deemed ‘weak 
in  character’ (Layton 2014: 80).
Hospitality, or siskal, is a key component of adat. Hospitality is 
extended not only to friends and family, and to strangers, but also to 
those who are deemed enemies. Siskal demands all who seek help or are 
in need of shelter must be taken in. This sense of honour and duty to 
others extends to all persons regardless of who they are. All guests are 
thus treated with the highest respect. This hospitality is extended for as 
long as the guest is in need; if applicable, enemy status applies once more 
only once the guest has left the home (Layton 2014: 77).
The entrenchment of adat personal codes naturally transitions 
into laws governing society, which often conflict with formal Russian 
laws, rendering them informal. Severe mistrust of Russian rule and 
the chaos resulting from political corruption in the region has resulted 
in the strengthening of adat laws and councils in an attempt to circum-
vent Russian federal rule (Malashenko 2014). Legal matters, which are 
officially the domain of the Russian federal and regional authorities, are 
sometimes ignored in favour of adat.
For example, if a marriage is not arranged through family, or nego-
tiated between individuals, a man may kidnap the woman he wishes to 
marry. Sometimes this is done playfully, and is entered into willingly 
by the woman who is also attracted to the man in question (Layton 
2014: 105). On other occasions the woman may be forcefully abducted, 
though this is less common. This is a violation of both human rights and 
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of encouraging the event by flirting, which is seen as provocation, lead-
ing to the abduction (Evangelista 2011; RFE/ RL 2010).
If a married couple separates, rather than seek mediation through 
the Russian courts, family members step in to resolve possible custody 
issues. Typically, the woman will keep primary custody of the children 
while they are still young and will turn over custody to the father’s family 
once each child reaches puberty (Layton 2014: 92). On occasions, how-
ever, women are kept away from their children, in violation of Russian 
law (Bazaeva 2013).
Typically, male family members handle other familial conflicts in 
the first instance. If the issue cannot be resolved in this way, it may even-
tually be brought to the council of elders (Mehk- Khel) for resolution. 
Inter- clan conflict can also occur. The ruling of one clan’s elders may 
be acknowledged as carrying validity, but it is not always enforced by 
the other clan(s) involved. Depending upon the severity of the alleged 
crimes, such as rape or murder, blood feuds (ch’ir) between clans can 
emerge. Russian law prohibits blood feuds, requiring all crimes to be 
dealt with by the official authorities via a fair trial. However, instances 
of blood feuds are often unreported due to another adat value: silence. 
Adat hospitality and silence make adjudication of these crimes near 
impossible, which is a threat to Russia’s legal authority in the region 
(Gendron 2009).
Chechens feel their culture is under attack. Some point to 
‘impure’ Chechens who have strayed too far from adat by adopt-
ing Russian behaviours and attitudes (Layton 2014:  34– 5). Another 
alleged cause is the influence of imported Wahhabism from the Arab 
countries. Wahhabism, a strict version of Islam, sees the Chechen- 
styled Sufi Islam and adat as incompatible with ‘true Islam’ and shari’a 
law (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2008). Many young people have been 
attracted to this ideology after study abroad, or have been influenced 
by the teachings of local Wahhabist clerics (Gendron 2009). Others 
blame the conflicts in society on Russia, which they feel is actively 
trying to destroy their culture through war and propaganda (Layton 
2014: 60). It is noted, however, that adat makes it possible for Chechen 
society to function successfully outside the control of corrupt official 
government institutions (Gendron 2009).
Examples of adat are found both in film and literature. Films in which 
adat is shown include Kidnapping, Caucasian Style (Kavkazskaia Plennitsa, 
1966) and Prisoner of the Mountains (1996). In literature, famous exam-
ples include Lermontov’s description of adat practices in A  Hero of Our 






















3.2 Ch’ir (chechnya and ingushetia)
emil aslan Souleimanov
institute of international Studies, faculty of Social Sciences,  
charles university in prague, czech republic
Blood revenge – a custom of avenging a grave insult by killing either the 
offender or his male relatives – has been prevalent in the Caucasus for 
centuries. Various terms have historically been used across the Caucasus 
to designate blood revenge or blood feud (that is, a cycle of subsequent 
blood revenges). These include ch’ir in Chechen, ch’ir or pkhä in Ingush, 
bidul k’isas in Avar, öttul kisas or badal in Lak, kanga kan or kanly in 
Kumyk and Noghai, litsvri in Svan, and qanli qisas in Azerbaijani, to name 
a few. This social practice expired in most of the region over the twentieth 
century owing to processes of modernisation and urbanisation. However, 
it is still commonplace in Chechnya and Ingushetia, two ethnic republics 
within the Russian Federation (Souleimanov 2007: 24– 9).
Blood revenge is by no means unique to the Caucasus. As part 
of informal local codes, known as unwritten or customary law, blood 
revenge has been practised widely by tribal or clan- based societies, 
among which central authority was either weak or absent and law 
enforcement was poor. Therefore, tribes or clans had to take upon them-
selves the task of defending their individual members (MacCormack 
1973; Chagnon 1988; Boehm 2011; Nivette 2011). Blood revenge was 
widespread in ancient Mesopotamia, Palestine, Greece and Rome as well 
as in the (proto)states of the Fertile Crescent (Barmash 2004). In early 
medieval Europe, it was practised by Scandinavians, Franks and other 
Germanic tribes (Rosenthal 1966). Blood revenge was practised well into 
the twentieth century in Southern Europe: for instance the notorious 
vendetta in Southern Italy and Corsica (Wilson 2003), as well as in parts 
of Greece and in Montenegro (Black- Michaud and Peters 1975; Gallant 
2000). Beyond Europe and the Middle East, it spread from pre- modern 
Japan (Mills 1976) through Cambodia (Laban Hinton 1998) to Oceania 
(Hoebel 2006). Nowadays, in addition to the North- East Caucasus, blood 
revenge remains active among the Gheg Albanians of northern Albania 
and Kosovo (Boyle 2010); in the Kurdish- dominated areas of Turkey and 
Iraq (Icli 1994); in Pashtun- dominated areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(Mahdi 1986); Somalia (Mohamed 2007); as well as in Yemen (Morris 
and Trammel 2011) and in other predominantly tribal Arabic societies.
Blood revenge in general, and specifically ch’ir, entails that follow-
ing an insult – either verbal or physical – an offended male or his patri-
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of offence or his patrilineal relatives (Elster 1990; Souleimanov 2007: 
24– 9). Grave verbal insults include those directed against a male or his 
female relatives, wife, or his/ her ancestors. Significant injury, particu-
larly injury leading to permanent disease or death, murder, manslaugh-
ter, rape or any form of defilement against women, including bride 
abduction, are regarded as grave physical attacks in Chechnya. In the 
past, a variety of acts were considered disrespectful, making a case for 
ch’ir. Killing one’s dog or showing disrespect to a man’s hat (papakh) by 
means of touching it with one’s feet or throwing it on the ground, were 
considered a grave insult in the Caucasus that was to be ‘washed off’ by 
the offender’s or his relatives’ blood. Nowadays, ch’ir is triggered almost 
exclusively by murder, manslaughter and rape.
The perception of honour is closely linked to the understanding 
of an individual as part of a larger community made up of ties of com-
mon ancestry, ‘shared blood’ and identity. Individuals in Chechnya and 
Ingushetia are perceived with reference to their patrilineal family (nekye 
or dözal) or clan (teip) ties (Sokirianskaia 2005). Therefore, offence 
against an individual is considered to extend to relatives. Retaliation, 
too, becomes the business of the entire family or clan. Failure to retali-
ate sharply decreases the social status of the offended individual and 
his or her clan. This may lead to opprobrium, with the entire family or 
clan dishonoured, and its male members regarded as weak and cow-
ardly. Members of a dishonoured family or clan may be excluded from 
the community: girls lose the chance of a worthy marriage, while men 
are ridiculed and marginalised. It may take many years and great effort 
for a family or clan to restore lost honour. Triggered by the threat of social 
sanctions, members of the offended families and clans usually seek to 
‘take their blood’ in order to avoid ‘losing their face’ (Souleimanov 2007: 
24– 9; Souleimanov 2015).
Since the mid- 1990s, ch’ir has been instrumental in shaping violent 
mobilisation in Chechnya (Souleimanov 2007). Many Chechens took up 
arms in order to avenge their relatives’ murder or fatal injury, or to seek 
ch’ir for the humiliation at the hand of the Russian counterinsurgents 
or their Chechen allies. Those who mobilised even included politically 
neutral individuals and those with prior antipathy towards Chechen sep-
aratist elites and their ideas. Those who knew the individual perpetra-
tor of an offence – who was typically a Russian officer or a member of 
Chechnya’s pro- Moscow paramilitary force (kadyrovets) – usually sought 
to retaliate on their own. There is evidence of insurgent units drawing on 
a network of relatives formed exclusively for the purpose of retaliation. 

























were absorbed into the insurgency and continued fighting. When the 
actual culprit of the offence was unknown or could not be found, the per-
ception of the legitimate target of retaliation was broadened to all mem-
bers of the Russian military or Russians as an ethnic community per se 
(Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015b).
The codes of hospitality (Chechen: siskal) and silence (Chechen: 
disttsakhilar) are important sources of pro- insurgent support in the 
Northern Caucasus (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015b). While consider-
ably weakened over recent decades, these codes still persist, especially 
in rural and mountainous areas. Enshrined in the customary law, adat, 
the code of hospitality requires the highlanders to provide support to 
those in need. Fugitives escaping enemies in ch’ir, or abreks (outlaws or 
lone- wolf guerilla fighters) are required to be sheltered by fellow high-
landers, regardless of the risk of armed confrontation with their guest’s 
personal enemies or with the authorities (Bobrovnikov 2000). This trad-
ition partly survives in the North- East Caucasus. The code of silence, 
close to the South Italian custom of omertà, (see 3.23 in this volume) 
requires highlanders to reject collaboration with outsiders, including 
formal authorities. Even in the case of severe inter- personal or inter- 
clan conflict, highlanders are not supposed to approach the authorities; 
such a move would expose the violators of the unwritten code of hon-
our as fearful and weak. The code of silence prescribes highlanders to 
remain silent about their community’s internal affairs and resolve their 
issues on their own, within the circle of clan or religious authorities. 
Insurgents have routinely been provided with shelter, food, medicine, 
clothes and other basic needs by the local population. Even those disap-
proving of the insurgents and their activities are unlikely to report them 
to the authorities (Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015a).
3.3 Uruuchuluk (Kyrgyzstan)
aksana ismailbekova
max planck institute for Social anthropology, halle, Germany
Uruuchuluk denotes lineage- based identity in Kyrgyzstan, where both 
public and private identity is determined primarily by a person’s mem-
bership of one of the descent groups known as uruu and uruk. Ancestors, 
patrilineage and genealogies constitute identity for the Kyrgyz. Genealogy 
is of crucial importance in the segmentary lineage system, which in turn 
is relevant to the present discussion since it explains how the Kyrgyz 
construe their social world and the extent and quality of their relations 
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generations of their patrilineage. This form of social organisation has 
been customary and stable for many years; as a result, the Kyrgyz people 
consider it natural or God- given.
There are 40 large patrilineal descent groups in Kyrgyzstan today. 
Historically, Kyrgyz divide themselves according to ‘Right Wing’ (Ong 
kanat), ‘Internal’ (Ichkilik) or ‘Left Wing’ (Sol kanat). In general, all 
Kyrgyz patrilineal descent groups have traditionally tended to be in com-
petition with one another (Abramzon 1971; Geiss 2004).
Under Soviet rule, the Communist Party authorities shaped the 
local identities of the Kyrgyz people to a certain extent, but by no means 
completely. Soviet ideology and local values were not separate domains; 
rather, they were complementary and congruent. Looked at from the 
outside, the Soviet system appeared to be one of top- down control. 
Seen from within, however, it was a system where local social relations 
were closely linked to the collective farm’s (kolkhoz) workers or to the 
Communist Party officials. At the top, therefore, there was a Soviet sys-
tem of governance, but inside this system Kyrgyz kinship relations con-
tinued to play an important role. As a result, the Soviet system did not 
eradicate but rather conserved pre- existing kin- based relations. Kinship 
identity and affiliations continued to form the basis of cultural identity 
and to play an influential role in everyday relationships (Yoshida, 2005; 
Hardenberg 2009; Jacquesson 2010; Ismailbekova 2017).
At the same time, kinship was officially viewed as backward and 
primitive during the Soviet period. As a result, state officials were often 
afraid to openly reveal their lineage identity. Kinship became a private 
affair. Even so, in the villages the chairman of the kolkhoz usually ensured 
that key positions such as deputy chairman, livestock specialist and team 
leader went to his own relatives (Roy 2000; Yoshida 2005; Jacquesson 
2010; Isakov and Schoeberlein 2014).
Attempts by the Soviet authorities to dilute or even destroy kinship 
affiliations and to impose a new ethnic (national) identity on the Kyrgyz 
ultimately failed. Following the break- up of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
kin- based relationships suddenly began to re- emerge. Genealogy became 
increasingly important in independent Kyrgyzstan, partly as a result of 
nation- building processes, and partly because of the new freedom that 
people had to express their previously hidden identities (Gullette 2010; 
Jacquesson 2010; Light 2011). As a result, present- day Kyrgyzstan 
has seen a reorganisation of kinship relations and a ‘renegotiation’ of 
 identities. Along with the transformation of institutional structures, the 
Kyrgyz started to revive and reaffirm their local, traditional and cultural 























Kinship- based affiliations and provincial kinship play significant 
roles in both politics and society, since people use their kinship or provin-
cial affiliations to build social networks. In times of economic hardship, 
kinship- based patronage networks have played a particularly important 
role. Kinship- discourse has begun to be used by ordinary people as a way 
of meeting their everyday needs and maintaining their hopes for a better 
future. People in rural areas are particularly involved with kinship prac-
tices in their everyday lives, but urban dwellers also become involved 
as a means of acquiring influence or financial capital. When people are 
engaged in business, they feel confident that they can rely on their kins-
men, united as they are by a sense of mutual responsibility and solidarity. 
In the event of a crisis, they rely particularly heavily on the support of 
their relatives.
As the Kyrgyz revived and reaffirmed their local, traditional and cul-
tural values, they also began to apply them to institutions of state power 
(Ismailbekova 2017). Today, kinship is highly valued by politicians as a 
means of competing for social and economic position. Those who are not 
related through kinship- patronage networks are often isolated. Divisions 
along kinship lines may provoke and exacerbate struggles between 
Figure 3.3.1 Doing ethnographic fieldwork in Kyrgyzstan.










2293.3 uruuchuluk  (KyrGyzSTan)
229
political groups and conflicts over positions within the state infrastruc-
ture, obtaining funds for development, education and so on.
Any politician – even one with presidential ambitions – will rely 
primarily on the support of his or her kinsmen. The logic behind this is 
that the politician knows that while he or she is unlikely to win the sup-
port of the entire country, they can rely on that of their kinsmen. They 
are also aware of the need to build alliances with other uruu members 
who will have recruited their own followers along kinship lines. Even 
so, alliances between uruu members may be temporary, since all politi-
cians have their own ambitions. And if a politician rejects his or her 
former allies, he or she will be able to rely, again, only on the kinsmen. 
There is a mutual interest here:  it is no secret that if a leader gains a 
higher rank, then his kinsmen will also be rewarded with higher posi-
tions. And if the leader loses his position, then the whole pyramid will 
collapse.
Lineage- based identity and kinship- belonging are very strong 
forces. If an individual breaks the rules of identity, he or she immediately 
loses status and becomes an outcast. As a result, no Kyrgyz would insult 
or ignore their kinsmen. Ties within political parties in Kyrgyzstan are, 
by contrast, much weaker and less disciplined. Parties are fluid organi-
sations:  their members converge or diverge, constantly moving from 
opposition to pro- government and back. The European party model has 
not taken root in Kyrgyzstan; the parties that function most actively and 
effectively are kinship- based (Ismailbekova 2014). Kinship played an 
important role, for example, in rallying people to take part in the mass 
protests of recent years – from the events in Osh in 1990 and 2010 to the 
revolutions of 2005 and 2010.
In times of instability and economic hardship, ordinary people 
choose to rely on strong politicians or entrepreneurs with political power 
and economic resources. People seek the patronage of such politicians 
and businesspeople by stressing their shared lineage, kinship ties and 
common provincial identities, and by using kin terms that lend legitim-
acy to their relationship. People imagine and construct a union with these 
figures built on closeness, hoping thereby to gain access to resources, 
protection and influence. Politicians and entrepreneurs, for their part, 
also use kinship ties to further their own political and economic interests. 
They do this by scrutinising the family history of potential kin in the hope 
of identifying common ancestors (Ismailbekova 2017).
Today, patrons are perceived as a source of economic and social 
support. This is reflected in people’s attitudes towards them in times 
























shared labour for the supposed benefit of the state. Now it is performed 
for the benefit of particular individuals. There is no term for patron. 
People use kinship terms such as ‘elder brother’, ‘younger brother’, ‘son’, 
and ‘father’ when seeking social and economic support from a wealthy 
politician or entrepreneur (Ismailbekova 2017).
In the Central Asian context, the ambiguous and manipulative 
behaviour of social actors such as patrons has been described by political 
scientists under such headings as ‘clan politics’, ‘tribalism’, ‘neopatronal-







Rushyldyq is a strong feeling of sub- ethnic identity with and loyalty to 
one’s ru in Kazakhstan. The word rushyldyk is derived from the Kazakh 
term ru, which denotes membership of a particular sub- ethnic group, or 
clan, united by actual or perceived kinship and descent and inhabiting a 
shared territory. Traditionally, the Kazakhs have been divided into three 
zhuz – ‘Great Zhuz’ (Uly Zhuz), ‘Middle Zhuz’ (Orta Zhuz), ‘Little Zhuz’ 
(Kishi Zhuz) – with each zhuz further subdivided into ru, the number of 
which varies. Western political scientists refer to the concepts of ru, zhuz 
and rushyldyq as ‘clan’, ‘umbrella clan’ and ‘clanism’ respectively (Schatz 
2004; Collins 2006). Rushyldyq can also be defined as the use of ru ties. 
When discussing rushyldyq, the Russian- language press uses various 
terms such as tribalism (traibalizm), nepotism, patronage or ‘economy of 
nephews and sons- in- law’.
The Kazakhs appeared as a distinct ethnic group in the sixteenth 
century, and were nomadic up to the twentieth century. During these 
nomadic times, genealogy was central to group identity. As Schatz 
explains (Schatz 2004: 28):
After inquiring into the health of one another’s livestock, nomads 
meeting in the steppe would typically ask, ‘What clan do you come 
from?’ (Qai rudan keldiniz?), or more generically, ‘What people 
do you come from?’ (Qai eldensiz?). The answer was couched by 
recounting ancestry; genealogical knowledge was thus reiter-
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exchange that helped to establish the widely recognized contours 
of clan at various levels.
From nomadic times to the pre- Soviet era, ru divisions (Kazakh: rugha 
bolinu) were not based on visible indicators that distinguished members 
from non- members, but rather defined by demonstrable knowledge of 
kin relations. To this day, every Kazakh is expected to be able to list his or 
her own genealogical background to the seventh generation (zheti ata), 
as well as his or her ru and zhuz.
The Soviet state stigmatised and criminalised rushyldyq, thus 
removing it from public domain. Yet the fact that the boundaries of ru 
were not catalogued or stored by the bureaucratic state as a statistical 
category meant that the Soviet authorities could not punish rushyldyq, 
due to the very informality of its institutions and practices. Being easily 
concealable, rushyldyq avoided state surveillance and continued to exist 
in the private domain. Schatz (2004) has suggested that ru divisions in 
the Central Asian region persisted precisely because of the efforts of the 
Soviet state to eradicate them from political and social life, rather than 
in spite of them. The Soviet crusade to eliminate clan divisions had an 
opposite effect:  Kazakhs hid their clan affiliations, which are based on 
exchanged genealogical information and therefore not visible from the 
outside. Consequently, the place of residence, the collective farm (kol-
khoz or sovkhoz) for rural Kazakhs, became a public marker of identity 
and subethnic background.
The institution of zheti ata, ru and zhuz genealogies has experi-
enced a rehabilitation since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the inde-
pendence of Kazakhstan. This revitalisation of genealogical knowledge is 
widely discussed privately and semi- publicly in Internet forums, and in 
relatively independent newspapers and magazines. For some Kazakhs, 
rushyldyq only extends to actual kinship ties as well as kinship derived 
through marriage (kuda). However, many Kazakhs extend their clan-
nish behaviour to fictive kin identities such as long- lasting friendships, 
school ties (synyptastar/ odnoklassniki), and neighbourhood affiliations 
(zherlester/ zemlyaki). This broader conception of rushyldyk has even 
extended to and is practised by Kazakhstani citizens of all ethnicities, not 
only ethnic Kazakhs (Kazakhstan is populated by more than 120 ethnici-
ties, including Kazakhs, Russians, Uzbeks, Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars 
and Uyghurs).
Rushyldyq can help to secure access to various essential goods: eco-




















give examples of the use of kin connections to find a job for a relative 
or a friend. These examples are especially observable in state- owned 
companies. A popular joke circulating in Kazakhstan goes: ‘There are no 
love affairs in state- owned companies. Why? Because they are all rela-
tives’. However, the influx of Western multinational companies has less-
ened the influence of clanism on managerial practices, especially in their 
subsidiaries.
Shatz (2004) describes in detail how ru or zhuz attachment can be 
a principal consideration in political patronage. Political appointments 
among Kazakhs often follow the logic of rushyldyq. For example, when 
a new mayor (akim) is appointed, he may replace the majority of the 
office staff with his kin relations. According to one unpublished study 
regarding attitudes towards clanism, around 45 per cent of respondents 
believed that kin connections were also important for the recruitment of 
deputies for maslikhat – local representative bodies (Mustafaev 2010). 
Incidentally, the concealability of rushyldyq helps to avoid the visible 
nepotism, since kin relations from the same ru are typically not public 
knowledge.
Attitudes towards rushyldyq are ambiguous even among Kazakhs. 
Some Kazakhs encourage mutual assistance among kin, maintaining that 
rushyldyq defines Kazakhness (qazaqshylyq) – that which distinguishes 
ethnic Kazakhs from other non- titular citizens of Kazakhstan (Russians, 
Uzbeks, Ukrainians, etc.). Other Kazakhs consider rushyldyq to be a ‘dis-
ease’, and a threat to the unity of Kazakhs as an ethnic group. Non- titular 
citizens of Kazakhstan and some outsiders typically regard it as abuse of 
power for the benefit of kin groups.
To study rushyldyq (and clanism in Kazakhstan and Central Asia 
in general), Western political scientists have used intensive and exten-
sive ethnographic methods, interviews and focus group methods (Schatz 
2004; Collins 2006). Minbaeva and Muratbekova- Touron (2013) have 
developed ‘clanism’ as a management concept and studied its implications 
for human resource management practices in Kazakhstan. They under-
took a qualitative case research method based on several sources: formal 
interviews with human resources (HR) managers; informal conversations 
with Kazakhstani people; and the authors’ own personal experiences as 
Kazakhstani citizens. Hotho et al. (2013) used a vignette experiment to 
study the effects of clan ties on the recruitment and selection decisions 
made by managers in Kazakhstan. The scholars asked participants to 
impersonate a decision maker during a recruitment and selection pro-
cess based on realistic situational descriptions (the vignettes), which con-
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Ironically, the use of rushyldyq is crucial for field researchers to gain 
the required trust from respondents and access to companies for research 
cases. Kazakhstani people are often apprehensive about participating in 
management research, particularly when a study touches upon sensitive 
issues, such as the influence of clan relations. However, they tend to be 
more comfortable participating if they trust the party conducting the 
study; in particular if an interviewer is perceived as bizdiki or svoi (‘one 
of ours’ in Kazakh and Russian, respectively). The following quotation 
from a respondent illustrates the general attitude of Kazakhstani people 
to interviews: ‘If your friend had not asked me to meet you, I would never 
have spoken to you. I know that the director of the company values her a 
lot and trusts her. That’s why I said “yes” [to the interview]’.
3.5 Yongo (South Korea)
Sven horak
The peter J. Tobin college of business, St. John’s university, 
new york, uSa
Yongo describes personal or network ties in South Korea resulting from 
affiliation to an informally organised group. It derives its main cohesive 
power from strong particularistic ties, based on kin, educational institu-
tion (school/ university), and region (Horak 2014: 87). In common with 
yonjul (see inmaek, 1.13 in this volume), the syllable yon means ‘tie’. The 
syllable go infers that the bond exists for a certain reason, which is usually 
a mutual personal background that is regarded as the basis for yongo ties.
There are three traditional ties that are the foundations upon which 
yongo is established: first, kinship and blood ties (hyulyon), including 
ties to extended family members; second, ties to people from the same 
region or hometown (jiyon); and third, attendance of the same educa-
tional institution – high school, college or university – which represents 
hakyon. With regard to the latter, co- attendance is not a mandatory pre-
condition for the development of a yongo tie: even if individuals attended 
the educational institution decades apart they share hakyon. These three 
forms of tie, either separately or in combination, represent bonds that 
last for life. Yongo is to a great extent preset and thus it is scarcely pos-
sible for outsiders to establish yongo ties. Two of the three ties – family 
(hyulyon) and region (jiyon) – are predetermined by birth, i.e. ascribed 
(Yee 2000, 2015; Lew 2013), and therefore cannot be influenced by the 
individual. The educational institution is the only affiliation that can 
be chosen, which explains its particular importance for social mobility 























of modernity and has only recently gained importance relative to high 
school ties, which are associated with family and region. In earlier times, 
people used to attend high school in the region in which they were born; 
hence hakyon based on high school ties was strongly predefined. Today, 
high school graduates are more inclined to choose a university away 
from their hometown. Such geographical and social mobility is a fairly 
recent phenomenon. Moreover it has to be mentioned that hyulyon can 
be acquired through marriage and jiyon through moving from one place 
to another. However, how strong or influential these ties are when quasi- 
voluntarily acquired remains an empirical questions for future research 
endeavours.
Lines of social demarcation were observed as early as the Choson 
period (c.1392– 1910), in which the aristocratic rulers (the Yangban 
class), ‘grouped itself into mutually exclusive factions and clans that 
engaged in fierce rivalry. The fragmentation of the Yangban society along 
the line of scholarly association, kinship and region gave rise to purges 
and factional strife’ (Sik 2005: 84). These three camps separating com-
munities from each other are the bases that define yongo and are still 
found today.
As yongo is predominantly ascribed, it is cause- based, immutable 
and irreversible (Horak 2016). Yongo networks are rather closed and 
exclusive. Although they can be (and frequently are) instrumentalised, 
in principle having yongo does not imply pursuing any purpose. Yongo is 
often a determinant in distinguishing between in- and out- groups. When 
people share yongo, proactive cooperation, flexibility, mutual under-
standing, tolerance, loyalty and trust prevail. In contrast, relationships 
with people who belong to a different yongo camp are rather oppos-
itional, not considered worthy of care or dismissive. Y.- H. Kim notes that 
‘outside the boundary … people are treated as “non- persons” and there 
can be discrimination and even hostility’ (Kim 2000: 179).
The influence of yongo can be observed in contemporary politics 
and the business world in Korea. For instance, family ties (hyulyon), 
which represent one of the traditional pillars of yongo, include extended 
family members, meaning that the networks can be extensive. Although 
the large Korean business conglomerates (chaebols) are fiercely competi-
tive, they are, surprisingly, interconnected by family matrimonial ties. 
According to Kim (2007), inter- family marriage is an important mech-
anism for establishing social ties and interdependencies among leading 
families. Indeed, 23 of the 30 largest Korean corporations are connected 
to each other through inter- marriage ties. Marriage ties are said to rein-
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can be assumed to be the main mechanism for aligning interests in an 
efficient and effective way.
Ties based on regional origin (jiyon) are widespread in politics 
(Kim 2007; Horak 2015). Voting is strongly influenced by the regional 
origin of the candidate. Shim et al. (2008: 85) point out that, ‘many 
Koreans will vote for a political candidate, even if the person is less quali-
fied, just because he or she attended the same school or came from the 
same region of the country’. Between 1948 and 2013, Korea had 10 presi-
dents, 5 of which were born in the same region, the Kyungsang province 
in south- eastern Korea. Furthermore, approximately one- third of indus-
try leaders, executives and government ministers were born in the same 
region (Kim 2007) (Table 3.5.1).
Increasingly, alumni ties (hakyon) are regarded as the most influ-
ential form of yongo ties. Possessing a degree from a prestigious, elite 
university with a large alumni base can potentially provide access to influ-
ential decision makers and hence can provide high- quality yongo ties that 
are useful in business or career development (Horak 2017). The possibil-
ity of being recruited by a top firm is greater than for graduates of other 
universities (Lee and Brinton 1996). Although Korea has 370 institutions 
of higher education (QS 2015), the elite universities are concentrated 
geographically in Seoul, Korea’s capital. Of these, three universities are 
considered the most prestigious: Seoul National University (SNU), Korea 
University and Yonsei University (commonly referred to as the SKY uni-
versities), with SNU being the most favoured. A disproportionately high 
number of Korean leaders of business and politics graduated from SNU 
Table 3.5.1 Regional backgrounds of big business founders, business 
executives and government ministers (1991– 5)
Region Big business founders Business executives Government ministers
%*
Seoul 7 34 16
Kyonggi 9 7 4
Kyungsang 32 35 32
Cholla 11 6 16
Chungchong 10 8 23
Kangwon 3 4 2














as did approximately 50 per cent of government ministers and senior offi-
cials. Moreover, approximately 30 per cent of business leaders, as well 
as members of the national assembly, belong to the large base of SNU 
alumni (Table 3.5.2).
It is hard to say whether the influence of yongo may persist or 
decline in the future. Current theoretical debates assume that the more 
a country advances economically and the more formal institutions sta-
bilise (i.e. reliable courts and enforceable legislation), the less people 
feel the need to rely on informal relationships (Peng et al. 2008). The 
case of South Korea can contribute to this debate. Today South Korea is 
an advanced industrialised country, an established democracy that pos-
sesses stable formal institutions. Not only have informal networks such 
as yongo not disappeared (Kim 2000; Yee 2000, 2015; Lew 2013; Horak 
2014), but their use may have intensified as the personal cost of a free 
market economy increases individual competition for jobs and careers. 
Yongo is said to provide a reliable base for actors to be ahead of the com-
petition in the society. Renshaw shows that employees in Korea today 
believe that the ‘only way to succeed in this kind of society is through 
family, school or hometown cronies’ (Renshaw, 2011: 95) – in other 
words through yongo ties. Horak and Klein (2016) provide empirical 
evidence that yongo is still actively used in South Korea today. Yongo has 
thus persisted even in modern times and appears unlikely to decline, 
though its precise form may change as it continues to transform and 
adjust to modernity.













Executive 37 9 11 1
Minister 53 7 – 10
Senior official 54 13 7 26
National Assembly 
member
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3.6 Kumstvo (montenegro and the balkans)
Klavs Sedlenieks
riga Stradins university, latvia
Kumstvo (from kum a godfather, kuma – a godmother) is an informal 
network based on fictive kinship in Montenegro (a similar term associ-
ated with slightly different practices exists elsewhere in Bosnia, Serbia 
and Croatia). Kumstvo is one of the most venerated social institutions in 
Montenegro, often described with the words ‘kumstvo is holy’ (‘kumstvo 
je svetinja’). Kumstvo plays a significant role in the informal ties that per-
meate Montenegrin society. Kumovi, just like blood relatives, are sup-
posed to help each other and in most cases they do so in spite of formal 
bureaucratic ideals, thus often leading to nepotism.
Kumstvo is usually established by а person serving as a godparent, 
either in the baptism of a child or as а witness at a wedding, and thus is 
formally established through an official ceremony. Nevertheless, other 
means of initiating kumstvo that are not related to formal ceremonies 
are also described in the available literature. In contrast to other similar 
institutions e.g. Latin American compadrazgo (see 1.4 in this volume), 
Montenegrin kumstvo eschews hierarchical relations. After kumstvo has 
been established, all members of the nuclear families involved become 
kumovi (plural from, kum (m) or kuma (f)) to each other and are consid-
ered relatives for several generations (historically the relatedness could 
be counted up to the seventh degree (Tomašić 1948: 80)).
The choice of a kumstvo partner or kum/ kuma is preferably made 
on the basis of prior friendship and kumstvo itself then serves as a for-
malisation of such friendship. Thus kumovi are usually best friends and 
kumstvo is a proof of a very deep and important relationship. However, 
an offer to become a kum even if it comes from someone who is not a 
close friend is considered an offer that should not be refused. An offer 
to become a kum is considered a great honour and grounds for pride. 
In almost all cases an offer of kumstvo to a previously unknown per-
son is done through baptism of a child, and such cases clearly indicate 
the presence of vertical relationships that (similarly to godparenthood 
in other areas) require the godfather to take care of the godchild. 
Kumstvo can be established across religions (although not in accord 
with the Christian idea of godparenthood where the godparent should 
be a spiritual parent already experienced in the particular faith) at an 
event celebrating the first haircut of the child (called šišano kumstvo), 


























The ideal basis of Montenegrin kumstvo is a prior affectionate con-
nection between the would- be kumovi and therefore calculated cases of 
kumstvo offers are treated with some contempt. Nevertheless, because 
according to the tradition one is obliged to accept kumstvo offers, histor-
ical sources provide evidence of tactical usage of kumstvo, for example, 
a thief could offer kumstvo if caught in action, or a drowning man could 
offer it to oblige a passer- by to help him. Up to the end of the nineteenth 
century kumstvo was also widely used in the final phase of ending blood 
feuds as a means to seal relationships between previously feuding families 
(Boehm 1984: 136). Historical sources also describe the use of kumstvo 
for medical purposes, such as seeking a new kum if a child becomes sick. 
In such cases the parents would place the child at a crossroads and the 
first person to approach would be offered kumstvo (Hammel 1968: 43). 
The idea was that the choice of kum was left to destiny or God’s will, and 
could bring about a change in the child’s fortune. Contemporary kum-
stvo, however, rarely if ever has such tactical usage.
Similar institutions to kumstvo can be found elsewhere in the world. 
The term kum and derived terms associated with the process of becoming 
a kum are known across Eastern Europe (compare: kummi (‘godmother’ 
in Finnish), kūms/ kūma (Latvian), кум/ кума (Russian), kmotor/ kmo-
tra (Czeck and Slovak), kum/ kuma (Serbian, Croatian, Macedonian)). 
Тhe particularities of the institution may differ from country to country, 
while in other societies a similar institution may be described by a differ-
ent term. All Christian confessions have the institution of godparenthood: 
a person or a group of persons invited to become a spiritual parent of a 
newly baptised person. The number of godparents varies greatly, as does 
the role of the godparent in the life of the godchild.
The most well- known counterpart of kumstvo is compadrazgo (see 
1.4 in this volume) in the Iberian peninsula and especially Latin America. 
Compadrazgo shares many essential features with Montenegrin kumstvo, 
however, these features vary from place to place in Latin America. Latin 
American compadrazgo is almost invariably created at a baptism of a child and 
establishes a strong bond between the three parties involved. Particularly 
important is the tie between the co- parents. Refusing an offer to become 
a compadre is almost impossible. Literature describes both vertical (class- 
external, mostly seeking a compadre from a higher social class) as well as 
horizontal (class- internal) choices of compadre. In some places, strategic 
choice of a compadre from an upper social class is treated with contempt 
(Mintz and Wolf 1950: 359), while in other cases it is a common guiding 
principle. The compadre can be chosen either from among relatives or from 
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Latin American tradition of compadrazgo has undeniable roots in Europe 
and Christianity, some authors (e.g. Mintz and Wolf 1950: 353; Halbich 
2010) point out that the pre- Columbian Aztecs may have had a similar 
institution with very similar implications.
The functionality of kumstvo (as well as compadrazgo) is almost 
invariably linked with the possibility of extending one’s network of 
support and allegiance beyond that of kin relations. A  person born in 
Montenegro finds themselves embedded in various networks that tend to 
define not only personal affiliations, but quite often political alliances too. 
An individual belongs to a particular linguistic and religious group, fam-
ily (patrilineage or bratstvo), and geographic area. None of these can be 
changed by the individual to suit his or her particular life- course. Thus, 
kumstvo can provide a means of breaking away from the rigid frames of 
the prescribed networks. Because kumstvo is not exclusively a Christian 
endeavour, kumstvo links can be created across national and religious bor-
ders if necessary.
Kumstvo depends on and reinforces the strength of kin relations as 
a structuring element of Montenegrin society. Since the tendency of the 
modern bureaucratic nation- state is to minimise the importance of kin 
relations in society, kumstvo and obligations of mutual help have a strong 
potential of conflict with the bureaucratic principles of governance. It is 
therefore often associated with nepotism and political corruption, and is 
invariably interpreted in relation to the functioning of the state (see e.g. 
Tomašic ́ 1948: 80; Mintz and Wolf 1950: 346).
The flourishing of kumstvo in Montenegro and surrounding areas 
can be seen as related to the historical nature and trajectory of the 
state in these countries. As with other Eastern European countries, the 
Montenegrin state has been subject to considerable political, geograph-
ical and ideological upheavals throughout its history. In this context, 
trust in state institutions tends to be comparatively low, while trust 
in traditional forms and principles of organising day- to- day business 
(including kumstvo) is often much higher. A person who has a wide and 
well- integrated group of blood and fictive relatives has much better pros-
pects in life than a person who lacks it. Having a kum, just like having a 
relative or simply an acquaintance, is not necessarily a source of abuse in 
every case of dealing with state bureaucracies and similar interactions, 
but on average will put a person in a better position. As a result, resi-
dents of Montenegro who have recently migrated from other areas (e.g. 
Kosovo) and whose relatives and kumovi have stayed behind may typic-
ally complain of a lack of general support that reduces chances of success 





















inter-marriage and in particular by means of kumstvo – the latter being 
more flexible and more reliant on the networking capabilities of the par-
ticular individual rather than on his or her ascribed status (Boehm 1984: 
171; Sedlenieks 2013: 136– 41).
In contrast to membership of a family group or bratstvo that is 
advertised publicly via one’s surname, kumstvo relations are not gen-
erally public knowledge. Helping one’s relatives is a fundamental obli-
gation for most people in Montenegro, but it is publicly suspicious if an 
office starts to be filled with people sharing the same surname. Kumstvo 
is more concealed (although it is by no means a secret), but cooperation 
between kumovi may be even more intense and trustworthy. Knowledge 
of who is whose kum can therefore provide an insight into internal alli-
ances that might not be visible at the surface. Investigative journalists 
in the Montenegrin media often draw on such knowledge when they 
describe formally undefined relations among government officials or 
politicians and other influential players.
3.7 Azganvan popokhutyun (armenian diaspora in Georgia)
anri Grigorian
ucl, uK
Azganvan popokhutyun (literally meaning ‘changing of surname’) is the 
practice of name- changing by ethnic Armenians, who adopt Georgian 
names in order to gain ethnicity- based advantages. A similar practice 
exists among ethnic Georgians, gvaris gadaketeba, which literally means 
‘surname alteration’ in Georgian. These practices of socially constructed 
ethnicity change, whereby a surname loses one suffix and acquires 
another, have been observed during numerous periods of ethnic tension 
in the region from the second half of the eighteenth century to the post- 
Soviet era. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the practice 
has been particularly widespread among ethnic Armenians residing in 
Georgia, although the issues of swinging ethnicity are at the core of dis-
putes between Armenian and Georgian historians. Swinging ethnicity 
is a controversial aspect of the historical narratives of national identity 
that lay foundations for the statehood in the countries of the former 
Soviet Union.
From one’s birth, the surname constitutes an important part of an 
individual identity. Surname change takes place all over the world: an 
individual may change their surname for many reasons, most commonly 
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uniqueness or effective ‘branding’. Azganvan popokhutyun  – surname 
change as a means of hiding one’s ethnic origin and adopting a new iden-
tity – is a subset of such general practices, observable in many countries 
around the world. An informal practice of surname change emerges when 
a significant number of individuals from an ethnic minority change their 
surnames to those that are more representative of the ethnic majority, 
to confront or comply with the invisible constraints of political regimes.
As a response to the ‘external pressure’, surname change can be 
associated with a sense of personal loss, in as much as the surname rep-
resents an important attribute of personal identity to the individual (Arai 
and Thoursie 2009: 129). However, in the face of ethnic discrimination, 
surname change can allow one to avoid an even greater cost of ‘exist-
ential isolation’ – isolation from ‘moral resources’ that are important ‘to 
live a full and satisfying existence’ (Giddens 1991: 9). Another perspec-
tive on surname change is that of ‘place- identity’, which is defined as, 
‘those dimensions of self that define the individual’s personal identity 
in relation to the physical environment by means of a complex pattern 
of conscious and unconscious ideas, feelings, values, goals, preferences, 
skills and behavioural tendencies relevant to a specific environment’ 
(Proshansky 1978:  155). Intolerance towards one’s ethnic origin can 
damage one’s place- identity, and surname change can become the means 
of restoring it.
The first evidence of practices of surname change in Georgia dates 
from the second half of the eighteenth century. In 1783, the Treaty of 
Georgievsk established Georgia as a protectorate of Russia. From this 
time a trend of changing Georgian surname suffixes, such as - shvili to 
the Russian form - ov emerged, and continued up to the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Akhuashvili 2005:  43). For example, in the 1890s 
the Georgian surname Markarashvili was registered as Markarov. The 
Armenian Church baptised Markarovs as Armenians, while Armenian 
landowners in Georgia would change the Georgian surnames of the 
locals to Armenian ones (Akhuashvili 2005: 82– 3, 504). This was seem-
ingly as an attempt to expand the ‘official’ Armenian population in the 
region and accorded with Russian policy, which concentrated on diluting 
Georgian ethnic identity.
There are a number of controversies over Armenian and Georgian 
surnames, which have a common stem, but different suffixes. For 
instance, the following surnames have Armenian/ Russian/ Georgian 
suffixes respectively:  Torosyan/ Torozov/ Torozashvili; Khechikyan/ 
Krechikov/ Khechikashvili; Kirakosyan/ Kirakosov/ Kirakozashvili. The 








as - ian), while the suffix - shvili is Georgian. Similarly, while Badalian is 
an Armenian surname, Badalashvili is Georgian.
An interesting controversy exists over the stem Badal, an Arabic 
word meaning ‘equivalence’. According to Georgian sources, the sur-
name Badalashvili first appeared in the Georgian village of Koda 
in 1873 (Akhuashvili 2005:  274). An Armenian church was pro-
active there, resulting in many Georgians being baptised by Armenian 
priests as Armenians, with subsequent changes to surnames, including 
Badalashvili, modified to accommodate the suffix - ov or - yan to the stem. 
This process is reported to have reached its peak in 1886 (Akhuashvili 
2005: 173– 4, 186– 7, 274). However, Armenian sources provide a differ-
ent story, suggesting that Badalyan is an Armenian surname in its own 
right, rather than an adaptation of the Georgian version. For instance, in 
the case of the surname Badalyan, ‘Badal’ itself was a widespread name 
in Armenia during the eighteenth century, which suggests that the sur-
name Badalyan was derived from this first name (Durgaryan, 1985: 23).
Another controversy concerns the Catholics resident in the 
Javakheti region of Georgia, just north of Armenia, which has an 
Armenian ethnic majority. In the post- Soviet period the region has 
demanded greater political autonomy within Georgia, and some 
Armenian nationalist groups have even called for a transfer to Armenia. 
Armenian ethnographers and historians (Melqonyan 2003 in Avakian 
1994) document that these Catholics came to Georgia from Western 
Armenia at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The Georgian 
church, it is alleged, forced Armenian Catholics to change their reli-
gion over the period 1860– 80, while the then- government of Georgia 
re- categorised Armenian Catholics as Georgians through incentives, 
threats and terror. Some Armenian Catholics in the Javakheti region 
changed their surnames by adding Georgian suffixes such as ‘- dze’ or 
‘- shvili’ to their Armenian surname stems, while others chose to pre-
serve their national identity by retaining the Armenian form of the 
surname (Simavoryan and Hovyan 2009: 11– 12, 16). In contrast, 
Georgian scholars such as Javakhashvili (2005) and Akhuashvili 
(2005: 111– 12) claim that the Catholic Armenians of Javakheti had 
originally been Georgians, but changed their surnames into Armenian 
ones. They accuse the Russian Empire of ‘Armenianising’ the Georgian 
Catholic church by acting through Armenian Catholic clergymen, who 
were encouraged to give Armenian names to the Georgian Catholics 
after baptism. Furthermore, the Catholic population of eight villages 
of the Javakheti region categorised themselves as Armenians, despite 
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The practice of azganvan popokhutyun re- surfaced in the 1990s fol-
lowing the fall of the Soviet Union. Many Armenians living in Georgia 
adopted Georgian surnames to cope with discriminatory policies towards 
ethnic minorities pursued by the first Georgian government (1991– 2). 
Armenians, Azeris, Greeks and Ossetians were all affected (Komakhia 
2008). The nationalistic rhetoric of the government led to the de facto 
oppression of ethnic minorities. Despite the nationalistic course being 
abandoned by subsequent governments, the exodus of ethnic minorities 
continued due to fear and uncertainty. Following the fall of the Soviet 
Union, there have been significant changes in the proportion of ethnic 
minorities in the population count of Georgia. Thus, according to the 
last Soviet 1989 census data, ethnic minorities comprised 30 per cent 
of the population, but in the 2002 census this figure fell to 16 per cent 
(Statistical State Department of Georgia 1989, 2003).
Surname change reflecting ethnicity takes place in other parts 
of the world. There is evidence of Jewish and Italian surnames being 
changed to American surnames in the USA during the 1900s. American 
students at the University of Copenhagen tended to adopt abbreviated 
names because of the ‘pressure of environment’ (Drury and McCarthy, 
1980). Arai and Thoursie (2009) have documented the surname change 
of Asian, African and Slavic immigrants in Sweden during the 1990s.
Borkowski (1963) studied the patterns of Polish surname changes 
in the USA, where the most frequent was one of complete ‘substitution’ 
of one surname by another, e.g. Czarnecki to Scott, Borkowski to Nelson. 
Another pattern was ‘subtraction’, when the ending of the surname was 
dropped, e.g. Bolanowski became Bolan, Adamski – Adams, and so on. 
The third pattern was translation of the literal meaning of the Polish sur-
name into English, e.g. Krolewski into King, Zimotrowicz into Winters.
The reasons for Polish Americans changing their surnames included 
‘spelling and pronunciation errors’ and the ‘confusion and embarrass-
ment’ caused by surname errors (Zagraniczny 1963). ‘Business reasons’ 
was another factor cited – for instance, one respondent stated that his 
Polish name confused his customers. Generally, simple names, short and 
easy to remember, were preferred in order to ‘facilitate business transac-
tions’. Another reason for ‘Americanising’ a Polish surname was to hide the 
individual’s Polish origins. The rationale behind the ‘Americanisation’ of 
surnames would appear to be the desire to be fully integrated in American 
society, although more research is needed in order to fully understand 
the motives of those involved. Finally, and relatedly, Zagraniczny’s study 
found 64 cases where Polish professionals such as teachers changed their 












According to Armenian electronic media sources (such as armarlur.
com, archive.ankakh.com, artsakhnews.am), some Armenians residing 
in Georgia in the post- Soviet period also changed their surnames in order 
to help their advancement in the labour market, believing that, even after 
the change of the first nationalistic government, they would be more 
likely to succeed in the labour market with Georgian surnames.
3.8 Wantoks and kastom (Solomon islands, melanesia)
Gordon leua nanau
The university of the South pacific, fiji
The wantok system in the Solomon Islands, and the Melanesian coun-
tries more broadly, strongly links to the practices of group identity and 
belonging, reciprocity, and caring for one’s relatives. It is a term used 
to express patterns of relationships that link people in families, tribes, 
islands, provinces, nationality and even more superficially at greater 
Melanesian sub- regional aggregates. Various aspects of the wantok sys-
tem are called different names by distinct language groups in Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Nevertheless, the word wantok 
originates from the English words ‘one talk’, which literally means in 
Melanesian pidgin (Tok Pisin, Pijin and Bislama), speakers of the same 
language.
Wantok is an identity perception at the macro level and a social cap-
ital concept at the micro and family levels, especially in rural communi-
ties. It signifies a setting demanding cooperation, caring and reciprocal 
support, and a shared attachment to locality. It consists of a web of rela-
tionships, norms and codes of behaviour (kastom) that maintains group 
security and stability and distinguishes one group from another (Nanau 
2011). Renzio (1999: 19) defined the wantok system as
the set of relationships (or a set of obligations) between individuals 
characterised by some or all of the following: (a) common language 
(wantok = one talk), (b) common kinship group, (c) common geo-
graphical area of origin, (d)  common social associations or reli-
gious groups, and (e)  common belief in the principle of mutual 
reciprocity.
Wantok and kastom are attributes of Melanesian societies that both unite 
groups of people with a sense of identity and rhetorical common object-
ives but also distinguish them from others.
To appreciate the practice of wantokism, it is necessary to com-
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and cultures are employed in intra- groups and inter group relation-
ships. A very good way of perceiving the wantok network is as a pic-
ture of many small boxes in a bigger box where the bigger picture does 
not necessarily depict the status and condition of the smaller com-
ponents, which may or may not relate to the bigger picture. Distinct 
wantok groups as clans and speakers of the same language present a 
formidable force for identity continuity and differences, even in the 
face of rapid social change. At the local level, a wantok connotes affect-
ive, moral relationships and claims to certain resource rights such as 
those over land, gardening areas and fishing grounds. Wantoks in this 
category determine one’s rights to existence and support and depend 
on the group to which the person belongs and affiliations of that per-
son’s blood family. Narokobi (1980) argues that wantok gives a new 
meaning to the word community. It is common to regard people under 
a particular ‘clan leader’ (bigman, Sahlins 1963) as wantoks at the 
local level.
The smaller distinct wantok groups normally trace their origins 
to common ancestors. The common ancestral connection is the basic 
building block of what researchers now call a local wantok unit. A 
person’s claim to a piece of land is usually determined by his or her 
ancestral connections with the land concerned. Ascription to a common 
ancestor thus brings claims to land and properties of the wantok group, 
and it also requires group cooperation, often cemented by the act of 
reciprocity. Reciprocity plays an important part in maintaining cordial 
relationship within wantok groups at the basic level. This could be in 
the form of food produce, the making of shelters, vegetable gardens, 
hunting and fishing catches, bride- prize (dowry) payments and land 
settlements. Giving and receiving are two sides of the reciprocity coin 
in Melanesia.
The ‘spirit of the gift’ entrenched in wantok is more of a ‘you scratch 
my back and I scratch yours’ understanding. Bugotu (1968: 68) suc-
cinctly described it:
Gratefulness, sharing and giving are a way of life, accepted and 
practiced almost unconsciously by all. When I give, I have the satis-
faction of giving in a continuation of friendly relations. I wouldn’t 
expect a verbal ‘thank you’ [or immediate reciprocation] because 
thankfulness is seen in deeds rather than in words.
One person gives and does not receive payment, although (s)he knows 
that his/ her giving will be returned when (s)he needs the support of 


















(physical work) is a way of caring and uniting, especially through festiv-
ities such as ‘feasts, gift exchanges, dances, and … ceremonies celebrated 
to mark stages in the growth of individuals, their births, deaths and mar-
riages’ (Belshaw 1947: 5).
Apart from these kastoms developing goodwill and cooperation, 
there are also instances where divisions and competitions occur that 
drive wantok groups apart. In both intra- and inter- wantok relation-
ships, respect expressed through reciprocal gestures of goodwill and 
honest dealings by leaders is an acceptable norm. Each wantok group is 
happy when it is respected and its territories not infiltrated by external 
forces and groups. Accordingly, successive governments of the Solomon 
Islands since independence in 1978 were conscious of this and often 
made decisions claiming to be in the interest of national unity and sta-
bility by appearing to address national needs but de facto on provincial 
and wantok lines (Nanau 2016). LiPuma and Meltzoff (1990) claim that 
‘[t] he various Solomon Islands were joined not because they bore any 
inherent relationship or because their peoples desired to be united, but 
for reasons foreign and external’ (LiPuma and Meltzoff 1990: 83). More 
directly, Kabutaulaka (1998: 33) explained that the post- colonial nation- 
state of the Solomon Islands exercises authority over boundaries carved 
during the colonial era.
The further one uses wantok away from the local towards the 
national, the greater the system changes from being a subsistence and 
livelihood buffer, to one of exploitation and corruption. This explains the 
identity and allegiance predicament demonstrated by the Royal Solomon 
Islands Police Force (RSIP) during the 1998– 2003 ethnic crises. Police 
officers who were supposed to be impartial took sides instead of protect-
ing all citizens. Arms that were supposed to be used for the protection 
of citizens were used against them. A good number of Guadalcanal and 
Malaita Police officers ignored their national duties and affiliated them-
selves with militant fighters from their wantok groups (SIG 2001). This 
was due to the strength of wantok affiliations over national consider-
ations. The existence of very strong internal bonds among and between 
wantok groups nationally affects efforts towards a united and stable 
Solomon Islands.
The above discussions on wantok and kastom also convey an 
unequal system that supports the interests of certain individuals. This 
is more pronounced in relation to the formal state. In the modern gov-
ernment setting, the wantok system is often associated with nepotism 
and the use of one’s personal connections to secure public service jobs 
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explained that wantoks could use their positions of influence to pro-
tect their own, as when police officers block or frustrate investigations 
involving close relatives (Cockayne 2004: 20). Appeals to kastom could 
be the scapegoat for letting a wantok member off the hook. Others argue 
that because it promotes the traditionally noble act of reciprocity, pol-
itics is currently being administered poorly because of tribal, ethnic 
and clan loyalties (Rynkiewich 2000). Those who progress through the 
government hierarchies thanks to the wantok system have usurped the 
space for meritocracy.
In urban areas, at the personal and household level, a commit-
ment to the wantok attributes of caring, sharing and looking out for 
others’ needs is increasingly difficult because city life engages with the 
cash economy on a daily basis. The Solomon Times Online newsletter 
(2008) highlighted the negative effects of unemployed families relying 
on other wantoks in Honiara for their children’s school fees, food and 
other needs. A ‘frustrated’ person who experienced the demands of such 
Figure 3.8.1 Wantok groups contributing and reciprocating the  
earlier assistance and generosity of other wantok groups in local 
Guadalcanal community, Solomon Islands. Taken in Tathimboko, 
District of Guadalcanal.










a network while trying to make ends meet for his family made the fol-
lowing statements on the negative impact of wantoks in Honiara; ‘I think 
the system is making us very poor, and we will continue to be poor if we 
encourage it’ (Solomon Times Online 2008).
The concepts of wantok and kastom are important for under-
standing informal networks in the Solomon Islands and Melanesia 
more broadly. The history of the Solomon Islands’ integration into 
the global economy directly links to continuities and changes to the 
wantok system and networks at the local level. The wantok groups’ 
attachments to each other, and within themselves, changes from that 
of a reciprocal redistributive buffer to that of exploitation and polit-
ical expediency the further one moves away from the village. Despite 
the changes brought about by colonisation and now globalisation, 
wantok identities and kastom are maintained and continue to be the 
norms of operation at the village level. Cultural wantok concepts 
and attributes such as kastom influence other aspects of develop-
ment, particularly those related to opportunities, security, stability 
and access to government resources. It is the ‘invisible hand’ in live-




university of brawijaya, malang, indonesia
Bapak, which literally means ‘father’, is a term used to denote the patri-
archal role of men in every aspect of life in Indonesia. Bapakism was par-
ticularly prevalent under President Suharto’s regime, a 32- year period of 
dictatorship that lasted from 1965 to 1997. Suharto was known as the 
‘Father of (National) Development’ (Bapak Pembangunan) in Indonesia. 
He introduced several Javanese principles into national life, and in so 
doing influenced both formal and informal practices in Indonesian soci-
ety (Vickers 2005).
Historically, the term bapakism refers to a patriarchy in which soci-
ety respected its elders and their opinions, pronouncements and deci-
sions. Being a bapak can mean not only being the father of a family, but 
also the head of a formal or informal organisation, and the mentality 
of bapakism informs all aspects of life from the social, political and cul-
tural to religious relationships. Indonesia comprises a number of eth-
nicities (more than 300 ethnicities are documented in literature), but 
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of the largest ethnicities, and over time its traditions have significantly 
influenced the behaviours of the people in Indonesia. Koentjaraningrat 
(1985) notes that being a leader in the Javanese culture system means 
being concerned with familism (kekeluargaan) which Irawanto et al. 
(2012) confirm is a crucial part of a bapak’s identity.
The role of a bapak specifically demands obedience, in particular 
from those of lower status – defined by being younger in age, junior 
in work status, or culturally ascribed as having lower status in formal 
relationships. In formal contexts, bapakism requires both obedience 
and flattery from subordinates, which is reflected in all aspects of bur-
eaucratic relationships. Ideally, a bapak is the person who is considered 
to be the most knowledgeable and therefore has legitimacy. However, 
it is not uncommon for bapaks to make unwise decisions because of the 
informal social rules governing expectations and obligations to which 
subordinates are forced to comply. The prescribed relationship pre-
vents subordinates from advising against or remedying poor decisions 
made by their bapak. It is forbidden in Javanese culture to question a 
bapak’s decision under any circumstances. The reality is that the cul-
tural norms of bapakism mean that subordinates are inclined to speak 
only in ways that will please the bapak, even to the extent of withhold-
ing the truth. Being a bapak also demands the display of a paternalistic 
leadership style (Irawanto et al. 2013), which includes demonstrating 
authoritarian acts to display knowledge and in order to be seen as a 
credible leader. This kind of relationship is defined by concepts of hier-
archy and demand. In the public sector at the present time, this hier-
archal structure can still be readily identified with regard to the civil 
servants who hold high positions and thus, for example, are obliged to 
respect the city mayor’s decisions because the city mayoral position has 
political status. Often decisions taken at local level are out of line with 
government planning, but due to the respect demanded by the bapak 
– whatever the consequences – the civil servants comply. This behav-
iour is also found in relations between civil servants and business, and 
commonly this practice leads to collusion and nepotism for personal 
fulfilment (Pye 1999).
In Indonesia, being in a position of authority automatically imbues 
the holder with power, and because the bapakism culture is so embed-
ded, it becomes inevitable that even well- intentioned power holders take 
on the behaviours attributed to a bapak (Lubis 2001). As a consequence, 
during the dictatorship of President Suharto (who described himself 
as a Javanese King), all participants in the government were obliged to 



















behaviour termed ‘asal bapak senang’, which literally means ‘as long as 
the father is happy’, and influenced every aspect of life from the political 
to the business sector. In a region where Javanese customs of life, moral 
deeds and etiquette are still practised, for example, in reporting the com-
pletion of assignments, the subordinates in order to show high respect to 
the leader only report the good (Vickers 2005).
Bapakism has been described as ‘loyalty to a hierarchical structure 
of authority’ (Koentjaraningrat 1985). In a working environment, such 
cultural norms are at their worst when they result in blind submission 
to the higher authority and present as a lack of concern about work per-
formance, standards or initiative. Javanese culture strives for a system 
that encourages harmony, trust and deference and one that motivates 
the subordinate to work diligently to obtain the superior’s goals. Here 
the word ‘diligently’ is not equated with achieving high standards, as the 
main aim is to keep the bapak happy and complete the task given by the 
bapak.
In a culture in which loyalty to a hierarchical structure of authority 
is highly valued, followers have a tendency to try to please their supe-
riors, regardless of the fact that they frequently have no precise idea of 
what their superiors want (Caraka 1988). They remain untroubled by 
this as the cultural norm leads them to believe that their superiors have 
divinely inspired knowledge and abilities. Those in a position of super-
iority in this culture are able to control others thanks to the requirement 
for respect demanded of their position in the hierarchy of the organisa-
tion and, more generally, in their positions in society, regardless of their 
sophistication, actual competence, or technical ability. Complaints about 
superiors simply don’t occur because of the belief that such action would 
result in semi- divine retribution. The cultural norm demands that the 
superior with their position and knowledge is always right. Subordinates 
rarely lose respect for, or argue with a superior if they make a mistake; 
and equally, the superior remains indifferent, as the ultimate goal is con-
cern with his own status and the deference paid to him.
In contemporary society the application of bapakism is becoming 
less common. National reforms starting in 1997 were the catalyst for 
moving from an authoritarian regime towards democracy. The political 
movement is progressively leading to greater transparency in all aspects 
of formal life. People are increasingly basing their decisions on reason, 
and as reforms start to influence all aspects of national life, there is a 
growing awareness that conforming to bapakism means extending the 
application of unhealthy collusion and nepotism to daily life and realis-
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Since the start of the reforming era, corruption in Indonesia has 
been known by the acronym KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism). 
The legacy of 32 years of the Soeharto dictatorship left practices of the 
bapakism culture rooted mostly in the civil service. However, the new era 
has been marked by the establisment of many corruption watch organisa-
tions who take part in national development and have helped bring about 
an era of greater transparency (Hamilton- Hart 2001). As a consequence, 
in contemporary society bapakism tends increasingly to be restricted to 
being used only when showing respect to the elders of organisations.
Closed community lock- in
3.10 Krugovaia poruka (russia and europe)
Geoffrey hosking
ucl, uK
Joint responsibility, in one form or another, is characteristic of any soci-
ety where state capacity and the reach of its law  enforcement agencies 
are limited. In those circumstances local communities have to improvise 
their own ways of preserving law and order. Sometimes they act in the 
interests of higher authority, but sometimes they defend their communi-
ties against that authority’s attempts to extend its jurisdiction and ‘inter-
fere’ with their traditional communal practices.
Early medieval England offers an example: in the smaller townships 
(villata) free males aged 12 and over were required to belong to a tithing, 
and to take an oath, or francpledge, to maintain local law and order and 
the ‘king’s peace’. Each tithing had its own ‘chief- pledge’ or ‘elder’. The 
members were divided into groups of 10 or 12. Much is obscure about 
their operation, because their members were all illiterate, and even their 
existence can be adduced only from sheriffs’ records. If a felony was com-
mitted, for example, a murder or a cattle theft, members of the tithing 
were required to raise a ‘hue and cry’, find the culprit and deliver him 
to the king’s justice. Similarly they were required to provide for defence 
against brigands. When they failed they could be fined collectively: the 
tithing was responsible as a whole, not individually. Sheriffs checked 
regularly that every free adult male in a community was fulfilling his 
duty in a tithing, so their function was evidently considered important 
(Pollock and Maitland 1968: 268– 71).
According to Jerome Blum, village communities of collective 



















Ages, were dominant for several centuries, then began to weaken in the 
eighteenth century, and faded away with the growing penetration of cen-
tral and local government institutions during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. It was ‘simultaneously an economic community, a 
fiscal community, a mutual- assistance community, a religious commu-
nity, the defender of peace and order within its boundaries, and the 
guardian of the public and private morals of its residents’ (Blum 1971: 
542). Typically, it had a collegially organised council of ‘chosen’ or ‘best’ 
people, headed by an elder (Schultheiss or Ammann), which took deci-
sions as far as possible by consensus. It also had a court, often composed 
of the same people, to adjudicate disputes and to judge criminal cases. 
Its priority was to preserve the peace, order and economic viability of the 
community rather than to observe laws strictly. In dividing up respon-
sibilities among households its guiding principle was requiring from 
each household what it had the resources to fulfil (Hausnotdurft, Blickle 
1991).
The community of joint responsibility was obviously useful to higher 
authorities in ensuring that low- level administrative functions were car-
ried out. At times of crisis, though, these communities could become the 
seedbed of rebellion. Whole communities could apply the principle of 
Hausnotdurft to their own needs: they came to believe they had a right 
to self- defence against excessive landlords’ demands or threats to their 
rights and property, especially if these were not sanctioned by tradition, 
by asserting that violations of this principle were an offence against God’s 
law (Blickle 1981).
In France the collective responsibility of village communities lay at 
the foundation of the monarchical ancien régime as late as the eighteenth 
century. Hilton Root, who has studied peasant institutions in Burgundy, 
believes that they were in a sense more democratic than the reformed 
institutions that were set up after 1789. The village assembly typically 
handled the collective financial liability of the community for royal and 
municipal taxes and the mortgaging of communal property. It also took 
all the main decisions required by open- field farming: crop rotation, the 
timing of the harvest, the use of common land, the management of cat-
tle, the upkeep of roads and bridges. For this purpose it elected an elder 
(échevin) who oversaw the operations and liaised with higher author-
ities. Seigneurs and royal officials would try to insist that all heads of 
household participated in the deliberations of the village assemblies, so 
that they should not be dominated either by the wealthier households or 
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In Russia the term krugovaia poruka, literally ‘circular surety’, 
was used to describe the functioning of analogous local institutions. In 
the nineteenth century the Slavophiles and later the Narodniki argued 
that the principle of communal democratic governance and mutual 
aid embodied in them was peculiar to Russia. That is not really the 
case:  what had happened is that such institutions survived later than 
elsewhere. It could be argued, though, that Russia had special need of 
communities of joint responsibility: its land was abundant but relatively 
infertile and much of it was situated at the northernmost extremity of 
viable agriculture. It was a highly risk- prone environment, especially 
if one considers that most urban and rural buildings were constructed 
of wood and hence posed a fire hazard. It made sense to spread risk as 
widely as possible and to ensure that in case of a poor harvest or a major 
conflagration the whole community was required to help those who had 
suffered most severely.
From the earliest times collective surety developed in rural and 
urban communities as a way of ensuring that (a) local law and order was 
upheld, (b) taxes were collected and paid to an official, (c) recruits were 
available for the army as needed. Rulers took a direct interest in their 
operation. The earliest mention of joint responsibility comes in Russkaia 
pravda, in which communities are fined as a whole for crimes committed 
on their territory. In Muscovy fines were jointly levied if excise or tavern 
duties were not paid (Brokgauz and Efron 1895: 836– 9; Dewey 1988).
Given the hazards of Russian agriculture, the normal procedure 
was to divide open fields into strips, so that each household had a share 
in the different kinds of soil available. From the seventeenth century the 
population grew and land became scarcer in certain regions; accord-
ingly, it became common practice to periodically redistribute the strips as 
households grew or declined in size. Then the liability for taxes and other 
dues, which were imposed by landlords or state officials on the whole 
community, would be redistributed proportionately among households, 
so that the largest or wealthiest would bear the largest share. If any 
household fell behind on its payments, then the others had to make up 
the difference. For that reason villagers were inclined to look askance on 
any behaviour that might impoverish, endanger or bring disrepute on the 
whole community. Drunkenness would be frowned upon, as it degraded 
the work capacity of the drinker. Sexual irregularities likewise, as they 
could disrupt households.
The communal assembly was democratic, in that it represented 














tended to be dominated by the more affluent villagers or by older males. 
Russian village communities also bore responsibility for welfare provi-
sion, for maintaining village infrastructure and for keeping peace and 
order in their lands. When serious crime took place, it was incumbent on 
the whole community to find and apprehend the criminal and bring him 
to justice, either in a community court, or by delivering him to higher 
authorities. If conflict between individuals or households became vio-
lent, the community as a whole was expected to stop the fighting, limit 
the damage and ensure restitution took place in such a way as to min-
imise the harm to the common interest. If the community failed in any 
of these obligations, then higher authorities could impose penalties on 
them collectively (Robinson 1932; Danilova and Danilov 1996: 22– 39; 
Milov 1998:  418– 23; Hosking 2004:  47– 62; Ledeneva 2004:  85– 108; 
Dennison 2011: chap. 4). ‘Joint responsibility’ affected Russian peasants’ 
attitude to all social institutions: authority, law, property and tradition. 
They regarded the land as belonging to God, which implied that it should 
be available to all who needed it and could work it, together with their 
dependents.
The mentalities associated with joint responsibility persisted in 
Russia long after krugovaia poruka was officially abolished in 1903, 
indeed well into the Soviet period. The concept of personal duty or legal 
responsibility tended to remain diffused in the collective. Lower- level 
collectives arose whose members both acted as a channel for commands 
from above, yet also as a means of unobtrusive resistance when those 
commands were uncongenial. Members covered up each other’s trans-
gressions. Party secretaries would bring with them to any new appoint-
ment their trusted associates from the underground or civil war. They 
would then dig themselves into the new authority structures and protect 
each other against investigations or reprimands from higher up. At the 
party Central Committee of February–March 1937 Stalin’s accusations 
of nepotism (semeistvennost’) reflected this survival of krugovaia poruka 
into an apparently incongruous milieu (Ledeneva 1995; Easter 2000: 
chs 2– 4).
3.11 Janteloven/ Jantelagen (Scandinavia)
morten Jakobsen
ucl, uK
Janteloven is a term that describes a set of norms, which state that ‘one 
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more valuable than others’ (Bromgard et al. 2014: 375). These norms 
are embodied in informal practices that confer negative attitudes 
towards individuality, individual self- expression and measures of 
success. These practices can take many forms across a range of social 
settings. In a business and work environment it may be seen in the 
condemnation of new ideas and the reluctance to voice those ideas; 
in a school setting it may pertain to serving the needs of average and 
low- skilled students, while neglecting the needs of talented students; 
in public life it may refer to voiced disapproval of material displays of 
success (Avant and Knutsen 1993– 4: 456; Stigsgaard 2005; Lelner and 
Fabler 2008c). Common to these examples is the disapproval of indi-
vidualism, independent thought and the overall support for a homo-
genous, egalitarian collectivity.
The term was first coined by Danish- Norwegian author Aksel 
Sandemose in his book En flygtning krydser sit spor (1933/1994). Inspired 
by his own upbringing in the small town of Nykøbing Mors, Denmark, 
Sandemose depicted the upbringing of a young boy in the fictional town 
of Jante who experienced immense pressure to conform to the peasant 
life of its inhabitants. By studying the behaviour of the villagers, the 
author codified the norms of the small society into 10 commandments 
reminiscent of the Biblical 10 Commandments, and named them jante-
loven (Sandemose 1994: 76). They read as follows (emphasis added):
1. Thou shalt not believe that thou art something.
2. Thou shalt not believe that thou art as good as us.
3. Thou shalt not believe that thou art more than us.
4. Thou shalt not fancy thyself better than us.
5. Thou shalt not believe thou knowest more than us.
6. Thou shalt not believe thou art greater than us.
7. Thou shalt not believe that thou art a worthwhile human being.
8. Thou shalt not laugh at us.
9. Thou shalt not believe that anyone is concerned with thee.
10. Thou shalt not believe thou canst teach us anything.
The function of these laws is to subdue the individual to the community. 
The spiteful linguistic framing of the norms by Sandemose reflects his 
own opposition to janteloven, which he believed drained the spirit and 
motivation of individuals.
While the practice exists in Denmark and Norway as janteloven, 
it is known in Sweden as jantelagen. It has been claimed that the same 













present in other Nordic societies such as Finland (Booth 2015: 242). The 
Greek mythology concepts of hubris and nemesis express similar ideas 
(Sprognævnet 2004). Sandemose claimed that janteloven applied not 
only to small communities within Denmark, but identified it as a specific 
Figure 3.11.1 Commemorative plaque at Sandemose’s birthplace in 
Nykøbing Mors.
Source: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:Sandemose_ 
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trait of human nature that had the possibility of flourishing in any  society 
(Sandemose 1933/1994: 15). However, those who practise it seldom 
clarify what is meant by the term, which poses challenges when inves-
tigating its supposed influence. Some consider it a social practice, while 
others use it as a label for a specific set of norms. The ambiguity of the 
term is also recognised in public. According to a survey conducted by a 
Danish newspaper in 2008, half of the Danish population believed that 
janteloven was often rhetorically misused as an excuse by people who 
were experiencing a lack of success (Lelner and Fabler 2008b).
There has been little academic research on janteloven in its own right. 
This is likely due to the conceptual imprecision of a term loaded with mean-
ings and controversies, as well as the elusive character of these practices, 
which do not easily lend themselves to scientific research. Nevertheless, 
the term has been used in an academic context to explain social relations 
in Scandinavia: it has been suggested that as a set of norms and informal 
practices it plays a role in Scandinavian society. Some scholars have con-
sidered it a useful label for describing socially acceptable and appropriate 
behaviours in Norway (Avant and Knutsen 1993– 4). In this case janteloven 
reflects larger societal norms of conformity. Norwegian society is highly 
homogenous and egalitarian with a considerable emphasis on societal 
solidarity. The extensive welfare state reflects this solidarity as it tries to 
eliminate poverty through welfare redistribution and social benefits. In the 
context of this research janteloven functions as a label for the underlying 
norms explaining these modern developments, while also being used as a 
social tool to ensure that people stay within the boundaries that serve the 
community and do not set out on an independent trajectory.
The strong emphasis on community serves to ensure its continued 
existence, while at the same time limiting those who dare to stand out. 
It can be problematic for creative and innovative persons, who may be 
discouraged from pursuing their passions, especially if their actions are 
considered a threat to equality. One example of this limitation is the pub-
lic education system, where pupils are socialised into the Norwegian idea 
of community from an early age. Education most frequently is targeted 
towards the needs of the average student, and supplemented with special 
assistance for those who lag behind, but rarely is any separate teaching 
available for those who display particular talent. It has been claimed that 
this is a direct consequence of the belief and values of janteloven, which 
dictates that no one should consider themselves better than any other 
(Avant and Knutsen 1993– 4: 456).
In Denmark, janteloven has been described as a set of norms pre-













early age and reproduced throughout life (Gopal 2004). Perceptions 
of equality in Danish society are described as the belief in the equality 
of people across economic, political, cultural and social spheres. The 
supremacy of the community poses a challenge to people with a mindset 
of individualism.
The term is widely known and referred to outside academia. In 
the aforementioned 2008 survey, three- quarters of the respondents 
believed that janteloven existed in contemporary Danish society (Lelner 
and Fabler 2008a, 2008b). The same poll also suggested that success-
ful people experience different attitudes from people to their success 
depending on how they express their accomplishments. The majority of 
respondents did not believe that if a person held a prestigious job or went 
to an elite school as a result of his or her talents, that this would produce 
Figure 3.11.2 Anja Andersen as coach for the Danish handball team 
Slagelse HF.
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negative responses from others. Conversely, it was found that individuals 
who displayed their success through material possessions, such as own-
ing an expensive car or electing to have plastic surgery, would be nega-
tively connoted (Lelner and Fabler 2008c).
Critics have vehemently attacked janteloven’s prescription of con-
formity, pointing to its petty mindset that only accepts mediocrity. This 
criticism is especially visible among business leaders and celebrities. One 
of the most famously outspoken critics of janteloven is Anja Andersen, 
a successful and controversial former Danish handball coach. Often 
criticised for her aggressive manner and swearing on the sideline dur-
ing matches, she was renowned for wearing T- shirts with the words ‘fuck 
janteloven’ printed in bold capital letters on the front (Figure 3.11.2). 
These T- shirts later became available for public sale, which exemplifies 
the broader popular critique (Information 2006).
3.12 Hyvä Veli (finland)
besnik Shala
ucl, uK
The Finnish term Hyvä Veli, which in English translates as ‘Dear Brothers’, 
is believed to have gained common usage and popularity during President 
Urho Kekkonen’s Presidency (1956– 82) as he habitually addressed his 
network of political friends with these words. More recently the term has 
become associated with corruption and favouritism arrangements in the 
business world and in public tenders in Finland.
Unlike the UK or USA, where ‘old boy’ networks (see ‘old boy net-
work’, 3.13 in this volume) exist based on being a member of the alumni 
of a prestigious school or college, Finland is a country with low social 
inequalities and does not have ‘elite’ universities. The quality of educa-
tion is high and it is free of charge, therefore Hyvä Veli networks are not 
directly analogous with ‘old boy’ networks. Hyvä Veli networks are char-
acterised as a phenomenon that occurs in a large number of diverse social 
circles. It is possible for Hyvä Veli networks to be established within many 
environments and groups; examples include Hyvä Veli networks within 
rotary groups, associations, ‘niche’ sports clubs, business networks, reli-
gious groups, minorities and the military.
The military and specifically the Reserve Officer School (ROS) is 
acknowledged to be among the most common environments for creating 
strong interpersonal ties of Hyvä Veli networks (Ledeneva 2016), attract-
ing as they do, only the most motivated and best candidates for military 


























candidates meet annually for training purposes, and some continue to do 
so for decades (Ledeneva 2016). Generally, ROS graduates have excel-
lent leadership skills, and traditionally the majority of the candidates 
go on to have successful careers. Unsurprisingly, continued networking 
among the group is inevitable.
Likewise, members of minority groups in Finland, such as the 
Jews, Tatars, Catholics and Mormons, are found to have particularly 
strong links with their communities, therefore Hyvä Veli networks 
are to be expected within them and are enduring. This is also true 
within sporting groups, particularly within niche sports such as sail-
ing, golfing and skiing, which also serve as an opportunity to meet 
similar- minded people and create strong interpersonal ties. Many big 
corporations organise seasonal sports weekends to bring employees 
together in completely new environments. Such events are designed 
to enable employees to have access to management in totally relaxed 
conditions, which contributes to better relations and strengthens 
interpersonal ties. The possibility of establishing Hyvä Veli networks 
can occur anywhere and it is not limited to the above- mentioned sce-
narios – rather it is a matter of individuals’ social skills, personality and 
chemistry with others.
In 2012, Former Prime Minister of Finland Esko Aho (1991– 5), 
who also acted as a Senior Executive at Nokia, stated that ‘Hyvä Veli net-
works are good for a small country such as Finland. These networks can 
consist of hunters, labourers, farmers and business leaders sitting around 
the same campfire and talking with each other about various issues’ 
(Helsingin Sanomat 2012). Research shows that in a small country, such 
as Finland, strong interpersonal ties are to be expected, therefore for the 
most part, favours are not even considered a form of corruption – they 
are systemic (Isaksson 2009). However, defining the exact boundary 
between healthy and corrupt networks is not always easy.
The strength of Hyvä Veli ties depends on the level of interaction 
between the actors (Granovetter 1973, 2005). The most typical char-
acteristics of these interpersonal ties are: gratitude, loyalty, reciprocity, 
friendship and protection of ‘the members’ (Salminen and Mäntysalo 
2012). These ties hold with the appointment of friends to positions 
(cronyism), preferential treatment (favouritism), favouring relatives 
(nepotism) and abuse of government resources (kleptocracy), as well 
as political or professional protection (Salminen and Mäntysalo 2012; 
Peurala and Muttilainen 2015). While Hyvä Veli networks may be consid-
ered unethical, it should be noted that from a legal perspective they are 
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Corruption is not considered to be a major threat in Finland 
(see Salminen 2010, 2015; Peurala 2011). Based on Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Finland has for many 
years been ranked among the least corrupt countries in the world. In 
2015, it ranked as the second least corrupt country in the world out of 
the 168 countries scrutinised (Transparency International 2016). The 
Special Eurobarometer on Corruption (European Commission 2013) 
also positions Finland among the least corrupt countries in the European 
Union (EU). The majority of EU citizens (76 per cent) believe that forms 
of corruption are common in their country, but only 36 per cent of Finns 
think the same about their country. However, based on the same report, 
35 per cent of Finnish respondents agree that corruption and favouritism 
are part of their business culture (European Commission 2013).
Salminen (2015), describing the different aspects of corruption and 
corruption control systems in Finland, states that the main weakness of 
the CPI measurement is that it does not address the problem of Hyvä Veli 
networks because it does not include the particularities of corruption.
Despite the low corruption perception level (CPI corruption rank-
ing), the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development 
(OECD) Working Group on Bribery noted that Finland needed to do 
more to counter foreign bribery in high- risk sectors of state- owned enter-
prises. Bribery occurs mainly in foreign markets where Finnish compan-
ies may be pressured to act according to local culture and violate OECD 
conventions. Based on OECD reports (2006), bribery in overseas mar-
kets has been the subject of media attention, with some investigations 
reaching Finnish courts. For instance, according to Finnish broadcaster 
Yle, in 2015 a court found the Finnish arms company Patria and two of 
its executives guilty of charges relating to foreign corruption (Yle 2015).
Further concerns were also raised with regard to the financing of 
political parties, due to funding disputes during election campaigns. In a 
report from 2009, the Ministry of Justice of Finland considered Hyvä Veli 
networks as a problem at national level, especially in municipal govern-
ment, which it found to be particularly susceptible due to its small size. It 
found that at municipal level strong ties were likely to develop between 
public decision makers and the private sector (Joutsen and Keränen 
2009). In the same report, the Ministry of Justice stated that ‘there is 
reason to believe that favours are exchanged among insiders in govern-
ment and businesses on the basis of informal relationships’, i.e. Hyvä Veli 
networks (European Commission 2014).
A study conducted in 2010 (Salminen 2010) measured the per-















occurrence of Hyvä Veli arrangements in Finland. This large national 
citizens’ survey (N = 5,000) found that corruption in Finland in gen-
eral was low. However, violations relating to Hyvä Veli networks, such 
as nepotism, close relationships in business and administration, were 
highlighted as problems in the survey. Hyvä Veli networks and other 
forms of favouritism were perceived by Finns to be of greater con-
cern than widespread corruption in the politico- administrative system 
(Salminen 2010; Peurala and Muttilainen 2015). These networks, like 
other forms of corruption in general, are difficult to spot by competent 
authorities even though they are part of everyday life, because they are 
considered normative.
Although Hyvä Veli networks have been recognised as harmful to 
the Finnish society and economy by scholars, the government and the 
EU, there is no evidence of its impact in monetary value or value ‘in kind’. 
Literature on the issue is also very limited. Finnish investigative media 
has been active in recent times and has identified numerous deals char-
acterised by favouritism and brought them to the attention of the pub-
lic (Salminen and Mäntysalo 2013). Nevertheless, a study by Tuominen 
(2012) on the local media of the Tampere region of Finland showed that 
there was evidence of constant external and internal attempts to influ-
ence the content of publications when there was a perceived threat of 
Hyvä Veli arrangements being made public. The study found that some 
editors were members of Hyvä Veli networks, and therefore were com-
promised by having strong interpersonal ties with other group members 
(Tuominen 2012), which prejudiced their ability to report proceedings 
openly and without bias. Hyvä Veli networks are generally dominated by 
men, as is the case in ‘old boy’ networks in the UK, as well as Aidagara 
networks in Japan (see 1.20 in this volume). This may change in the 
future as a result of the appointment of an increasing number of women 
to managerial positions, as well as the establishment of rival ‘female net-
works’. Hyvä Veli networks are unlikely to disappear from Finnish soci-
ety anytime soon, however, public awareness is increasing regarding the 
potential negative effects of such networks.
3.13 Old boy network (uK)
philip Kirby
Sutton Trust, uK
'It’s not what you know, it’s who you know’ – the oft- quoted phrase that 
captures the essence of the ‘old boy network’. In the UK, it refers to the 
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members of society – especially those that have passed through the coun-
try’s private school system and Oxbridge (old boy being a synonym of 
alumni). Such networks expedite, so it’s claimed, the progress of certain 
individuals to the top – of the professions, of society, of the country as a 
whole. It’s an informal system found in different forms across the world 
(for a discussion of the US example, see Rivera 2012), but the UK’s is per-
haps the most well known.
Some figures provide context: of the UK’s top judges (High Court 
and Appeals Court), three- quarters (74 per cent) went to private school – 
the same proportion (74 per cent) that attended Oxbridge; of Members 
of Parliament (MPs), the figures are 32 per cent and 26 per cent, respect-
ively; of the senior civil service, 48 per cent and 51 per cent. Similar 
proportions exist across the professions and have remained remarkably 
stable across time (Kirby 2016). Schooling and university are not the 
only markers of social capital, of course, but given that only 7 per cent of 
the population attend private schools (and far fewer Oxbridge), they are 
emblematic of how moving in certain circles increases one’s chances of 
success. Given that the best state schools academically outperform private 
schools, there’s more going on here than the simple fact of the best- edu-
cated rising to the top.
So what is happening? The precise mechanism is that curious mix-
ture of the obvious and the opaque – researchers know it’s there, they 
can often identify the people who it affects, but the precise mechanics 
are complex and variable. Corporeality is important, of course – a look, 
an accent, even a posture; the kind of qualities often imbued by a private, 
but not state, education. But it is also about more direct forms of assis-
tance – a parent who can secure a top internship for their son/ daugh-
ter at a firm their old classmate runs; a recruiter who attended the same 
school (or at least type of school) as you did, and trusts you slightly more 
because of it.
It’s adaptable, too. Research has shown that, where education level 
ceases to be an indicator of a particular individual’s social milieu (such 
as in education- blind recruitment practices), other traits fill the gap 
(Bathmaker et al. 2013). Did you play football at school, or did you row (a 
sport traditionally associated with the elite in the UK)? Did you spend the 
summer waiting tables, or working at that investment bank? Did you have 
the requisite ‘polish’ and confidence, or were your manners a little more 
‘coarse’? It might be possible to disguise someone’s school on an applica-
tion form, but you cannot disguise a candidate’s background completely.
Why does this happen? Again, the reasons are plural. There is a 
















themselves (Ashley et al. 2015). There is also the legacy factor – those 
from certain social classes and backgrounds, especially in the UK, have 
always disproportionately populated certain employment fields, such as 
the judiciary. People expect to see particular people in particular places 
and changing such cultural assumptions is not straightforward – and cer-
tainly not feasible overnight. Less generously, many of the powerful are 
keen to retain their power, of course, or bequeath it to friends, family or 
others like them who they favour.
In this way, it is perhaps easy, when discussing the network in the 
abstract, to construe it as some kind of singular grand conspiracy. But 
much of this work is done subconsciously, without necessarily a dedi-
cated effort to reproduce elites of a similar social background over time. 
In this sense, ‘network’ is something of a misnomer. Undoubtedly, there 
are concrete examples of people giving others who (literally) wear the 
same school tie opportunities that they would not have otherwise, but 
we are all culpable to an extent. The lionisation of particular attitudes 
and qualities runs throughout society and is often associated with cer-
tain educations. Being a ‘statesmanlike’ politician is widely respected, 
but the next time you hear the term used, consider the background of 
the politician in question – almost invariably the ‘statesmanlike’ qualities 
they possess are synonymous with the ‘polish’ they acquired from a pri-
vate education. Of the UK’s 76 Prime Ministers to date, the vast majority 
attended private schools, with 19 attending just one – Eton College (BBC 
News 2010). You do not have to be in the network to implicitly support 
values associated with the same.
‘Statesmanlike’ is also a useful term for thinking about perhaps the 
most obvious characteristic of the ‘old boy network’ – its gendering. In 
keeping with the UK’s historical patriarchy, the term originally referred 
to ex- students of all- male schools; students who proceeded to lead the 
country in business, warfare, politics and so forth. The gendered dimen-
sion remains, albeit the almost complete domination of elite professions 
by men, characteristic of UK society as recently as the middle of the twen-
tieth century, has slightly eroded. In the High Court and Appeals Court 
today, one in five (21 per cent) judges are female (Judicial Office 2016). 
The present (but gradual) procession of gender equality is replicated 
across other professions, too. If the ‘old boy network’ is no longer literally 
true, therefore, it still captures the dramatic over-representation of men 
in positions of UK social power.
Given the durability of the network, what is to be done to break its 
power and make the top of UK society more representative of the rest? 
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been the advent of ‘social mobility’ and associated agendas – the effort to 
ensure as free movement as possible between social classes, so that one’s 
life chances are no longer predicted by schooling, family background or 
similar (Blanden et al. 2005). ‘Education- blind’ recruitment strategies, as 
mentioned, are one way that this goal has been approached, including in 
a recent proposal by the UK civil service (Civil Service 2016). In her first 
statement as UK Prime Minister, Theresa May promised to fight the injust-
ice that, ‘If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top of pro-
fessions than if you’re educated privately’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2016). 
The influence of Internet- based social networking will be interesting to 
follow here too – will services such as Facebook and LinkedIn help to dem-
ocratise recruitment and level the playing field? Perhaps – but they might 




Klüngel denotes secret agreements and underhand dealings made pos-
sible through personal connections to family members, friends, col-
leagues or political associates, and often, but not necessarily, used for 
personal gain. The word stems from the regional dialect of Cologne and 
is used predominantly in the broader Rhineland region, commonly in ref-
erence to Cologne itself, though it also occasionally appears in national 
media in the context of national or international scandals concerning 
public mismanagement and corruption. It derives from the diminutive 
of the Old High German noun klunga (‘ravel, entanglement’; see also 
English: ‘to cling’). The first known use of the word in the sense of deceit-
ful scheming can be traced to the year 1782 (Wrede 1971: 55).
The word Klüngel has a predominantly negative connotation and 
is associated, albeit not synonymous, with administrative secrecy and 
cases of suspected or proven corruption among municipal authorities. 
In the most prominent case in recent history, the 1999 Cologne dona-
tion scandal, it was revealed that private contractors had paid millions 
of Deutschmarks in bribes to city officials in order to secure construction 
contracts. The contractors further bribed local politicians to gather sup-
port for the construction project, while the politicians then added the 
money to party funds as faked donations from party members (Die Welt 
2004). Key actors in the scandal were personally acquainted or otherwise 




















Other local instances of allegations of Klüngel include the 2009 col-
lapse of the Historical Archive of Cologne, which was heavily covered in 
the media in conjunction with accusations of cover- ups of inadequate 
construction supervision by local authorities (Bannas 2009; Driessen 
2009). Use of the term in the national media may also occur in refer-
ence to other city administrations or higher- order authorities such as the 
European Union or the World Bank, indicating a conflation of the term 
with corruption and the inappropriate usage of personal networks in 
general (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007; Die Welt 2008).
It is important to note that in any instance of this broad, but in no 
way exhaustive, range of negatively associated examples of Klüngel, a 
characteristic feature of the practice is the role of social ties in underhand 
dealings rather than in any particular illegal practice (Überall 2007: 
183). Broadly speaking, Klüngel describes the pursuit of a particular goal, 
often economic or political in nature, with the help of available social 
connections. The criminal meaning with which the word is often associ-
ated in everyday usage stems from the potential for private networks to 
divert resources from the common good through the subversion of offi-
cial procedures.
The meaning of Klüngel should therefore not be confused with 
corruption, particularly as local manifestations and perceptions of 
Klüngel are far from universally negative. High- level officials such as 
former mayors Norbert Burger and Konrad Adenauer have publicly 
depicted Klüngel as a positive feature of urban life in Cologne, with the 
former pointing to its usefulness in efficient and unbureaucratic deci-
sion- making and the latter describing it as a social network of mutual 
assistance (Klauser 2007:183). In this more positive sense, it has even 
been suggested that Klüngel may contribute to the democratic cul-
ture of Cologne by increasing communication between the municipal 
administration and local citizens and creating unofficial opportunities 
for civic participation, assuming that it is not performed within closed 
networks (Überall 2007: 242). Researchers and local folklorists such 
as Überall, Feldhoff (2006) or Klauser acknowledge this more posi-
tive understanding of Klüngel as a shortcut that skirts official channels 
without necessarily causing harm for those uninvolved. At the same 
time, however, they warn that the possibility of positive and con-
structive functions of Klüngel should not detract from the potential of 
Klüngel to be employed for personal advantage over the common good 
(see also jaan- pehchaan, 1.19 in this volume).
Klüngel as a term and practice can perhaps be best conceptualised 
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(see, for example, Putnam 2000): On the one hand, it may build on exist-
ing connections between individuals of similar social standing and occu-
pation, closing out those lacking necessary connections and generating 
potential incentives for abuse to the disadvantage of outsiders. On the 
other hand, Klüngel can also form a strategy for cooperation within and 
across social and political networks that facilitates formal procedures. 
This ambiguity is reflected in the local understanding of Klüngel, which 
acknowledges the centrality of social connections in decision- making 
procedures and the fragility of purportedly rigid barriers between public 
and private life in an urban context.
The influence of social ties in local decision- making procedures is 
not a unique feature of urban administrations in the broader Rhineland 
area. Studies of the impact of decentralisation and privatisation meas-
ures in municipal administrations across Germany indicate that such 
institutional reforms may generally generate incentives for corruption by 
complicating accountability and blurring boundaries between the public 
and private sector (see, for example, Von Maravic 2006). The distinct-
ive feature of Klüngel, then, lies not in the unusual role of social ties in 
the institutional environment of the Rhineland, but in local awareness of 
these structures and understanding of the ambivalence of their effects.
Research on Klüngel is sparse, both in terms of empirical study and 
theoretical discussion, and practically non- existent in non- German aca-
demic literature. Micro- level studies of both the publicly documented 
cases of corruption as well as of the positive manifestations of Klüngel 
promise, however, to offer insights into the functions and effects of social 
networks in the context of strong formal institutions. Research into the 
prevalence of Klüngel might also investigate private contexts with lit-
tle connection to public affairs, for example, local business- to- business 
interactions or even purely social situations, as Klüngel does not neces-
sarily involve administrative or political representatives. Such informa-
tion could prove useful in enhancing the understanding of the functions 
and perceptions of social networks in Western societies.
3.15 Vetterliwirtschaft/ Copinage (Switzerland)
lucy Koechlin
institute of Social anthropology, university of basel, Switzerland
Vetterliwirtschaft is a widespread expression denoting mutual favours or 
preferential treatment in German- speaking communities in Switzerland. 
























translates as the ‘cousins’ economy’. Swiss- German dialects exclusively 
use the diminutive form Vetterliwirtschaft (i.e. signified by the suffix - li, 
which makes the literal meaning akin to ‘little cousins’ economy’). Like 
nepotism, Vetterliwirtschaft implies the favouring of friends or family 
by those in a position of power. Everyone knows what is meant:  ‘back- 
scratching’ exchanges of favours between colleagues in politics and 
business.
In the French- speaking parts of Switzerland, the equivalent term 
copinage is used, from the French copain, meaning ‘buddy’ or ‘mate’. 
Although copinage is usually translated as ‘cronyism’, the meaning of 
copinage and Vetterliwirtschaft strongly reflects the social, political and 
economic idiosyncrasies of Switzerland. Switzerland is a small country, 
which prides itself on its egalitarian and citizen- based political system. 
Historically, Switzerland came into existence through a growing coali-
tion of communities, as exemplified by the Swiss national folk hero 
Wilhelm Tell. The founding legend, in which Tell assassinated a brutal 
Habsburg ruler with his crossbow, sparking rebellion and the eventual 
independence of the Old Swiss Confederacy, represents the resistance of 
oppressed Swiss communities against the occupying force of the counts 
of Habsburg. The Old Swiss Confederacy was based on a coalition (lit-
erally:  an ‘oath- fellowship’, or Eidgenossenschaft) of communities from 
Uri, Schwyz and Unterwalden in what is now central Switzerland, with 
the Federal Charter of 1291 regarded as its founding document. In sub-
sequent centuries, more so- called cantons and cities joined the confed-
eration (a loose union of federal states), leading to the establishment 
of modern Switzerland on the basis of a federal constitution in 1848. 
The history of Switzerland is embodied in its official name, the ‘Swiss 
Confederation’ (Kreis 2014).
This history has translated into a strong bottom- up democracy, 
where the smallest political unit is the community, which to this day is 
vested with real political power. The centrality of the idea of the commu-
nity as the core unit of society is reflected in the country’s executive body. 
Switzerland’s executive is headed not by an individual (such as a presi-
dent or prime minister), but rather a collective body, the Federal Council, 
which acts as both head of state and head of government. Tellingly, 
the seven- member Federal Council, elected by Parliament, forms a 
multi- party body representing the different regions and languages of 
Switzerland (Kriesi 2008; Kreis 2014; Vatter 2014).
Thus, the community as a political institution and as a frame of 
reference for political identity plays a key role in Swiss culture. It also 
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in communities, business and politics are closely intertwined on a local 
level. Many people running a small business, such as an electrician or a 
small construction company, will also have some local political position, 
or have had one at some time. This is where Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage 
comes into play: a local electrician may be awarded the contract to rewire 
a municipality’s public buildings without a public tender or clear criteria; 
or a local farmer may have a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ with the village 
council to maintain the school grounds or clear the roads from snow in 
winter. However, Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage also takes on more obvi-
ously corrupt forms, especially in procurement and construction; typical 
examples include the brother- in- law of a local politician getting a con-
tract to build a new school, or the re- zoning of land so that an influential 
member of the community can build a house, or a commercially lucrative 
hotel or ski- lift (Queloz et al. 2000). However, although all these deci-
sions pass through a village or municipal council, it is striking that the 
community routinely turns a blind eye to these informal practices. This 
is even true of cases where other members of the community are being 
excluded from such deals.
One reason for the widespread societal acceptance of 
Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage may lie in the so- called ‘consensus- dem-
ocracy’ (Kriesi 2008; Kreis 2014) that characterises Switzerland. The 
Swiss loathe being confrontational – issues are solved by consensus, 
while conflict is frowned upon. This deep- seated suspicion of individ-
uals who go ‘against the grain’ remains highly topical, illustrated by the 
heated debates surrounding the introduction of an (ironically toothless) 
whistleblower law in Switzerland (Carranza 2014; Jürgensen 2015; The 
Economist 2015).
Furthermore, the nature of Swiss nepotism differs from ‘old boy 
networks’ (see 3.13 in this volume), which usually serve to entrench the 
economic and political privileges of the upper classes. Vetterliwirtschaft/ 
copinage is more democratic and inclusive; it is an everyday occurrence on 
the local level, and is not only tolerated but viewed with some fondness 
by many Swiss. The political history, the smallness of the country, and not 
least the high density of all sorts of associations, mean that the Swiss know 
each other very well on a local level. Politics is very accessible, and social 
capital – i.e. horizontal ties between community members characterised 
by high levels of trust and reciprocity – is high (Freitag 2014). Arguably, 
Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage contributes to the density of social capital by 
fostering exchange networks that are embedded in a community.
Switzerland may be highly democratic, participative and egalitar-

















can also be observed in the higher echelons of society. Especially since 
the Second World War, elite networks mutually reinforced their ties and 
opportunities by occupying key positions in politics, business and the 
army (which to this day is a militia army based on conscription of all adult 
males). For decades, these ‘higher’ forms of Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage 
enjoyed virtual immunity from public critique. This changed in the late 
1990s, when a series of scandals shook the famously stable country. The 
most spectacular incident was the cessation of flight operations of the 
renowned Swiss airline Swissair on 2 October 2001. Due to the compa-
ny’s inability to make payment to creditors on its large debt, fuel suppliers 
refused to fuel the waiting aircrafts, grounding thousands of passengers 
around the world. The incident sent shockwaves through Swiss society 
as the Swiss held great pride in Swissair, seeing it as a national treas-
ure and the epitome of Swiss stability and quality. Swissair’s previously 
inconceivable collapse was a result of seriously misguided management 
strategies and regulatory failure. In particular, it brought to light what 
the media has called the ‘inbreeding’ of top management: the system-
atic ‘recycling’ of a handful of board members between several large 
Swiss companies, some of whom also acted as members of parliament 
(Stämpfli 2003; Lüchinger et al. 2006). For the first time, this type of 
Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage within the political establishment was seen to 
be deeply problematic, and has since led to a far more critical attitude 
towards such practices.
The new millennium has seen significant changes in terms of access 
to politics and business. Vetterliwirtschaft/ copinage among political and 
economic elites has become the exception due to a transformed polit-
ical and social landscape, tightened regulatory frameworks and highly 
internationalised boards of large companies (Stock 2007; Aiolfi 2015; 
Bühlmann et al. 2015). Yet although this may hold particularly true on 
a national level, on a local level the many forms of Vetterliwirtschaft/ 
copinage remain more tenacious.
3.16 Tal (alt. taljenje, taliti, utaliti, rastaliti)  
(Serbia and countries of former yugoslavia)
danko runic 
ucl, uK
Tal is a term used throughout most of the former Yugoslavia to colloqui-
ally describe an agreement, a settlement, or an arrangement between 
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financial cut, such as a kickback, or other types of advantage through ille-
gal means. Etymologists agree that the term is derived from the modern 
German word Teil (Klaić 1978: 132; Uroić and Hurm 1994: 801), which 
translates in English as ‘part, portion, component, piece, bit, share, deal 
or slice’. Teil is clearly linked to Thaler, a silver coin used throughout 
Europe, an abbreviation of ‘Joachimsthaler’, meaning from the town of 
Joachimsthal in the Kingdom of Bohemia, where the first such coins were 
minted in 1518. In languages spoken in the former Yugoslavia, tal origin-
ally meant the same as in modern German, primarily to signify part or 
portion and less commonly to signify part of inheritance or dowry (Klaić 
1978: 132).
The term tal was first used in urban centres to imply widespread 
engagement in illicit practices through reaching secretive agreements 
(Imami 2003: 353; Ćirković 2011: 72– 3). The use of the term has evolved 
since, with the noun taljenje and verbs taliti, utaliti and rastaliti deriving 
from it, indicating that the practice has become a complex phenomenon, 
well established in the informal economy, with several variants having 
similar meanings. The term tal is commonly used nowadays among many 
generations and all levels of social strata (Imami 2001).
The participants of a tal come together in order to combine 
resources that each has at their disposal. For example, if one person has 
financial means, another might have the necessary political connections 
to get a deal done. The type of resources involved can vary; tal can be 
private, political, commercial, criminal and often a combination of these. 
According to the Serbian language online dictionary of slang, Vukajlija, 
tal is most often negotiated ‘face- to- face’ and its existence is thus known 
solely to parties involved and people of trust (Vukajlija rečnik slenga 
2007). It goes on to explain that
besides a petty tal, in which common people are engaged on an 
everyday basis in order to earn some money to feed the family, 
there are also tals between criminals, large businesses and polit-
ical establishments, a combination of which is most dangerous, as 
it enables tycoons and politicians to accumulate wealth at the speed 
of light and at the cost of the state and the people.
Entering tals is both a large- scale survival strategy for ordinary people 
and a widespread practice of bending the formal rules of economy caused 
by extensive lack of trust in institutions.
Across the former Yugoslavia, the practice of entering different 
tals has become so widespread that the formally obtained knowledge 





















redundant (Cigler 2013). To be awarded a lucrative contract or to 
enter a business deal with an important client does not depend on 
achieving the best price, on knowledge, quality of product or service, 
but depends solely upon the prospect of acquiring personal wealth for 
the individuals involved in the decision- making, i.e. being part of the 
tal (Cigler 2013). Hence those who prosper most and acquire most 
profit are those who make the best tals and participate in the highest 
number of tals.
The term tal is thus also used to ‘express appropriating a share in 
currency or some other commodity, which the seller returns to the buyer, 
an influential individual inside a company, an institution or an organ-
isation, after the process of purchase is completed’ (Cigler 2013). The 
individual becomes part of a tal by guaranteeing the purchase of goods 
or services from a particular seller. In this sense, tal is easily translated in 
English as kickback. In such cases the amount of tal can vary significantly. 
It is usually no less than 10 to 20 per cent of the value of a transaction, 
however, it is not uncommon for it to be much higher.
Both tal and kickback imply collusion. Such collusion, based on 
trust as a moral predisposition, contributes to the accumulation of ‘social 
capital, which acts as a force of cohesion on the quantity and quality of 
mutual social interactions’ (Vehovec 2002: 230). Although hidden and 
secretive, it is not uncommon for an individual who is part of a particu-
larly important tal, or a tal in which the other party is influential in cer-
tain circles, to boast about it so as to demonstrate self- importance and 
well-connectedness. Being part of high- profile tals is hence seen as not 
only highly profitable, but also socially beneficial and desirable within 
business and political communities in systematically corrupt regimes.
The practice of entering tals, i.e. taljenje, is also widespread by 
elected and appointed public officials in their attempts to disguise own-
ership and management of private businesses. In Serbia, for example, 
the Law on Anti- Corruption Agency prevents government officials from 
owning or managing a private business while exercising public function 
(Zakon o Agenciji 2008). Similar legislation is in place in all countries 
throughout the region. Yet in order to earn extra income, and faced with 
a number of conflicting interests, government officials opt to become 
part of a tal, whereby their share in a business venture is disguised by 
trusted frontmen, close friends or distant family members posing as de 
jure owners. It is also not rare for a politician to become part of such a tal, 
being entrusted with the primary role of ensuring the speedy delivery of 
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other preferential treatment by government institutions through influ-
ence peddling.
The term tal is frequently used in the media. In cases where 
solid evidence of wrongdoing is absent, one might choose to publicly 
accuse someone of being part of a tal. Since tal does not appear in the 
Criminal Code, the media can avoid charges for defamation, while 
at the same time making a reference to illicit doings. For example, in 
September 2015, Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanović publicly 
accused Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić of being in a tal with 
the Croatian opposition leader Tomislav Karamarko and Hungarian 
Prime Minister Victor Orbán (B92 2015). The event that led to such 
an accusation during the height of the election campaign in Croatia 
was the influx of refugees from the Middle East that passed through 
Serbian territory on their way towards the European Union, who 
were allegedly transported and directed by Serbian authorities exclu-
sively towards the Croatian border. Milanović implied that although 
he offered assistance to Vučić, to provide a fleet of buses to transport 
refugees from the Serbian border with Macedonia towards not only 
Croatia, but also to Hungary, Vučić refused them.
In a statement the Croatian Prime Minister declared (B92 2015):
The man simply refuses it. Can anyone explain what motives 
can one possibly have to refuse such help? Our offer is clear 
and well- intentioned. But he refuses it because he has motives, 
because he must be in a tal with someone. He is in constant con-
tact with Budapest, he secretly meets Karamarko in Zagreb. They 
are all part of the same clique [Vučić, Karamarko and Orbán all 
belong to the same family of political parties, i.e. conservative and 
centre- right].
Similarly, in an interview to Jutarnji in 2014, Mirela Holy, the leader of 
Croatian political party ORaH  – Sustainable Development of Croatia, 
noted that there was no strategic approach by the government to support 
investment in the economy and that rules of the game were not the same 
for everyone. She concluded by saying ‘if you are not in a tal with some-
one in the local administration or national government, your investment 
proposal will sit in a drawer for years’ (Penić 2014).
An almost identical point was made by famous Serbian documen-
tary film director Želimir Žilnik when he was asked to comment on poor 
government support of the cinematography industry. He noted that ‘we 



























there is no place for someone to utaliti and that is the key reason why the 
funding is poor and not because they hate documentaries’ (Akter 2013).
Taljenje has serious implications for both the economy and society. 
In business transactions it is damaging for companies and institutions, as 
the price paid for goods or services is higher than the market price, while 
the quality also often suffers (Cigler 2013). When tals are part of public 
procurement processes, the government budget is severely damaged. In 
cases when the value of tal is not financial, it nevertheless leads to all 
manner of illicit acts, including favouritism, seen in providing employ-
ment to family members of tal partners in government administration, 
for example. Entering tals is thus closely connected to influence peddling, 
tax evasion, racketeering, kickbacks and the grey economy in general.
3.17 Mateship (australia)
bob pease
School of humanities and Social Sciences,  
deakin university, australia
Mateship is part of the Australian male heritage; it originated in colonial 
days and was glorified in war and sport. An important element of mate-
ship has always been that the company of other men is preferred to the 
company of women (Bell 1973). Thus Australian mateship developed in 
the context of the harsh reality of bush life for men without female com-
panionship. The central elements are that mates are ‘exclusively male, 
not female, they share a particular sceptical camaraderie in doing things 
together [and] there is a lack of emotional expression other than sharing 
jokes’ (Edgar 1997: 79).
The First World War introduced a new stage of mateship. Men had 
to be moulded together into an effective fighting force (Webb 1998). In 
fact, as Garton (1998: 74– 5) has noted, war played a significant role in 
‘constructing particular masculine ideals in Australian culture’. Perhaps, 
more than any other event, it was the Gallipoli campaign that enshrined 
mateship as a significant part of the Australian male self- image. This 
mythologising began immediately after the landing in 1915. The Anzac 
legend of mateship, anti- authoritarianism, larrikinism and fortitude, 
became translated into a national ethos (Garton 1998).
There are many positive dimensions claimed for mateship. Bruce 
Ruxton, president of the Returned Soldiers League in Australia, says it 
means ‘supporting one another in life or death situations. Your mate is 
someone you can rely on. It is a bond between persons made in war or 
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‘primarily means personal or group loyalty’ (The Age 1999). As Edgar 
(1997: 79) notes, ‘mateship implies a deep and unspoken understanding 
that a mate will always stick by you’. Thus your mates would never ‘dob’ 
(inform on) you to the police no matter what crimes you may have com-
mitted. For many Australian men, mateship implies that loyalty to one’s 
mate is a higher virtue than observance of the law.
While bonds between men have often been used as a basis for 
male solidarity in many countries, Australia is perhaps the only country 
where ‘the romanticisation of male bonding provided so useful a basis 
for national ideology’ (Altman 1987:  167). So it is more than just an 
Australian version of male bonding. Rather, such bonding has formed 
the basis of myths of national identity among Australian men. Bell 
(1973: 8– 9) noted that while male comradeship is common in most cul-
tures, the Australian version seems to exaggerate this institution ‘almost 
as if Australian men were constantly in a state of emergency where they 
needed one another’.
The Anzac period has continued to establish a particular version of 
Australian national identity. When Australia prepared for a referendum 
on the option of becoming a republic in 1999, the then Prime Minister 
John Howard proposed a preamble to the Australian constitution that 
extolled the virtues of mateship and numerous references were made to 
the war years.
While mateship is often presented and promoted as healthy and 
positive, Marston (1994: 12) has drawn attention to a number of aspects 
of mateship that are ‘unhealthy, oppressive and ultimately destructive’. 
While the idea of mates staying together is presented as one of the virtues 
of mateship, it can be used to justify violence against women, gays and 
indigenous people. In fact, Australian manhood and masculinity were 
constructed against the image of ‘others’ who were different.
In this context, Bell (1973: 24) argued over 40 years ago that an 
understanding of mateship is important to an understanding of female 
and male relationships in Australian society. He said that frequently ‘the 
interpersonal satisfactions of mateship for the husband are achieved at 
the cost of marital satisfaction for the wife’. Marston (1994:  14)  simi-
larly argues that mateship ‘cripples the full potential of men and their 
relationships’.
A number of writers have commented on the emotional poverty of 
Australian masculinity. Colling (1992: 50), for example, says that mate-
ship embodies toughness and a disdain for ‘weak emotion’. Meanwhile, 
Webb (1998) regards the celebrated culture of silence and emotional 
















seen as the essence of traditional mateship, as evidenced in the nature 
of men’s relationships that emphasise sport and communal drinking.
Australian men are renowned for their dedication to drinking beer. 
Drinking in the company of other sporty and gambling men has come to 
be seen as being archetypically Australian. Dixon (1982: 169) says that 
‘heavy drinking is a symbol of mateship and solidarity’. Thus drinking 
beer has become part of the mateship subculture. Beyond the expression 
of mateship in sport and communal drinking, there are more troubling 
aspects of this Australian form of male bonding.
Pack rape is more prevalent in Australia than in America or 
Britain. Looker (1994) suggests that this is connected to the intrica-
cies of relationships between men in Australia and the affirmation of 
an aggressive form of masculinity. She cites a convicted rapist (Looker 
1994: 218):
There’s … a sense of camaraderie about a gang bang, where you 
have a good mate and you will share a woman with a good mate. 
It’s … a very binding act with you and your friend, with you and 
your mate. The sense of camaraderie would be possibly the biggest 
aspect of it. You do everything together.
This aspect of male culture is elucidated in a book by Carrington (1998) 
who retraces the police investigation into the rape and murder of a 14- 
year old girl at a beach party in an Australian town in 1989. The book 
describes what happens when shame and mateship mix with a small- 
town mentality. The police responsible for the murder investigation 
reported that a ‘wall of silence’ hampered their investigation. This silence 
was seen to be related to ‘a rigorous adherence to the ethic of not dobbing 
in a mate’ (Carrington 1998: 99).
Homophobia is also a dominant feature of Australian mas-
culinity with widespread condemnation of homosexuality by men 
evidenced by the hostility and violence shown towards gay men. 
Tacey (1997) says that homophobia is the most recently discovered 
aspect of Australian mateship. While ‘men adore their mates, there 
will be no obvious caring, no touching, no outward display’ (Tacey 
1997: 135). Thus while male bonding is an important prerequis-
ite for the development of masculine identity in Australia, many 
men fear that if the bonding is too close, it will destroy heterosex-
ual identity and become confused with homosexuality (Webb 1998). 
Nevertheless, mateship and homosexuality have a very close homo-
social proximity. Certainly, there are affinities between mateship as 
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(1982: 81) even suggests that mateship involves ‘powerful sublimated 
homosexuality’. Australian mateship is also constructed against the 
image of indigenous men, immigrant men and non- Caucasian males. 
The ‘virtues’ of mateship are thus reserved for native- born white men.
The women’s movement and pro- feminist masculinity politics have 
played a significant role in challenging mateship and putting men’s vio-
lence and gender- based inequalities on the political agenda in Australia. 
Community- based initiatives tackling men’s violence and campaigns 
challenging patriarchal ideologies and belief systems underlying mate-
ship have all contributed towards more egalitarian gender relations. 
However, Australia has a long way to go before its claimed commitment 
to the principles of social equality, as they relate to gender relations, can 
become more than rhetoric.
Semi- closed lock- in
3.18 Sitwa (poland)
piotr Korys´ and maciej Tymin´ski
faculty of economic Sciences and institute of Social research, 
university of Warsaw, poland
Sitwa is a Polish word describing a powerful informal network of mutu-
ally supportive individuals who pursue their own personal interests even 
when these are harmful to the interests of society as a whole. In recent 
years, the word has come to be used to describe unorganised, informal 
networks in local or central authorities, lacking hierarchical structure or 
clearly defined leaders. The term may also be used to denote influential 
circles within professional corporations or social organisations. Relations 
between sitwa members are often based on a non- market exchange of 
favours (see kumoterstwo, 7.14 Volume 2). While sitwa is a form of pro-
fessional rather than family relations, its structure resembles that of the 
social networks that controlled local politics in Italy in the aftermath of 
the Second World War (Banfield 1958). The moral basis of sitwa in Polish 
politics bears striking resemblance to what Edward Banfield described as 
‘amoral familism’.
The noun sitwa (plural sitwy) derives from a Jewish word mean-
ing cooperative or company (szitwes in Yiddish, szuttafuth in Hebrew). 
In the years preceding the Second World War, it was used in criminal 
slang to denote worthless, badly behaved and poor people, or partners in 
crime. While sitwa has not always been used pejoratively (Kamiński and 






















it became widely used in the mass media and in everyday language to 
mean informal networks within the privileged public authorities.
As an expression describing informal activity, sitwa resembles 
the German term Kamarilla (literally ‘little chamber’, from the Spanish 
camarilla, meaning an elite circle of courtiers or favourites surround-
ing a king or ruler). Kamarilla was used in the German Empire in the 
late nineteenth century and again during the Weimar Republic, notably 
to describe the coterie surrounding President Paul von Hindenburg, 
to whom responsibility is attributed for the decision to appoint Adolf 
Hitler as Chancellor. In German, however, the meaning of Kamarilla 
has typically been limited to the central authorities. Similar expressions 
found in many languages are ‘clique’ and ‘coterie’ (kliki and koteria in 
Polish).
While informal networks flourished in pre- modern Poland (as 
indeed they did throughout Europe), the term sitwa came into use rela-
tively recently. The Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569– 1795) saw 
coteries cluster around the families of the richest noblemen; based on 
patron– client relations, these groups exercised strong influence over par-
liament and the regional authorities. Such networks, with their focus on 
securing political and financial benefits for their members, have been 
identified by Polish historians as one of the main reasons for the crisis of 
the Polish political system that provoked the collapse of the state in the 
eighteenth century (Mączak 2003).
In the nineteenth century, when Poland was partitioned between 
Russia, Prussia and Habsburg Austria, informal networks were not found 
within the leadership for the simple reason that Poland was no longer an 
independent state and had no central government. Poles in those days 
had little access even to local government. The years between the two 
World Wars saw the rebirth of Polish politics, and new cliques and sitwy 
sprang up.
They continued to flourish during the communist period (1945– 
89). At that time, the nomenklatura system saw appointments to influ-
ential posts approved exclusively by the Communist Party apparatus. 
This quickly evolved into a hierarchical mechanism whereby clients or 
friends were promoted by Communist Party patrons (Hirszowicz 1973, 
1980; for a description of a similar process in the USSR, see Voslensky 
1984 and Gregory 1990). As a result, informal patronage networks 
became established at both central and local levels (Tarkowski 1994; 
Tymiński 2002).
These coteries (cliques, sitwy) focused on securing personal bene-
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access to rare or hardly accessible goods and services such as motor cars, 
privileged health care, apartments, houses or summer cottages. In certain 
circumstances, cliques might play a positive role for a specific enterprise 
or local community. Since the system of central economic planning led to 
frequent shortages of virtually all resources, goods and services, network 
members might help a local enterprise to obtain resources, machinery or 
investment funds (Tarkowski 1994). While such activity would benefit a 
specific enterprise or local community, however, it was unlikely to benefit 
the wider community since, in a centrally planned economy, the informal 
acquisition of goods or resources by one local community or enterprise 
would result in a loss by others.
Many of the informal networks created under the commun-
ist system survived the collapse of communism. As shown by Łoś and 
Zybertowicz (2000), such networks captured significant sectors of both 
economic and political capital during the transition from state-social-
ism. In one notable incident, for example, Mariusz Łapiński, minis-
ter of health from 2001 to 2003, accused Polish President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski (in office 1995– 2005) of presiding over a sitwa that sought 
to reap benefits from public institutions. ‘The presidential palace’s sitwa, 
built in the past ten years’, Łapiński (2005: 5–6) asserted,
is a group of people connected to one another by their various inter-
ests. In order to realise their interests, this group does not hesitate 
to break the law or to harm inconvenient people. … How this most 
dangerous sitwa works can be summed up as ‘MSM’ – money, secret 
services, media.
Łapiński’s allegations should be viewed with caution in light of his con-
flict with President Kwaśniewski’s administration (see e.g. Krasowski 
2014). In 2006, however, in a conversation with Aleksander Gudzowaty 
(one of Poland’s richest men, who recorded the conversation), former 
Prime Minister Józef Oleksy stated that, ‘My sitwa did not give a damn 
about Poland’, though he went on to stress that this did not apply to him 
personally (Zapis 2007).
Large amounts of information on sitwy has been published in the 
Polish press. For example, in an interview published in 2012 under the 
heading, ‘Gorzów [a city in western Poland] is governed by sitwa’, a mem-
ber of the local opposition accused the city authorities of creating a sitwa 
consisting of a pyramid topped by the city’s president. ‘In this pyramid 
there are some 60, maybe 80 managers, various directors and friends. 
Then there are their families and colleagues’ (Rusek 2010). Also in 2012, 





























sitwa after they refused him access to documents in the notorious Amber 
Gold financial scandal (Drozdowski 2012).
Again, these accusations should be taken with a pinch of salt. In 
recent years, the term sitwa has become widely used in the mass media to 
describe informal networks within local and national government. Often 
it is hard to distinguish accusations levelled as a form of political cam-
paigning from descriptions of real problems.
3.19 Barone universitario (italy)
Simona Guerra
university of leicester, uK
As a general term, barone has come to indicate people who wield power 
and wealth in contemporary Italy. In particular, the term is used with ref-
erence to ‘university barons’ (barone universitario), who use their author-
ity within their profession to exercise undue power.
The term barone (in English ‘baron’) originally referred to the 
highest feudal degree in the thirteenth- century Italian feudal system. 
According to the Treccani Encyclopedia, the word ‘barone’, from the Latin, 
baro- baronis, may also refer to a cheater, villain or rascal. Don Abbondio 
shouts this insult in Alessandro Manzoni’s novel, The Betrothed (Manzoni 
1972 [1842]). In the Italian university system the term is negatively asso-
ciated with the practice of nepotism, although it may also be used more 
generally to describe senior academics working at the highest levels of sci-
entific research. When positively connoted, the term barone refers to full 
chair professors, who have built a network structure in their field of excel-
lence, in which colleagues include a number of their former researchers 
engaged in a career in academia. In this instance barone refers to know-
ledge and experience, but it can also be used negatively to refer to a sys-
tem of undue personal influence and co-optation (Tagliavini 2003).
The term barone is widely used in the national press and the media, 
and several major newspapers and magazines have produced special edi-
tions dedicated to ‘baroni universitari’. Magazines and newspapers, such 
as L’Espresso, Il Corriere della Sera and Il Fatto Quotidiano, have investi-
gated the impact and extent of the phenomenon, comparing it in style to 
practices employed by the mafia. Other publications and debates in the 
national media have been inspired by the personal accounts and experi-
ences of scholars.
When considering the Italian system of higher education, a com-
parison is often made with practices in the Spanish higher education sys-


















2813.19 Barone uniVerSitario  ( iTaly)
281
although the levels of localism in appointments in Spanish  universities 
seem to be lower (Francalacci 2014). A study conducted between 2000 
and 2010 looked at family connections in the Italian university system. 
It found evidence of the recruitment or promotion of a close relative 
(defined as ‘son or daughter, spouse, nephew or niece, son or daughter 
in law’) in 18 out of the 57 universities it surveyed across Italy. This prac-
tice could be detected in 6 of the 10 largest universities in the country 
(Bari, Bologna, Florence, Milan, Naples and Palermo) (Durante et al. 
2011). In 2008, at the Faculty of Medicine in Palermo, 58 of the 384 
professors had at least one close relative in the same faculty, while in 
2010, at the Medical Faculty in Messina, 100 out of 531, and in the 
Faculty of Law, 27 out of 75 members of the faculty were found to have 
appointed a close family member. A prosecutorial inquiry in Bari was 
reportedly known as the ‘I give, so that you will give’ (‘Do ut des’) trial, 
which seems to accurately describe the nature of relationships within 
the local network.
The impact of ‘familism’ in universities also has a negative effect in 
terms of the quality of research within departments. Studies show that 
the higher the levels of familism, the poorer the research performance. 
Further, an examination of poor civic values, along with a low sense of 
civic responsibility, shows that the decentralisation implemented after 
the 1998 educational reforms instigated by Minister Luigi Berlinguer 
had a negative impact, resulting in an even higher incidence of nepo-
tism (Durante et al. 2011: 23). The Berlinguer Act implemented by the 
Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR), enabled univer-
sities to appoint staff at a local level and replaced the previous system 
in which the national committee (concorso nazionale) had decided the 
selection of candidates. The reform was well intentioned in that it sought 
to speed up the hiring process and diminish bureaucratic selection pro-
cesses (Verzillo 2013), but had unexpected consequences.
Empirical results reveal a number of remaining shortcomings. 
First, it shows that the phenomenon of nepotism (Durante et al. 2011) 
might actually be hugely underestimated. When investigators attempted 
to trace relationships they based their searches on the assumption of a 
shared surname, which was not always the case. It was also supposed 
that large universities would be easier to investigate. Analyses at the 
administrative level of small universities, and at the periphery, with the 
opening of new universities, could have provided additional evidence. 
Second, it was found that decentralisation did not improve the low com-
petitiveness rates. In Italy salaries and teaching are controlled at national 

















and as was observed, ‘no penalties were associated with collusive behav-
iours’ (Verzillo 2013: 20).
Nicola Gardini’s book, I Baroni (‘Barons’ 2009) provides a snapshot 
of Italian academic life from the perspective of a member of staff, hired 
locally, but educated overseas. The system he describes has elements 
of both an old type of clientelism, which mixes a personal and affective 
nature, and new clientelism, which brings tangible benefits and provides 
the opportunity of an academic career to staff members (Caciagli 2006). 
He suggests that in order to distinguish between the two main types of 
baroni, it is necessary to divide them into two categories:  ‘strong’ bar-
ons and ‘weak’ barons. He defines ‘weak’ barons as professors, associates 
and researchers who are not involved in final decision processes and are 
in place ‘just to obey … as a consequence, they become very important 
[for baronia]. Without their cooperation, “strong” barons would not 
exist, as fathers would not exist without their sons and daughters’. Weak 
Barons support each other and subscribe to the same logic, which sees 
them defend the status quo, reasoning that to abolish the system might 
damage their own future prospects (Gardini 2009: 201– 2). This system 
is called ‘baronia’, and the author further postulates that ‘baronia is a lan-
guage’. Baronia describes an informal power of relations that maintains 
relationships of trust between individuals in unequal positions, based on 
an exchange of benefits. Baronia, as a clientelistic relationship, is based 
on particularistic interests, and within this system ‘in Italian academia’, 
Gardini warns, ‘purity does not exist’ (2009: 202).
As is typical of systems of corruption, the dynamic flows ‘from the 
top to the bottom’, spreading and choosing the network on the basis of 
pragmatism, to then further move upwards and create a system of ‘com-
plicity of interests’ (Della Porta 1997: 35– 6). The further the system 
spreads, the lower the costs and the more probable network opportun-
ities become. Italian Professor Francesco Gazzoni’s volume Co- Optations: 
Yesterday and Today (‘Cooptazioni: Ieri e oggi’) describes this network of 
interests as a mafia system of organisation. The ‘mafia’ analogy has also 
been made by Maestripieri, another university professor: ‘They [baroni] 
have hierarchies of power with a “boss” at the top, they aim to control 
entire areas of academia, and they do not hesitate to threaten and intimi-
date to get what they want’ (Maestripieri 2012: 2). For example, there 
have even been cases where qualified job candidates who competed 
against the baroni’s relatives or protégés were threatened with physical 
violence by mafia associates in order to make them withdraw from the 
competition (Maestripieri 2012: 2). Another shortcoming of the baronia 
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independent of the profile and requirements of the candidates and the 
curriculum. He compares the situation to the appointment of Incitatus, 
Caligula’s favourite horse, to the position of consul in the Roman Empire.
Further reforms, named after the Minister of Education, Mariastella 
Gelmini, and implemented in 2010, introduced, among others, a sys-
tem of national scientific licences, or abilitazione (‘National Scientific 
Qualification’, MIUR n.d.) – which called for the submission of a CV, 
publications and the research profile of candidates applying for the pos-
ition of Associate or Full Chair in the Italian Academia. The reform was 
contested. In 2012, the first round of abilitazioni sparked a wave of pro-
tests. Approximately 60,000 candidates submitted their applications; 
of which almost 24,000 attained the abilitazione as Associate and/or 
Full Chair. But it is estimated that about 8,000 appeals were submitted 
to TAR (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale), the Administrative Court, 
which deals with proceedings in which individuals consider themselves 
wronged. A further review of policy by the Ministry was requested. In 
November 2015, while this entry was being written, a new scandal came 
Figure 3.19.1 Narcisismo e cecitá dei baroni uccidono l’accademia 
italiana (The Narcissism and Blindness of Barons is Killing Italian 
Academia), Corriere della Sera, 28 January 2015.










to light (ROARS 2015). It was alleged that a baron asked university staff 
members to recruit colleagues as reviewers for the Quacquarelli Symonds 
(QS). This body, founded in 1990, has been responsible for providing 
the rankings of higher education institutions globally since 2004. It was 
apparent that the colleagues (who would be fully aware of the import-
ance of rankings for universities) would unfairly review the university in 
a positive light.
Baronia as a system is self- reinforcing and self- sustaining, but it 
is not an all- encompassing system in which knowing and working with 
‘strong’ barons can ensure the survival of the system itself. Numerous 
studies have found that the system is one of the main reasons why many 
researchers leave Italy (Morano- Foadi 2006). Examples of incidents 
provided by Nicola Gardini (2009) included intentionally being given 
the wrong timetable and venue for his teaching, as well as observations 
of low mobility and competitiveness (Verzillo 2013). Caciagli has noted 
that the baronia system has its roots in a code of ‘deference, which makes 
sense in a social context and from collective experiences’ (Caciagli 
2006). One of the main goals of the Gelmini reform was the renewal of 
the Italian academic system in the hope that it would produce honest, 
enthusiastic and brilliant scholars and researchers who would have suf-




Keiretsu consists of two kanji (Chinese) characters, kei meaning ‘series’ 
and retsu meaning ‘line’. It denotes a type of informal business group and 
may be translated as ‘cluster of interlinked firms’ (Lincoln and Gerlach 
2004: 1). A multi-layered concept, keiretsu is rooted in traditional 
Japanese society’s tendency to build business partnerships on the basis 
of family or clan. In the Edo period (1603– 1868), it became common for 
employees who had served a merchant family over a long period to be 
granted ownership of their own businesses while remaining within the 
structure of the family. This practice is known in Japan as norenwake; a 
comparable English concept is a franchised business. Norenwake is still 
practised in Japan and is common in small businesses; a typical example 
is a ramen noodle chain.
The Meiji Revolution of 1868, which propelled Japan into the mod-
ern era, saw the rise of powerful family- controlled business conglomer-
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are strong capital and human ties between member companies). Typical 
examples of keiretsu in the years preceding the Second World War, the 
zaibatsu dominated the Japanese economy until the war and influenced 
both foreign and domestic policy.
In pre-war Japan, the Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo conglom-
erates were known as the ‘Big Three’ (sandai) zaibatsu. They controlled 
companies in a wide range of activities including the mining and chemical 
industries as well as banking and finance. Comparable family- controlled 
conglomerates known as chaebol were found in Korea (e.g. Samsung and 
Hyundai) and India (e.g. Tata and Birla).
In the late 1940s, during the Allied occupation of Japan, the zai-
batsu were dismantled as part of the Allied Powers’ occupation policy. 
However, many zaibatsu reorganised themselves by means of share pur-
chases to form horizontally integrated kigyo- shudan, or horizontal kei-
retsu. The big three zaibatsu companies plus the Fuyo, Daiichi- kangin 
and Sanwa corporations, became known as the ‘Big Six’ (rokudai) kigyo- 
shudan. There was no longer an overall controlling company, but mem-
ber companies remained connected by means of cross- shareholdings. 
Horizontal keiretsu contributed to the development of large compan-
ies during the post- war economic miracle that saw Japan grow into 
the world’s second largest economy (after the USA) by the 1960s. 
Researchers sometimes use the degree of cross- shareholding as an 
indicator of group ties in horizontal keiretsu, but the practice of cross- 
shareholding has been reduced since the economic bubble burst in 
Japan in the early 1990s and, as a result, the practice of horizontal kei-
retsu in Japan has weakened.
Another form of keiretsu, known as vertical keiretsu, is seen as a 
key characteristic of the Japanese automotive industry. It resembles 
a supply- chain management system in which an original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) draws on collaborative, long- standing relations 
with dozens of key suppliers. There is no well- accepted definition of 
this practice; indeed, it can be difficult to define the border between kei-
retsu and non- keiretsu firms. For example, OEMs’ supplier associations, 
kyoryoku- kai, are considered one of keiretsu’s key characteristics, but 
these associations usually include companies that supply parts to mul-
tiple OEMs and thus cannot be considered keiretsu firms. In vertical 
keiretsu, an OEM holds a certain percentage of shares in some of its 
suppliers. However, Japanese OEMs have collaborative, long- standing 
relationships with suppliers whose shares are not owned by the OEM. 



















Some researchers analyse the role of keiretsu by means of trans-
action- cost economics. Vertical keiretsu allows an OEM to reduce costs 
arising from market failure by establishing collaborative relations with 
suppliers; it also helps to reduce costs arising from organisational fail-
ure through sharing the development and production burden with sup-
pliers. Others highlight the way in which vertical keiretsu enhances the 
competitiveness of the Japanese automotive industry by developing 
mutual trust between OEMs and their suppliers. Unlike the arm’s- length 
OEM– supplier relationship found in the West, Japanese suppliers often 
offer to provide OEMs with high- quality parts at cheaper prices. At the 
same time, these suppliers can receive various forms of support from 
the OEMs, such as expert advice on improving production or training 
and education opportunities. Such collaboration contributes to ongoing 
improvement, or kaizen, in Japanese OEMs’ production systems, their 
supply chains included.
Toyota’s supply chain is a typical example of vertical keiretsu. 
Toyota’s supplier association, Kyohokai, had 224 members in 2015. 
These suppliers have differing degrees of closeness to Toyota. Thirteen 
of them belong to the Toyota Group and Toyota holds at least 20 per 
cent of the shares of these companies. Toyota transfers corporate 
executives to posts on the boards of these companies. Their presidents 
and Toyota’s head meet on a monthly basis. Then there are another 
30 companies that do not belong to the Toyota Group, but of whose 
shares more than 20 per cent are held by Toyota; Toyota also trans-
fers corporate executives to serve on their boards. Of the remaining 
Kyohokai member companies, 180 do not have capital ties with Toyota. 
However some companies, such as Kojima Press Kogyo, are exclusively 
dedicated to Toyota, and are believed to have strong loyalty to Toyota. 
Kyohokai’s activities include (Kyohokai website 2015):
1. General assembly: an annual meeting of member- companies.
2. Meetings of the Board of Directors: held three times a year.
3. Executive round- table:  representatives of member- companies meet 
with Toyota’s executives to promote mutual communication.
4. Business management and special interest lectures:  lecturers and 
Toyota executives provide insights on topical management issues to 
member- companies.
5. Social events: various events aimed at fostering close relations and 
effective communication between Toyota and member- companies.
6. Theme- specific research groups:  joint research activities on topics 
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7. Body- and unit- part sectional meetings: a variety of activities aimed 
at promoting two- way communication between Toyota and member- 
companies and developing a common understanding of the issues 
affecting the automotive industry.
During the period of Japan’s rapid economic growth (which came 
to an end with the bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble in 1991), 
most of the Japanese automotive OEMs depended heavily on their kei-
retsu suppliers for parts- purchasing. However, the vertical keiretsu in 
the Japanese automotive industry in general has weakened since the 
bubble burst. This was particularly the case with Mazda, Mitsubishi 
and Nissan, which formed capital ties with overseas OEMs. In the case 
of Nissan, which formed an alliance with Renault in 1999, one of the 
executives, Carlos Ghosn, clearly stated that Nissan’s keiretsu system 
had not functioned well. Nissan subsequently launched the Nissan 
Revival Plan and tasked its suppliers with reducing their prices by 20 
per cent over three years. Toyota also initiated a competitive purchas-
ing strategy in 2000, ‘Construction of Cost Competitiveness for the 
21st Century’, the aim of which was to reduce purchasing costs by 30 
per cent over three years. However, Toyota did not use this scheme 
to terminate its dealings with uncompetitive suppliers. Rather, it pro-
vided support to help existing suppliers improve their competitiveness. 
In the mid- 2000s, Nissan again began to stress the importance of col-
laborative, long- term relationships with suppliers, and initiated new 
supplier- support activities.
The cases of Toyota and Nissan suggest that vertical keiretsu con-
tinues to operate in the Japanese automotive industry. However, today’s 
keiretsu differs from that which existed before the 1990s. It may be said 
that vertical keiretsu has developed by incorporating competitive aspects, 
and formed a hybrid style between the Japanese collaborative style and 
Western competitive ways.
3.21 Kanonieri qurdebi (Georgia)
alexander Kupatadze
King’s russia institute and department of european and 
international Studies, King’s college, london
Kanonieri qurdebi is best translated in English as ‘thieves- professing- the- 
code’, but is usually translated literally, as ‘thieves- in- law’ (in Russian 
vory- v- zakone). ‘Thieves- in- law’ refers to leaders of organised crime 

















defined as ‘networking criminal leaders who engage collectively in mafia 
activities’ (Slade 2013:  17), and senior criminal figures who ‘main-
tain, interpret and enforce the thieves’ code’ (Galeotti 1998: 429). Like 
Sicilian mafia godfathers, qurdebi operate within a defined honour code 
and maintain strict secrecy. This code is often referred to as ‘understand-
ings’ (gageba) – that is, ‘a set of preserved, ritualised practices and sta-
tus markers guided by a well- articulated, codified yet fluctuating body of 
rules’ (Slade 2013: 17).
The fraternity of qurdebi became known as ‘thieves’ world’ (qurduli 
samkaro). Formally, all qurdebi are equal in status. However, there are sig-
nificant differences in terms of influence within and beyond the network 
depending on the resources an individual qurdi has access to. There are 
three different factions within the network named after three Georgian 
cities: the Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Sukhumi networks. These networks have 
been mostly competing over the resources and influence in Georgia as 
well as in other countries where Georgian organised crime has been suc-
cessfully transplanted (Russia, Spain, Austria and France among others). 
Despite being in competition with each other, the factions also coordin-
ate activities through meetings or thieves’ courts (skhodka), where intra 
and inter- factional conflicts are discussed and new recruits are initiated 
through ‘baptising’ (‘crowning the candidate’). Qurdebi collectively pool 
resources to an administrative and trading body and common fund (obsh-
chak, see 5.22 Volume 2) based on voluntary and involuntary (extortion) 
contributions from various sources both in and outside of the prisons 
(Varese 2001). Qurdebi manage the expenditure of the obshchak and 
supervise the inflow of income through ‘overseers’ (makureblebi), the rep-
resentatives of the qurdebi in a particular prison or in a given territory.
Most scholarship on the topic finds that ‘thieves-in-law’ origi-
nated in the Soviet gulag labour camps in the 1930s (Chalidze 1977; 
Applebaum 2003). However, the archival evidence from the Caucasian 
State Okhranka (Tsarist secret service) contained in Georgia suggests 
that kanonieri qurdebi predated the Soviet Union. A secret letter from an 
Okhranka officer dated 1908 speaks about the ‘thieves’ slang’ (vorovskoy 
zhargon) in the Tbilisi city prison. In the same period the Okhranka con-
fiscated a letter from an inmate that complained about thieves’ extortion 
and their control of the prisons in Tbilisi. Qurdebi emerged as an influen-
tial power structure in the Soviet gulags because they were empowered 
by the Soviet authorities to control the gulag population (Montefiore 
2007; Shelley 2007). Because the gulag was their birthplace, the impact 
of qurdebi has been most consistent in prisons, despite their fading influ-
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In Georgia qurdebi have capitalised on some romanticism attached 
to the peasant outlaws abragi. One of the most celebrated pieces in con-
temporary Georgian literature is Data Tutashkhia (1975) by Chabua 
Amirejibi, which paints a heroic image of a Georgian abragi fighting 
Russian imperial injustice. The resistance to colonialism coupled with the 
opportunities provided by crime turned many of the ‘freedom fighters’ 
into outlaws. Originally, the abragi were men who escaped blood feuds 
after committing a crime by taking to the mountains. After the Russian 
Empire came to the South Caucasus in the early nineteenth century, abr-
agi denoted those resisting the Russians. These circumstances cultivated 
romanticism towards criminality, which then served as the basis for simi-
lar attitudes towards the qurdebi. Another celebrated Georgian author 
Nodar Dumbadze chronicles the life of a just, pious and moral qurdi in his 
1973 novel White Flags (Godson et al. 2004).
Georgia contributed disproportionally to the world of the Soviet 
thieves- in- law. This small nation, comprising 2 per cent of the overall 
population of the Soviet Union, contributed 31.6 per cent of the pro-
fessional criminals active in the Soviet Union. In comparison, the much 
larger Russian population provided 33.1 per cent (Serio and Razinkin 
1995: 77). Some researchers have explained this disproportionality in 
terms of cultural traits of Georgians, manifested in risk- taking, hon-
our- based trust and eagerness to use violence (Mars and Altman 1983). 
However, the most plausible explanation lies in the strong informal 













economy that thrived due to the near monopoly of sub- tropical Georgia 
on the supply of wine, fruit, tobacco and tea to the closed Soviet mar-
ket. Georgian criminals gathered extensive resources through what 
amounted to a de facto ‘tax’ imposed on the domestic shadow economy 
(Shelley 2007; Scott 2015). The commercialisation of qurduli samkaro 
was not commensurate with original ‘understandings’ that forbade any 
link with state representatives and owning private property (Afanasyev 
1994: 438; Glonti and Lobjanidze 2004). However, in the 1970s and 
1980s some of the rules changed or were discarded, and qurdebi have 
jumped on the burgeoning opportunities generated by legal and illegal 
markets.
In the 1990s the newly independent post- Soviet Georgia was sub-
stantially weakened by lack of public trust in its institutions, and their 
failure to provide basic public goods such as protection of property rights. 
This created major demand for the services of kanonieri qurdebi, who 
stepped in to fill the void and provide the services of protection, dispute 
resolution and debt collection (Volkov 2002; Slade 2013). Businesses and 
citizens were reluctant to turn to the inefficient and corrupt courts and 
instead sought justice through qurdebi. Ironically, government officials 
and even policemen would be frequently found among those turning to 
qurdebi for help. Qurdebi also headed groups involved in wide- ranging 
semi- legal and illegal activities including gambling, human kidnapping 
for ransom, drug smuggling, robberies and car theft. Throughout the 
post- Soviet period qurdebi evolved into influential power wielders enjoy-
ing extensive links with officials of law enforcement structures and politi-
cians, and sometimes running joint businesses with them, for example, 
wholesale markets or petrol stations (Slade 2013).
Qurdebi were also successful in generating popular legitimacy and 
would often engage in charitable works, especially through the widely 
popular Georgian Orthodox Church. Due to their lavish lifestyle and dis-
plays of power, qurdebi became role models among the youth – in 1995 
more than 25 per cent of school children surveyed said that they aspired 
to become a qurdi (Serio and Razinkin 1995: 76).
Due to the large number of thieves, Georgia differed from other 
post- Soviet republics in terms of impact of this type of organised crime on 
politics and the economy. In Central Asia, Russia and Ukraine, for exam-
ple, thieves initially focused more on racketeering and extortion and 
only later developed political ties, while in Georgia qurdebi penetrated 
politics immediately after the Soviet break-up. Jaba Ioseliani, qurdi and 
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Shevardnadze’s deputy in the early 1990s. In the rest of the former Soviet 
Union thieves can be distinguished from other types of criminal groups 
that developed outside of the thieves’ world, for example gangs of sports-
men (in particular specialists of martial arts) that moved to organised 
crime after the abundant Soviet funding for sports had dried up (Volkov 
2002). In Georgia most of the groups representing sportsmen were sub-
ordinate to the thieves’ influence. For example, a group of wrestlers 
arrested in 2005 were operational leaders of an organised crime group 
with international connections. The group was headed by influential 
kanonieri qurdebi and also had a former police official (a former head of 
an anti- corruption unit of Ministry of Internal Affairs) in its ranks. The 
group was engaged in kidnapping, robberies and selling illegally traf-
ficked cars from Europe in Georgia (Ministry of Internal Affairs Special 
Operations Department 2005).
Towards the end of the 1990s thieves were caught up in violent 
conflicts with competing criminals and faced an increasingly repres-
sive state that had been investing in its coercive capacity (Varese 
2001). As a consequence thieves have gradually lost their influence 
on politics and the economy, although still maintained their grip over 
the prisons. In Georgia qurdebi showed the most resilience, through 
manipulating their links with law enforcement officials and politi-
cians, and dominated illicit markets until the early 2000s (Shelley 
2007; Kupatadze 2012). Their dominance has been undermined only 
since the 2003 Rose Revolution, the protest movement that resulted in 
regime change in Georgia. The Rose Revolution is often described as 
a popular uprising against rampant corruption and unpunished crime. 
The state response to qurdebi has changed from tolerance to antag-
onism in the aftermath of the Revolution, and the new reformist gov-
ernment has integrated the campaign against organised crime into its 
state- building project. Targeted by policies of zero- tolerance to crime 
and the legislation modelled on American and Italian anti- mafia laws, 
qurdebi have lost most of their business assets and their links with the 
state have been undermined. However, in the penal institutions infor-
mal criminal hierarchies have perpetuated, albeit in increasing sub-
ordination to the formal authorities (Kupatadze 2012). Escaping the 
domestic crackdown, most qurdebi have moved to Russia or Europe. A 
number of law enforcement operations in various European countries 
in 2005– 13 have targeted large criminal gangs headed by Georgian 




















3.22 Silovye Gruppirovki (bulgaria)
igor mitchnik
ucl, uK
The Bulgarian term silovye gruppirovki can be literally translated as vio-
lent groups. The term, which is widely known in Bulgaria, can also be 
understood as a pun; in Bulgarian sila means both power and violence 
(Langenscheidts 2005: 180). The term is also commonly translated in 
English as ‘violent entrepreneurship’ and is used to describe a form of 
organised crime that developed in Bulgaria during the transition period 
of the 1990s (CSD 2009: 3).
The members of these violent groups are known as mutri, mean-
ing ‘thug’, ‘bully’ or ‘gorilla’ (Carvajal and Castle 2008; Bagasheva and 
Pencheva 2009: 455; Bulanova- Hristova 2011: 342). Vadim Volkov 
described the Russian equivalent of silovye gruppirovki as racketeers, 
who produced ‘both, the danger and, at a price, the shield against it’. 
They were – and to some extent still are – ‘violent entrepreneurs’ who 
‘convert organized force (or organized violence) into money’ (Volkov 
2000: 710, 725). In the 1990s members of the silovye gruppirovki 
groups in Bulgaria were responsible for an increasingly insecure envir-
onment and thereby they created a demand for their services from 
both business and members of the public who sought a guarantee of 
personal security. The rates they offered to their clients were two to 
three times cheaper than the cost of hiring police officers (Dzhekova 
and Rusev 2015: 32f.).
The noticeable success of the silovye gruppirovki resulted from the 
specific social and political circumstances prevalent in post- communist 
Bulgaria. First, the collapse of the centralised Bulgarian communist sys-
tem in 1989 left immense resources, which had to be transformed from 
state assets to private property (Bulanova 2008: 57). Second, during the 
period of the chaotic privatisation process in Bulgaria, communist elites, 
who were fully cognisant of the extent and value of the resources, sought 
to accumulate wealth by buying and selling them (Ganev 2007: 186; 
Bulanova 2008: 57). This personal accumulation of wealth was facili-
tated by the ‘gradual loss of statehood’ during the transition period –  
characterised by legal chaos, lack of institutional and judicial regula-
tion, as well as widespread insecurity (Bulanova 2008: 66). Under these 
circumstances, the post- communist Bulgarian state failed to guarantee 
either property rights or contract compliance. Therefore the absence of 
















2933.22 SiloVYe gruppiroVki  (bulGaria)
293
A further contributory factor to the growth of the security service 
sector was that it was particularly appealing to former wrestlers who 
lost their jobs with the collapse of the communist system. In the People’s 
Republic of Bulgaria, wrestling had been a popular sport in which the 
Communist Party had invested a substantial amount of money estab-
lishing sporting facilities and organising tournaments. Bulgarian wres-
tlers were successful on the international stage and thus considered to 
enhance the reputation of the Republic in the world. In return for their 
perceived contribution to the country’s international status, the sports-
men were compensated with a comfortable lifestyle, guaranteed by the 
state (Appelius 2006: 169; Bulanova- Hristova 2011: 341). After the 
sudden cessation of the totalitarian state control in November 1989 and 
during the first years of the transition, the sportsmen were deprived of 
their privileges. The former wrestlers found themselves in urgent need 
of alternative employment. A large number of these wrestlers decided 
to use their physical strength, together with their connections to for-
mer communist elites, to fill the gap in the supply of security services. 
Businesses with security services – sourced through either private secur-
ity companies or so- called ‘insurance companies’ – became the main 
source of income for the former wrestlers. Serving their own monetary 
interests, the former wrestlers organised in gangs and became ‘violent 
entrepreneurs’ – the so- called silovye gruppirovki. The gangs were regis-
tered as official companies offering a variety of security services. These 
‘problem- solving services’ ranged from violent ‘persuasion’ of private 
persons, often contract partners on behalf of their clients (Volkov 1999: 
750; Appelius 2006: 169; Bulanova- Hristova 2011: 342– 4), to vandal-
ism, kidnapping and assassinations (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81).
Crucial elements within the social networks of the former wres-
tlers were a number of dismissed employees from the former com-
munist security service Darshavna Sigurnost (DS), as well as former 
employees of the interior ministry of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria 
(Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81; Bulanova- Hristova 2011: 342f). The 
use of personal networks – which may be regarded as the Bulgarian 
version of blat (Ledeneva 2011: 720) – involving former state employ-
ees, was exceptionally valuable for the violent entrepreneurs, thanks 
to the former employees’ specific knowledge of Bulgarian politics 
and economy, as well as their durable international networks, estab-
lished during the communist era. Accordingly, the former employees 
of Darshavna Sigurnost are considered to have presided over and 
been the main initiators of the culture of ‘violent entrepreneurship’ 






















The racketeering business, however, was not the only source of 
income for the silovye gruppirovki. While the Bulgarian state officially boy-
cotted Serbia in the Bosnian war (1992– 5), the criminal gangs ensured 
Figure 3.22.1 Some notorious underground bosses, who were 
involved in racketeering, became widely known in Bulgaria. This picture 
shows a selection of biographies of some famous criminal figures sold at 
a Bulgarian petrol station.
Source: https:// flic.kr/ p/ 8wDeiL. © Jonathan Baker- Bates, 2010. 
Licensed under CC BY- SA 2.0.
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the supply of goods such as fuel to the Serbian regime (Appelius 2006: 
170f.; Carvajal and Castle 2008). In brief, the political and economic 
networks of the silovye gruppirovki facilitated their impunity and thereby 
paved the way for the continuous undermining of the state’s monop-
oly on the control of security (Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 81f.; Bulanova 
2008: 54– 7; Carvajal and Castle 2008; Bilefsky 2010; Bulanova- Hristova 
2011: 343f.; Dzhekova and Rusev 2015: 32f.).
Between 1990 and 1994 the private security companies were 
essentially unregulated. In this environment, the silovye gruppirovki were 
able to launder money earned through other illegal businesses, which 
included trade in stolen cars, the supply of drugs and arms, and earn-
ings gained from prostitution (Bulanova- Hristova 2011: 344; Dzhekova 
and Rusev 2015: 32f.). Yet the high visibility of the silovye gruppirovki 
increased the pressure on state institutions to react. From 1994 onwards, 
an increasing number of investigations and enhanced law enforcement 
measures saw a decline in the number of so- called security companies. 
As a result of institutional pressure, it became harder to receive a licence 
to start a security company and licences were denied to companies where 
the founders or employees of the company were under investigation. As 
a consequence, between 1994 and 1997, a number of private security 
companies repositioned themselves as insurance companies. In practice 
these so- called insurance companies were able to continue their semi- 
legal businesses simply by adopting a new name (Dzhekova and Rusev 
2015: 33). One of the biggest and most notorious of those security com-
panies was Vasil Illiev Security (VIS); registered in 1992 it changed its 
name to VIS2 in 1994 (Appelius 2006: 170).
Since 1995, much of the illegal money brutally earned by the 
silovye gruppirovki has been invested in legal and increasingly pros-
perous sectors, such as in Bulgarian tourism. Former gang members 
invested in hotels and in the fruit trade on the Black sea coast in Varna 
and Burgas; additionally money was laundered through waste disposal 
companies (Appelius 2006: 171). Some rich gang members even bought 
soccer clubs, attracted by the possibility of a scenario ‘where money can 
be laundered through huge fees paid for transfers of players’ (Carvajal 
and Castle 2008). Since 2007 the process has continued. In recent times 
the well- established system of money laundering saw investment in real 
estate in the Bulgarian capital Sofia. It enabled several former leading 
gang members to successfully transform their image into that of well- 
respected businessmen (Appelius 2006: 176). A World Bank Enterprise 
Survey in 2013 found that nearly 75 per cent of Bulgarian private com-



















East European countries (Carvajal and Castle 2008; Dzhekova and Rusev 
2015: 42).
According to Bulgarian police sources, the majority of security and 
insurance companies are no longer involved in extortion or racketeer-
ing. Exceptions, however, are found within the agriculture sector in the 
Bulgarian provinces and in low- grade nightclubs where a culture of ‘pro-
tection’ is still evident (Dzhekova and Rusev 2015: 53f). Actors involved 
in the shadow economy are found to be implicated in violent ‘debt col-
lection’ in the aforementioned sectors. Since the end of the 1990s, the 
re- establishment of state power and the increasing re- enforcement of the 
rule of law by the Bulgarian state have succeeded in marginalising the 
silovye gruppirovki. Yet analysts of the security sector agree that informal 
contacts between the political class and the heads of private security and 
insurance companies, which replaced the silovye gruppirovki, still persist 
(Dzhekova and Rusev 2015).
3.23 Omertà (italy)
anna Sergi
department of Sociology, university of essex, uK
Omertà denotes a code of honour that requires a person to maintain 
silence about crimes or other illegal actions that they either witnessed 
or came to know about, whether directly or indirectly. The individual 
is obliged to protect the identity of the perpetrator and must not reveal 
any information that might draw the perpetrator to the attention of the 
authorities. This is the case even when the individual was themselves 
the victim of the crime. The term is used almost exclusively in connec-
tion with crimes committed by mafia- type organisations. It enables such 
organisations to rely on the omertà of entire communities as protec-
tion against investigation and/ or prosecution by state law  enforcement 
agencies.
The origin of the word omertà is contested. One of the earliest 
explanations was that proposed by Giuseppe Pitré, an ethnologist from 
Palermo who linked the term to the Italian word uomo (man), thereby 
associating it with ‘manhood’ or ‘virility’ (Lupo 2011). In this sense, 
omertà is the attribute of a man who is essentially responsible for him-
self and who remains independent of the law and the state. This mean-
ing has been criticised from a moral standpoint since it can be seen to 
link the idea of manhood with disrespect for collective values. Indeed, it 
might condone behaviours outside the law, including vendettas and vigi-
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word umiltà, meaning ‘humbleness’ but, in certain areas of Southern 
Italy, denoting ‘discretion’ or ‘privacy’. In the Sicilian dialect, the word 
is pronounced umirtà, which might explain the derivation of omertà 
(Alongi 1977/ 1886). This explanation has also been criticised on the 
grounds that it justifies silence and non- cooperation as acts of discretion 
rather than as attempts to pervert the course of justice (Deaglio 1993). 
As a result, the precise origin of the word remains unclear. In its current 
usage, the word appears to borrow from both etymologies. The idea that 
if someone minds their own business and does not get involved in things 
that do not directly pertain to them is seen, in many cultures prevalent in 
Southern Italy, as a sign of ‘manhood’.
In English, the word omertà is often written without the stress 
on the final ‘a’  – omerta. It is usually translated as ‘code of silence’ or 
‘conspiracy of silence’ and is used almost exclusively in relation to the 
behaviour of mafia members and external supporters (Albanese 1996). 
When used in the English- speaking world, the term often has a very spe-
cific connotation, deriving from the fight by the US authorities against 
Italian– American Cosa Nostra families. From the Italian viewpoint, the 
way the term is used abroad gives rise to considerable confusion. It seems 
that omertà in these circumstances is used to define a specific affiliation 
to mafia organisations that results in mafia members and their families 
or supporters refusing to cooperate with the authorities and behaving, 
instead, as a secret society.
It may appear, when the term omertà is translated, that the behav-
iour it encapsulates is specifically Italian. This is not, however, the case. 
On the contrary: it may be argued that refusing, out of a sense of privacy 
and of honour, to cooperate with the authorities is a much more wide-
spread phenomenon. It is found in every secret and/ or criminal organ-
isation in the world, from youth gangs to drug- trafficking networks. It 
is, however, true, as Schneider and Schneider (2005) have argued, that 
the essential features of omertà – the element of choice of this behaviour 
rather than its coercion, paired with its collective dimension – are pecu-
liar to certain enclave cultures, not just in Italy but everywhere in the 
world where small, geographically isolated communities are found.
There is, moreover, a darker meaning to the word omertà as it is 
used today in Italy. While in Southern Italy the word has long been essen-
tially associated with mafia- type organisations, this has recently become 
increasingly the case in the north of the country too. In its common 
usage, omertà denotes ‘the categorical prohibition of cooperation with 
state authorities or reliance on its [the state’s] services, even when one 


























can result in the murder of an individual who shares information with 
the authorities, since snitchers are not welcome in any secret and/ or 
criminal organisation. With this more structured meaning, the term has 
entered the law in Italy, whereby article 416- bis of the Italian Penal Code 
identifies behaviour motivated by omertà as one of the characteristic 
elements of the mafia clans. The criminalisation of membership of mafia 
associations in Italy is, as a result, based on the criminalisation of a set of 
behaviours (Sergi 2014) that manifest themselves through social harm. 
Omertà is a red flag for communities and individuals, warning them of 
the danger of such social harm.
One problem behind the definition of omertà is the difficulty of 
capturing what it essentially is, how it manifests itself, and how it can 
be measured and/ or assessed. Often no formal or explicit prohibition 
is placed on the act of talking to the authorities. Rather, the behaviour 
that is demanded is one of voluntary omission, dependent on the choice 
and judgement of a particular individual within a given community. It 
follows that it is at times very difficult to distinguish between omertà and 
the silence originating from discretion and privacy. It is not uncommon – 
particularly though not exclusively in small communities – to consider 
silence the best practice when it comes to business unrelated to oneself 
or one’s family. Except when silence becomes criminal conduct – lying to 
Figure 3.23.1 Cultural practices in Southern Italy.
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the authorities, for example, especially cases relating to mafia crimes –  
many local communities actively promote the principle of silence. In 
many southern Italian villages, for example, one sees posters in local 
dialects whose message translates as, ‘Whoever minds their own busi-
ness will live a hundred years and will live a better life’. This attitude, 
entrenched as it is in popular culture, may or may not have anything to 
do with mafia protection rackets and/ or a low sense of civic duty.
Clearly, however, omertà is not a positive practice. The opposite is 
the case. Civic engagement is a crucial factor in the fight against organ-
ised crime (Cayli 2013). This is especially true in those regions where 
law- enforcement agencies struggle to penetrate the dense networks of 
mafia engagement. If the fight against mafias is to succeed, it will be 
essential for local populations to actively reject mafia influence and dom-
inance (Arlacchi 1986; Dickie 2007; La Spina 2014). At the same time, 
however, omertà should not be considered simply as a clear- cut code of 
(mafia) (dis)honour to which people from certain areas and certain cul-
tures subscribe. Omertà can be found in many forms and in many com-
munities around the world, but it goes under different names and is not 
always commonly recognised for what it is.
3.24 Nash chelovek (russia)
Åse berit Grødeland
fafo research foundation (oslo), norway
and
leslie holmes
university of melbourne, australia
Nash chelovek is one of the most common concepts reflecting informal-
ity in Russia (plural: nashi lyudi, or the closely related svoi lyudi literally 
translated as ‘our people’). In some contexts a better rendering of nash 
chelovek is ‘one of ours’ or ‘one of us’, though the term is all too often 
translated as ‘our man’. Despite the commonality of the concept, an 
online search, using both Latin and Cyrillic script, reveals that very lit-
tle has been published on it. Such searches do however indicate that the 
phrase often makes it into the titles of movies and books, some of which 
will be familiar to Anglophone readers (e.g. the Russian title for Graham 
Greene’s Our Man in Havana), or in videos on Soviet leaders. A Russian 
play by Aleksandr Ostrovskii, Svoi Lyudi – Sochtemsya (usually translated 
as It’s a Family Affair – We’ll Settle It Ourselves, but referring to the code of 





















Linguistically, the use of svoi is more restricted than that of nashi, 
and similarly the circle of svoi lyudi is narrower in comparison to that of 
nashi lyudi. Svoi connotes belonging (as opposed to ‘stranger’, ‘foreigner’ 
or ‘outsider’ (chuzhoi), whereas nash implies solidarity (the opposite of 
‘alien’ or ‘extraneous’ (chuzhdyi) (personal communication with Svetlana 
McMillin)). The words can however be used interchangeably. The div-
isive meaning of both nash chelovek and svoi lyudi points to the ever- shift-
ing and thus hard- to- pin- down borderline between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The 
confrontation between ‘one of us’ and ‘not one of us’ appeared in Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s novel The Karamazov Brothers (2007 [1880]). Following an 
altercation with his second son (Ivan), the father of the three Karamazov 
brothers, Fyodor Pavlovich, tells his youngest son (Alyosha) that ration-
alist Ivan ‘is not one of us in soul … Ivan is not one of us. People like Ivan 
are not our sort, my boy’ (Ibid.: 190).
In Soviet times, nash chelovek was most often used pejoratively 
with the word ‘not’ in front of it, usually meaning someone who does not 
share the same view of the world and emphasising certain ideological 
connotations. The frequency of negative usage may be interpreted as an 
expression of Russian ‘negative identity’, defined by what it is not rather 
than standing for its own set of values (Gudkov 2004). The intricacies 
of crossing the ‘us versus them’ border are depicted in an early film by 
Nikita Mikhalkov, Svoi Sredi Chuzhikh, Chuzhoi Sredi Svoikh (1974; 
the title is usually translated into English as At Home Among Strangers, 
though a more literal translation would be One’s Own Among Strangers, A 
Stranger Among One’s Own). In the post- Soviet context, and particularly 
in contemporary Russia, understanding of continuity and change in the 
usage of the term presents a challenge: what does it mean to Russians 
nowadays; how do people view divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’; and do 
their perceptions reflect on the private/ public division, the ‘Russian idea’ 
in Putin’s Russia, or wider societal tendencies?
Using an original dataset on legal culture, corruption and law- 
enforcement in Russia, funded by the Norwegian Research Council, 
we have distinguished several types of discourse on ‘nash chelovek’ 
(Grødeland and Holmes, in progress). In 2013, 18 focus groups, each of 
8 persons, in various parts of Russia, both urban and rural, were asked 
to discuss practical usages of the term nash chelovek; the data collected 
were subsequently analysed using N- Vivo software. The discussions iden-
tified the following range of meanings and concentric circles of belong-
ing: from trusted persons and those sharing less formal, subjectively 
formulated identifiers (similar interests, shared professional experience, 
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identity (the same country, region or place) or emphasising a mix of the 
above.
According to the frequency of responses, the significance of shar-
ing (similar interests, views and so on) predominated over trustworthi-
ness and compatriotism. The most revealing result, however, was the 
overall predominance of other meanings, among them ‘close to one’s 
family’, ‘someone with whom you’d go drinking’, ‘someone who helps 
us’ and ‘someone you respect’, thereby pointing to the ambiguity of 
the term nash chelovek. Such ambiguity expresses essential features 
of the sense of belonging: defined by context and hard to pin down in 
a general way. While you can be one of us in one context, you can be 
excluded in others. The moving boundaries between us and them and the 
context- bound nature of nash chelovek can thus be regarded as part of its 
conceptualisation.
The most identifiable meaning of nash chelovek relates to sharing, 
that is someone who has ‘common views’, thinks ‘in the same manner’ 
or ‘shares the same interests’ as the others. Such circles of people share 
the same values, engage in the same type of behaviour, ‘understand’ one 
another and are considered ‘reliable’. It is therefore possible to depend on 
them and to ‘reach an agreement’ with them. Here are some of the typical 
responses: ‘a person who thinks in the same way’ (Focus Group [FG]10, 
Maksharip); ‘this is a person with my interests’ (FG13, Sergei); ‘a person 
with our views and emotions’ (FG15, Anna); ‘a person who is convenient, 
useful; there are some common interests and goals’ (FG2, Lyudmila).
While the concept is generally context- bound, certain contexts such 
as sports or professional experience invoke particular understanding of 
sharing, close to solidarity:  ‘I think that if a supporter of the [Moscow] 
football club Spartak said “our man,” then another supporter would also 
call him “our man” ’ (FG12, Musa); ‘a person who does sports, who does 
not drink or smoke’ (FG7, Tolya); ‘this is professionalism’ (FG16, Yuri).
While some focus group participants confined nash chelovek to per-
sonalised trust, meaning ‘someone who can be trusted/ is trusted’ or ‘can 
be relied upon’ – ‘nash chelovek is like me … someone on whom one can 
rely’ (FG17, Tatyana) – others opted for more general contexts, such as 
politics – ‘(a person) with a red banner’ (FG1, Igor) – or someone who 
also enjoys a drink: ‘he drinks (like us) – nash chelovek’ (FG1, Dimitrii). 
Thus, nash chelovek may be an ‘acquaintance’ or a ‘close person’, such 
as a member of one’s family or one’s own circle, but it can also refer to 
President Vladimir Putin, as well as to unspecified ‘nationalists’: ‘Putin 
is our man’ (FG13, Nina); ‘nationalists’ (FG16, Chechen). It should be 

















the establishment of the youth organisation Nashi (‘Ours’, established 
2005), which was seen by some as having nationalist tendencies and 
was compared with the Soviet- era youth movement the Komsomol, and 
even with the Hitler Youth (Whipple 2006; Young 2007). Such com-
parisons and Nashi’s reputation for thuggery began to embarrass Putin 
in his third term (Stanovaya 2013), and the organisation has since 
been replaced by less confrontational groups such as ‘Set’ (‘network’; 
Nemtsova 2014).
The divisiveness of cohesion, implicit in the term, may be illustrated 
by diverging views on whether the term essentially refers to belonging to 
one’s own ethnic group and/ or to living in one’s own country or local 
community (‘locals’ (FG8, Vera)); occasionally it may refer to belonging 
to ‘a workers’ collective’ (FG17, Julia), or be more generally associated 
with ‘Russians’ (FG5, Nikolai), ‘our people abroad’ (FG2, Vladimir) or ‘a 
patriot’ (FG7, Vova).
The patriotic connotations of nash chelovek are somewhat wider 
than those of the more exclusive and pragmatic- sounding svoi chelovek. 
Exploring the instrumental connotations of nash chelovek was aimed at 
establishing whether or not this term is used to describe people who pull 
strings, use connections, or go between. Some participants noted that 
nash chelovek is someone who can effectively do this. Nash chelovek can 
promote the interests of a locality or group of people, defend someone 
or ‘fight for the truth’. Further, and more importantly, he or she is influ-
ential and thus able to achieve something, including resolving prob-
lems. Sometimes nash chelovek is able to achieve something that, in 
principle, is not feasible. But he or she might also be ‘ dishonest’, ‘break 
the law’ or ‘engage in corruption’: ‘someone who does something for 
our local area’ (FG17, Aleksandr); ‘someone who promotes the inter-
ests of the masses’ (FG10, Nadezhda); ‘an influential person’ (FG12, 
Makka); ‘someone working in the police or who works somewhere, 
you have an acquaintance. Aha – “nash chelovek” ’ (FG17, Elena); ‘some 
problems may be settled through him/ her’ (FG17, Sergei); ‘from the 
depths of corruption, nash chelovek is the one bought by me’ (FG15, 
Alevtina); ‘corrupted people’ (FG16, Petr); ‘it is something dishonest’ 
(FG1, Natalia); ‘nash chelovek will most likely violate the rules and 
laws’ (FG9, Aleksei); ‘someone who steals together (with someone)’ 
(FG15, Sergei).
Those who were uncertain how to define nash chelovek noted 
that the term has ‘different’, ‘dual’ or ‘broad’ meanings, is context- 
dependent, and is used essentially as a slang word. According to our 
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the practical usage of the term nash chelovek in Russia today. However, 
the views of those who committed to a clear response and highlighted 
consensus that emerged around the idea of sharing – predominantly, 
sharing similar views and values – were not essentially different from 
the connotations of nash chelovek in the Soviet era. Specific meanings 
are context- bound and, in those contexts where nash chelovek can be 
‘appropriated’ for pursuing certain interests, its meaning is closest to 
‘svoi chelovek’.
What is clear even from the small sample of responses cited here 
is that, whereas some Russians will turn to ‘one of us’ to obtain some-
thing or to resolve a problem through unofficial channels and means, 
others are critical of nash chelovek precisely because their understanding 
of informality precludes bending the rules too much. What is also clear 
is that it is unsurprising that outside observers find it so difficult to pin 
down the concept of nash chelovek; other cultures can be rather opaque 
to external analysts, especially when the locals themselves are divided 
about the meaning of an ambiguous term (for further examples from 
other post- communist societies see Miller et al. 2001).




Birzha refers to a group of male teenagers or young men who meet regu-
larly in open spaces (squares, courtyards, basements), mostly in urban 
areas. In standard Russian language the term literally means ‘stock 
exchange’. However, the Dictionary of Georgian Slang (Bregadze 2005) 
defines an alternative meaning of birzha as ‘an outdoor gathering of idle 
youth’. The reference to the financial world is somewhat ironic as the par-
ticipants are generally economically inactive; on the other hand, valuable 
exchange does take place in birzha, but of social capital rather than finan-
cial capital. In Russian language another slang extension to the meaning 
of the term birzha dates back to the nineteenth century, and refers to a 
place where people wait for a temporary job (Dal’ 1955, in Zakharova 
2010). Ethnographic research on post- Soviet Lithuania also reports that 
a group of men waiting in the street for informal short- term employment 












As a fundamental space of socialisation for young males, birzha is 
thought to be a specifically Georgian phenomenon. The author’s field-
work has revealed that young people from several neighbouring post- 
Soviet countries (Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan) define 
local understandings of the word birzha through the meaning of ‘stock 
exchange’, with no reference to street youth.
Research on birzha is linked to sociological and anthropological 
analyses of ‘street corner societies’, mainly based on ethnographies 
of American ethnically defined urban areas (most often inhabited by 
Afro- and Latino- American communities) and ‘Mediterranean cultures’ 
(Whyte 1943; Anderson 1999). As in Tbilisi’s neighbourhoods, in the 
Mediterranean model ‘the street’ is an essential function of identification 
and rootedness within local communities (Garot 2007). Conversely, in 
the American context belonging to ‘street corner society’ entails social 
and economic marginalisation (Zakharova 2010). Similarities (espe-
cially regarding masculinity and reliance on social networks) can also be 
found with American ‘good old boys’ (Farr 1988).
Every neighbourhood (ubani, kvartali) has its birzha, regardless of 
the social and economic prestige of the area. Similarly, the right to be 
part of birzha is given by birth to all males, regardless of differences in 
ethnicity, religion, and socio- economic status. Birzha is considered as the 
principal school of masculinity, as well as an essential stage in the tran-
sition from teenage to manhood. Children become increasingly involved 
in birzha up to the end of school. However, this time can be extended, 
especially for young men struggling to find an occupation (working or 
studying).
Every male is expected to be familiar with the set of norms regulat-
ing street life. Such norms, whose key points are honour, honesty, manly 
attitudes and respect for the elderly, are framed and enacted within a 
strict hierarchy of roles and identities. The top of the hierarchy is consti-
tuted by the ‘old boy’ (dzveli bichi) – the most important figures in street 
communities and the main source of authority in birzha. Dzveli bichi are 
teenagers or young men, who typically are aiming for a career in the crim-
inal world (Finckenauer and Kelly 1992). Key features of dzveli bichi are: 
utter disregard for official rules and authorities; mastery of street norms; 
proneness to solve conflicts through violent means; prison experience. 
Dzveli bichi status is regarded as the first step in a criminal hierarchy cul-
minating with the figure of vor v zakone (in Georgian kanonieri qurdebi, 
‘thief-in-law’, see 3.21 in this volume; see also Frisby 1998; Slade 2014). 
Birzha members rely upon each other through ties of unquestioned 
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‘brother’, and katsi, ‘man’, which indicates a stronger and manlier rela-
tionship than the neutral ‘friend’, megobari (Frederiksen 2012, 2013). 
The duty of dzmakatsi is to always be at each other’s side, offering uncon-
ditional support, especially in conflict situations with a potentially vio-
lent outcome.
As the financial origin of the term suggests, birzha is underpinned 
by reciprocal exchange and the ongoing interaction of individuals. Social 
networks arising from birzha provide people with long- lasting human 
connections, which are a source of informal social and economic support. 
Deals of various sizes and legality are conducted within birzha: from the 
purchase and exchange of goods such as clothes, accessories, cigarettes, 
mobile phones, to the offering of ‘favours of access’ (short- term informal 
working positions, introduction to potentially useful individuals and so 
on). The latter use of birzha can be compared to the Soviet phenomenon 
of blat, the ‘use of informal contacts and personal networks to obtain 
goods and services in short supply’ (Ledeneva 1998: 4).
Birzha is also related to the ubiquitous practice of Georgian hospi-
tality. Both phenomena are underpinned by exchange networks of rela-
tives, friends and neighbours. Moreover, birzha itself is often structured 
as a hospitable event. Birzha is shaped by everyday activities such as 
sharing a bottle of vodka in the street while nibbling smoked fish and 
sunflower seeds, or drinking homemade wine in a basement or a court-
yard. The traditional path of more formal hospitable events (supra) are 
followed, reproducing speech, gestures and attitudes, especially with 
regard to the structured process of toasting and drinking. For this reason, 
birzha can be considered a veritable expression of ‘street hospitality’ in 
Georgian urban areas.
Research shows that the main reasons underpinning young peo-
ple’s participation in birzha are unemployment and, most importantly, 
protest against the state (Finckenauer and Kelly 1992; Zakharova 2010). 
Birzha is a form of socialisation alternative to, and conflicting with, 
official institutions. Birzha provides young Georgians with moral and 
social norms that are radically different to those gained from school, the 
Church and even the family. During the period of Soviet communist rule, 
being actively involved in birzha was incompatible with being a mem-
ber of official organisations such as the Komsomol (Young Communist 
League). Moreover, as the potential first rung of an ascending criminal 
career, birzha is the embryonic stage of informal dynamics, which both 
compete with and threaten official public institutions and the rule of law.
During his decade in power (2003– 13), President Saakashvili’s 



















in general, included efforts to tackle juvenile delinquency and youth 
street communities (Shelley et al. 2007). In their official discourse, the 
Georgian authorities drew clear links between organised crime and the 
shadow economy on the one hand, and street groups on the other (Slade 
2012). Through tighter laws, harsh punishments (including jail sen-
tences) and stricter control on ubani and schools, the government has 
reduced the practice of birzha to some extent (Zakharova 2010).
In recent years, birzha has begun to decline in social significance. 
Belonging to street communities is viewed as less important than before 
by many Georgians, who look to other values (politics, family, career, 
consumerism), often regarding birzha as a backward heritage from the 
chaotic period of the late 1980s and 1990s. Geographical and social 
mobility has increased, displacing individuals from native neighbour-
hoods (Zakharova 2010). This is particularly true for the new upper 
and middle classes, which are emerging as a result of growing social 
and economic inequality (Roberts and Pollock 2009). Thus, birzha is 
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Dizelaši is a slang expression that may be translated as ‘Diesel Boys’. It 
refers to the members of a youth male subculture that emerged in Serbia 
in the turbulent socio- political environment of the early 1990s. The break- 
up of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992 plunged the region into 
war. As violence escalated, Serbia became mired in deep economic crisis. 
United Nations (UN) sanctions imposed in 1992 provoked soaring infla-
tion and shortages of such key products as fuel. Economic turmoil saw 
rogue traders and members of criminal gangs grow extremely wealthy 
very quickly, and some nouveaux riches groups used fashion to express 
their new- found status (Gordy 2000: 6).
The word dizelaši is thought to derive from the fashion brand Diesel, 
Diesel jeans being one of the most prized fashion items among young 
males in Serbia at this time (Gerzić 2002: 60). However, it may also refer 
to the smuggling of diesel fuel, one of the illegal activities in which the 
dizelaši were allegedly involved (Subcultureslist.com 2015). The phys-
ical appearance of the dizelaši reinforced their reputation as tough and 
criminally oriented. Typically shaven- headed, muscular and robust, 
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attention to their clothing. As a sign of group identity, their dress code 
included sporty attire consisting of a tracksuit or jeans (the upper part 
of the tracksuit tucked into the trousers) and Nike Air Max or Reebok 
trainers (Klajn 2010: 366). They wore conspicuously thick gold chains 
around their necks (Subcultureslist.com 2015). Female members of the 
subculture, known as dizelašice or sponzoruše (diggers), were known by 
their fondness for glamorous lifestyles. They wore heavy make- up, short 
skirts, high heels, long, usually blonde hair and extravagant jewellery 
(Subcultureslist.com 2015).
‘The videos of artists such as Snezana Babic and Dragana Mirkovic 
were filled with gold jewellery, luxury cars and huge new houses; they 
depicted young women in knock- off Versace living it up in the mirrored 
bars and casinos of Belgrade’s luxury hotels – the Intercontinental, the 
Hyatt and the Metropolitan’ (Higginbotham 2004). This embrace of 
branded clothing, ostentatious fashion accessories and expensive motor-
cars was seen as a means used by the young nouveaux riches to distance 
themselves from social and financial instability.
The dizelaši were ardent fans of turbo- folk, a new musical genre 
that emerged in the 1990s and that glorified the luxurious lifestyle. The 
term was coined by rock musician Rambo Amadeus as an ironic reference 
to the genre’s hybridity since it blended traditional Serbian folk music 
with hip- hop, rock ‘n’ roll and dance. In his song ‘Turbo- folk’, Amadeus 
explained that the term encompasses more than just a particular music 
style: ‘Folk refers to people, turbo refers to speedy fuel injection under 
pressure. Thus, turbo- folk refers to combustion of people. Anything lead-
ing to this combustion can be called turbo- folk’ (Higginbotham 2004). 
Petar Popovic, director of Serbia’s state- run record company, followed 
the same line of argument when he said that turbo- folk ‘is the sound of 
the war and everything that the war brought to this country. It represents 
everything that has happened to this country over the past few years’ 
(Higginbotham 2004).
Turbo- folk gained popularity largely thanks to its promotion by 
state- controlled and private TV stations. State- sponsored TV Pink and TV 
Palma, for example, supported the regime of Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević not only through their news- reporting but also by focusing in 
their entertainment programmes on turbo- folk and by avoiding any refer-
ence to the rich pop and rock scene that had existed in Yugoslavia before 
the 1990s. According to Amadeus, ‘rock ‘n’ roll in Serbia died the moment 
that Milosevic came to power’ in 1989 (Gordi 2001:  129). Turbo- folk 
with its kitschy, flashy videos and lyrics popularising the glamorous life-


















conflict and war. On the one hand there was rock ‘n’ roll, underground 
and rebellion; on the other there was turbo- folk, dizelaši and crime; 
this cultural divide reflected the social and political orientations that 
characterised Serbian society in the 1990s (Gordi 2001:  116). Dizelaši 
embraced the aesthetic of ‘war chic’ (Kronja 2006: 92) and discriminated 
against other, usually Western- inspired subcultures such as Metalheads 
or Punks (Subcultureslist.com 2015).
While the dizelaši subculture was closely linked to the specific 
socio- economic conditions of 1990s Serbia, similar subcultures were 
found in other countries that underwent social and economic turmoil 
at the turn of the century. For example, gopniki describes members of 
the youth subculture found in Russia and other post- Soviet states in 
the 1980s (Subcultureslist 2015). It too attracted young males, com-
parable to ‘chavs’ or ‘neds’ in Great Britain, characterised by aggressive 
behaviour, a predilection for criminal activity, and alcohol abuse. Like 
the dizelaši, gopniki followed a dress code featuring tracksuits and lea-
ther jackets.
The dizelaši phenomenon was propagated in popular culture 
through films such as To the Bone (Do koske), Wounds (Rane) and See 
You in the Obituary (Vidimo se u čitulji). Nowadays the phenomenon 
persists through the subculture neodizelaši, whose members follow the 
same dress code as the dizelaši and listen to music from the 1990s. The 
neodizelaši are not however nearly as prominent or widespread as their 
predecessors were. Indeed, today, the term dizelaši is mostly used pejora-
tively to refer to a people with poor taste in clothing and music. However, 
the subculture of dizelaši also survives through a ‘Silicone valley’ sub-
culture that emerged in the late 1990s and persists to this day (Kronja 
2006: 92). Female members of the subculture are known for their use of 
silicone implants – hence the term.
3.27 Normalnye patsany (russia)
Svetlana Stephenson
london metropolitan university, uK
Normalnye patsany are members of street groups that can be found in 
many Russian urban areas, particularly in the peripheries of big cities, 
as well as in small and medium- sized towns (Golovin and Lurie 2008). 
Street groups and street cultures, in which children and young people, 
mainly boys, spend time outside adult control – playing together, fight-
ing with their peers from other areas and engaging in petty crime – are a 
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Whyte 1943; Kintrea et al. 2011; Pearson 2011). In Russia, members of 
these groups are commonly known as gopniks, a derogatory name simi-
lar in its connotations to English ‘chavs’, that is, low- and working- class 
young men, presumed to have bad taste, vulgar manners and aggres-
sive dispositions towards the outside world (Hayward and Majid 2006; 
Nayak 2006; Jones 2011). Their clothes (often cheap tracksuits), their 
use of slang (borrowing heavily from criminal culture), and their general 
demeanour (including, for example, their manner of walking the streets 
in groups or ‘aggressively’ occupying street corners) are seen as signifying 
their social and cultural inferiority. The gopniks’ parochial stubbornness 
seems to represent resistance to late modernity, and to an increasingly 
individualised, diverse and consumer- orientated way of life.
Research conducted with patsany, however, shows that they see 
themselves as ‘normal lads’, and the core reputational group in the ter-
ritory. They have strong local identities and see themselves as, far from 
delinquents, the backbone of the local community (Pilkington et  al. 
2002; Stephenson 2012). While members of the groups may engage in 
episodic acts of delinquency and crime (theft, shoplifting, joyriding), 
their key practices are those of local sociability and territorial defence. 
They spend their time out of school on the streets, policing their turf. 
The cultural imperative to be in control of the local territory is expressed 
through an obsessive search for the ‘Other’, typically members of ethnic 
minority groups, or the so- called neformaly (members of youth subcul-
tures, for example, punks or goths), young people from other territories 
and, increasingly, young men from exclusive residential developments 
built on the territory of the patsany.
While violence constitutes one of the key practices of the normalnye 
patsany, they place a high emphasis on collective rules of ‘honourable’ 
conduct (Gromov and Stephenson 2008). Seeing themselves as members 
of a territorial elite (Collins 2008), they follow honour rules that limit 
violence or channel it into ritualised forms. For example, it is not con-
sidered proper for youths to fight with women or children, for 10 youths 
to attack one, or to start a fight with non- street local young men, the so- 
called ‘botanists’ (botaniki) who cannot be seen as equals. If, however, 
a non- street young man looks or talks in a wrong way, or does anything 
that can be construed as a lack of respect to a patsan, it is permissible 
physically to ‘punish’ him and take away whatever the patsan wants (usu-
ally a mobile phone, a watch or money).
A key cultural practice of the patsany is the ‘arranged combat’ 
(strelka) – a ritual whereby members of different territorial groups meet 















by different street groups to test their strength, settle disputes or confirm 
territorial boundaries. These fights tend to take place in neutral areas 
or (in a trope reminiscent of medieval culture) on a bridge over a river 
separating two areas, or in winter on the frozen river itself (Golovin and 
Lurie 2005). These practices can be traced to the traditions of village 
fights, which were a feature of most European peasant societies (Tilly 
1974; Ploux 2007), often coinciding with weddings and other celebra-
tory events. In Europe and in Russia they were used to test the strength 
of adversaries and reinforced the solidarity of the male peer groups 
(Kabanov 1928; Bernshtam 1988; Shchepanskaia 2001; Morozov and 
Sleptsova 2004). The relatively late urbanisation of Russia may account 
for the longevity of these practices.
The patsany agree in advance on the approximate number of fight-
ers and whether weapons (such as chains, clubs or knuckledusters, but 
never guns or knives) may be used. They make formations with the 
strongest at the front. Sometimes a fight is started by the group leader 
challenging the enemy leader to a battle. If a group is defeated, the repu-
tation of the territory suffers. This is why fights can lead to an escalation 
of violence. If the youngsters lose, older comrades may try to repair the 
territorial reputation by fighting themselves. Alternatively, they may tell 
the youngest to arrange another revenge fight. There may be lengthy 
cycles of arranged fights, in which neighbourhood groups build alliances 
to help each other out. The favours done by one group to another are 
returned, and it is not uncommon to offer ‘payment’ for extra fighters 
(usually a couple of crates of beer). Respectable adult figures in the local 
community (often ex- criminals, seen as experts in the use of violence or 
former members of the street group) may help the youngsters to mobilise 
additional fighters.
Normalnye patsany are often heavily influenced by criminal cul-
ture (Kosterina 2008). Some groups collect money to send to inmates 
in prisons and penal colonies. A  small minority of so- called ‘initiative- 
takers’ (initsiativshchiki) actively seek to join criminal groups, liaising 
with former convicts and members of organised crime groups in their 
areas, and building their criminal reputations through small- scale rack-
eteering, burglary and other forms of acquisitive crime. These patsany 
seek to become real’nye patsany (real lads), members of criminal gangs. 
But usually normalnye patsany aspire to mainstream careers, seeing their 
street pursuits as a necessary stage for a boy to learn how to be a real 
man through street camaraderie and violence. Their practices of terri-
torial violence are not entirely oppositional to the mainstream culture. 
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norms that are prevalent in wider Russian society and are celebrated in 
mass culture and political behaviour (Stephenson 2015).
In recent years the street as a key place of male socialisation and a 
locus of territorial control has begun to lose its significance. This may be 
attributed to a growing privatisation of public space and the relocation 
of leisure activities into the space of the home. Street groups still exist in 
social and spatial periphery, making their members even more vulner-
able to cultural stigmatisation by the urban middle classes.
3.28 Futbolna frakcia (bulgaria)
Kremena iordanova
department of ethnology, Sofia university ‘St Kliment ohridski’, 
bulgaria
Futbolna frakcia refers to an informal society of football supporters in 
Bulgaria with their own symbols, rules and behaviours. The synonym fut-
bolna grupirovka is equally used. A futbolna frakcia roughly corresponds 
to the meaning of a football ‘firm’ in English. The frakcia is part of the so- 
called agitka – a term used to define the whole group of active supporters 
of a football team, who are engaged in loud and fanatical support of their 
club. Thus, all the futbolni frakcii of a given football club collectively form 
the agitka.
In Bulgaria, futbolni frakcii are typically comprised of a mixture of 
British- style football hooligans and the Italian model of ultras groups. 
In Western football culture the terms ‘hooligans’ and ‘ultras’ have spe-
cific meanings. Hooligans display a wide range of aggressive behav-
iours, including physical aggression against supporters of other teams. 
The ultra movement also features aggressive behaviour, but in a less 
extreme way. Ultras are more closely associated with visual and audio 
performances involving the display of banners, throwing smoke bombs, 
shouting, chanting and the staging of special choreography during the 
football match. In Bulgaria, however, hooligans and ultras identify as 
part of the same movement, whose common objective is to support their 
chosen club.
The appearance of the first futbolni frakcii in Bulgaria cannot be 
precisely dated. However, it is known that they emerged later than in 
most other European countries and even than in most Soviet republics. 
Before the fall of the socialist regime, football fan culture was not wide-
spread, arguably because the Soviet authorities actively opposed such 


















elections to take place in Bulgaria, which in turn, after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, led to Bulgaria’s transition to democracy. Henceforth there 
has been a growth in ultra and hooligan culture, which has led to increas-
ing concern within the country. The main driver of this growth was the 
new freedom of expression permitted in the media and new sources like 
the Internet, which not only made it possible for fans to watch games at 
home on television, but also allowed football fan culture to be articulated 
and publicised.
By the mid- 1990s futbolni frakcii had become increasingly sophisti-
cated in their cohesiveness and organisation. Usually frakcii are divided 
into rival territorial groups according to the city of origin and districts 
(rayoni), neighbourhoods and estates (kvartali). They display strong ter-
ritorial identity, which is easily revealed in the names of the frakcii them-
selves. Examples include North Side (FC CSKA), Lulin boys (FC CSKA) and 
Sofia West (FC Levski). At present some of these frakcii are split between 
groups whose fans display behaviour more associated with ultras, and 
those that are more closely associated with football hooliganism. There 
are frakcii that are further divided by fans’ ideological and political views. 
In Bulgaria, the majority of football clubs and their fans are renowned for 
their support of right- wing political parties. For example, the agitka of FC 
Levski is associated with the far right, thanks to the influence of the club’s 
largest frakcia, Sofia West. Sofia West members are closely allied with the 
fans of the Italian club S.S. Lazio, who are widely known for their far 
right fascist views. This link with the far right is not universal, however, 
and other subdivisions of groups exist. Some of the groups, for instance, 
are formed specifically according to age – the ‘Drinking hools veterans’, a 
supporters’ group of FC Lokomotiv Sofia, is comprised solely of adults in 
their forties. Some frakcii have fixed rules: they have agreed membership 
fees, which are strictly controlled, as well as a well- established hierarchy 
within the organisational structure. There are also informal frakcii who 
do not follow any specific rules and where hierarchy is not considered 
necessary.
In Bulgaria (as in other European countries) each member of the 
frakcia has his own role so that necessary activities are well controlled 
and tasks carried out efficiently. The most active and authoritative fans 
(usually three or four members) are responsible for match- day activities. 
Each member has his own tasks: some of them sell tickets; others arrange 
the travel or sale of club merchandise and membership. Some members 
coordinate the choreography; others deal with club finances or coord-
inate appointments with other organisations and arrange many other 
















3133.28 futBolna frakcia  (bulGaria)
313
One of the main features defining the collective identity is the 
feeling of solidarity that exists between members of the various fut-
bolni frakcii. This solidarity is understood as group support for individ-
ual cases of need, with all members of the frakcia relying on each other. 
The mutual trust between members can be compared with the mutual 
trust experienced within a family. Participants in the community have to 
respect each other as members of one family so the group remains always 
cohesive. This idea of informal family is reflected in the language mem-
bers use to conceptualise their in- group relationships, which is typically 
expressed in the form of fictive kinship. Members often use the terms 
‘brother’ or ‘brotherhood’ when expressing their relationship with other 
fans in the frakcia.
Each frakcia has its own leader, whose main function is to man-
age the group. Leadership requires important personality traits, such 
as charisma, authority and the ability to carry out all necessary activ-
ities and contacts with other groups. The leader must have the necessary 
social contacts, which include contacts with members of the other frakcii 
as well as the local police authorities and different state institutions. 
Another important person is the so- called tartor of the agitka. A tartor 
is the Bulgarian equivalent of the Italian capo, the equivalent of a cheer-
leader. The tartor’s main task is to set the tone for chants in the fan sector, 
using a megaphone or microphone. He has to inspire fellow supporters in 
the stadium to engage with both visual and auditory performances, such 
as displaying and waving banners, throwing smoke bombs, shouting, 
chanting and taking part in special choreographed movements. A third 
important person is the guardian of the flag, which is the distinguishing 
symbol of every frakcia. It must be guarded carefully because a captured 
flag destroys not only the authority of the frakcia, but that of the agitka 
as a whole. Stealing scarves, flags or other equipment from opposition 
supporters shows dominance over them and subjects them to symbolic 
public disgrace.
In common with large European and Latin American supporters’ 
groups, the practice of incorporating some of the fan base into criminal 
organisations has been observed in Bulgaria. Some of the most notorious 
drug lords in the country are known to conduct their business through 
futbolni frakcii. In Bulgaria, many football supporters’ groups are linked 
to other criminal activities as well, including blackmail, violence, robber-
ies and abductions (Spaaij 2006). For example, the supporters’ club of 
Sofia West is associated with drug distribution, contract robberies, beat-
ings and alleged murder and they have repeatedly been the object of 




















As well as crime bosses, it is also common for politicians and political 
parties to use the frakcii for their own ends. Over the last 10 years many 
football supporters have taken part in political campaigns and protests in 
return for payment. Benefitting from the strong level of group identity, 
some frakcii leaders try to manipulate the fans to participate in paid activ-
ities (Teodosieva 2013). Almost all the author’s respondents reported 
knowing frakcia members who participate in protests, either as provoca-
teurs or simply to increase the number of people on the protest. However, 
it is important to emphasise that a small minority of frakcii are involved in 
such activities; the majority of fans do not support this behaviour.
Conclusion: organic solidarity and informality – two 
irreconcilable concepts?
christian Giordano
university of fribourg, Switzerland
For social sciences’ mainstream theoretic paradigms, informality – 
together with its specific coalitions, networks and personalised relation-
ships – has a questionable, if not notorious, reputation. These aspects are 
often regarded as pre-modern, dysfunctional or indeed anomic (Durkheim 
1893) because they foster or are the foundation of social phenomena such 
as friend’s favouritism, nepotism, cronyism, patronage and corruption.
In this conclusion we argue that, in principle, so- called modern 
societies, according to social sciences’ mainstream theoretic paradigms, 
should essentially be founded on Emile Durkheim’s organic solidarity, 
thus on formal structures. We shall bring to the fore how in many soci-
eties that are considered modern – and thus characterised by formal 
organisational structures and based on organic solidarity – these struc-
tures are infiltrated or replaced by a vast phenomena of informality, 
which the actors themselves consider meaningful, and thus legitimate, 
though often illegal and rationally suitable for specific situations.
Among the fundamental concepts of the social sciences, that of soli-
darity dates back to the beginnings of sociological thought in the late nine-
teenth century. In fact, sociological reflection on forms of solidarity may 
be attributed to Durkheim along with Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel 
and finally Max Weber, though these last three did not use the term soli-
darity as systematically as Durkheim did. Simmel spoke exclusively of 
a solidarity already rooted in pre- Christian religiosity, thus calling into 
question the idea that solidarity is solely a product of Christianity (Simmel 




















never attempted to develop a core dichotomy (Jenks 1998). In fact, though 
Tönnies (1912) and Weber (1956) used different notions, on closer ana-
lysis several analogies can be detected. Tönnies is well known for his 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, whereas Weber, indir-
ectly inspired by Tönnies, speaks correspondingly of Vergemeinschaftung 
and Vergesellschaftung. By Gemeinschaft and Vergemeinschaftung these 
two authors identify archaic, traditional, thus pre-modern forms of 
society, or types of social cohesion or social relations. Gesellschaft and 
Vergesellschaftung are the exact opposite of the first two, that is, they are 
typified by their rationality in terms of values (Wertrationalität) and goals 
(Zweckrationalität), and therefore correspond to more advanced forms of 
society based on types of solidarity ascribable to modernity.
However, it was Durkheim who devised the classic core socio-
logical dichotomy between mechanical and organic solidarity. Durkheim 
points out that mechanical solidarity emerges and develops in situations 
of proximity, where the various actors maintain strongly personalised 
relationships and live in relatively small communities. This form of soli-
darity is founded on an affinity of roles and behaviours, and division of 
labour is therefore scarcely developed (Durkheim 1893). Accordingly, 
mechanical solidarity is based on similarity and is generally prevalent in 
small groups such as family, kin, village and tribe. These small collectiv-
ities, where highly personalised relationships are prevalent, are far more 
important than the single individual. Ultimately, according to Durkheim, 
mechanical solidarity is a social characteristic of archaic, primitive, back-
ward and traditional societies as well as of tribal, pastoral or rural ones. 
One cannot fail to notice, however, that Durkheim’s representation of 
mechanical solidarity mirrors that of societies under colonial regimes or 
possibly the France profonde peasant communities of his times.
Organic solidarity emerges in societies characterised by marked 
social differentiation, thus with a highly differentiated system of social 
division of labour, which generates a considerable complexity of social 
roles and positions. Accordingly, societies based on organic solidarity have 
a high degree of specialisation, which may be regarded as a true guar-
antee of social cohesion since everyone is dependent on everyone else’s 
labour. Organic solidarity, therefore, is rooted in the certainty of recipro-
cal dependence between people who have a specific function or exercise 
an activity within society. Consequently, unlike societies based on mech-
anical solidarity, they do not have a strong collective consciousness, but 
rather an individual awareness that the division of labour safeguards the 
existence of the members of these societies. This promotes an allegiance 
























collectivity’s laws, norms, rules and customs. The formal legal system 
based on the law of restitution and contractual practices thus finds its 
legitimacy. Finally, given their specific social structure, these are modern 
societies with a great number of members and are characterised by con-
siderable social complexity.
In all these dichotomous conceptions put forth by Tönnies and 
Weber, and especially in the pair mechanical solidarity/ organic solidarity 
formulated by Durkheim, an implicit value judgement, perhaps involun-
tary, spontaneous and possibly unconscious, comes to the fore. Essentially, 
societies based on organic solidarity are deemed more advanced, thus also 
more modern, since even the subtitle of Durkheim’s book (1893) in a 
so- to- speak spontaneous manner mentions the concept of sociétés supé-
rieures. Undeniably, in Durkheim’s book societies characterised by mech-
anical solidarity, in the words of Edward B. Tylor (1871), are survivals, 
that is, a residual category or, better yet, a relic of the past. Thus, mech-
anical solidarity is a phenomenon heading towards extinction, whereas 
organic solidarity – that is, modernity – is the present and above all repre-
sents the future. Even an insightful observer such as Durkheim lapses into 
a number of clichés typical of a specific evolutionism of his times.
In the wake of Durkheim in particular, many representatives of 
the social sciences developed similar, albeit not identical, theoretic 
approaches, though not all of them drew direct inspiration from his 
work. We are referring in the first place to the so- called modernisation 
theories that postulate a more or less required and above all advisable 
transition from the traditional (tribal or rural) stage to that of mod-
ernity (urbanity) where, to paraphrase Durkheim, organic solidarity 
is prevalent. Ultimately, the vast majority of modernisation theories, 
still very popular despite criticisms especially in discussions about 
social strategies and development policies, also regard these soci-
eties, rightly or not, as traditional or, due to specific socio-cultural 
characteristics, pre-modern. Thus these societies are viewed as defi-
cient socio-cultural aggregations; consequently, they are the negative 
reference of Western modern societies and are considered backward. 
According to these theories and discourses of social development pol-
icies, these socially and culturally lagging societies must be helped to 
achieve modernisation by copying or at least drawing inspiration from 
the Western model.
In essence, Western societies are beyond dispute the reference 
model to pursue. Clearly, all theories of development to a greater or 
lesser extent smack of ethnocentrism, which tends to belittle and at 
















that are not founded on organic solidarity. Yet, a social organisation in 
line with the principles of organic solidarity implies living and acting in 
a society where formal organisations as well as the consequent social 
practices should, in theory, be by far predominant, if not indeed gen-
eralised. In principle, informality is banned from the public sector, yet 
tolerated and regarded as normal in the strictly private sphere or, better 
yet, especially among people linked by intimate relationships, for exam-
ple, family members or close friends entertaining strictly emotional rela-
tionships. Informality, particularly in the public sphere, is frowned upon 
since it is deemed dangerous because of the dysfunctionality it may trig-
ger in public institutions.
Yet, the phenomenon of informality in organic solidarity societies 
remains important and cannot be interpreted via simplistic theories on 
the individual actor’s socialisation deviance or deficit or the persistence 
of specific bygone cultural models. We ought to bear in mind, instead, 
that informality with its various forms and its complex array of dyadic 
relationships, coalitions and personalised networks, such as ritual or 
symbolic family relationships, instrumental friendships, blat and similar 
phenomena, clientelist networks, coalitions and mafia- like associations, 
is not evidence of social inferiority or deviant behaviour. Therefore, 
Durkheim appears to be too inflexible with his overly idealistic or max-
imalist conception of organic solidarity and his markedly critical and 
somewhat arrogant view of mechanical solidarity.
In order to grasp the significance of informality in modern societies, 
and also therefore the meaning it is attributed by the actors themselves, 
social sciences need to perform a reversal of perspective, in Nietzsche’s 
words (Nietzsche 1892). This methodological procedure, which in social 
sciences has been endorsed particularly by Weber and Clifford Geertz 
(Weber 1956; Geertz 1973, 1980), allows the observation that, contrary 
to many theoretic approaches still widespread in the social sciences, infor-
mality weakens neither the state nor its public institutions in general. 
Quite the opposite: it is their longue durée (Braudel 1958: 725 et seq.), 
nonfulfilment and resulting permanent legal arbitrariness, thus also 
their inconsistent institutional legitimacy that trigger citizens’ rational 
reaction. The latter, logically enough, opt for the most efficient and less 
conspicuous route offered by various types of informality in order to neu-
tralise the actions of the public sector, which is perceived as legal, yet is 
also viewed as illegitimate. The nearly generalised diffusion of a feeling 
of mistrust in the public sector, and especially in anything perceived as 
pertaining to the state, generates a permanent informalisation of any-




















an irrational attitude, but rather an instrumentally rational social know-
ledge that is deeply rooted in complex societies and is based on actual 
and likewise longue durée historical experiences.
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The unlocking power of  
non- conformity: cultural resistance  
vs political opposition




In the political context, the term ‘opposition’ might appear a synonym 
for ‘resistance’, but there is an important distinction. Opposition involves 
counterbalanced or conflicting forces: action and reaction, left and right, 
yes and no, black and white. These forces engage in tug- of- war, a zero- 
sum game where the advantage of one comes at the disadvantage of the 
other. Not only does opposition involve dichotomies or binary forces, it 
tends to assume formal or even official shape. Democratically elected gov-
ernments confront an officially recognised opposition seated in the halls 
of power. Resistance, by contrast, does not operate through such clear 
dynamics: it is multivalent and poly- directional, and its forms of organisa-
tion are often complex or informal. Resistance does not simply confront 
the structures of power head on, but may seek paths or detours around 
those structures, often seeping into the cracks and fissures in the barri-
ers, or inhabiting spaces that have been deemed outside of or irrelevant 
to the shape of the discourse. Resistance to a single regime or practice 
can encompass a magnificent variety of beliefs, simultaneously incompat-
ible yet united. And when resistance is victorious, it need not necessarily 
oust or eliminate what it resisted, but often simply replaces the dynamic of 
opposed forces with a less structured, more complex swirl of possibilities.
What this means is that resistance (as opposed to political oppos-
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resistance occupies a grey zone in between categories such as ‘political’, 
‘social’ and ‘cultural’. When ‘opposition’ takes cultural form, the result 
is generally didacticism: a novel, painting, song or film communicating 
a particular message as forcefully and clearly as possible. The aesthetic 
limitations of such ‘message art’ are fairly obvious. Resistance, by con-
trast, generally takes forms more subtle than such explicit messages. A 
novel may constitute political resistance simply because of the way it 
is written. (Take the Stalinist association of ‘experimental’ prose with 
Western ‘decadence’, for example, rejected in favour of didactically con-
ceived Socialist Realism.) Informality and ambiguity – the structure of 
‘both- and’ or ‘neither- nor’ – are thus not simply a common tactic that 
resistance uses to express itself: they constitute its very essence.
Such features were embodied in almost comically literal form in 
Poland in the early 1980s, under Martial Law: electrical resistors – mini-
ature, multi- coloured electronic components – were often worn, pinned 
to a sweater or the lapel of a jacket, as a small symbol of resistance to 
the governing authorities. Several facts stand out in the present context. 
First, this disarmingly humble gesture reveals that resistance has a ten-
dency to seek out symbolic forms. Even in situations where the luxury 
exists of expressing resistance openly and explicitly (and historically 
such luxury has been rare) resistance cannot resist redoubling its mes-
sage through simple symbols: the peace sign (in 1960s counterculture), 
the improvised shantytown put up in the sight of the privileged (in inter-
national protests against apartheid in the 1980s), the jingling of keys (in 
demonstrations in Czechoslovakia in 1989). Often the events associated 
with resistance movements assume, almost despite themselves, shocking 
or triumphant symbolic significance, such as when a peaceful march is 
prevented through violence from crossing a bridge, or when a concrete 
wall dividing a city is torn down. In short, even when resistance is under-
stood in the first instance as a social or political category, it is drawn 
inexorably into semiotic systems that bring it into traffic with cultural 
expression. It is no coincidence that resistance movements so often prod-
uce iconic music, rhetorical performances, and literature.
Second, resistance involves a paradox: even when it harbours a clear 
message, it commonly works through ambiguity. Is that strange little 
object pinned to people’s jackets an emblem of specific political demands, 
the expression of a general attitude, or simply a curious fashion trend? 
One needs to read the symbol or interpret the allegory – and even then 
the ambiguity may linger intentionally: harassing or arresting people on 
the basis of a clothing accessory or a hairstyle, after all, draws authority 














object will be nearly invisible to people unaware of its significance, but 
will stand out immediately to the initiated, an emblem either of solidarity 
or of provocation.
Third, resistance often seeks out informal forms. This can take the 
shape of recuperating linguistic or cultural patterns widely rejected as vul-
gar (see materit’sya, 4.5 in this volume). Or sometimes the mere act of 
reading literature or listening to music that has no political resonance at 
all becomes a form of resistance: a refusal to engage, a resistance even 
of resistance, an insistence that life exists outside the imposed discourse. 
An archetypal example of this is the so- called ‘music underground’ in 
Czechoslovakia in the 1970s, the most famous protagonist of which is the 
band The Plastic People of the Universe. The Plastic People embody infor-
mal resistance on a number of levels. First is that their music, their per-
formances and their lifestyle embraced what could be called an aesthetics 
of informality. Their music flaunts a rough, unpolished edge that remains 
jarring and unsettling even today, and was fully intentional. Second, 
‘the underground’ was characterised not by a particular musical style or 
fashion – in addition to the hard- edged eccentricities of the Plastic People, 
it handily encompassed, for example, folk singers and jazz musicians – 
but by an attitude that, by definition, defied definition: in the words of 
Ivan Martin Jirous, artistic director of The Plastic People and an extremely 
influential poet, art theorist, and essayist, the underground was ‘a move-
ment that has created, outside of a corrupt society, its own independent 
world with a different charge of inner energy, a different aesthetic and, as 
a result, a different ethic’ (Jirous 1975/2006: 12). Concerts and related 
performances generated the atmosphere of ‘events’ that united the par-
ticipants as much through an unarticulated sense of shared intensity as 
through any particular shared interests. Often these performances took 
on a sort of legendary status (especially since many ended in police raids). 
Thus, in a manner inverse to the strategy of artistic repossession used in 
the Soviet Union, the underground aimed to act as far as possible as if 
the oppressive Czechoslovak regime simply did not exist, and to pursue 
what Jirous termed an informal ‘second culture’ completely set off from 
‘the establishment’ (understood not simply as the communist authorities 
but as modern commercial society more generally) and eschewing all 
formal structures of support or distribution. That this revolt against and 
resistance to the establishment inevitably meant conflict with the author-
ities of Normalisation- era Czechoslovakia was clear to all and, especially 
by the mid- 1970s, brought with it significant risk of political persecution 
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In September 1976, those same Czechoslovak authorities put sev-
eral representatives of the underground on trial, including Jirous and 
Vratislav Brabenec, saxophonist for The Plastic People. The trial ended 
with jail sentences ranging from eight to eighteen months. This trial had 
unintended consequences for the authorities, however, largely due to the 
written account produced by one observer sympathetic to the defend-
ants: the banned playwright and essayist Václav Havel. Havel’s account – 
bearing the Kafkaesque title ‘The Trial’ (see Havel 1991 [1976]) – and 
what subsequently came to be known as ‘The Trial of the Plastics’ have 
widely been viewed as a central impetus for the drafting and distribu-
tion of Charter 77 a few months later. Charter 77, one of the most cel-
ebrated documents of late twentieth- century European dissent, explicitly 
challenged the Czechoslovak government to uphold the human rights 
set forth in the 1975 Helsinki Accords, rights the government formally 
acknowledged but routinely violated. The core formulators and spokes-
people for the Charter were intellectuals – writers, philosophers and 
out- of- favour politicians, thus people trained in presenting arguments 
eloquently and persuasively – and Charter 77 represented an explicitly 
political challenge to the regime. So the temptation arises to view this 
episode as embodying a shift from informal, non- political resistance 
(The Plastic People and the underground) to formal, politicised oppos-
ition (Charter 77). Yet, as Jonathan Bolton (see Bolton 2012) and other 
commentators have argued, such an understanding is reductive. For one 
thing, though the underground aimed to ignore rather than actively 
undermine ‘the establishment’, there was no question that it hoped ‘their 
work and attitudes’ would ultimately ‘destroy the establishment’ (Jirous 
1975/2006: 30). For another, much of the activity unleashed by Charter 
77 took the form of cultural endeavours that often refused express pol-
itical postures. In short, the distinction with which this essay began – 
between clear- cut opposition and multivalent resistance – should not be 
taken as absolute. This distinction is itself multivalent, and it is necessary 
to understand the terms as designating the endpoints on a sliding scale 
rather than clearly discrete categories.
4.1 Artistic repossession (general)
christina ezrahi
independent researcher, israel
‘Artistic repossession’ is a theoretical term used to describe a range of 
creative strategies developed by artists working under the constraints 















authoritarian dictatorship such as the Soviet Union. The term focuses 
on the enabling power of constraints by analysing ways in which artists 
turned pressure into creativity, responding to the ideological constraints 
by finding increasingly creative ways of artistic self- expression. Just as 
the owner of a house who was dispossessed might aim to repossess his 
property, artists working under the pressure of censorship and ideo-
logical control tend to seek ways to repossess their house of cultural pro-
duction (Ezrahi 2012: 7).
‘Artistic repossession’ looks at deep structures of resistance and 
systemic subversion by identifying tactics that operate within the sys-
tem but seek to use the system to promote goals alien to it. Artists in the 
Soviet Union had no choice but to accept the political organisational 
structures and ideological frames imposed on cultural production, but 
they learnt to creatively adapt and redefine the rules imposed on them, 
and to even exploit them for their own artistic ends in a way that had 
nothing to do with the regime’s goals or the values of the structures and 
ideological concepts they were supposed to promote (Ezrahi 2012: 7). 
Thus ‘artistic repossession’ does not describe informal practices such 
as samizdat (self- publishing) that explicitly rejected and challenged 
the official system of Soviet cultural production. The term looks at 
more subconscious ways of subverting the system from within by art-
ists who endeavoured to forge their own destinies within the system’s 
parameters. An interesting structural parallel can be found in Michel 
de Certeau’s study of indigenous peoples of the Americas who sub-
consciously subverted Spanish colonisation from within (de Certeau 
1984: xiii):
submissive, and even consenting to their subjection, the Indians 
nevertheless often made of the rituals, representations, and laws 
imposed on them something quite different from what their con-
querors had in mind; they subverted them not by rejecting or alter-
ing them, but by using them with respect to ends and references 
foreign to the system they had no choice but to accept.
The term ‘artistic repossession’ originated from a study of cho-
reographers and dancers at the Kirov and Bolshoi Ballet companies, 
which analysed the way in which they exploited the ambiguity inher-
ent in the system to develop strategies that allowed them to reclaim 
some artistic autonomy during the period of the cultural thaw in the 
Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s (Ezrahi 2012). One strategy 
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artistic purposes. For example, in 1956, the young choreographer Yuri 
Grigorovich was entrusted with choreographing Sergei Prokofiev’s 
ballet The Stone Flower for the Kirov Ballet. Overtly, Grigorovich stayed 
within the boundaries set by the officially sanctioned dramatic para-
digm for Soviet ballet: the ballet had a narrative plot based on a story 
from Pavel Bazhov’s folkloristic fairy tale collection The Malachite 
Casket and was told in the language of classical dance. Beneath the sur-
face, however, Grigorovich challenged the established dogmas of late 
Stalinist ballet by modernising the language of his choreography, by 
including quasi- abstract divertissements of pure dance, and by work-
ing with a set designer, Simon Virsaladze, whose aesthetics strayed 
from socialist realism. A fight between the Kirov Ballet’s ‘old guard’ 
and its young challenger ensued. In order to overcome resistance 
from within the company and to ensure proper working conditions, 
Grigorovich and his team declared the ballet a ‘youth production’ and 
dedicated it to the Sixth International Youth Festival, to be held in 
Moscow and Leningrad in 1957. This enabled them to enlist the help 
of the theatre’s Komsomol (Youth) organisation, which counted some 
of the main dancers involved in the production among its members. 
At this point The Stone Flower metamorphosed into an initiative of the 
theatre’s Komsomol organisation and enabled the young, innovative 
choreographer to secure the Soviet government’s support and thus 
to counter his conservative opponents within the theatre. An order 
issued by the Minister of Culture of the USSR commanded the Kirov 
Theatre to ensure that the ballet would be completed in time for the 
festival. Instead of increasing political awareness and instilling com-
munist values, the Kirov Theatre’s Komsomol organisation had unwit-
tingly used its influence to support the artistic goal of challenging the 
existing aesthetics of Soviet ballet (Ezrahi 2012: 118– 28).
Throughout the Soviet period, the Kirov and Bolshoi Ballet com-
panies continuously struggled to meet the government’s demand for bal-
lets on Soviet themes. In the 1950s and 1960s, some of the most daring 
challenges to Soviet ballet aesthetics found an audience simply because 
they helped theatres fulfil official quotas for new ballets based on con-
temporary Soviet themes. Further examples of the successful use of this 
strategy are found in the work of the choreographer Igor Belsky, whose 
ballets on Soviet themes were attacked as dangerously abstract in their 
execution, and by the enfant terrible of Soviet ballet, Leonid Yakobson, 
who staged ballets on contemporary Soviet themes using an idiosyncratic 
movement vocabulary that was far removed from classical dance (Ezrahi 














Ultimately, art is an inherently resistant medium because it is 
impossible to completely control either the artist’s intention behind 
the creation of a piece of art, or its subsequent interpretation by a 
performer and/ or an audience. In 1968, Yuri Grigorovich created the 
Soviet ballet blockbuster Spartacus for the Bolshoi Ballet within the 
context of the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the revolution. 
Despite the ballet’s hordes of goose- stepping Roman soldiers and its 
propagandistic plot about Spartacus, leader of a slave revolt in ancient 
Rome, its strength as a theatrical production showed that choreog-
raphy could become resistance. The choreography, the dancers’ cha-
risma and the spectacle of the production engaged the audience in the 
power of the performance, making them forget the ballet’s ideological 
subtext, and allowing them to interpret it in their own way. In the pro-
duction, Maris Liepa, who created the part of Crassus, leader of the 
Roman army, portrayed himself not as the evil anti- hero and oppressor 
of slaves, but as the defender of an ancient civilisation against a bar-
barian revolution. The ballet outlived the political context of its cre-
ation and continues to be a signature piece of the Bolshoi Ballet in the 




Magnitizdat was the unofficial practice of (re- )recording uncensored 
music or speech onto cassette tapes, which were then distributed 
throughout the Soviet Union. The term magnitizdat is etymologically 
composed of two words  – magnit (derived from Russian magnitifon 
(tape- recorder)) and izdat (meaning ‘to publish’) – and was exploited in 
the 1950s onwards to record poetic songs by bards (avtorskaia pesnia) 
and later, rock music. Alongside the growing consumerist culture and 
technological developments within the Soviet Union, magnitizdat 
became the natural replacement of roentgenizdat – the adequately cheap 
X- ray discs and temporary solution to unofficial post- war music record-
ing (see Roentgenizdat, 4.3 in this volume). As Kolya Vasin remembered, 
‘enterprising young guys ran around the streets of our town with show 
boxes filled with recordings “on the bones”, but their time would not last 
long […] the era of tape recorders began’ (Vasin 1990: 31).
The first magnetic tape recorders (the El’fa- 6, the Dnepr- 3 and the 
Spais) arrived in the late 1950s, but their production was limited to a 
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was steadily increasing the production of tape recorders throughout the 
1960s: 128,000 cassette recorders were in circulation by 1960, which 
had risen to 4.7 million by 1985 (Yurchak 1999: 82– 8). While an esti-
mated 50 million citizens bought these Soviet- made tape recorders, 
many thousands of Japanese recorders were smuggled into the Soviet 
Union by Soviet sailors and were either sold in second- hand shops or 
passed on through informal networks (Yurchak 1999: 82– 8). Along with 
the increase of tape recorder sales and the influx of foreign tourists, there 
was also an explosion in practices of re- recording and spreading unofficial 
Western music records or songs by Soviet bards (singer- songwriters such 
as Aleksandr Galich, Bulat Okudzhava, Vladimir Vysotskii and others, 
who merged poetry and music with political commentary). Just as pre-
sent- day YouTube has allowed artists and other amateur enthusiasts to 
become more accessible to a larger audience, magnetic tape recorders 
allowed the content, initially restricted to small numbers at private apart-
ment gatherings, to be circulated via informal networks to an increasing 
number of listeners. As Timothy Ryback stated (Ryback 1990: 45):
A vast underground culture developed around magnitizdat. Tapes 
were collected, recorded, and passed on. Although sound quality 
Figure 4.2.1 Magnet recorder, self- made at one of St Petersburg’s 
industrial plants in the 1970s.












dissipated with each re- taping, the recordings evoked what one 
observer called the ‘romance of the forbidden’. Through the hiss of 
surface noise, one heard not only the voice of the singer but also the 
presence of the audience: chairs scraping across the floor, a bottle 
knocking against glasses, muted laughter or quiet applause, the rat-
tle of a tram on the street below … From these underground record-
ings, legends emerged, faceless legends, recognisable only by their 
voices, their music, and their lyrics.
Regarding the reproduction of imported Western music, experts 
point out financial advantages of the re- recording practices. Vinyl 
recordings were extremely expensive and the further one went away 
from Moscow, the more expensive the discs became to consumers. 
Indeed, a vinyl in the Urals could cost around 200 roubles, which 
can be contextualised to an engineer’s monthly wage of 120 to 150 
roubles a month (Aksenov 2012). In this respect, tape recordings 
often appeared to fill a gap in the market for affordable and access-
ible music. The Russian journalist Andrei Logutkov indicated that he 
bought a tape recording of a Beatles track (Sgt. Pepper) in the Russian 
city of Orlov, from a friend for just 60 kopecks (Aksenov 2012). In the 
same way, music critic Artemy Troitsky wrote that a ‘tape recording 
of an LP cost three roubles, while the album itself would fetch 20 or 
30 roubles’ (Troitsky 1987: 25). It is clear that the economic advan-
tage of cassette re- recording was that popular music could be distrib-
uted to a wider and less- affluent audience, something that perhaps 
resonated with a socialist mentality of sharing and subverting private 
property rights.
As with the earlier possession of roentgenizdat music, magnetic 
tape recorders conferred ‘significant symbolic capital upon its owner’ 
(Daughtry 2006: 25) and strengthened the demand for them. The econ-
omy of shortage alongside the weakened ideological constraints on 
imported music (as well as other Western goods) ensured that, by the 
start of the 1980s, magnitizdat was being exploited for recording rock 
music on a mass scale. It has been argued that this phenomenon caused 
a decline in attendance figures at official concerts and the reduction of 
album sales, which eventually helped provoke the state concert organisa-
tion (Goskontsert) to promote the unofficial Soviet rock group Mashina 
vremeni (Time Machine) to ‘professional status’ (Easton 1989: 52– 3). 
Nevertheless, rock fans could surpass the official system through use of 
informal suppliers (known as the fartsovshchiki), who were well known 
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clothing (e.g. blue jeans). Hanging around Western- tourist holiday 
hotels and popular tourist destinations, the fartsovshchiki would barter 
with tourists for marketable goods, which could then be passed on and 
sold through informal networks.
Magnitizdat was similarly highly evasive. The Soviet press attacked 
the cassette tape recordings for, as quoted in the newspaper Sovetskaya 
Rossia on 9 June 1968, ‘spreading faster than a flu virus’ (Ryback 1990: 
46). Buying, selling or owning unofficial music tapes still carried up to 
a three- year prison sentence (Sargent 2015). The Soviet militia (police) 
attempted to wage war against the fartsovshchiki, but their attempts were 
futile as countless numbers continued to ‘ply the trade’ (Ryback 1990: 
109– 10). One Soviet musicologist, Vladimir Frumkin, on 20 March 1974 
attempted to fly from Leningrad to the United States with a selection of 
cassette tape recordings of his bard- friend Bulat Okudzhava. The tapes 
were ‘verified’ by Soviet customs officials and then handed back to him, 
but upon arriving in the United States Frumkin discovered that his mag-
netic tape recordings had all been ‘demagnetised’ (Daughtry 2006: 2). 
Although these recordings had been erased, they were probably not fully 
checked; it was often the case that avtorskaia pesnia could be secreted 
among ‘other less provocative songs’ (Sargent 2015). Despite such efforts 
of containment by the authorities, thousands of recordings were already 
in unofficial circulation, locked into personal and private distribution 
networks.
Magnitizdat was neither an exclusively urban phenomenon nor a 
practice specific to Russia, but had parallels across central Eastern Europe. 
For example, in Hungary, the artist György Galántai, who had bought a 
Sony tape recorder through his relatives in Vienna, began experimenting 
with ‘mail art’ (sending cassette tapes through the postal system) in the 
early 1980s. These tapes, described as ‘cassette- radio, radio work’ and 
entitled ‘Radio Artpool’, contained a mixture of ‘interviews, music, ambi-
ent recordings … improvisations, sound art, found sounds [and] spoken 
words’ (Hagen and Denora 2012: 452– 3). In Czechoslovakia, which also 
had a shortage of Western LPs, the magnitizdat labels S.C.T.V (samizdat 
cassette tapes [and] videos, founded by Petr Cibulka) and Fist Records 
(founded by Mikoláš Chadima) were both initiated as small- scale pro-
jects in their owners’ respective home apartments. In 1976, Cibulka was 
credited with producing the first tapes of the numerous imprisoned bands 
of the Czech Underground (Hagen and Denora 2012: 453). The Prague 
rock group Plastic People of the Universe (PPU) was an example of this 
underground culture: often performing privately in friends’ houses, or 


















and Bojanovice (1976), their music would be recorded and distributed 
via these magnitizdat tape recordings (Horne 2013: 186– 7). While tap-
ing and re- recording would be carried out by both Cibulka and Chadima, 
magnitizdat tapes would then be traded and exchanged through friends 
and acquaintances, but also through samizdat magazines such as Vokno 
and other such underground literature.
As a phenomenon, magnitizdat shared many qualities with roent-
genizdat, primarily as both practices helped to overcome and subvert 
the state constraints on the non- authorised music distribution channels. 
The core difference was that while roentgenizdat provided a cheap imi-
tation of vinyl discs in short supply, magnitizdat used authentically pro-
duced magnetic tapes that eventually made X- ray discs technologically 
redundant; the cassette tapes had a longer duration and better audio 
quality. These tape recorders and self- produced tapes were legal to pos-
sess in every household, compared to the strictly illegal paper- copying 
devices of samizdat, and could therefore be distributed with less risk 
of being arrested. According to Daughtry, the ‘Frumkin’ case cited 
above, for example, highlighted the ‘difference in the regime’s attitudes 
towards magnitizdat and samizdat’ (Daughtry 2006:  3). The fact that 
Frumkin had considered it worthwhile to attempt to emigrate with sev-
eral magnitizdat tapes, unthinkable for the case of the forbidden works 
of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, is perhaps testament to the ambivalence of 
state policy on cassette tapes. Therefore, just as roentgenizdat became 
the medium for unofficial jazz music, magnitizdat became the medium 
for unofficial avtorskaia pesnia and later rock music. Breaking the Soviet 
government’s monopoly on information and music, magnitizdat as a 





Roentgenizdat (also known as ‘music on ribs’ or ‘music on bones’) was 
the unofficial practice of cheaply reproducing and disseminating dis-
carded and reprogrammed X- ray photographs as music records in the 
Soviet Union. The term roentgenizdat is etymologically composed of 
two words – roentgen (the Russian word for X- ray, named after Wilhelm 
Conrad Röntgen, the German physicist who discovered electromagnetic 
radiation in wavelengths), and izdat (from Russian meaning ‘to publish’). 
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recordings in the Soviet era, a time of prohibition of musical styles and 
material shortage. The practice thus became the metaphorical ersatz- 
bread, satisfying the post- war musical hunger of the masses.
Roentgenizdat originated in Leningrad in 1946, in a studio situated 
at house no. 75 on Nevsky Prospect, named Audio Message (Zvukovoe 
pis’mo). Its founder, Stanislav Filon, used a redesigned German 
Telefunken music re- writer to replicate music recordings from the ori-
ginal vinyl to cheaply reinvented, imitation X- ray material. The price of 
one X- ray copy was between 5 to 15 roubles; however, individual orders 
would be more expensive (Bogdanova 2009: 1). The studio would typ-
ically remain open throughout the night, recording unofficial perfor-
mances onto X- ray material where opaque X- ray images of skulls and ribs 
were still clearly visible. The process became so successful that another 
underground studio, named Golden Dog (Zolotaia sobaka), was estab-
lished the following year. Boris Pavlinov, one of the founders of Golden 
Dog, recalled that the most popular recordings were of jazz music from 
the West and songs in the style of the tango, foxtrot and romances – all 
non- sanctioned styles within the Soviet Union (Kitaev 2009: 9). From 
these underground studios, thousands of X- ray copies were being sold 
on the black market and by the late 1950s millions of these X- ray records 
were in circulation, becoming ‘the common currency of the Soviet- bloc’ 
(Ryback 1990: 32).
The support and agency of the stiliagi (commonly referred to as the 
‘hipsters’ in Western literature) was primarily responsible for the increasing 
demand of roentgenizdat. Part of a subculture in the Soviet Union from the 
late 1940s to the early 1960s, the stiliagi represented a rejection of official 
Soviet musical styles, fashion and behaviour, and became the advocates of 
a new Westernised model. They sported suits with striped silk shirts, multi- 
coloured and patterned ties, complemented with waxed quiffs and comb- 
over hairstyles comparable to John Travolta in the film Grease (Dotsenko 
2005). Dance also became a key mode of their expression, rejecting the 
‘approved’ dances (waltz, polka and quadrille) for the frowned upon alter-
natives (the tango, foxtrot, boogie- woogie and jitterbug) (Troitsky 1987: 
13). X- ray discs would be obtained via the ‘second economy’ (underground 
studios or blat networks, see 1.1 in this volume) and disseminated at the 
stiliagi’s main ‘hang out’ meeting points (known as Broadway or ‘Brod’ 
for short) – Gorky Street (Moscow) and Nevsky Prospect (St Petersburg), 
and private dance hall parties (Fürst 2010: 222). According to Juliane 
Fürst, the stiliagi culturally confronted the system on a ‘new, unfamiliar 
and non- textual’ level, which left the Communist Party struggling to deal 



















forms of dance, Westernised clothing and jazz music ‘on bones’ all played 
an exceptional role in the stiliagi subculture.
A number of structural developments helped cement the position 
of roentgenizdat as an underground informal practice. One cause was the 
Soviet ban and subsequent clampdown on jazz music. In August 1946, 
articles denouncing jazz concerts appeared in the official Soviet news-
papers Pravda and Izvestia: Andrei Zhdanov (director of post- war cul-
tural policy) voiced his concern with the dangers of ‘high culture’ and 
‘foreign influence’ in art, and ruled that anything other than mass song 
or folk- styled socialist realist composition was ‘ideological diversion’ 
(Pilkington 1994: 65– 6). By the end of the decade, many jazz musicians 
such as Eddie Rosner, Igor Piatigorskii (a jazz band leader) and A. G. 
Alekseev (a Moscow- based jazz musician) were either imprisoned or sent 
to Siberian prison camps (gulags) (Ryback 1990: 11). The official Soviet 
press, through their attacks on the stiliagi, also helped reinforce the pos-
ition of roentgenizdat as a subversive informal practice. The term stiliagi 
appeared for the first time in the Soviet satirical magazine Krokodil in 
1948, and consistently satirised the movement for their supposed bad 
taste in fashion. On 10 March 1949, Krokodil declared that ‘the most 
important part of their [stiliagi] style of clothing is not to resemble nor-
mal people’ (Yurchak 1999: 89) and in another article by Pravda, the 
stiliagi were described as a mixture of ‘parasitism, hooliganism and ban-
ditism’ (Johnson 2011: 201). It also became common practice to compare 
the stiliagi with monkeys or other wild animals, seemingly because they 
resembled the style of Johnny Weissmuller in the Tarzan films (Johnson 
2011: 201).
Finally, the emergence of roentgenizdat can be seen as a conse-
quence of the growing consumerist culture forming within the post- war 
Soviet Union. The hegemony of American mass consumption culture 
was rapidly being transmitted through the Iron Curtain, which proved 
surprisingly porous with respect to socio- cultural trends. The produc-
tion of radios, cameras and sewing machines tripled between the years 
1953– 63, and production of domestic appliances such as refrigerators, 
washing machines and vacuum cleaners increased at similar rates (Reid 
2009:  146). Cultural products such as trophy films (e.g. Stagecoach 
(1939), Sun Valley Serenade (1941), The Girl of My Dreams (1934)), 
American radio (Radio Liberty, Voice of America – the jazz programme 
Music USA hosted by Willis Conover was first broadcast in January 
1955) and American magazines (e.g. Amerika) were also available in the 
Soviet Union, all of which were designed to impress the Soviet consumer 
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(many of whom self- defined as shtatniki – worshippers of American cul-
ture), who closely observed the clothes and styles of Western foreigners. 
This was a ‘well- known practice’, even down to imitating the language 
with Americanised jargon such as trauzera (trousers), khetok (hat), 
and shuzina (shoes) (Fürst 2010: 222– 5). Obtaining Westernised music 
was therefore just another part of developing a Westernised identity. 
However, the American influence is often overstated, as Hilary Pilkington 
argued, the new Soviet teenager was a product of the new domestic 
society, which was characterised by fewer working hours (the working 
day reduced from eight to six hours for 16– 18 year olds in July 1956), 
increased leisure time and expanding leisure industry, higher disposable 
income, and the extension of adolescence through more opportunities in 
higher education (Pilkington 1994: 18, 67). The new teenage consumer, 
rebelling against the styles and modes of the previous generations, there-
fore sought out an original way of expressing their self- identity through 
consumption – a need that was in part met through roentgenizdat.
Figure 4.3.1 ‘Music on the bones’ (X- rays used for recording).
Source: https:// commons.wikimedia.org/ wiki/ File:Rock_ on_ Bones2.










To conclude, while it was the activity of the underground record-
ing studio networks and the stiliagi that enabled the production and cir-
culation of X- ray discs, there were a number of structural developments 
that increased demand for this underground product. These included the 
jazz ban, satirising of the stiliagi in the official press, and the emerging 
Soviet consumerist culture. Nevertheless, roentgenizdat was born out of 
a desire, not specifically to subvert the official institutions and censors 
of artistic expression, but to help obtain an individual style in the new 
era of Soviet consumerism. By the 1960s, just as rock music replaced jazz 
music and the stiliagi became ‘clichéd and outmoded’ (Johnson 2011: 
204), roentgenizdat was replaced by a more technologically advanced 
phenomenon – magnitizdat, the unofficial practice of (re- )recording 




Samizdat is a specific textual culture that existed in the Soviet Union 
from the late 1950s to the mid- 1980s. Through the production and cir-
culation of texts outside of official institutional frameworks, the prac-
tice of samizdat challenged dominant values and positions and created a 
space for alternative cultural production and communication. The word 
samizdat can be translated as ‘self- publication’. Etymologically, the word 
comes from the Russian sam, meaning ‘self, or by oneself’ and - izdat, an 
abbreviation of the word izdatel’stvo, which means ‘publishing house’. 
Well- known dissident Vladimir Bukovsky summarised the samizdat 
process as follows:  ‘I write myself, edit myself, censor myself, publish 
myself, distribute myself, go to jail for it myself’ (Bukovsky 1979: 141).
Samizdat emerged out of the space of relative cultural liberalisation 
created by the Thaw. A growing aversion to tired ideology and a desire 
to reassert literary autonomy led to resistance within the cultural field 
(Komaromi 2015:  38). This quest for greater cultural autonomy is key 
to the emergence of samizdat. The samizdat of the late 1950s primarily
consisted of the unofficial circulation of banned, suppressed and other-
wise un- publishable literature and literary journals. Access to such lit-
erature in samizdat allowed authors and readers to explore language 
and conceptions of self and society in a critical way. Examples include 
the works of Pasternak, Akhmatova, Mandelshtam and Tsvetaeva and 
poetry journals such as Feniks and Sintaksis (Alexeyeva and Goldberg 
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and became inextricably linked with dissidence. After the 1965– 6 trial 
of writers Andrei Siniavskii and Yuli Daniel and the repressions that fol-
lowed, samizdat not only functioned as a means of artistic and literary 
expression, but also played a crucial role in dissident communication and 
Figure 4.4.1 Cover page of the Chronicle of Current Events 6(11)  
31 December 1969.






activism. Various groups and individuals, representing such interests as 
human rights, religious freedoms and national self- determination, pro-
duced and circulated petitions, appeals, periodicals, open letters and 
trial transcripts in samizdat. While those involved in the production and 
dissemination of samizdat material faced severe repressions from the 
state (incarceration, exile and confinement to psychiatric wards), samiz-
dat activity endured until the advent of glasnost and perestroika.
The most common way to produce samizdat was by typewriter 
(though handwritten, mimeograph and later Photostat copies of samiz-
dat texts were also in circulation). Samizdat authors would usually type 
their texts using four or five carbons and then distribute the copies to 
people they knew. If a recipient found value or was interested in the text, 
he or she would copy it and pass it along to others in a similar manner 
(Alexeyeva 1985: 12). These informal text- sharing networks were essen-
tial to the production and dissemination of samizdat. In the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, such groups were mostly comprised of Moscow and 
Leningrad intelligentsia, however, as these networks grew and samizdat 
activity increased, samizdat texts could be found across the Soviet Union. 
In the words of veteran dissident Ludmilla Alexeyeva, samizdat spread 
across the country like ‘mushroom spores’, connecting people through 
unofficial networks (Alexeyeva 1985: 284).
The status of samizdat texts was reinforced by the practice of 
tamizdat, which was the smuggling of texts to the West for publica-
tion. Once published, the texts would often be smuggled back into 
the Soviet Union and circulated in samizdat, as was the case with 
Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago (Lovell 2000: 112). Indeed, the 
development of samizdat was in many ways supported by audiences 
abroad and Western publishing opportunities (Komaromi 2015: 133). 
Some groups, such as human rights defenders and Jewish refuseniks, 
relied on tamizdat to help garner international support for their cause 
and bring political pressure to bear on Soviet leaders. Another prac-
tice closely connected to samizdat was magnitizdat (see 4.2 in this vol-
ume), which involved the production and circulation of audiotapes. 
The tapes were often amateur recordings of live performances of cult 
musicians such as Alexander Galich, Bulat Okudzhava’ and Vladimir 
Vysotskii (Steiner 2008: 622).
One bulletin that particularly demonstrates the scope and signifi-
cance of samizdat is the Chronicle of Current Events (Chronicle). The 
Chronicle was published in samizdat from 1968 to 1983 and its editors and 
contributors were human rights activists who were involved in the found-
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was to provide regular and accurate information about human rights vio-
lations in the Soviet Union and report on the activity of human rights 
groups. The Chronicle played a coordinating role within the entire Soviet 
human rights movement. Samizdat bulletins such as Ukrainian Herald, 
Exodus, The Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church and the Herald 
of the Evangelical Christian Baptists can be seen as direct offshoots of the 
Chronicle. Chronicle editors encouraged readers who wanted to contrib-
ute information about rights violations and abuses to pass the informa-
tion along to the person from whom they received a copy, a process that 
would be repeated until the information reached the editors. This system 
of information transfer exemplifies the trust- based networks and chains 
of reproduction and transmission that typified samizdat. Additionally, as 
the Chronicle grew, its geographical dissemination widened. In the begin-
ning, the Chronicle primarily reported on issues in Moscow, Leningrad 
and the Ukraine. However, later issues would include increasingly more 
information about the provinces and national republics. Not only does 
this reveal the multidirectional character of information exchange, but it 
also demonstrates samizdat’s capacity to connect geographically isolated 
segments of society.
The unofficial circulation of texts that began in the late 1950s served 
as a forum for the development of alternative culture and transformed 
relations among Soviet citizens. Artistic, literary and socio- political sam-
izdat made otherwise inaccessible texts available and made discussion 
of experiences repressed from official culture possible. In addition, sam-
izdat created significant informal social links; samizdat networks con-




university of copenhagen, denmark
Mat describes a type of obscene language commonly used in Russia 
and other parts of the former Soviet Union. Its lexicon consists of only a 
handful of words (though they have multiple variants), which are gen-
erally regarded as highly offensive. The act of using mat is described 
in Russian by the expressions rugat’sya matom (‘to swear using mat’), 
matom vyrazhat’sya (‘to express oneself in mat’) or simply materit’sya (to 
use mat).
Materit’sya is central to day- to- day communication in several sub-













resistance (the Soviet underground, Mit’ki (see padonki language, 4.6 in 
this volume)), self- expression (graffiti and other forms of wall- inscription, 
see 4.9 in this volume) and the general violation of social taboos, as well as 
the power of expression and the effectiveness of communication, rendering 
mat instrumental in crisis communication. Mat is not, however, normally 
used in formal contexts. Mat is mostly an oral tradition, used at moments of 
anger but also in jokes, songs, limericks (chastushka) and tales, and could 
be used to satirise the government. Under the Soviet regime, mat became 
the language of dissent associated with the Gulag penal system and with 
counterculture, adopted by the intelligentsia to dissociate itself from hege-
monic discourses. In 2014, a law was brought into force in Russia that for-
bade the use of obscene language in films, television broadcasts, books and 
public performances (Rossiiskaia gazeta 2014).
Recent research has disproved the popular belief that mat entered 
the Russian language as a result of the Mongol domination of the thir-
teenth to fifteenth centuries (Ermakova 2001; Kovalev 2005; Popova 
2009: 48; Baranov 2014). Mat has been found in several documents 
dating from much earlier than the Mongol invasion. One of the earliest 
is a letter dating from the early twelfth century that was found during 
an archaeological excavation in Russia’s Veliky Novgorod (Novgorod 
the Great) (Mokienko and Nikitina 2008: 7). A woman wrote to scold a 
friend for not paying back a loan. Another letter found in a nearby region 
and dating from the same period contains brotherly business advice and 
makes creative use of the verb ebat’ (to fuck) (Mokienko and Nikitina 
2008: 8).
Ebat’ is to this day one of the most popular swear words in the 
Russian language and serves as the base for countless words and expres-
sions. Similar verbs can be found in other Slavic languages such as Serbian 
(jebatj), Slovak (jebat’) and Polish (jebac) among others. Linguists point 
to a common proto- Slavic form of the word – jebati/ jebti – meaning to hit 
or to lie to someone (Kovalev 2005). Philologists today believe that the 
word probably comes from the Indo- European root jeb, originally mean-
ing ‘to hit’ but later acquiring the meaning ‘to copulate’ (Kovalev 2005; 
Mokienko and Nikitina 2008: 75). Likewise, the verb ‘to fuck’ in English 
is believed originally to have meant ‘to strike’ or ‘to thrust’ (Sheidlower 
1995). The Oxford English Dictionary (1989) gives the word’s etymol-
ogy as ‘Early 16th century: of Germanic origin (compare Swedish dialect 
focka and Dutch dialect fokkelen); possibly from an Indo- European root 
meaning “strike”, shared by Latin pugnus “fist” ’.
The etymology of the word mat can be traced back to the Indo- 
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To use mat is thus to ‘swear by one’s mother’ (Erofeyev 2003; Plutser- 
Sarno 2005; Popova 2009: 48). Similarly, in other civilisations, invoking 
the name of a god or another supernatural force was intended to add 
weight to what the speaker was saying, and to indicate that what was 
being said was the truth (Mohr 2013: 57). In Ancient Greece and Rome, 
for example, it was common to swear ‘by Hercules!’ or ‘by Jupiter!’ while 
obscene language of a sexual character was commonly used in religious 
rituals and festivities (Hultin 2008:12; Ljung 2011:49– 50). In ancient 
Russia, or Rus’, mat was used during pagan rituals, and it may be that 
the Christianisation of Rus’ at the end of the tenth century contributed to 
rendering that type of language taboo (Uspenskii 1994: 57).
Today, the commonest mat expression is yob tvoyu mat’ (‘fuck your 
mother’), though the form of the verb ebat’ in this instance is not an 
imperative, but rather the third- person singular of the past tense, mean-
ing ‘[someone] fucked your mother’ (Ljung 2011: 40). Other dictionaries 
suggest a range of equally taboo subjects of intercourse: ‘a dog fucked 
your mother’ (Uspenskii 1994: 109– 26; Kovalev 2005). Supporters of 
this theory link it to the end of matriarchy in Russia during the twelfth 
century, when the man who lay with the mother of the house would 
become the master of the home (Kovalev 2005). To say yob tvoyu mat’ to 
someone was accordingly to assert one’s own superior power, which may 
be interpreted as seniority: ‘I am now your father (or father- figure) and 
have authority over you’, or ‘Everything you owned is now mine’ (Kovalev 
2005). Moreover, questioning the reputation of a mother implied that 
her children were bastards, perhaps leading to the expression sukin syn 
(‘son of a bitch’) (Kovalev 2005). References to the mother are taboo 
in many languages, notably Spanish, Italian and the Nordic languages, 
because of the strong bond between the mother and her child (Harbeck 
2015). Some writers have suggested that the ‘insult by mother’ may be 
rooted in the Oedipus complex, that is, a son’s desire to replace his father 
in his relationship with his mother (Harbeck 2015).
Another interpretation of the origin of the word mat links it to ‘a 
loud voice’ or ‘a scream’, and suggests that it may refer to the sounds 
that animals make during the mating season (ma, mia, meh) (Trubachev 
1974; Plutser- Sarno 2005; Anikina 2012). Such an animalist context 
would make it obscene for humans (Plutser- Sarno 2005).
Because of its obscenity, the mat lexicon is rarely included in stand-
ard dictionaries. However, several dictionaries of mat have been pub-
lished in Russia. Most of these include the main mat words related to 
genitals and their sexual use:  ebat’ (‘to fuck’), blyad’ (‘whore’), pizda 














words suka (‘bitch’), manda (‘cunt’), mudak (‘asshole’), zhopa (‘ass’) and 
govno (‘shit’).
It might at first seem that the Russian swearing vocabulary is 
rather poor, consisting as it does of only a handful of words. However, 
the particularity of swearing in Russian is that it is highly malleable and 
the words listed above can be worked into an almost infinite number of 
nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs (Dreizin and Priestly 1982: 233– 4; 
Smith 1998: 172). It is noteworthy that, of the mat words listed above, use 
of the first four in films, television broadcasts and public performances 
is banned under legislation introduced in 2014, while copies of books, 
DVDs or CDs that contain such words must be sealed and labelled as con-
taining obscene language before being put on sale (Rossiiskaya gazeta 
2014). The legislation was controversial, with critics seeing it as marking 
the return of censorship into official discourse and art forms (though par-
ents may have welcomed the fact that their children would be sheltered 
from foul language). The legislation was so vaguely worded, however, 
that it has so far been applied only in a very inconsistent manner.
Paradoxically, while swear words may build social barriers, they 
may also help to dismantle them. When not formulated as a direct insult 
Figure 4.5.1 The swear word ‘khuj’ carved into a birch tree, one of the 
most common and symbolic trees in Russia. 
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to someone, swearing can work as an icebreaker and create a bonding 
experience. Since swear words are not generally accepted in public, when 
an obscenity slips through in a small group it may be seen as an indica-
tion that the atmosphere is relaxed and sufficiently comfortable for the 
speaker to use familiar language. According to Elistratov (2001), the use 
of obscene language during a conversation can create a sense of intimacy, 
and help set up a relationship of trust and confidence.
Mat can play an important role in politics precisely since it can act 
as an instrument of bonding, becoming the language of ‘insiders’ but also 
adding veracity and authenticity to what the speaker is saying. Erofeyev 
(2003) has claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin engages in 
‘demonstrative swearing’ with his subordinates in order to reinforce his 
position in the hierarchy. Putin has been known publicly to use jargon 
associated with criminal argot, notably in his vow of 1999 to ‘wipe the 
terrorists out in the outhouse’ (mochit’ ikh v sortire). It might seem hypo-
critical for Putin’s regime to launch a campaign against mat even as its 
members indulge in swearing behind closed doors. Such doublethink is 
not, however, uncommon in Russia.
In contemporary Russia, too, mat is consistently used as a lan-
guage of crisis communication. When an individual needs to signal to 
others that he or she is sick or in danger and needs immediate attention, 
the surest way to convey the extraordinary nature of the situation is to 
switch to mat. The same goes the other way: a sure way of knocking 
someone else off balance is to switch to mat. This has led some com-
mentators to describe mat as a management tool. Coercive leadership 
is quite common in Russia, and from that perspective mat might be con-
sidered a leadership tool (Fey and Shekshnia 2011). Mat can produce 
remarkable results when used in a measured way, however, if leaders 
use it constantly their followers are likely to become used to it and cease 
to take it seriously.
4.6 Padonki language (russia)
larisa morkoborodova
Åbo akademi university, finland
The padonki language or Padonkaffsky jargon after the phonetised ver-
sion of the word podonok for scumbag, or riffraff, is a specific linguis-
tic practice on the Russian Internet, usually understood as cyber slang. 
It is also known as the Olbanian/ Albanian language (Russian: albanskii 
or olbanskii jazik). The characteristic features of the practice include the 













(mat) (normally judged not to be printable); wordplay; and a set of non- 
standard words and phrases.
The terms padonki language and Padonkaffsky jargon most likely 
originated from the self- definition of Internet users as ‘padonki’ rebel-
ling against cultural norms in language use. The term Olbanian first 
appeared in 2004 without any connection to the Albanian language and 
owes its origin to an incident in LiveJournal, when an English- speaking 
user didn’t understand a post written in Russian Internet jargon and was 
told that the language was Albanian. The posts that followed included an 
imperative: ‘Learn Albanian!’ (now written as Olbanian), that since has 
become an Internet meme and gave an alternative, and commonly used, 
name to the padonki language.
Based on play on words and spelling, this Russian online practice 
of orthographic distortions is somewhat similar to other Internet lan-
guage phenomena such as English Leet or Romanised Cypriot Greek (see 
French verlan, 4.7 in this volume). The difference is that the padonki lan-
guage has its own original structure, its own sources, as well as a specific 
position in the socio- cultural environment.
Deliberate misspellings and puns were first developed by the 
Russian FidoNet in- group in the late 1990s. A  massive Internet users’ 
movement ‘for spelling mistakes, against automatic spell- checking’, a 
denial of the social taboo of using mat publicly, has spread across the 
Russian Internet since 1999. Their main goal, manifested on www.fuck.
ru (currently defunct), was to question language correctness as a marker 
of social status (Andreev 1999). Andreev’s manifest of anti- literacy pro-
claims the right to make grammatical errors and propagandises phonetic 
spelling.
The Manifest of Anti- Literacy states, ‘We are principally against the 
so- called spelling correctness on the Net! … all masters of the Russian 
word should challenge the killing of our live language by soulless 
automatons!’
The declared ‘freedom’ from orthography (‘I write as I  speak’) 
and resistance to the culturally prevalent linguistic norms have proven 
extremely attractive for hundreds of thousands of Russian Internet 
users, and not only youths – dozens of counterculture- oriented websites 
have started practising the padonki language (e.g. padonki.org, fackru.
net, down.ru, udaff.com and others). The followers of this countercul-
tural practice online have formed an Internet subculture by maintaining 
an internal cohesion and group distinction mainly due to the play with 
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cohesion rested upon the adherence to their linguistic norms, display of 
intolerance, and ostracising the non- observers.
Since its inception, the padonki language has been used in all 
types of computer- mediated communication (ICQ chat rooms, social 
networks, Internet forums, blogs, Twitter, etc.). Websites of padonki 
Internet community, practising wrong spelling and mat (such as udaff.
com and padonki.org), provide a place where padonki authors can pub-
lish online their original short stories (called kreatiffy) for readers to rate 
and share. The potential of the ‘anti- literacy padonki- movement’ when 
it comes to its influence on online communication is shown by impres-
sive statistics: the average number of uddaf.com visitors (the most popu-
lar resource practising the padonki language) during years 2003– 10 has 
been around 1 million people a month, according to the open statistics on 
the site (since the access to visitor statistics on uddaf.com closed in 2011, 
the web information company liveinternet.ru reports 140,000 to 180,000 
visitors a month in 2015).
The main distinction of the padonki language as a linguistic phe-
nomenon is the deliberate use of misspellings. The misspellings should 
be systematically observed and modelled on the phonetic corrections of 
Russian normative orthography. Such corrections include the reduction 
of unstressed vowels, voicing and devoicing of consonants (e.g. afftar, 
instead of avtor (author); ashibka instead of oshibka (error)). Other prin-
ciples of the padonki language include the grammatical rules reversal. For 
example,
• where the rule suggests to write - жи, ‘- zhi’ and - ши, ‘- shi’ with ‘и’, 
‘i’, the padonki norm suggests otherwise: жызнь, ‘zhyzn’ instead of 
жизнь, ‘zhizn’ (life);
• after ч- , ‘ch- ’ and щ- , ‘shch- ’ letters я, ‘ja’ and ю, ‘ju’ are used instead 
of а and у, ‘u’:  чюство, ‘chjustvo’ instead of чувство, ‘chuvstvo’ 
(feeling);
• letter substitution and hypercorrection are used for transforming 
the words:  for example, сч- , ‘sch- ’ instead of щ- , ‘shch- ’:  обсчие, 
‘obschie’ instead of общие, ‘obshchie’ (common); помасчь, 
‘pomasch’’ instead of помощь, ‘pomoshch’ (help);
• letters е, о instead of и, i, and а: пеши, ‘peshi’ instead of пиши, ‘pishi’ 
(write), сотона, ‘sotona’ instead of сатана, ‘satana’ (Satan).
The use of reversal for a number of morphemes that break with their trad-
itional literate appearance plays a particular role in padonki language. For 
















instead of verb endings - тся/ - ться, ‘- tsja/ - t’sja’: кончацца, ‘konchatstsa’ 
instead of кончается, ‘konchaetsja’ (ends); жыниццо, ‘zhynitstso’, instead 
of жениться, ‘zhenit’sja’ (to get married). The rules of ‘creative’ orthog-
raphy also apply to the Russian obscene language (mat) and its numer-
ous derivatives. Thus, padonki- movement fans would use ипацца, 
‘ipatstsa’ (meaning to fuck), and бисписды, ‘bispisdy’ (literally, no cunt) 
that somewhat softens the look and the sound of mat.
The padonki lexicon includes slang words and phrases which have 
come into use as Internet memes. The longevity of these lexical inno-
vations depends on different factors, including their communicative 
function, possible linguistic parallels, associations with particular lin-
gua- cultural paradigm, connections to some actual social or political con-
text, as well as their originality and attractiveness of appearance. Below 
is a short glossary of the most durable padonki lexical units (variation in 
spelling occurs):
An expression of approval: зачот, ‘zachot’ from correct зачет, ‘zachet’ 
(pass, as in exams).
An expression of disapproval:  ацтой, ‘atstoi’, from correct отстой, 
‘otstoi’ (sediment).
An expression of highest approval:  аффтар жжот, ‘afftar zhzhot’, 
from correct автор жжет, ‘avtor zhzhet’ (the author burns).
An expression of approval: пешы исчо, ‘peshy ischo’, from correct пиши 
ещё, ‘pishi eshchjo’ (write more).
A popular Russian meme for greeting: превед, ‘preved’, from correct 
привет, ‘privet’ (‘Hi’). It originates in a cartoon, widely posted on 
the Internet, where a bear comes out of the woods and cries out 
‘Surprise!’ to a couple having intercourse. In the Russian version, the 
bear exclaims ‘Preved!’.
Since the mid- 2000s, many padonki words spread from their home 
Internet sites into all types of advertisements, headlines, outdoor ban-
ners, names of business entities and social events (see Figure 4.6.1).
Elements of the padonki language rules have widely penetrated 
computer- mediated communication, the erroneous spellings have stabi-
lised. The reason for the popularity of distorted orthography is linked to 
the lack of expressivity of the virtual ‘written talk’. Deliberate erroneous 
spellings, exposed and repeated in various contexts for a long time, have 
proven themselves capable of denoting expressivity in ‘low’ keys (irony, 
sarcasm, etc.). Thus padonki language enhances the communicative cre-
ativity of the Russian computer- mediated communication in general. The 
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time this lexical innovation gradually loses its counterculture character. 
The linguistic subculture can only remain deviant and limited in scale, if 
not incorporated into the orthographically correct mainstream.
The increasing scale of padonki spelling practices has caused ‘fear 
for the fate of the Russian language’ and stimulated a counter-movement 
in academic and educational circles. Advocacy campaigns for ‘a clean 
Russian’ prevail in public discussions on the websites and in the trad-
itional mass media. Although no official restrictions were imposed on 
the public use of padonki misspellings, this practice has been strongly 
discouraged by the administration of many Russian- speaking websites. 
‘I can speak Russian!’ became a popular slogan in forums, blogs and per-
sonal web- pages in the late 2000s.
To date, the padonki movement has not reached its declared goal 
and has not transformed the Russian Internet communication into a zone 
free from social and cultural norms in language use. Since the 2010s, 
the popularity of the padonki language has gradually declined, and its 
frequency of use on the Internet sites is diminishing. Nevertheless the 
decade of the padonki language ‘fashion’ has had a significant impact 
Figure 4.6.1 A cafe in St Petersburg, name misspelt on purpose 
(‘bufed’ instead of ‘bufet’/ cupboard).











upon the use of slang at large and upon people’s linguistic awareness. 
This phenomenon has shown that dramatic societal changes and techno-
logical shifts provoke powerful ‘linguistic’ responses. The case of the 
padonki language raises the challenging question of how marginal sub-
cultural communication practices can develop and have much wider 





Verlan is a form of French slang featuring the inversion of syllables to 
create new words and was originally used by the first generation of chil-
dren born in France to North African immigrants as an in- group or secret 
language. Its proliferation in the housing projects in the outer suburbs 
of Paris became an exhaustive area of study in the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Bachmann and Basier 1984; Méla 1991). Verlan quickly gained 
notoriety as a method of disguising criminal activity in the city outskirts 
(banlieues) from the police. These days, Verlan appears to be used much 
less maliciously and by a wider social spectrum, although some of the 
original prejudices against its use still remain.
In Europe in particular there is a plethora of slang lexicons, such 
as Rotwelsch in German, furbesco in Italian and of course argot in French 
(Burke and Porter 1995). It would appear that Verlan has its roots in the 
French slang of argot, which François- Geiger (1991) splits into two main 
categories; first, its original intended use was as a cryptolect by vari-
ous gangs in nineteenth- century France as a means of concealing crim-
inal activity; and second, the parlers branchés (this could be translated 
as ‘trendy speech’) were employed within different areas of culture as 
a means of both identification and to disguise meaning. In some ways, 
Verlan can be viewed as a revival of the traditional functions of argot; a fun-
damentally oral phenomenon, it is particularly prevalent in large urban 
conurbations and in some cases has similar functions, the most important 
of which is as a means of masking certain topics of conversation from out-
siders (François- Geiger 1991). With its use of syllabic inversion, Verlan 
falls into the category of ‘reversal ludlings’ (Bagemihl 1995), present in 
Europe in the forms of Pig Latin (Treiman 1989) and some aspects of Cant 
or Shelta (Kirk and Ò Baoill 2002). However, it is perhaps the Balkan slang 
Šatrovački that is the most similar to Verlan, given its popularity among 
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and the choice of words it incorporates into its lexicon, which tend to be 
drug- or crime- based (Rizzolo 2004; Rìos 2009). Rizzolo gives as exam-
ples the Serbo- Croat words džok, meaning ‘joint’, which becomes kədžo, 
and nož (‘knife’) which turns into žəno (2004: 276– 7).
In Chomskyan terms, Verlan is a not a grammatical practice but a 
social one (Azra and Cheneau 1994), regardless of the morphological 
processes a word must undergo to become verlanised. In Peters’ words, 
‘Verlan serves primarily as an identity marker, not as a semantic addition 
to a sentence’ (2007: 3). Spoken as a means of rebellion against the pur-
ity of the French language, which is more strictly regulated than most by 
the Académie Française, it is often seen as a means of association and soli-
darity with a very particular social group. In its early incarnations, the 
offspring of immigrants from former French colonies and Muslim coun-
tries such as Algeria, Morocco and Turkey, who as first- generation French 
citizens struggled to fit in with both their parents’ and French culture, 
employed Verlan (itself an inversion of the word l’envers, literally ‘back 
to front’) as a way of self- identification. This section of society was, and 
still is, disproportionately socially excluded, often confined to high- rise 
developments on the outskirts of large cities such as Paris and Marseilles. 
As a result they created for themselves a kind of underground society 
within which Verlan was the primary means of excluding the uninitiated.
Verlan is not only a means of inclusion, but as with many other in- 
group languages, a way to ‘scramble’ a word or message to hide criminal 
or dubious activity, for example, teshi from le shit (a French slang term 
for cannabis) and keuf for flic, a rather derogatory name for a police offi-
cer (Méla 1991). It is also extremely prevalent in the lexical fields of sex 
and relationships, the body, ethnicity, drugs and violence. This can be 
accredited to the fact that a Verlan term may be ‘softer’, less brash and 
without the connotations and taboos of the original word; take the very 
common beur used in place of arabe, or caillera, the inversion of racaille, 
a word that president Nicolas Sarkozy used in 2005, akin to the English 
word ‘scum’, to describe delinquent members of society.
These days, many French people use some degree of Verlan 
regardless of race, age, gender or social class (Méla 1997). As would be 
expected, different varieties of Verlan have developed over time, almost 
certainly from diatopic (from experience, Lyonnais Verlan is quite dif-
ferent to the Parisian variety) and diastratic points of view. As has been 
noted ‘it can … distinguish yuppies from street kids’ (Peters 2007: 9). 
Lefkowitz (1991) claims that some members of the bourgeoisie may try 
to show empathy or awareness of social problems by using Verlan. Indeed 

















to be current. As Azra and Cheneau report: ‘On se souviendra de Mitterand 
[François, the former French president] répondant à un journaliste lui 
demandant ce que signifie chébran; “Ça veut dire branché” ’ [‘We remember 
Mitterand responding to a journalist who had asked him what chébran 
meant; “It means trendy” ’] (1994: 149).
One of the most telling indicators that Verlan is not just a pass-
ing fad has been its diffusion across French media. A mode of speech 
that was once only heard on news reports from the Parisian banlieues 
is now omnipresent in the French film and music industry. Isabelle 
Marc Martínez’s book, Le rap français. Esthétique et poétique des textes 
(1990– 1995) gives an in- depth account of the use of Verlan in popular 
music, and specifically rap music, which in France tends to be produced 
and listened to by the maghrébin population (Martínez 2008). It would 
appear that when Verlan is used in rap music, it is not used as cryptically, 
but instead allows the listener to feel part of the movement as well as 
emphasising the message of the music. As  Martínez puts it: ‘[Verlan] n’a 
pas pour fonction de brouiller le message, mais, au contraire, de l’intensifier 
par l’accumulation de synonymes’ [‘Verlan] does not seek to scramble the 
message; but rather to intensify it through the accumulation of syno-
nyms’] (2008: 271).
However, it is also important to consider the roots of French hip- 
hop. Mitchell (2000) maintains that rappers and hip- hop artists have 
always looked to their ethnic backgrounds for inspiration and have 
used this to forge a strong identity; although he does not explicitly 
mention Verlan, it can clearly be considered an important feature of 
this identity.
Hip- hop music has also created for itself a sub- lexicon of Verlan, 
in which the most important words within the realm of rap music are 
almost better known in this form (Martínez 2008); examples include 
the word rappeur itself, verlanised into peura, and the name of the well- 
known artist MC Solaar, also known as Laarso. Unlike the previously 
discussed ‘common’ verlanisations of slang words, the rapper Ministère 
A.M.E.R. has branched out into inverting everyday words (i.e. those not 
considered to be argotique or slang) namely maneci (cinéma) and naisco 
(connais) (Martínez 2008: 271), thus giving strength to the argument 
that Verlan is no longer restricted to a cryptic form of usage.
The cultural importance of Verlan is highlighted in the 1995 film 
La Haine, in which the director Matthieu Kassowitz draws on French 
society’s understanding of the slang. The film’s events take place against 
the backdrop of a Parisian council estate, focusing on the frustrations of 
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it as ‘viewer- friendly’ as possible while also conveying the message that 
the characters’ speech is different from that of the more bourgeois soci-
ety that they encounter in central Paris. Peters sums this up well: ‘The 
characters speak Verlan only amongst themselves, never to adults inside 
or outside the banlieues [suburbs] … they use Verlan for drug vocabulary 
and employ many of the better- known terms: keuf, from flic, (meaning 
cop or pig) … téci, from cité (ghetto)’ (2007: 15). Furthermore, although 
the characters never use more than a few words of Verlan at a time (pre-
sumably to facilitate the comprehension of the viewer), what is consid-
ered to be the most important word in the sentence is usually the one that 





Avos’ is a Russian word used in both economic and non- economic contexts 
to refer to a ‘lackadaisical’ attitude to chance in the world. It expresses 
the idea that ‘things might work out for me’ (albeit with a low degree of 
probability). A typical usage might be ‘Relying on chance, I drove into the 
oncoming lane in order to get round the traffic jam’ (‘Nadeyas’ na avos’, ya 
reshil vyekhat’ na vstrechnuyu polosu, chtoby ob’’ekhat’ probku’).
In an economic context, avos’ is often evoked to blame people for 
engaging in risky deals or popular speculation and for then falling prey 
to cheats and scams. Contemporary Russian writing tends to portray 
avos’ as an age- old Russian habit of mind, a regrettable lapse into folk-
ways that has somehow survived despite the advent of more ‘progressive’ 
kinds of economic thinking, such as striving to achieve socialist produc-
tion targets, rational administrative planning, responsible management 
of a household economy or hard- headed capitalist calculation.
The concept of avos’ is a response to unpredictability and has deep 
roots in a cosmological vision of how the world works. Although advo-
cates of modernity express the view that it must sooner or later dis-
appear, in fact avos’ springs into view as soon as the economy experiences 
one of its abrupt upswings or downturns, and hence it is widely evident 
in twenty- first- century Russia.
It is worth briefly considering the history of the idea. There is an 
ageless proverb (‘The Russian god is chance (avos’), probably, and yes, 
somehow’ (Russkiy Bog – avos’, nebos’ da kak- nibud’), which has been 









Pushkin onwards. In the nineteenth century the notion that avos’ was 
somehow like a god for the common folk was used, for example, by the 
novelist Pavel Mel’nikov- Pechersky when he was contemplating the 
secrets of the economic success of the Old Believers (dissenters who 
broke away from the Russian Orthodox Church in the seventeenth cen-
tury). He wrote that what separates the upstanding, prudent, hard- work-
ing Old Believers from the lazy peasants belonging to the mainstream 
Orthodox Church is that they have escaped from the fatalism of ‘the 
primordial law of the Russian person, “the Russian god – avos”. The 
Old Believers are virtually all active and efficient, he wrote, and there-
fore prosperous, whereas the Orthodox peasants, prey to avos’, are an 
inert, slack and reckless lot only too happy to ‘eat at others’ expense’ 
(Mel’nikov- Pechersky 1868).
It might seem that the passivity of avos’ would imply an idea like 
Providence, a viewpoint sub specie aeternitatis, the viewpoint of God’s eye – 
except that in fact avos’ is devoid of Christian connotations and refers 
instead to wild, untamed happenstance. So, with avos’, it is not by the 
will of the Christian God that an opportunity comes to be. Rather, avos’ 
suggests an alternative chanciness – not as inexorable as Fate nor as deity- 
like as Fortuna, even if Russian writers refer to it sarcastically as a deity – 
which is just the way the unfathomable world seems to work. Latching 
on to avos’ implies unreflective immediacy. The great Russian dictionary 
of Vladimir Dal’ explains the etymology of avos’ as a shortening of ‘А vot 
seychas!’ (Oh, there it is, right now!) (Dal’ 1863– 6).
Avos’ is associated with informal, off- the- cuff practices. For exam-
ple, an avos’ka was the string bag that people used to carry in Soviet 
times just in case they came across something good to buy on their way 
to work. In post- Soviet times it is assumed that the days of the avos’ka 
are over (‘You’ll find it in a museum!’) and, with its peasant associations, 
people today rarely use the word avos’ to describe their own actions – 
even if in fact they act in exactly this way. On the other hand, they are all 
too ready to apply the word to others. This contrast is apparent in the fol-
lowing statements, collected during the author’s fieldwork in Vladivostok 
in 2015, concerning Russia’s highly risky real estate business. A young 
man who had paid in advance for an apartment that, as it transpired, was 
never built, and having lost all his money, recounted:
I didn’t think of checking the reputation of the firm. You can’t call it 
rational. I knew it was risky. I understood that the firm had been set 
up more or less on the principle of a pyramid but – ha, ha, I hoped 
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Another man, when asked why he had been so idiotic as to put down his 
entire life savings for a flat in similarly uninsured and legally dodgy cir-
cumstances, replied: ‘Well, it was there – on my way to work. There was 
the house going up. There was the sales office. And inside, there was the 
contract. So I signed’. Commenting on such occurrences, the director of 
an estate agency said, rather pompously,
It is common to find sad cases of avos’. When buying flats with obvi-
ously suspect documents but a price well below the market rate, 
a considerable proportion of our citizens continue with arrange-
ments, even though any foreigner would have long ago fled from 
such fishy schemes. Sometimes when searching for a flat for clients 
I have to push them away almost by force from dubious offers that 
seem to them extremely profitable.
(RIA Nedvizhimost’ 2013)
Avos’ is one among various ideas of luck and fortune, hope, specu-
lation and anticipation found in societies across the world (Da Col and 
Humphrey 2008). Such ideas are used contextually, including in seem-
ingly completely rationalised financial markets (Miyazaki 2007). Yet 
the history of anthropology shows that some indigenous concepts have 
themselves become theoretical terms of wider import. According to 
David Graeber, concepts such as ‘mana, sakti, baraka and orenda’ might 
best be considered as ‘grappling with the same ambiguities and anti-
nomies of temporal existence that all humans, even social theorists, have 
to confront in one form or another’ (Graeber 2012: 25). Avos’ has not yet 
reached the limelight in this respect; but it can be compared with the 
idea of kairos, named after the Greek god Kairos, the deity of seizing the 
moment – an idea that has been expanded and recast to capture ideas 
of event, revolution, or effective business action in numerous theoretical 
writings of the twentieth century (Boer 2013). Writing about the US box-
ing business, for example, Loic Wacquant uses this idea to explain how 
an experienced matchmaker becomes successful by his ability to choose 
exactly the right time to strike the best deal for his fighters (Wacquant 
1998: 16). Yet avos’ differs from kairos. The latter in its ancient Greek 
version implies selecting the right place and time, duly measured, appro-
priate and opportune, and is an aristocratic practice; the unbalanced, 
untimely, out- of- place and vulgar are outside the zone of kairos (Boer 
2013). With avos’, by contrast, conceptions of harmony and due measure 
are absent. So is the notion of judicious choice. Avos’ is chance that seems 








In an economic context, despite seeming similarities, the ‘spot-
ting a break’ and the ‘letting things happen’ of avos’ are very differ-
ent from the laissez- faire attitude of the model capitalist entrepreneur 
described by Friedrich Hayek (2002). The latter is an opportunist, 
flitting here and there, navigating by intuition and grazing on lucky 
breaks; but he or she still takes account of the rules of the game and 
the laws of the state, and must peg an operation to the calculated 
choices of the multitude of economic actors. Avos’ on the other hand 
supposes a proper cosmic chaos. It does not expect there to be rules or 
statistical regularities – none, at any rate, that the actor can discern. 
Practice by avos’ mirrors such an unpredictable world: sly, yet incon-
sistent and happening according to whim. Thus it operates beyond any 
strategies of circumscription by means of rules, laws or governmental 
techniques. The more the economic environment does indeed manifest 
itself as arbitrary, unreliable and beyond the law, the more attractive 




The word graffiti is the plural of graffito, which in the history of art 
refers to a drawing or writing scratched on a wall or other surface. It is 
derived from the Italian word graffito, which literally means a scratch. 
However, in its more widespread modern usage, graffiti refers to ‘words 
or images marked (illegally) in a public place, esp. using aerosol paint’ 
(Oxford English Dictionary 2016). Graffiti first began to be practised in 
this modern sense in the 1960s and has continually been evolving and 
developing since.
In many countries worldwide graffiti is regarded in law as vandal-
ism. Graffiti’s status of illegality is at the heart of the debate as to whether 
it constitutes a valid art form. In 2004 the Keep Britain Tidy campaign 
issued a statement signed by 122 MPs, including the then- prime min-
ister, Tony Blair, which read:  ‘Graffiti is not art, it’s crime. On behalf of 
my constituents, I will do all I can to rid our community of this problem’ 
(Guardian 2004). This contested nature of the social and artistic value of 
graffiti can lead to conflicting approaches in how the authorities ‘man-
age’ it when it is spontaneously created.
In its contemporary practice graffiti has several forms and usages. 
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defined as ‘a stylised signature of a graffiti writer’s pseudonym’ (Gottlieb 
2008: 35). In this form it exists simply as a means for the artist to indicate 
his presence. Tagging is primarily associated with gangs and crime; it is 
a form of communicating and marking territory. Often associated with 
graffiti on trains, the ‘tag’ developed into a more mature art form and 
was found on bridges and buildings, often displayed with unique styles 
and colouring. By the 1980s graffiti had become intertwined with the 
‘hip hop’ culture of the African American and Latino youths of the South 
Bronx in New York (Gottlieb 2008: 6– 7). In time, the designs became 
bigger and brighter and developed into large- scale murals, intended to 
enhance the community. These murals were much more complex and 
required hours of work, undertaken usually at night in order to avoid 
detection from the authorities.
The association of street art with gangs and crime led to graffiti 
being used primarily as an instrument of communication and rebellion. 
Many graffiti artists used their art as a method to express their emotions 
and to indicate political views, which could not otherwise be voiced. The 
subculture of graffiti artists, by definition, rebelled against authority and 
the power of the mass media. One of the most influential and prominent 
examples of this is the Bristol- born street artist Banksy, whose works 
have dealt with an array of political and social themes, including anti- 
war, anti- capitalism, anti- fascism, anti- imperialism, anti- authoritarian-
ism, anarchism, nihilism and existentialism. His works have addressed 
such components of the human condition as greed, poverty, hypoc-
risy, boredom, despair, absurdity and alienation. In the West Bank, he 
memorably painted a hole revealing blue sky on the Palestinian side of 
the barrier erected by Israel (Byrne 2007). In December 2015, as the 
European Union faced a ‘migrant crisis’ caused by conflicts in Syria 
among others, Banksy created a work depicting the late Steve Jobs, the 
Apple Company founder, on a wall of a refugee camp in Calais known as 
‘the Jungle’. He painted Jobs with a black bin bag over one shoulder and 
an Apple computer in one hand. Unusually on this occasion Banksy also 
made a public statement regarding attitudes to refugees, in which he 
said (Ellis-Petersen 2015):
We’re often led to believe migration is a drain on the country’s 
resources but Steve Jobs was the son of a Syrian migrant. Apple is 
the world’s most profitable company, it pays over $7bn (£4.6bn) a 

















The use of graffiti for political ends can be observed worldwide. One 
of the most interesting recent examples of graffiti as a tool of spontaneous 
political expression took place in Egypt. The Egyptian Ministry of Culture 
rigidly controlled all public expression in Egypt and until 2011 protest art 
was hard to find (Parshley 2011). However, in January 2011 protesters 
used walls across the Egyptian capital as the canvas for an open letter to 
the regime, demanding the ousting of President Mubarak. Cairo’s protest 
street art highlighted the fury of the demonstrators and demonstrated 
their resilience and determination to topple President Mubarak’s regime. 
The demonstrators were successful in forcing the resignation of the des-
potic president and for a brief period thereafter succeeded in bringing 
new freedoms, which included the right to make art (Parshley 2011). In 
June 2012, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood became Egypt’s 
first democratically elected president. A few months later, the authorities 
had the revolutionary graffiti erased. However, graffiti artists mocked 
the government’s whitewashing by spraying slogans such as ‘erase one 
more time’, and ‘congratulations on the new paint’, over the covered 
murals, and most protest graffiti re- appeared within hours (Huffington 
Post 2014).
In recent times, graffiti has started to be embraced by the establish-
ment in some countries. It has moved away from its illegal display on pub-
lic or private property to be more generally accepted as an art form in its 
own right. Graffiti is no longer necessarily orchestrated for rebellious or 
criminal reasons, but rather to challenge people to accept aesthetic pleas-
ure from a unique form whose development has not been constrained 
by traditional and institutional demands. As an art form it has become 
sufficiently accepted in popular culture to be adopted by multinational 
companies such as Nike, who have incorporated the aesthetic aspects of 
graffiti into their products and advertising.
In March 2009, the Brazilian Government passed a law decrimi-
nalising graffiti. Street art was legalised provided that the works were 
undertaken with the consent of the owners of the property on which it 
was placed (Untapped Cities 2012). The policy was adopted as a result of 
the development of Brazilian street art, which is considered to be one of 
the most advanced and active of global street art movements.
In Brazil, artists differentiate between tagging, which is known as 
pichachao, and grafite, which is a specific type of street art particular to 
Brazil. The term pichacho, also known as ‘wall writings’, comes from the 
Portuguese word piche, meaning tar, which was stolen from construction 
sites and used by early taggers to create their art. Pichachao emerged as 
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It disappeared in the 1970s, only to reappear in the 1980s, adopted at 
this time by gangs as a means of marking territory. Today, the differences 
between pichachao and grafite are very distinct. Pichachao is negatively 
connoted, whereas grafite has been viewed positively since the 1990s 
and is welcomed and encouraged by both communities and Government 
(Untapped Cities 2012).
The contrast between the perception of street art in the United 
Kingdom and in Brazil could not be starker. It appears that where laws 
exist banning such a practice, street art will always be negatively con-
noted. However, where the law actively supports the form, not only 
does it have the possibility to both personalise and beautify a city, it 
also has the possibility of engaging with disaffected youth, channel-
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Hacktivism is a portmanteau word of hacking and activism. It builds on 
the notion of the hacker as a creative tinkerer and disruptor of technology 
(Rheingold 2000). The definition rose to prominence in the early 2000s. 
In an influential book chapter, Dorothy Denning defined hacktivism as 
‘the marriage of hacking and activism. It covers operations that use hack-
ing techniques against a target’s Internet site with the intent of disrupting 
normal operations but not causing serious damage. Examples are web sit- 
ins and virtual blockades, automated email bombs, web hacks, computer 
break- ins, and computer viruses and worms’ (Denning 2001: 241). This 
definition has since been rendered somewhat obsolete, due to the prolif-
eration of electronically mediated communications and the changes in 
velocity and volume of such communicated acts (Castells 2006).
Mediatisation theory looks at the institutionalised changes that 
media enacts as it becomes embedded in actions of everyday life (Couldry 
and Hepp 2013). Politics and political participation is at the forefront of 
such changes. A process that can be traced to the early era of mass com-
munication and the formation of public opinion (Anderson 1983), it has 
profoundly changed the ways of political participation in the digital age. 
Hacktivism is the logical application of mediatised political action to the 
world of participatory social media and ‘always- on’ connectivity: a way 
to engage and challenge political and commercial institutions through 















Media institutions and media activities become entangled with 
other spheres of life, in a way that reciprocally alters both (Schulz 2004). 
Popular examples are the change in length and structure of political 
speeches to accommodate the televised political spectacle; the focus on the 
personal over the professional; the idea of political consumerism, where 
life choices and ideologies are wrapped together with certain purchasing 
habits, as in buying free- range food, or boycotting products associated 
with organisations or values one dislikes (Brants and Voltmer 2011; De 
Beus 2011). Simultaneously, a record low level of trust in traditional polit-
ical and economic institutions is registered, prompting citizens to look for 
new forms of participation and expression. These alternative actions can, 
for instance, be seen in the creation of crypto- currencies and the Occupy 
movement. The resulting space of expressive political consumerism is the 
breeding ground for hacktivism in its current form.
The Anonymous collective has popularised the term and many 
associated practices. Born from the ‘4Chan’ image boards website – and 
specifically the infamous ‘/ b/ thread’ (Herwig 2011)  – Anonymous 
resists definitions. Even the name itself is tongue- in- cheek, reflecting 
the default mode of displaying messages on the boards; no registration 
or sign- in is possible, and thus each post is defaulted to an ‘Anonymous’ 
user. Consistent self- identification is discouraged and even frowned 
upon and thus the majority of communication occurs between unknown 
numbers of users lacking any identifying signs.
This somewhat schizophrenic form of non- identification lies at 
the foundation of Anonymous as political actors and hacktivists. The 
movement claims to be leaderless and non- hierarchical, where everyone 
can join by simply proclaiming himself or herself part of Anonymous. 
Ethnographer Gabriela Coleman notes how such decentralised ethos of 
action is also rooted in the technological platforms they use for hacktivism 
(Coleman 2014). Hacktivism is thus an inherently tiered phenomenon, 
encompassing a wide variety of potential actions and skills (Fuchs 2014). 
As with many terms associated with Anonymous, the precise meaning 
and the extent of the actions that fall under the term are disputed.
At the lower technical end of the spectrum, activists use social media 
to pressure or ‘shame’ public figures and institutions. Often this is done 
by way of subversion, highlighting the clumsiness of traditional institu-
tions when attempting to engage with the widely open contemporary 
media platforms. In a famous example, the New York Police Department 
asked the public to share images on Twitter under the #myNYPD hashtag 
in order to highlight the community work undertaken by the police in the 













4.10 hacktiViSm  (General)
police violence towards protesters and minorities, which resulted in ever 
more citizens posting unflattering images of the police (BBC Technology 
2014). Other similar actions that can be roughly grouped in this category 
include subscribing the target to unwanted mailing lists, or filling the 
target’s social media presence with obscene or distracting material. The 
unifying characteristic of these actions is the lack of reliance on technical 
prowess (thus rendering the ‘hack’ prefix somewhat oxymoronic). All it 
takes to achieve these actions is a loose consensus on the target’s identity 
and the ability to coordinate (Coleman 2014).
A more demanding technical practice is the coordinated attack and 
defamation of a target’s website and/or social media profile including 
publishing personal information about the target (a practice known as 
doxing). The most common example of this is the Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack, where multiple computers bombard the target’s 
IP(s) with non- stop traffic, causing it to slow down or to become com-
pletely unavailable. Anonymous has popularised DDoS attacks through 
the release of such tools as the ‘Low Orbit Ion Canon’ (LOIC), which 
allows a user to subscribe their computer to an ongoing attack without 
any prior technical knowledge (Gallagher 2012). Like many other hack-
tivist tools and techniques associated with Anonymous, LOIC’s name is 
drawn from popular Internet culture, thus giving the somewhat banal 
act of using basic disruption technique an aura of grandeur and adven-
ture. This spirit of ludic (playful) political engagement is a characteristic 
of hacktivist collectives, who draw their inspiration from groups such as 
the Dadaist, the Yes Man, Spaßguerilla and the Flux collectives (Fuchs 
2014), famous for using absurdist and carnivalesque methods for polit-
ical action.
At the highest technical tier of hacktivist activities, actual hack-
ing (as in unauthorised access of privileged computer data) takes place. 
These techniques are not different technologically from any other com-
puter hacking. The tools and skills used to hack a cache of credit card 
data is the same, regardless of whether it is done by Anonymous or a 
criminal organisation. The difference is in the motivation; the intent 
of hacktivists most commonly is to publicly release the data in order to 
embarrass or pressure their target. Even in this environment, the play-
ful and mocking tone often remains. For example, LulzSec was a small 
group of hackers, loosely affiliated with the Anonymous brand, who 
were responsible for a few high- profile ideologically motivated attacks 
on corporate websites and databases, such as defacing the US Public 
Broadcast Service (PBS) website in response to an unfavourable docu-

















activities require coordination between a small group of highly skilled 
individuals, it is far easier for the authorities to understand and circum-
vent through traditional law enforcement than mass distributed low- skill 
action (Lee 2011). Thus, although the high- profile hacks of major organi-
sations attract attention, the hacktivists carrying out the action are often 
caught and prosecuted, as occurred in the cases of LulzSec and its off-
spring AntiSec (Coleman 2014).
Overall, hacktivism proves that despite the participatory prom-
ises of some new media evangelists, the skills levels and technological 
proficiencies of users still very much limit their possible roles in con-
stitutive political action. The difficulty of defining the scope of hack-
tivism and defining what kinds of actions it includes creates issues for 
both researchers and activists. For instance, the oft- repeated critique 
of ‘slacktivism’ accuses web activists of low- effort, low- risk type of 
undertakings that rarely result in actual change. Yet, as can be seen in 
the brief typology drawn above, some types of hacktivist action is suc-
cessful in spite of the minimal demands of individual members, simply 
by virtue of mass coordination; whereas in other cases, activists pay 
a heavy personal price for their actions. As the (mobile) web increas-
ingly integrates into the daily lives of millions, resulting in a hybrid 
reality of the physical and digital entwined (de Souza e Silva 2006), 
we can expect hacktivism to become an even more potent tool in the 
activists’ playbook.




People do not challenge political systems that they do not accept or that 
they want to see reformed as often as might be expected. Accommodating 
quiescence prevails most of the time, open rebellions are infrequent, 
though various forms of resistance are more common. Does quiescence 
signal acceptance, resistance mere annoyance and desire for minor 
changes, and is only rebellion a sign of outright rejection of unwanted 
authority? Is there a linear escalation from accommodation (quiescence) 
through resistance to rebellion? The answers to these questions are 
negative. It has been amply documented that people’s relations with the 
authorities are full of ambiguities and complex twists and turns (Scott 













Zygmunt Bauman (concluding remarks to this volume) sees the pro-
clivity to divide ourselves into ‘us’ versus ‘them’ as ‘the thousands- of-years-
old, deeply ingrained human mode of being- in- the- world’. As he correctly 
observes, this proclivity has serious, often tragic, consequences, as humans 
engage in protracted and utterly devastating conflicts based on binary clas-
sifications (religious, national, ethnic or racial) with frightful regularity. A 
clearly articulated dichotomisation (‘us’ versus ‘them’) may be detrimental 
and undesired but, on the other hand, it helps to build solidarity and cohe-
sion, without which an effective rebellion would be hard to imagine.
There exists, however, another mode of being- in- the-world, equally 
ingrained, that comes to the fore when humans try to avoid confron-
tation and instead seek accommodation, for example, with powerful 
authorities. This requires blurring the boundaries (also between ‘us’ and 
‘them’), muddling clear moral distinctions, blunting categorical classifi-
cations, and developing an ability to live with the resulting ambiguity. 
In this case the choice that is forgone is not between ‘us’ and ‘them’, but 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Here again a sharp (moral) dichotomisation 
is undesired, although for different reasons. It ‘disturbs the peace’, in 
Vaclav Havel’s felicitous phrase (1991). Choosing the peace of accom-
modation is an existentially savvy, if morally dubious, move. Telling the 
truth and thus ‘disturbing the peace’ is morally ennobling, but often its 
costs may be fatally high.
Throughout history, many people have asked how to live, earn a 
living, raise a family and yet preserve a minimum of integrity under a 
political system that is ‘alien’, imposed, unaccepted. Is it possible to live in 
a secluded bubble, in total isolation from the public sphere that has been 
imposed by conquerors or autocrats? There have been individuals or 
small communities, here and there, that have managed to achieve such 
isolation. And there have been periods of resistance or, from time to time, 
outbursts of rebellion or revolution against unwanted systems. But most 
of the time and in most places the vast majority of people have chosen a 
strategy of accommodation based on an illicit compromise that results in 
at least some degree of ‘co-optation’ by the unaccepted regime.
The extent of such accommodation/ co-optation and its conse-
quences, both for individuals and for political systems, are matters of 
great interest to both social scientists and ethicists. The study of these 
issues is driven by several questions: Where are the boundaries of 
‘decency’ and ‘selling out’? Where is the line separating shrewd simula-
tion of obedience from unwitting opportunism? What level of comprom-
ise can one’s conscience tolerate? What kinds of trade- off are acceptable, 



















people throughout history have faced and answered in many different 
ways. And often they have inherited or chosen a mode of existence that 
does not require answers to such questions. Avoidance allows leading life 
in a state of inherited or calculated inchoateness that offers existential 
security while suppressing or minimising the possibility of asking poten-
tially disturbing ethical questions. The question ‘Am I right?’ can be posed 
only when existential and moral ambiguity has been overcome, when the 
choice is articulated and becomes a nagging ethical dilemma.
But why do some people choose heroic stances, guided by clear 
moral distinctions, while most choose silent obedience? From Max 
Weber through Michel Foucault to modern feminists and scholars of 
subalternity, this question has been central to many inquiries of social 
order and power. The subaltern are the people at the bottom of the class 
structure, subjected to indoctrination aimed at legitimising their subju-
gation, yet still possessing enough autonomy to harbour their own under-
standing of their situation. Their position is thus inherently ambiguous: 
they are controlled, but they do not internalise – at least not fully – the 
legitimacy of this control. But they may not be able to find a language in 
which to articulate and challenge their subjugation; they may not be able 
to ‘speak’ (Spivak 1988).
The nagging question, then, is ‘Where does the proclivity to accom-
modate, to accept – even if superficially – the subservient position, come 
from?’ Is it simply a result of fear and resignation, a strategic choice 
underpinning simulation, or an effect of indoctrination that has produced 
an obedient (authoritarian) personality? This is the question that drives 
the debate between James Scott, armed with the concept of the ‘weapons 
of the weak’, and proponents of the strong hegemony thesis. According to 
this thesis, the rulers (controllers of the message) can mould the minds 
of the ruled to such a degree that the image of the reality that the lat-
ter hold legitimates the former’s power. When this happens the rulers 
achieve hegemony in Gramscian terms. The power of the rulers is ‘natu-
ralised’, often as a result of ‘symbolic violence’, and becomes a part of the 
taken- for- granted common sense, a part of ‘doxa’ in Pierre Bourdieu’s ter-
minology (Bourdieu 1991). Scott objected to this idea, arguing that the 
‘weak’ are rarely if ever so thoroughly indoctrinated and often only simu-
late their acceptance of the prevailing order, the authority structures sup-
porting it, and the narratives legitimising it. There exists, however, the 
third possibility when people, particularly over longer periods, vacillate 
between accepting and challenging the status quo, tolerating the ensu-
ing ambiguity. ‘The peasants of Central Luzon … were psychologically 
















Brian Fegan observed (quoted in Ortner 1995:176). They saw collabor-
ation with the powerful as distasteful and yet they engaged in it, for their 
primary concern was to protect and provide for their families.
Scott’s concept of everyday resistance is so innovative because it 
alerts us to the possibility that acquiescence may be simulated and that 
hegemony may therefore be only imagined. While in their behaviours 
and statements (official transcripts in Scott’s terminology) produced for 
the rulers’ benefit, ‘the weak’ pretend to accept the rulers’ power, they 
challenge this power off- stage, where they are able to feel secure commu-
nicating among themselves. Through more or less subtle ridicule, people 
dilute the solemnity of hegemonic discourses (Wedeen 1999). They do 
so by whispering at their kitchen tables, winking to one another while 
faking obedience, sharing parables that delegitimise the power of the 
powerful, or faking compliance in ambivalently performed rituals. These 
‘hidden transcripts’ are the currency of everyday resistance and potential 
precursors of open resistance and rebellion.
As many commentators have observed (Ho 2011), ‘everyday resist-
ance’ can be understood psychologically, as a decision or predilection of 
an individual. The resisters, on this view, have not been indoctrinated. 
They possess an ‘authentic psyche’ and thus retain some capacity to 
remain sovereign, at least in some areas of life. But everyday resistance, 
or rather a capacity to engage in it, can be also construed as a feature of 
a cultural system. Individuals may or may not have access to cultures and 
languages – Scott’s ‘little traditions’– that provide them with conceptual 
tools of resistance.
By and large, ‘little traditions’ provide people with repertoires of 
scripts, some of which are useful for simulating obedience, some for 
expressing mild forms of displeasure, and some for engaging in acts of 
resistance. There is, however, a fundamental ambiguity in the idea of 
everyday resistance. When is a pickpocket a thief, and when does he or 
she (also) become a resister? Should we look for an answer in individual 
intentions (not easy to reconstruct), or rather in cultural scripts, provid-
ing ‘cultural intentions’ and thus legitimising pickpocketing as an act of 
resistance? The point is, then, that resistance must be defined as such 
in the actor’s culture of reference. However, cultures are often full of 
ambiguities, to say nothing of contradictions, which means that finding 
a clear- cut categorisation of a given (type) of action is often impossible.
When people engage in rebellion, many but not all of these ambigu-
ities disappear. What is ‘really’ the goal that drove individuals to join often 
risky causes? Are they always driven by the noble aim of disposing of 














politics in order to vie for power inside the group, settle personal accounts, 
or take care of particularistic interests, as Ortner argues (1995)? There is 
a strong tendency to romanticise rebellion that is hard to resist.
There is no straightforward, linear progression from oblivion or dis-
comfort of quiescence through inconsistency of everyday resistance to 
the moral clarity of rebellion. Each of these forms of engagement with 
the world controlled by others has its own grey zones of ambiguity; each 
can be as equivocal as human existence itself.
Bibliography to Chapter 4
Introduction: the grey zones between cultural and political
Peter Zusi
Bolton, J. 2012. Worlds of Dissent: Charter 77, The Plastic People of the Universe, and Czech Culture 
Under Communism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Havel, V. 1976/ 1991. ‘The Trial’. In Open Letters:  Selected Writings 1965– 1990, edited by Paul 
Wilson, 102– 8. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Jirous, I. M. 1975/ 2006. ‘Report on the Third Czech Musical Revival’. In Views from the Inside: Czech 
Underground Literature and Culture (1948– 1989), edited by Martin Machovec, 9– 31. Prague: 
Ústav české literatury a literární vědy, Filozofická fakulta Univerzity Karlovy.
4.1 Artistic repossession (general)
Christina Ezrahi
De Certeau, M. 1984. The Practices of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven Randall. Berkeley: 
University of California Press.




Aksenov, Pavel. 2012. Beatles for Sale:  The Vinyl Underground in the USSR. BBC Russian 
Service, 5 October. Accessed 14 August 2015. http:// www.bbc.co.uk/ news/ 
entertainment- arts- 19827438
Daughtry, Martin J. 2006. Magnitizdat as Cultural Practice. Prepared for the University of 
Pennsylvania conference – ‘Samizdat and Underground Culture in the Soviet Bloc Countries’, 
7 April.
Easton, Paul. 1989. ‘The Rock Music Community’. In Soviet Youth Culture, edited by J. Riordan, 
45– 83. London: Macmillan Press.
Hagen, Trevor with Denora, Tia. 2012. ‘From Listening to Distribution: Nonofficial Music Practices 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia from the 1960s to the 1980s’. In The Oxford Handbook 
of Sound Studies, edited by Trevor Punch and Karin Bijsterveld, 440– 58. Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press.
Horne, Brian A. 2013. ‘The Bars of Magnitizdat:  An Aesthetic Political History of Russian 
Underground Recordings’. In Samizdat, Tamizdat, and Beyond, edited by Friederike Kind- 
Kovacs and Jessie Labov, 175– 89. New York: Berghahn.
Ryback, Timothy W. 1990. Rock Around the Block: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the 

























Sargent, Hale. 2015. Refrains of Dissent. Accessed 14 August 2015. http:// americanradioworks.
publicradio.org/ features/ stalin/ d1.html
Troitsky, Aretemy. 1987. Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock in Russia. London: Faber & Faber.
Vasin, Kolya. 1990. ‘Notes from a Rock Museum’. In Soviet Rock: 25 Years in the Underground + 5 
Years of Freedom, edited by Igor Zaitsev, 30– 46. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Yurchak, Aleksei. 1999. ‘Gagarin and the Rave Kids’. In Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, 
and Society Since Gorbachev, edited by Adele Barker, 76– 109. Durham: Duke University Press.
4.3 Roentgenizdat (Russia)
James  Taylor
Avramov, K. V. 2012. ‘Soviet America: Popular Responses to the United States in Post- World War II 
Soviet Union’. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Kansas.
Barker, A. M. (ed.) 1999. Consuming Russia:  Popular Culture, Sex, and Society Since Gorbachev. 
Durham: Duke University Press.
Bogdanova, K. 2009. ‘Bugi- Vugi “Na Kostyakh” – A Eto Ne Strashno? Iz Zhizni Melomanov 40- 50- 
kh Godov’. ShkolaZhizni.ru, 10 July. Accessed July 2017. http:// shkolazhizni./ archive/ 0/ 
n- 27775/ 
Dotsenko, A. 2005. ‘Chuvaki Na Khatakh’. Rodina, 7. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.istrodina.
com/ rodina_ articul.php3?id=1618&n=86
Fürst, J. 2010. Stalin’s Last Generation: Soviet Post- War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Johnson, T. 2011. Being Soviet:  Identity, Rumour, and Everyday Life under Stalin 1939– 1953. 
New York: Oxford University Press.
Kitaev, A. 2009. Shadow X- Ray Recording. St Petersburg: unpublished version.
Pikington, H. 1994. Russia’s Youth and its Culture:  A  Nation’s Constructors and Constructed. 
London: Routledge.
Reid, S. 2009. ‘Happy Housewarming: Moving into Khrushchev- Era Apartments’. In Petrified Utopia: 
Happiness, Soviet Style, edited by M. Balina and E. Dobrenko, 133– 60. London: Anthem Press.
Ryback, T. W. 1990. Rock Around the Block: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and The Soviet 
Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Troitsky, A. 1987. Back in the USSR: The True Story of Rock in Russia. London: Faber & Faber.
Yurchak, Aleksei. 1999. ‘Gagarin and the Rave Kids’. In Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and 
Society Since Gorbachev, edited by Adele Barker. Durham: Duke University Press.
4.4 Samizdat (USSR)
Jillian Forsyth
Alekeyeva, Ludmilla. 1985. Soviet Dissent:  Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and 
Human Rights. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
Alexeyeva, Ludmilla and Goldberg, Paul. 1990. The Thaw Generation: Coming of Age in the Post- 
Stalin Era. Boston: Little, Brown.
Amalrik, Andrei. 1970. Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? New York: Harper & Row.
Bobbyer, Philip. 2005. Conscience, Dissent and Reform in Soviet Russia. London: Routledge.
Bugan, Carmen. 2013. Burying the Typewriter:  Childhood Under the Eye of the Secret Police. 
London: Picador.
Bukovsky, Vladimir. 1979. To Build a Castle: My Life as a Dissenter. New York: Viking Press.
Ginzburg, Aleksandr (ed.) 1967. Belaia kniga o dele Siniavskogo I  Danielia. Frankfurt am 
Main: Posev.
Gorbanevskaya, Natalya. 1977. ‘Writing for Samizdat’. Index of Censorship 6(1): 29– 36.
Hopkins, Mark. 1983. Russia’s Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events. New York: Praeger.
Hopkins, Mark. 1983. Russia’s Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events. New York: Praeger.
Khronika tekushchikh sobytii. 1968– 83. Memorial Society, 1– 63. Accessed July 2017. www.memo.
ru/ history/ diss/ chr/ index.htm


































Komaromi, Ann. 2015. Uncensored: Samizdat Novels and the Quest for Autonomy in Soviet Dissidence. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
Lovell, Stephen. 2000. The Russian Reading Revolution: Print Culture in the Soviet and Post- Soviet 
Eras. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Nathans, Benjamin. 2007. ‘The Dictatorship of Reason: Aleksandr Vol’pin and the Idea of Rights 
Under Developed Socialism’. Slavic Review 66(4): 630– 3.
Oushakine, Serguei. 2001. ‘The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat’. Public Culture 13(2): 191– 214.
Steiner, Peter. 2008. ‘Introduction: On Samizdat, Tamizdat, Magnitizdat, and Other Strange Words 
That Are Difficult to Pronounce’. Poetics Today 29(4): 613– 28.
Tchouikina, Sofia. 1996. ‘Uchastiye zhenshchin v dissidentskom dvizhenii (1956– 1986)’. In 
Gendernoye izmereniye sotsial’noy i politicheskoy aktivnosti v perekhodnyy period. Tsentr nezavi-
simykh sotsial’nykh issledovaniy. Sankt Peterburg, 61– 81. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.a- 
z.ru/ women/ texts/ chuikinr.htm
Walker, Barbara. 2000. ‘On Reading Soviet Memoirs: A History of the “Contemporaries” Genre as 
an Institution of Russian Intelligentsia Culture from the 1790s to the 1970s’. Russian Review 
59(3): 327– 52.
Yurchak, Alexei. 2006. Everything Was Forever Until It Was No More:  The Last Soviet Generation. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zubok, Vladislav. 2009. Zhivago’s Children: The Last Russian Intelligentsia. Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press.
4.5 Materit’sya (Russia)
Anastasia Shekshnya
Afansyev, A. 1998. Russian Secret Tales: Bawdy Tales of Old Russia. Baltimore: Clearfield.
Anikina, N. 2012. ‘Stikhiya slova. O russkom mate’ (‘Elements of the Word: On Russian mat’), 16 
August. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.elabuga- rt.ru/ component/ k2/ item/ 1932- stihiya- 
slova- o- russkom- mate.html
Baranov, A. 2014. ‘Pora spasat’ russkii mat’ (‘It’s Time to Save Russian mat’). Interview by Roman 
Ukolov, 2 July. Accessed July 2017. http:// lenta.ru/ articles/ 2014/ 07/ 02/ language/ 
Dreizin, F. and Priestly T. 1982. ‘A Systematic Approach to Russian Obscene Language’. Russian 
Linguistics 6(2): 233– 49.
Drummond, D. and Perkins, G. 1987. Dictionary of Russian Obscenities. 3rd revised ed. Oakland: 
Scythian Books.
Elistratov, V. 2001. ‘Russkii mat: Istoriya i mesto v russkom yazyke’ (‘Russian mat: Its History and 
Place in the Russian Language’). Interview by Marina Koroleva and Sergei Korzun, 20 June. 
Accessed July 2017. http:// www.echo.msk.ru/ programs/ beseda/ 14946/ 
Ermakova, A. 2001. ‘Russian mat as a Cultural Phenomenon’. April, lecture delivered at Lomonosov 
Moscow State University.
Erofeyev, V. 2003. ‘Dirty Words’. The New Yorker, 15 September, 54– 8.
Fey, C. and Shekshnia, S. 2011. ‘The Key Commandments for Doing Business in Russia’. 
Organizational Dynamics 20(1): 57– 66.
Flegon, A. 1973. Za predelami russkikh slovarei (Beyond the Limits of Russian Dictionaries). 3rd ed. 
London: Flegon Press.
Harbeck, J. (2015). ‘Mind Your Language! Swearing Around the World’, 6 March. Accessed July 
2017. http:// www.bbc.com/ culture/ story/ 20150306- how- to- swear- around- the- world
Hultin, J. 2008. The Ethics of Obscene Speech in Early Christianity and its Environment. Leiden: 
Koninklijke Brill NV.
Ilyasov, F. 1994. Russkii MAT. Antologiya (dlya spetsialistov – filologogov) (Russian MAT: An 
Anthology for Specialists and Philologists). Izhevsk: Lada M. Accessed July 2017. http:// royal-
lib.com/ read/ ilyasov_ f/ russkiy_ mat.html#0
Kovalev, G. 2005. ‘Russkii mat:  Sledstvie unichtozheniya tabu’ (‘Russian mat:  The Consequence 
of Destroying a Taboo’). Accessed July 2017. http:// www.philology.ru/ linguistics2/ 
kovalyov- 05.htm
Ljung, M. 2011. Swearing: A Cross- Cultural Linguistic Study. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Mohr, M. 2013. Holy Shit: A Brief History of Swearing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.































Oxford English Dictionary. 1989. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plutser- Sarno, A. 2001. ‘Opyt postroeniya spravochno- bibliograficheskoi basy dannykh leksicheskikh 
i frazeologicheskikh znachenii slova “khui”’ (‘The Experience of Building a Reference and 
Bibliographical Data Base of the Lexical and Phraseological Meanings of the Word khui’). In 
Bol’shoi slovar’. mata, Vol. 1. St Petersburg: Limbus Press.
Plutser- Sarno, A. 2005. ‘Opredelenie ponyatiya “MAT”’ (‘A Definition of the Concept of mat’), 23 
April. Accessed July 2017. http:// plutser.ru/ mat_ definition/ derenition_ mat
Popova, E. 2009. ‘O skvernoslovii’ (‘On Swearing’) Russkaya rech’. 1: 48– 52.
Rossiiskaya gazeta. 2014. ‘Federal’nyi zakon Rossiiskskoi Federatsii ot 5 maya 2014 g. N 101- FZ’ 
(Federal Law of the Russian Federation of 5 May 2014 No 101- FZ’), 7 May. Accessed July 2017. 
http:// www.rg.ru/ 2014/ 05/ 07/ rus- yazyk- dok.html
Sheidlower, J. 1995. The F- Word. New York: Random House.
Smith, S. A. 1998. ‘The Social Meanings of Swearing: Workers and Bad Language in Late Imperial 
and Early Soviet Russia’. Past & Present 160: 167– 202.
Trubachev, O. 1974. Etymological Dictionary of Slavic Languages. Moscow: Academy of Sciences of 
the USSR.
Uspenskii, B. 1994. ‘Mythological Aspects of Russian Expressive Phraseology’. In Selected Works, 




Andreev, A. 1999. ‘Manifest of anti- literacy’. Accessed July 2017. www.fuck.ru (currently defunct).
Chatfield, T. 2013. Netymology: From Apps to Zombies: A Linguistic Celebration of the Digital World. 
London: Quercus.
Guseinov, G. 2005. ‘Berloga bebloga. Vvedenie v erraticheskuju semantiku’. Accessed July 2017. 
http:// www.speakrus.ru/ gg/ microprosa_ erratica- 1.htm
Krongaus, M. 2013. Samouchitel’ olbanskogo. Москва: АСТ.
Mokroborodova, L. 2008. ‘Russkaja fonetika I  orfografija kak resurs “novogo pravopisanja” v 
Internete’. Scando- Slavica 62– 78.
4.7 Verlan (France)
Rebecca Stewart
Azra, J. L. and Cheneau, V. 1994. ‘Jeux de langage et théorie phonologique. Verlan et structure syl-
labique du français’. Journal of French Language Studies 4(2): 147– 70.
Bachmann, C. and Basier, L. 1984. ‘Le verlan: argot d’école ou langue des Keums?’. Mots 8(1): 
169– 87.
Bagemihl, B. 1995. ‘Language Games and Related Areas’. In The Handbook of Phonological Theory, 
edited by John A. Goldsmith, 697– 712. Oxford: Blackwell.
Black, C. and Sloutsky, L. 2010. ‘Évolution du verlan, marqueur social et identitaire, dans les 
films: La Haine (1995) et L’Esquive (2004)’. Synergies Canada 2: 1– 14.
Burke, P. and Porter, R. (eds) 1995. Languages and Jargons:  Contributions to a Social History of 
Language. Bristol: Polity Press.
François- Geiger, D. 1991. ‘Panorama des argots contemporains’. Langue française 90: 5– 9.
Kirk, J. M. and Ó Baoill, D. P. (eds) 2002. Travellers and Their Language. Vol. 4. Belfast: Cló Ollscoil 
na Banríona.
Lefkowitz, N. 1991. Talking Backwards, Looking Forwards:  The French Language Game Verlan. 
Vol. 3. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.
Martínez, I. M. 2008. Le rap français:  esthétique et poétique des textes (1990– 1995). Vol. 9. 
Oxford: Peter Lang.
Méla, V. 1991. ‘Le verlan ou le langage du miroir’. Langages 101: 73– 94.
Méla, V. 1997. ‘VERLAN 2000’. Langue française 16– 34.
Mitchell, T. 2000. ‘Doin’ Damage in My Native Language: The Use of “Resistance Vernaculars” in 


































Peters, N. 2007. C’est pas blesipo: Variations of Verlan. BA dissertation, Swarthmore College.
Ríos, J. V. 2009. ‘Linguistique et sociolinguistique du verlan à travers le monde’. Analecta Malacitana 
26: 197– 214.
Rizzolo, O. 2004. ‘Šatrovački: la construction et l’exploitation d’un corpus de verlan serbo- croate’. 
Corpus 3: 261– 310.
Treiman, R. 1989. ‘The Internal Structure of the Syllable’. In Linguistic Structure in Language 
Processing, edited by G. N. Carlson and M. K. Tanenhaus, 27– 52. Netherlands: Springer.
4.8 Avos’ (Russia)
Caroline Humphrey
Boer, R. 2013 ‘Revolution in the Event:  The Problem of Kairos’. Theory, Culture and Society 
30(2): 116– 34.
Da Col, G. and Humphrey, C. 2008. ‘Subjects of Luck: Contingency, Morality, and the Anticipation 
of Everyday Life’. Social Analysis 56(2): 1– 18.
Da Col, G. and Humphrey, C. (eds) 2012a. Cosmologies of Fortune. Special Issue of Social Analysis 
56(1). 
Da Col, G. and Humphrey, C. (eds) 2012b. Future and Fortune: Contingency, Morality and the 
Anticipation of Everyday Life’. Special Issue of Social Analysis 56(2).
Dal’, V. 1863– 6. Tolkovyy slovar’ zhivago velikoruskago yazyka. Accessed July 2017. http:// slovard-
alja.net/ word.php?wordid=52
Graeber, D. 2012. ‘The Sword, the Sponge, and the Paradox of Performativity: Some Observations 
on Fate, Luck, Financial Chicanery, and the Limits of Human Knowledge’. In Cosmologies of 
Fortune, edited by G. Da Col and C. Humphrey 56(1): 25– 42.
Hayek, F. 2002. ‘Competition as a Discovery Process’. The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 
5(3): 9– 23.
Mel’nikov- Pechersky, P. 1868. Otchet o sovremennom sostoyanii raskola v Nizhgorodskoi 
gubernii. Accessed July 2017. http:// az.lib.ru/ m/ melxnikowpecherskij_ p/ text_ 0200.
shtml
Miyazaki, H. 2007. ‘Between Arbitrage and Speculation: An Economy of Belief and Doubt’. Economy 
and Society 36(3): 396– 415
RIA Nedvizhimost’. 2013. ‘Osobennosti natsional’nogo podkhoda k pokupke i ekspluatatsii zhil’ya 
v Rossii’, 9 August. Accessed July 2017. http:// riarealty.ru/ affordabletrends_ analisis/ 
20130809/ 401091712.html
Wacquant, L. 1998. ‘Fleshpeddler at Work: Power, Pain and Profit in the Prizefighting Economy’. 
Theory and Society 27(1): 1– 42.
4.9 Graffiti (general)
Milena Ciric
Alonso, A. 1998. ‘Urban Graffiti on the City Landscape’. Paper presented at Western Geography 
Graduate Conference, San Diego State University, 14 February. Accessed July 2017. http:// 
www.streetgangs.com/ academic/ alonsograffiti.pdf
Byrne, C. 2007 ‘The Big Question: Just Who Is Banksy and What Is All the Fuss about His Work?’. 
Independent, 1 November. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.independent.co.uk/ news/ uk/ 
home- news/ the- big- question- just- who- is- banksy- and- what- is- all- the- fuss- about- his- work- 
398448.html
Curry, G. D. n.d. ‘Graffiti’. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.britannica.
com/ art/ graffiti- art
Ellis- Petersen, H. 2015. ‘Banksy Uses Steve Jobs Artwork to Highlight Refugee Crisis’. Guardian, 
11 December. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.theguardian.com/ artanddesign/ 2015/ dec/ 
11/ banksy- uses- steve- jobs- artwork- to- highlight- refugee- crisis
Ferrell, J. 1995. ‘Urban Graffiti: Crime, Control and Resistance’. Accessed July 2017. http:// yas.
sagepub.com/ content/ 27/ 1/ 73.short


























Guardian. 2004. ‘Graffiti Blamed on “Cult of Cool”’, 2 August. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.
theguardian.com/ uk/ 2004/ aug/ 02/ society.politics
Huffington Post. 2014. ‘This Graffiti Art Shows How Egypt’s Revolution Came Full Circle’, 
2 November. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2014/ 02/ 11/ graffiti- art- 
egypt- revolution_ n_ 4762431.html
Oxford English Dictionary. 2016. ‘Graffito’. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parshley, L. 2011. ‘For Egypt’s Graffiti Artists, Revolution Brings Inspiration and Uncertainty’. The 
Atlantic, 3 October. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.theatlantic.com/ international/ archive/ 
2011/ 10/ for- egypts- graffiti- artists- revolution- brings- inspiration- and- uncertainty/ 245941/ 
Untapped Cities. 2012. ‘The Legislation of Street Art in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’. Accessed July 
2017.    http:// untappedcities.com/ 2012/ 02/ 13/ the- legalization- of- street- art- in- rio- de-  
 janeiro- brazil/ 
4.10 Hacktivism (general)
Alex Gekker
Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities:  Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 
London: Verso.
BBC Technology. 2014. ‘NYPD Twitter Campaign “Backfires” after Hashtag Hijacked’. BBC News, 
23 April. Accessed July 2017. http:// www.bbc.com/ news/ technology- 27126041
Brants, K. and Voltmer, K. (eds) 2011. Political Communication in Postmodern Democracy: 
Challenging the Primacy of Politics. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Castells, M. 2006. ‘Communication, Power and Counter- Power in the Network Society’. International 
Journal of Communication 1(1): 238– 66.
Coleman, G. 2014. Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy:  The Many Faces of Anonymous. 1st ed. 
London  and New York: Verso.
Couldry, N. and Hepp, A. 2013. ‘Conceptualizing Mediatization: Contexts, Traditions, Arguments’. 
Communication Theory 23(3): 191– 202.
De Beus, J. 2011. ‘Audience Democracy:  An Emerging Pattern in Postmodern Political 
Communication’. In Political Communication in Postmodern Democracy: Challenging the Primacy 
of Politics, edited by K. Brants and K. Voltmer, 19– 38. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
de Souza e Silva, A. 2006. ‘From Cyber to Hybrid:  Mobile Technologies as Interfaces of Hybrid 
Spaces’. Space and Culture 9: 261– 78.
Denning, D. E. 2001. ‘Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism:  The Internet as a Tool for 
Influencing Foreign Policy’. In Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, 
edited by J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, 239– 88. Pittsburgh: RAND.
Fuchs, C. 2014. ‘Hacktivism and Contemporary Politics’. In Social Media, Politics and the 
State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in the Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, 
edited by D. Trottier and C. Fuchs, 88– 106. New York: Routledge.
Gallagher, S. 2012. ‘High Orbits and Slowlorises: Understanding the Anonymous Attack Tools’. Ars 
Technica, 17 February. Accessed July 2017. http:// arstechnica.com/ business/ news/ 2012/ 02/ 
high- orbits- and- slowlorises- understanding- the- anonymous- attack- tools.ars
Herwig, J. 2011. ‘The Archive as the Repertoire: Mediated and Embodied Practice on Imageboard 
4chan.Org’. Minds and Matter: Paraflows 10 Symposius. Accessed July 2017. http:// homepage.
univie.ac.at/ jana.herwig/ PDF/ Herwig_ Jana_ 4chan_ Archive_ Repertoire_ 2011.pdf
Lee, T. B. 2011. ‘LulzSec Spokesman in Court after Police Find 750k Passwords on His PC’. Ars 
Technica, August. Accessed July 2017. http:// arstechnica.com/ tech- policy/ news/ 2011/ 08/ 
lulzsec- spokesman- in- court- after- police- find- 750k- passwords- on- his- pc.ars
Poulsen, K. 2011. ‘Hacktivists Scorch PBS in Retaliation for WikiLeaks Documentary’. WIRED, 
30 May. Accessed July 2017. https:// www.wired.com/ 2011/ 05/ lulzsec/ 
Rheingold, H. 2000. The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press.
Rogers, R. 2009. ‘Post- Demographic Machines’. In Walled Garden, edited by A. Dekker and 
A. Wolfsberger, 29– 39. Amsterdam: Virtueel Platform.
Schulz, W. 2004. ‘Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept’. European Journal of 



























Conclusion: ambiguities of accommodation, resistance  
and rebellion
Jan Kubik
Bourdieu, P. 1991. ‘On Symbolic Power’. In Language and Symbolic Power, edited and intro-
duced by John B. Thompson. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson, 163– 70. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Havel, V. 1991. Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvizdala. New York: Vintage.
Ho, W.- C. 2011. ‘James Scott’s Resistance/ Hegemony Paradigm Reconsidered’. Acta Politica 
46(1) 43– 59.
Ortner, S. B. 1995. ‘Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal’. Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 37(1): 173– 93.
Scott, J. C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak:  Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven:  Yale 
University Press.
Scott, J. C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance:  Hidden Transcripts. New Haven:  Yale 
University Press.
Spivak, G. C. 1988. ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, 
edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271– 313. Urbana:  University of 
Illinois Press.
Wedeen, L. 1999. Ambiguities of Domination. Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. 












Concluding remarks to Volume 1: 
what is old and what is new in the 
dialectic of ‘us’ and ‘them’?
Zygmunt Bauman
University of Leeds, UK
The division of humans into ‘us’ and ‘them’  – their juxtaposition and 
antagonism – has played an essential role in human existence throughout 
history of the human species. ‘Us’ and ‘them’ are as related as heads and 
tails – two faces of the same coin (and a coin with but one face is a contra-
diction in terms). The history of Homo sapiens may be written as the 
story of successive extensions of the volume of ‘us’ – integrated human 
groups – from the primitive horde of hunter- gatherers that would have 
included in the notion of ‘us’ no more than 150 members, to the ‘imag-
ined community’ of the modern nation- state. It may also be written – and 
so far, indeed, has been written – as the story of ‘them’ against whomever 
groups, of whatever size, consolidate. Indeed, the idea of being ‘one of 
us’ derives its meaning primarily from ‘not being one of them’, and only 
secondarily from being ‘unlike them’.
As the great Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik Barth convincingly 
argued (Barth 1969), borders are not drawn in order to separate differ-
ences. Rather, differences are searched for, found or invented in order to 
legitimise and fortify (preferably to the point of non- permeability) bor-
ders that have already been drawn or that are intended to be drawn. The 
snag is that in most and perhaps all such cases, fully and truly airtight, 
leak- proof and impassable non- porous borders are both logically and 
practically unachievable. Borders create not only ‘us’ and ‘them’, but also 
bring into being, well- nigh inevitably, a cognitive and behavioural ‘grey 
zone’ of conceptual ambiguity and ethical/ axiological ambivalence; an 
area reminiscent of the territories marked on ancient maps as ‘hic sunt 
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for that reason, incommunicable. As Ludwig Wittgenstein put it, ‘If lions 
could speak, we wouldn’t understand them’ (Wittgenstein 1953).
As for the residents of (or exiles to) the grey frontier zones, the con-
dition of ‘being unknown and therefore menacing’ is the effect of their 
inherent or imputed resistance to and eluding of assignment to any of the 
cognitive categories that serve as building blocks of ‘order’ and ‘normal-
ity’. Their cardinal sin or unforgivable crime consists of being the cause 
of the mental and pragmatic incapacitation that follows the behavioural 
confusion that they cannot but generate (Wittgenstein defined under-
standing as ‘knowing how to go on’ (Wittgenstein 1980)).
Moreover, that sin or crime presents formidable obstacles to 
redemption, given the stout refusal of ‘us’ to engage with ‘them’ in a dia-
logue aimed at defying and mitigating the initial impossibility of under-
standing them. The assignment to a grey zone is a self- propelling and 
self- intensifying process that is set in motion and driven not so much 
by a breakdown of communication but rather by an a priori refusal to 
communicate. Raising the difficulty of understanding to the rank of a 
moral injunction and duty predetermined by God or history is, after all, 
the prime cause of and paramount stimulus to drawing and fortifying, 
mostly (though not exclusively) along religious or ethnic lines, borders 
separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. As the interface between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the 
grey zone of ambiguity and ambivalence inevitably constitutes the main, 
and all too often the only, territory on which the implacable hostilities 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are played out and the battles are fought.
As described so far, the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dialectic is a constant of 
the human condition. However, it also contains historical, time- bound 
variables as the game of self- identification and separation (or, to be pre-
cise, the game of separation because of self- identification and the game 
of self- identification through separation) confronts new issues and chal-
lenges posed by changing techniques of domination and technologies of 
social action.
One such challenge has been the need to shape a replica of the 
orthodox, territorial form of separation inside cyberspace. The Internet 
is notorious for creating the freedom to ignore border posts and to cross 
frontiers. This challenge has been met: contrary to many a hopeful prog-
nosis, the near- universal 24/ 7 availability of access to instant commu-
nication regardless of geographical distance has not abolished limits 
and off- bounds information. On the contrary, it has facilitated mental 
separation and non- communication to a degree unattainable either in 
off- line parts of the universe or in the Lebenswelte (the world ‘as lived’) 
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Research into the practices deployed by a great majority of Internet 
users – the DIY ‘comfort zones’, ‘echo chambers’ or ‘mirror halls’ easily 
constructed on line by the simple expedient of nipping communication 
in its bud – finds that they are more effective at creating and sustaining 
separation than even the most refined technologies of ‘gated communi-
ties’, state- installed frontier walls, barbed wire and heavily armed border 
patrols.
The challenge of the on line version of separation described here 
acquires yet graver importance from its coincidence with another chal-
lenge – arguably the most seminal and hardest to meet in the long history 
of the human species. That challenge is an unprecedented link in the long 
chain of expansions in the volume and reach of socio- political integration 
(and so, in effect, of the segments of humanity included in the idea of 
‘us’). It is unprecedented because all previous levels of integration – from 
the primitive horde to the nation- state – were reached through the use of 
the same interplay of inclusion and exclusion: integration of ‘us’ coupled 
with separation from a shared enemy, the resented and assumedly hos-
tile ‘them’.
The next leap in the history of expanding integration will  – 
if indeed it ever happens  – have to take place without the clutch of 
a shared enemy, of new divisions, new separations and new walls 
needed to accommodate (indeed, to give meaning to) the unity of an 
expanded ‘us’. In our globalised world of universal interdependence 
we are all already cast, as Ulrich Beck insisted, in a ‘cosmopolitan situ-
ation’ (Beck 2006). However, we have not as yet embarked in earnest 
on the long and rocky road leading to the acquisition of its essential 
complement:  cosmopolitan consciousness, awareness and mindset. 
And no wonder:  those prospective ‘us’ embracing, as they must, for 
the first time in human history, the whole of humanity, will need to 
acquire such consciousness without help from our enemy:  a shared 
enemy, legitimising and demanding the solidarity of all of ‘us’. Is this, 
with its concomitants such as an end to the grey zone of ambiguity and 
ambivalence, at all possible? Is it, indeed, conceivable? To become a 
realistic proposition, this will require no less than a renegotiation and 
replacement of the thousands- of- years- old, deeply ingrained human 
mode of being- in- the- world.
That incompatibility of means and ends is arguably the gravest, 
most intractable and potentially the most menacing manifestation of 
the present- day ‘instrumental crisis’, justifying the view of the current 
planetary condition as one of ‘interregnum’, defined by Antonio Gramsci 
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collective action have stopped working properly, while new ones, ade-
quate to the changed conditions, are at best still on the drawing board 
(Gramsci 1971).
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Adat (North Caucasus, Russia): system of Chechen customary laws and 
norms practised in the North Caucasus among ethnic Vainakh and 
the diaspora.
Agashka (Kazakhstan): an influential figure with strong personal 
connections; a patron.
Aidagara (Japan): social networks in Japan.
Alga aploksnē (Latvia): lit. ‘salary in an envelope’, arrangement 
whereby an employee receives the legal minimum salary officially, 
and the remainder in cash, enabling the employer to avoid social 
insurance contributions.
Allegados (Chile): poor families who live in a single room in a relative’s 
house without paying rent.
Amici, amigos (Mediterranean and Latin America): social actors 
involved in a relationship of instrumental friendship.
Aploksne/ aploksnīte (Latvia): lit. ‘envelope’, unofficial payments made 
to doctors and (less frequently) public officials for services they are 
required to provide by law.
Artistic repossession (general – totalitarian regimes): artists ‘reclaiming’ 
control over their work in totalitarian regimes by manipulating the 
restrictions imposed on them by the state.
Astroturfing (USA, UK): the attempt to create an impression of 
widespread grassroots support for a policy, individual or product, 
where little such support exists.
Avos’ (Russia): a ‘lackadaisical’ attitude to chance in the world, used in 
both economic and non- economic contexts.
Azganvan popokhutyun (Armenian diaspora): surname change by 
ethnic Armenians living in Georgia, usually for reasons of ethnic 
identity.
Baksheesh (Middle East, North Africa and sub- continental 
Asia): facilitation payment made to officials, etc.
Bapakism (Indonesia): Javanese culture of patriarchy; refers to being the 







Barakholka (Kazakhstan): pejorative term for an outdoor, open- air flea 
market where second- hand goods are bought and sold.
Barone universitario (Italy): literally ‘barons’, academics holding 
powerful positions who influence decisions in universities, 
especially with regard to academic appointments.
Benāmi (India): in Hindu law, a transaction or property made or held 
under a fictitious name or that of a third party, who acts as a ‘front’ 
owner on behalf of the real owner.
Biombo (Costa Rica): an illegal payment made to a medical professional 
in exchange for providing preferential treatment to a patient or a 
patient’s family within the state- funded health care system.
Birzha (Georgia): group of male teenagers or young men who meet 
regularly in open spaces (squares, courtyards, street corners).
Bitcoin (general): peer- to- peer electronic currency system.
Blat (Romania): fee- dodging, match- fixing, illicit activity.
Blat (Russia and former Soviet Union): getting things done through 
personal contacts, ‘pulling strings’ or the exchange of favours.
Boda- boda taxis (Uganda): informal motorcycle taxis.
Brodiazhnichestvo (Russia): term for vagrancy used to legislate 
against persons engaging in dissent, forbidden trades, private 
entrepreneurial activity or speculation in the Soviet Union.
Brokerage (general): flow of valued resources from one actor to another 
via an intermediary.
Budženje (Serbia): jerry- building, cobbling together, jury- rigging or 
bodging carried out on houses, cars and household and electrical 
objects.
Buôn có bạn, bán có phường (Vietnam): informal vendors’ associations 
in Vietnam.
Bustarella (Italy): lit. ‘little envelope’, euphemism for a bribe.
Caffè sospeso (Naples, Italy): lit. ‘suspended coffee,’ forward paying for 
a cup of coffee for a future customer.
Campamento (Chile): informal urban settlements which typically lack 
at least one of the three basic services (electricity, drinking water 
and sewage system).
Cash for access (UK): British politicians/ political parties receiving 
payment to provide access to influential individuals, usually with 
the aim of lobbying.
Cash in hand (general): a business taking payment for goods or services 
by cash, usually for a lower price than other forms of payment, so 






Character assassination (general): deliberate and sustained effort to 
damage the reputation or credibility of an individual.
Chelnoki (Russia and former Soviet Union): small traders who resell 
goods purchased abroad, normally in China.
Chernukha (Russia): use of the public media instrumentally in order to 
damage an opponent’s reputation.
Chir (Chechnya, Igushetia): blood feud/ blood revenge.
Chơ ̣ cóc (Vietnam): lit. ‘toad markets’; informal markets in socialist 
Vietnam.
Chorizo (Latin America): lit. ‘sausage’, euphemism for corruption/ 
corrupt acts by government officials.
Coima (Argentina): euphemism for a petty bribe.
Compadrazgo (Chile): system of exchanges of favours within an 
ideology of friendship.
Cyberattacks by semi state actors (general): attacks on political 
opponents using semi- state actors to exploit computer systems and 
disrupt data, hosts or networks.
Dacha (Russia): out- of- town dwelling and plot of land for intermittent 
use by urbanites.
Dalali (India): brokerage.
Dangou/Dango (Japan): bid- fixing in supposedly competitive tenders.
Dash (Nigeria and other West African countries): ubiquitous tip that 
can also serve as a facilitation payment to a public servant.
Deryban (Ukraine and Russia): the expropriation and informal sharing 
of state property among private actors.
Dirt book (UK): record of compromising information on Members of 
Parliament (MPs) held by party whips to ensure voting discipline.
Dizelaši (Serbia): 1990s’ youth subculture also involved in fuel 
smuggling resulting from the wartime fuel shortage.
Dzhinsa (Russia): media article or report, often paid, which is staged or 
created on purpose in order to promote a certain idea, individual or 
company.
Egunje (Nigeria): involuntary ‘gift’ extorted from the giver by a corrupt 
official.
Esusu (Nigeria): informal community- based savings scheme.
Externe Personen (Germany): private sector individuals working in the 
German civil service.
Fakelaki (Greece): infamous envelopes of money given for such diverse 






Favela (Brazil): slum in urban Brazil.
Fimi media (Croatia): siphoning off state funds, embezzlement.
Flipping (UK): British Members of Parliament (MPs) manipulating 
the classification of their ‘second home’ to maximise expenses 
claims.
Futbolna frakcia (Bulgaria): gangs of football supporters that have their 
own symbols, rituals, etc.
Gap (Uzbekistan): informal get- togethers over dinner by groups of 
people, usually of the same age, enabling them to socialise and 
share information, and sometimes also operating a rotating 
savings fund.
Gestión (Mexico): negotiating access to public goods or services in a 
private manner.
Goudui and yingchou (China): ways entrepreneurs form informal ties 
with state officials – through banqueting, karaoke, brothels, etc.
Graffiti (general): street art, unsolicited markings on property not 
owned by oneself, usually in a public space.
Guanxi (China): personal or social connections to get things done, 
acquire a scarce commodity, or gain access to an opportunity.
Hacktivism (general): the commission of computer crimes to further 
political or social ends.
Hawala (Middle East, India and Pakistan): informal system of money 
exchange prevalent throughout South Asia and the Middle East.
Hongbao (China): handing over informal payments disguised as a gift.
Hyvä Veli (Finland): interpersonal network associated with favouritism.
Informal mining (general): ‘off- the- books’ mining around the world.
Inmaek (South Korea): lit. ‘people entangled like a vine’, network of 
social ties and relationships developed in the course of one’s life.
Insider trading (general): trading of shares, bonds, etc. by individuals 
with access to non- public information about companies related to 
the sale.
Jaan- pehchaan (India): facilitation of business by exchange of favours.
Jangmadang (North Korea): unofficial markets in North Korea, from 
physical markets with small- time traders to de facto private 
businesses run by state officials, operating under the guise and 
licences of state- socialism.
Janteloven/Jantelagen (Scandinavia): set of norms embodied 
in informal practices that confer negative attitudes towards 
individuality, individual self- expression and measures of success.
Jeitinho (Brazil): seeking personal favours by cajoling, sweet- talking and 





Jinmyaku (Japan): personal connections of vital importance in 
business, politics and aspects of day- to- day life.
Jugaad (India): ways of solving problems with limited resources or by 
getting a round formal constraints.
Kalym (Russia) moonlighting and/ or using company tools or vehicles to 
undertake private work.
Kanonieri qurdebi (Georgia): ‘thieves- in- law’, professional criminals 
who have elite status in the organised crime environment.
Kastom (Solomon Islands and Melanesia): the assertion of traditional 
values and cultural practices in a modern context.
Keiretsu (Japan): Japanese system of corporate governance in which 
firms are interlinked.
Khokkeynaya diplomatiya (Russia): utilising amateur ice hockey for the 
development of personal, business and government relationships.
Klüngel (Cologne, Germany): the exchange of favours among friends 
and acquaintances in political and business settings in Cologne.
Kolesiostwo (Poland): a non- market exchange of favours between 
friends and colleagues restricted to the professional sphere.
Kombinacja (Poland): bending rules to access resources, scheming to 
earn money and acquire opportunities.
Kompromat (Russia): compromising materials used to control or exert 
power over others.
Korapsen (Papua New Guinea): euphemism for corruption in Papua 
New Guinea, but with distinctive local connotations.
Kormlenie (Russian Empire): lit. ‘feeding’, the practice in pre- modern 
Russia of maintaining local officials at the expense of those they 
governed.
Kraken (The Netherlands): living in – or using otherwise – a dwelling 
without the consent of its owner.
Krugovaia poruka (Russia and Europe): collective responsibility or 
irresponsibility (cover-up).
Krysha (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus): lit. ‘roof’, individuals or organisations 
providing a range of services, predominantly illicit, ranging 
from protection and patronage to enforcement of contracts and 
settlement of disputes.
Kula (Tanzania): lit. ‘eating’, gaining access to resources to satisfy 
needs, often a euphemism for corruption.
Kumoterstwo (Poland): mutual exchange of favours, especially for 
relatives, friends or colleagues.
Kumstvo (Montenegro and Balkans): godparenthood; an informal 




relations and useful contacts for parents and improve life chances 
for the newborn.
Kupona (Kosovo): non- registration of transactions or not printing 
receipts for the purpose of tax avoidance.
Kuratory (Russia, Ukraine): representatives of political power in a 
corporate setting.
L’argent du carburant (sub- Saharan Africa): a metaphor designating a 
small sum of money given to customs officials.
Loteria / Lloteria (Albania): private lottery scheme/ collective savings 
scheme.
Mafia Raj (India): criminal power networks.
Magharich’ (Armenia): traditional gift- giving practice in Armenian 
culture, which in more modern times has also become a 
euphemism for a bribe.
Magnitizdat (USSR): re- recording and distributing uncensored 
speeches or music on cassette tapes in the USSR.
Mahallah (Uzbekistan): Islamic local governance groupings; also 
community- based, informal economic and welfare practices.
Materit’sya (Russia): category of obscene language.
Mateship (Australia): friendship links/ loyalty to friends (generally 
male).
Mita (Gabor Roma, Romania): a multifunctional cash gift among the 
Gabor Roma.
Mordida (Mexico): lit. ‘to bite’, euphemism for a bribe or backhander.
Mukhayyam (OPT): informal dwelling – refugee camps in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories.
Nachbarschaftshilfe (Germany and German-speaking countries): lit. 
‘neighbourhood watch’ acts of mutual assistance and support 
in times of crisis usually involving no payment; cover for illegal 
earnings.
Nash chelovek (Russia): ‘our person’, one of us.
Natsnoboba (Georgia): informal contacts and networks.
No-entry (India): a deed of sale of land, which has been signed by a 
notary, but without paying tax or being registered by the Land 
authorities.
Normalnye patsany (Russia): members of urban street gangs.
Obshchak (Russia): informal welfare system in penal and criminal 
communities.







Old-boy network (UK): members of a network arising from membership 
of the alumni of a prestigious school or college.
Old corruption (UK): system of sinecures in eighteenth- and nineteenth- 
century British political system.
Omertà (Italy): unwritten code of keeping silent about crimes or 
deviant acts, particularly those perpetrated by mafia groups.
Otkat (Russia): diversion of part of the money allocated for a purchase 
to the person responsible for the purchase; equivalent of the 
English term ‘kickback’.
Paid favours (UK): acts of one- to- one material help within wider 
kinship, friendship and neighbourly networks that are reimbursed 
with money.
Pabrčiti/ Pabirčenje (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Hertzegovina):  
gleaning, collection of grains that are left over in the field after 
harvest.
Padonki (Russia): Slang Internet language used by Russian speakers.
Padrino system/balimbing (Philippines): network of symbiotic 
relationships between a patron (godfather or godmother) and 
a  client (godchild) within the context of Catholic values and 
interpersonal bonds.
Pantouflage (France): practice of leaving a civil service position, 
typically on secondment, to obtain work in the private sector.
Parteibuchwirtschaft’ (Austria and Germany): informal distribution 
of jobs, material goods and distinctions based on memberships or 
links to a particular political party.
Pituto (Chile): use of connections to gain some advantage (commonly a 
job), regardless of merit.
Political machinery (USA): informal means of organising political 
parties in urban centres in the USA in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.
Pomochi (Russia): an occasion of collective helping, for free, of a 
member of a Russian village to complete a large task.
Pork barrelling (USA): in politics, securing preferential funds for a local 
project paid for out of the national budget.
Potemkin villages (USSR): a façade built to deceive or to hide an 
undesirable fact or condition.
Pozornost’/ d’akovné/ Všimné (Slovakia): expressing gratitude for official 
or unofficial services, typically by means of a small gift or sum of 
money; can also be a euphemism for a bribe.







Psikhushka (USSR and Russian Federation): use of psychiatric services 
as means of controlling and repressing political opponents.
Pulling strings (UK/USA): using useful connections to secure 
preferential treatment or access to services/ information.
Pyramind schemes (general): operators recruiting unsuspecting 
investors with promise of high returns.
Quàn jiǔ (China): toasting people as a means of building 
relationships.
Raccomandazione (Italy): lit. ‘recommendation’ or ‘reference’, the use 
of social connections in order to get things done, especially in the 
context of patron– client relations.
Rad  na  crno (Serbia): lit. ‘black labour’, payment for jobs that are not 
officially registered or that are only partially reported to the state 
authorities.
Reiderstvo (Russia and former Soviet Union): corporate raiding by 
illegal, semi- legal or unethical means.
Repetitorstvo (Russia and FSU): supplementary private tutoring.
Rod- re (Thailand): mobile street vendors in Bangkok.
Roentgenizdat (USSR): unofficial production of records on discarded 
X- rays.
Rushyldyq (Kazakhstan): loyalty to and use of extended kinship ties; 
‘clanism’.
S vrutka (Bulgaria): lit. ‘with a twist’, practice of bending the rules and 
pulling strings in order to achieve a goal.
Sadghegrdzelo (Georgia): Georgian word for ‘toast’, which follows a 
generally uniform, yet not entirely fixed, structure at a festive meal 
(supra).
Salam credit (Afghanistan): informal agricultural credit system for 
poppy farmers.
Samizdat (USSR): reproduction of censored and underground 
publications by hand, passed from reader to reader.
Samogonovarenie (Russia): the distilling of homemade spirits (samogon).
Schwarzwohnen (GDR): lit. ‘black living’, the illegal occupation of 
accommodation in the German Democratic Republic.
Seilschaft (Germany): lit. ‘rope alliances’, cronyism in career promotion 
in business and politics.
Shebeen (South Africa): illicit establishment serving alcohol, 
particularly to black Africans under apartheid.
Shpargalka (Russia): crib sheets to cheat in an examination, often 
tolerated by examiners.





Sitwa (Poland): informal networks within public authorities; ‘amoral 
familism’.
Skipping (general): urban foraging technique involving collecting 
objects or food items from the waste.
Small- scale smuggling (general): bending or subverting the rules of 
goods transportation across national borders.
Smotryashchie/alt. kuratory (Russia, Ukraine): functionaries looking 
after certain interests (state, oligarchic or regional).
Sociolismo (Cuba): the use of social networks to obtain goods and 
services in short supply to circumvent state rationing and the 
inefficiencies of the command economy.
Songbun (North Korea): socio- political classification system, according 
to which every North Korean citizen is assigned a class status on 
the basis of their perceived loyalty to the regime.
Songli (China): gift- giving as a form of social exchange and developing 
network relations.
Sosyudad (Philippines): informal savings and lending scheme.
Spaza (South Africa): small informal grocery shop operated from 
residential premises in townships.
Squatting (general): informally settling on vacant land or occupying 
abandoned buildings.
Štela (Bosnia and Hertzegovina): use of contacts/ informal connections 
to obtain goods or services.
Stoyanshik (Georgia): person that watches over cars parked in public 
spaces; an informal parking attendant/ guard.
Stróman (Hungary): someone acting on behalf of someone else, such as 
a ‘front’ owner or chief executive officer (CEO) of a company.
Švercovanje (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro): 
fare- dodging on public transport.
Tal/alt. taljenje, taliti, utaliti, rastaliti (Serbia and countries of former 
Yugoslavia): an agreement between parties to combine their 
resources for financial gain, often via illegal means.
Tamozhennye l’goty (Russia): excise privileges for the importation 
of alcohol and tobacco excise- free, extracted from the state by 
charitable foundations in the 1990s.
Tandas and Cundinas (Mexico and South-Western USA): rotating credit 
associations.
Tangentopoli (Italy): system of political corruption in Italy based on 
kickbacks, which culminated in a judicial investigation leading to 
the demise of the so- called First Republic.







Tapş (Azerbaijan): obtaining favours on behalf of others, typically 
through network connections.
Tazkia (Iraqi Kurdistan): letter of support based on party political 
membership, which grants members exclusive access to positions 
within the public service sector.
Telefonnoe pravo (Russia): oral commands, informal influence and 
pressure of the executive on judiciary.
Torpil (Turkey): use of connections to find private solutions to the 
problems faced when dealing with bureaucracy.
Trafika (Czech Republic): assigning a fellow politician to an office in a 
state- owned company in return for their support.
Tsartsaani nüüdel (Mongolia): a distinctly Mongolian type of 
population movement that is arranged before an election in order 
to influence its outcome.
Uhljeb (Croatia): person who became a public administration employee 
through a nepotistic relationship or a political party affiliation 
and does not usually possess the required qualifications for that 
position.
Uruuchuluk (Kyrgyzstan): lineage- based identity that shapes how the 
Kyrgyz construe their social world and the extent and quality of 
their relations with others.
Vay mượn (Vietnam): form of informal loan.
Verlan (France): French slang formed by changing the order of syllables.
Vertical crowdsourcing (Russia): digital technologies harnessed by 
the state to create semblance of openness, while in practice 
neutralising citizens’ activity and exerting control.
Vetterliwirtschaft/ Copinage (Switzerland): lit. network of little cousins, 
providing mutual favours or preferential treatment.
Veza (Serbia): lit. ‘connection’, the use of informal contacts in order to 
obtain access to opportunities that are not available through formal 
channels.
Vitamin B (Germany): use of networks to obtain benefits, enabling 
favouritism.
Vrski (Macedonia): use of personal connections to obtain goods and 
services.
Vruzki (Bulgaria): connections or ties used for social exchange of 
favours, similar to pulling strings.
Vzaimozachety (Russia): Russian term meaning ‘mutual exchange in 
kind’, and referring to a specific type of inter- firm transactions, 







Vzyatkoemkost’ (Russia): in a narrow sense, the potential of a piece of 
legislation to create opportunities for bribery; in a broader sense, 
a legal framework that grants state officials discretionary power to 
extort bribes, obedience or other forms of benefits.
Wantoks (Solomon Islands, Melanesia): informal clan- based 
expectations of welfare and monetary support resulting in 
overheads for businesses and nepotism in politics.
Wastā (Middle East, North Africa): the deployment of intermediation 
on behalf of an individual or a group to secure some benefit that 
would be otherwise unobtainable or too burdensome.
Window dressing (general): the deliberately misleading manipulation of 
a company’s income statement and balance sheet in order to create 
a falsely attractive image and thereby conceal poor performance or 
monetary losses.
Yingchou (China): making informal ties in business through 
banqueting, karaoke, brothels, etc.
Yongo (South Korea): personal or network connections resulting from 
strong particularistic ties based on kin, educational institution, and 
region.
Yonjul (South Korea): informal ties between people who are members 
of a social network oriented towards a certain goal.
Zakaznoe bankrotstvo (Russia): lit. ‘bankruptcy to order’, use of 
loopholes in bankruptcy law to launch hostile takeover.
Zalatwianie (Poland): getting something done in an easier way, a 
euphemism describing a range of informal behaviours carried 
out mostly to obtain benefits by avoiding the use of arduous legal 
activities or formal rules.
Zarobitchanstvo (Ukraine): earnings made through labour migration, 
both internal and external.
Zersetzung (GDR): term used by the East German secret police to 
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